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This thesis aspires to establish a new research direction in STS. In the first
chapter a literature review is conducted and the research questions are being
formulated. The second chapter is devoted to presenting research findings
from the archaeological, biological and brain sciences in a unified form. The
various stone tool technologies are analysed, and a brief introduction follows
into human evolution and the effects that artefacts had on it; then recent
neurobiological research on the deeper relationships between consciousness,
artefacts and the brain is presented. In the third chapter, after an introduc-
tion in the deeper neurological relationships between language and gestures,
a gestural analysis of mathematical speech follows, based on visual data gen-
erated from an interview with a working mathematician; the last section
examines recent research on gesture and mathematics as special cases of Ro-
man Ingarden’s aesthetic theory. In the fourth chapter, four approaches to
the social history of mathematics in the USSR are presented, based on data
generated from interviews with former professional Soviet mathematicians.
Following a Maussian approach, the Soviet mathematical community is pre-
sented as a gift economy of scientific articles. Then, in line with a Marxian
approach, the Soviet university mathematical school is presented as a fac-
tory with its own mode of self-production. In the following section, based
on a Parsonian systemic approach, the Soviet mathematical community is
presented as a banking system, with the scientific journals as the banking
institutions. In the next section of the fourth chapter, following a Weberian
approach, the mathematical community in the USSR is presented as a social
estate, as separate and distinct from other Soviet social estates. The final sec-
tion integrates the previous approaches and presents the Soviet mathematics
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research community as a modern version of an ancient city-state. In the fifth
chapter Hilbert spaces are briefly presented, as an example of the fictional
universe of modern mathematics, along with some conjectured differences
between Soviet and Western mathematics research. In the final chapter, the
conclusions of this research project are summarised, and this thesis is pre-




To Olga for her patience and love.
4
Acknowledgements
It is always a pleasure to thank people in writing: verba volant, scripta
manent.
This thesis would have been impossible without my two supervisors, Donald
MacKenzie and Alex Preda. Their contribution was indispensable, and they
are wonderful role models both as social scientists, and as supervisors. I
would like to thank them both for their guidance, for their patience, and for
their genuine interest in my transformation into a social scientist proper; I
was a blind man when I first met them.
I would like, additionally, to thank both of the examiners of my viva, Tim
Johnson, and Robin Williams. Their suggestions, in fact, proved to be fun-
damental for the completion of my thesis. I wish I could have more of their
advice in the future.
I was also lucky to meet many talented people during my PhD who also
had a direct or indirect impact on me. Javier Hernandez stunned me with
his profound knowledge: he is, practically speaking, a walking encyclopedia
in sociology and anthropology. Michael Barany directed my attention to
Derrida and his différance and Yu-Hsiang Chen made me turn my reading to
Weber: I have to admit that I felt myself philosophically and sociologically an
illiterate man when I first met them. Laur Kanger made me appreciate the
value of social theory. Meritxell Ramı́rez-Ollé challenged me and my theories
many times with her clever comments and astute observations. Taylor Spears
is a perfect example of a modern Renaissance Man with his broad background
in sociology, economics, mathematics, and computing. Friedrich Eierdanz
5
had many interesting ideas on middle range theory, which I had never thought
about before.
I would like also to thank my wife and best friend, Olga Ilina, for her support
and help: she helped me understand fundamental principles of accounting
which were important for my thesis. She has been my continuous inspiration
and my modern muse.
I would like to thank the STIS research unit of the University of Edinburgh
for their generous support and hospitality, and the ESRC for funding my
research project with the studentship ES/H019952/1.
Last, but not least, many thanks go to the Institute of Academic Develop-
ment of the University of Edinburgh: I attended many of their seminars and
workshops, and especially those on startups and entrepreneurship were very
inspirational for my thesis.
6
Contents
1 Opening the Stage 9
1.1 The Bloorean Charter of New Sociology . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 Reinventing the Socially Constructed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Scientific Knowledge and its Discontents . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4 The Imaginative Lives of Scientific Others . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5 Spelling Out The Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2 The Spectre of Artefacts 41
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 The Rise of Artefacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3 The Revolution and Convolution of Evolution . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4 O Mind, Where Art Thou? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.5 The Rise of the Social Constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3 When the Mind Talks to the Hand 85
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2 The Movement of the Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.3 The Faces of a Generic Polynomial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7
3.4 A Multitude of Worlds in Everyday Life . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4 The Banks are Always to Blame 157
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.2 The Gifts of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
4.3 Value and its Spacetime of Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
4.4 Banking Mathematical Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
4.5 The Estates of the Soviet Realm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
4.6 Modern City-State or Post-Modern Nation-State? . . . . . . . 239
5 Material Theorems - Phantasmatic Proofs 255
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
5.2 The Artefactuality of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
5.3 Counting Infinity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
5.4 Keeping Distances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
5.5 Straight Line Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
5.6 The Pure and the Applied Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
6 Mathematics in Perspective 313
6.1 Theoretical Origins and Empirical Investigations . . . . . . . . 313
6.2 Mathematics as Applied Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
6.3 Scaling Up the Enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321





1.1 The Bloorean Charter of New Sociology
David Bloor is, most probably, known as a major proponent of the new, at
the time, wave in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), after Robert
Merton’s original research programme in the sociology of science. SSK came
to be interested more in the interactions between human cognition, scientific
practice, and societal influences. More accurately, SSK researchers started
developing a more ethnographic approach to scientific cognition, leaving aside
theoretical approaches of a philosophically defined type of knowledge. Bloor
aspired “for a conception of the natural world as morally empty and neu-
tral” [54, p. 9]. In the same way, in other words, that a primatologist would
study nonhuman primates without focussing on moral issues with respect to
nonhuman primate social groupings, Bloor proposed a primatology of hu-
man scientists. Instead, though, of simply observing a human primate social
group of scientists, a sociologist, that is, a behavioral biologist of human pri-
mates, would approach his or her subjects as an ethnographer, that is, as a
human primate studying his or her conspecifics, or rather as an intra-species
participant observer.
Bloor called for a revision of Merton’s social-research imperatives, and called
his revised research-imperatives the Strong Programme in SSK. Since the
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sociologists of scientific knowledge were now primatologists, or rather behav-
ioral biologists, they had to resort to natural causality explanatory claims, as
physicists, chemists, and biologists would do, adding to these the causality
claims of their own field, that is, social-cultural explanations: this was the
causality research imperative. Moreover, the Strong Programme should ad-
here to an impartiality research imperative “with respect to truth and falsity,
rationality or irrationality, success or failure” [p. 7]. True knowledge, rational-
ity, or success were, in this view, social constructions, and it would, therefore,
be pointless to treat them in a different fashion from false knowledge, irra-
tionality, or failure, or any other social construction. The symmetry research
imperative would dictate the same causality narratives both for successful
and unsuccessful types of scientific knowledge, that is, the social researcher
could not invoke specific sociological explanations for specific fields of scien-
tific knowledge; common underlying explanations, rather, both for successful
and unsuccessful claims to knowledge should be proposed as explanation
narratives. The reflexivity research imperative would make visible the fact
that the intra-species participant observer would not escape his or her own
socially constructed scientific claims.
There was, however, another research imperative, or rather a crypto-impera-
tive, which seems to have eluded Bloor, and, in general, is being ignored in the
relevant literature. In Bloor’s opinion, SSK had met with strong resistance
within the scientific community because
[s]cience is sacred, so it must be kept apart. It is . . . “reified” or
“mystified”. This protects it from pollution which would destroy
its efficacy, authority and strength as a source of knowledge [p. 49–
50].
Scientific knowledge, in other words, is part of the social imaginary, that is,
the unconscious mirror image of society itself, and SSK was apparently set to
demystify and profane it extensively. David Bloor’s fifth research imperative
of the Strong Programme was, in fact, a call for a (continuous and repeated)
secularization of science, or rather, for a linguistification of the sacred :
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The aura of rapture and terror that emanates from the sacred,
the spellbinding power of the [scientific] holy, is sublimated into
the [social] binding/bonding force of criticizable [scientific] validity
claims and at the same time turned into an everyday occurrence
[198, p. 77, italics in the original].
Scientific knowledge, as the unconscious mirror image of the (scientific) so-
ciety itself,
provides a channel through which our simplified social ideologies
make contact with our theories of knowledge. It is these ideologies
rather than the totality of our real social experience which might
be expected to control and structure our theories of knowledge
[54, p. 53].
The Strong Programme, as a research programme of linguistification of the
scientific sacred, would assist sociologists in separating and isolating the ide-
ological part from the scientific part of the various theories of knowledge
dominant at the time. Ideology, though, has proved quite resistant to em-
pirical analysis, and hard to penetrate scientifically, and separate it from the
surrounding reality. Ideology
in its basic dimension it is a fantasy-construction which serves as
a support for our ‘reality’ itself: an ‘illusion’ which structures our
effective, real social relations and thereby masks some insupport-
able, real, impossible kernel [477, p. 45].
What would that “insupportable, real kernel” be that ideology would mask?
In the case of science, there seems to be a possible candidate for that im-
possibility: the proverbial gap in the literature. Every scientific publication
asserts, sometimes implicitly, but more often explicitly, to be “filling a gap
in the literature.” But scientists have been filling this proverbial gap for, at
least, over two centuries; this gap is still being filled without any pause what-
soever, and, quite probably, it will continue to be filled for quite some time in
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the distant future. This gap in the literature “awaiting to be filled” seems, in
fact, to be the hard core of the official, or unofficial, scientific meta-narrative,
that is, the shared narrative embracing all the local narratives that each sci-
entific field generates, and the grand narrative of all science that mobilises
the scientific community into scientific social action.
David Bloor decided to break down and space out all the components of the
scientific sacred by laying afresh the claim of “filling the gap in the litera-
ture”, generating, thus, a “new gap to be filled,” espousing, in this way, the
scientific meta-narrative itself of his time. In other words, Bloor proposed
an alternative ideological surrogate; by attempting to linguistify the scien-
tific sacred, he created a new sacred, a new necessary illusion, a new false
consciousness. Ideology, in other words, is not simply false consciousness,
as the popular view has it;1 [human] consciousness, rather, is false anyway,
and scientific consciousness is no exception. Bloor, in other words, swapped
one ideological component for another. From the moment that consciousness
is false anyway, the concept of fantasy jumps into the scene in a rather un-
expected way, as the white knight championing a new scientific era. If, in
other words, we identify ideology with fantasy, and if we assume that what
is left to scientists is the choice of one fantasy over another, then another
view of scientific activity emerges out of the smokescreen of “modern post-
modernist” interpretations of culture. The defining characteristic of scientific
activity, that is, the [once again] proverbial scientific consensus, becomes the
convergence principle of divergent social-phantasmatic apparatuses.
1.2 Reinventing the Socially Constructed
David Bloor, in fact, was a contributor to a more general trend in the social
sciences, to what, actually, came to be generically called the social construc-
tion of reality. The term was first popularised in the social sciences by Berger
& Luckman [45],2 almost a decade before Bloor’s first major publication, al-
1See for example [134, p. 1–32].
2For a history of social constructionism in the social sciences and the humanities see
[296]; see also [199].
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though Bloor himself never used the term. The main ideas behind the social
construction of reality are basically two:
(a) the central assumption that people make sense of experience
by constructing a model of the social world and how it works and
(b) the emphasis on language as the most important system
through which reality is constructed [277, p. 892].
Social groups, in other words, continuously perform (mainly linguistic) “at-
tempts to construct, maintain, repair, and transform [social] reality” [80,
p. 24], and these attempts are being influenced by culture and social institu-
tions.
Two more trends of social constructionism have also been present in social
research. One is discursive constructionsim, influenced mainly by the work
of Michel Foucault:
For Foucault, it is discourse that shapes the social world . . .Language
provides us with the tools to express meaning and therefore shapes
how we may do so, whereas discourse, at least as Foucault uses
the term, relates to the regulation of the content of what we say.
[141, p. 11, emphasis in the original].
The other trend, which Bloor espoused, is knowledge constructionism:
[K]nowledge for the sociologist is whatever people take to be
knowledge. It consists of those beliefs which people confidently
hold to and live by. In particular the sociologist will be concerned
with beliefs which are taken for granted or institutionalised, or in-
vested with authority by groups of people . . . [We reserve though]
the word ‘knowledge’ for what is collectively endorsed, leaving
the individual and idiosyncratic to count as mere belief [54, p. 5].
Bloor’s social constructionism, in other words, consists in renaming collective
belief, or collectively believed facts, as knowledge, and the sociology of scien-
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tific knowledge is, actually, the sociological study of the collective scientific
beliefs (and practices) of the various communities of science.
A major question to be raised by a natural scientist, or rather a behavioral bi-
ologist, would refer to the biological possibility of social constructions. How
is it biologically possible, in other words, to socially construct realities in
human social groups, that can be so varied and diverse, as many anthropo-
logical studies have repeatedly demonstrated? The second chapter of this
thesis attempts to answer exactly that in two successive steps. In the first
place, the major difference between the Homo biological genus and the rest
of the animal kingdom is the systematic use of artefacts. The only difference,
in other words, between humans, Neandertals, Homo erectus, and so on, and
the rest of the mammals, as well as the non mammals, is the construction
of artefacts. Artefacts, in fact, were a major cognitive leap in biological
evolution, and this leap was the result of the interaction between the ecolog-
ical environment of the long past of 2–3 million years ago, and the bodily
anatomy of the Homo species. This evolutionary leap has been reflected in
the differences between the neural substratums of the modern human brain
and the brain of modern nonhuman primates, in spite of the fact that all
the modern primates share a common evolutionary ancestor, and, therefore,
they should share a brain of the same evolutionary origins.
The second chapter, in addition, attempts to answer another more inter-
esting question: how the Homo sapiens species differs from the other Homo
species, since the proliferation of Homo sapiens material culture has been un-
precedented. In order to answer that question, the author has reversed the
common definitions of a “modern society.” The usual definitions of moder-
nity in the social sciences start from today’s society, and then go on to
define societies that precede or, especially those that, come after the modern
ones: societies of “postmodernity”, societies of “late modernity”, societies of
“fluid modernity”, societies of “multiple modernity”, and so on. A lay person
would be most probably led to think of two questions. After two or five
hundred years, are the sociologists of the future going to start talking about
“post-post modernity”, or “post-late modernity”, or “late-late modernity”, or
maybe “late-post modernity” and so on? This question demonstrates the
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cumbersome character of attempting to identify modern society in terms of
its temporary character in the long historical time. The second question,
which in fact is an observation, has to do with sociologists themselves, or at
least a group of social theorists: they seem to rush to define the historical
period of their time, like a teenager who is impatient in acquiring general
recognition: definition of a certain historical era comes about usually by the
generations of the future historians, one or two hundred years later. Sociolo-
gists of modernity seem to have confused current social trends with historical
ones: currency of events is only transient, while their historicity spans at least
half a century.
In this thesis, modernity, following the current biological research threads, is
defined as the historical period that Homo sapiens appeared, a period marked
with the concomitant appearance of cave art, dance, music, mythology, mod-
ern language, and so on. In this period, the main social activity moved from
artefact construction to the emergence of the social imaginary, rendering the
artefacts simply the material traces of the social imaginary. The social imag-
inary is the transcendental reality that made social constructions possible,
and as a result sociology that does not deal with the social imaginary, is
simply ethology, that is, behavioral biology. It is attempted, in other words,
in this thesis, to have the research objectives of the social sciences redefined,
and then continue with proceeding to a more specialised study of a partic-
ular socially constructed activity, that of mathematical research. The social
imaginary rendered the modern human societies to become social (animal)
groupings of gigantic proportions, both in population and geographical size.
In spite, though, of the unprecedented high rate in modern technological in-
novation, societies still have remained rather backward, according to today’s
“Western” standards. The social imaginary does not change that fast, as
technological innovation seems to delude us into believing, and in the end of
the day, the so-called, or rather self-styled, modern/advanced societies are
only about a sixth of the world’s population.
The study of the social imaginary calls forth a new entity, or rather a new
social agent: that of imagination, and its relation to the artefact. Following
Bernard Stiegler, any stone tool is in fact a prosthesis :
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By pros-thesis [sic], we understand (1) set in front, or spatializa-
tion (de-severance [sic]); (2) set in advance, already there (past)
and anticipation (foresight), that is, temporalization . . . The pros-
thesis is not a mere extension of the human body; it is the consti-
tution of this body qua “human” (the quotation marks belong to
the constitution). It is not a “means” for the human but its end,
and we know the essential equivocity of this expression: “the end
of the human [i.e. Homo sapiens ]” [is the artefact] [421, p. 152–
153].
The stone tool, in other words, marks the appearance of time, that is, a
before, and an after the construction of the tool, as well as a before, and an
after its use. A tool marks the Homo cognitive abilities of hindsight, that is,
remembering how a tool has been constructed in the past while it is absent
at present, and that of foresight, that is, the end result of construction, while
it is still absent from the present. Systematic construction of a stone tool,
in other words, increases to a great degree the cognitive load of the brain.
The stone tool, more specifically, acquires imaginary locomotion, and the
movement of hands towards constructing it is simply the visible aspect of it.
Imaginary locomotion is, in fact, another term for Homo imagination as
an act of Homo-species consciousness. Following Jean-Paul Sartre’s phe-
nomenology of the imaginary, artefact-imagination has four basic character-
istics. The first is that “the [artefact-]image is a consciousness [itself]”:
We thought [. . . ] that the image was in consciousness and that
the object of the image was in the image. We depicted conscious-
ness as a place peopled with small imitations and these imitations
were the [artefact-]images. Without any doubt, the origin of this
illusion must be sought in our habit of thinking in space and in
terms of space. I will call it: the illusion of immanence [401, p. 5,
italics in the original].
The mental image of the past artefact to be a construction model, as well
as the mental image of the future artefact to be constructed, are not in our
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heads, as the common wisdom has it, but they constitute a new transcen-
dental vision, as our third eye, which is itself the imaginary reality being
sustained from the recent past while being projected onto the imminent fu-
ture.
The second characteristic of artefact-imagination is the appearance of the
“phenomenon of quasi-observation”:
Our attitude in relation to the object of the [artefact-]image could
be called “quasi-observation”. We are, indeed, placed in the atti-
tude of observation, but it is an observation that does not teach
anything [401, p. 10, italics in the original].
When observing a stone tool in front of me, I see it only partially, and slowly
I acquire a view of all its sides; during each moment of observation, though, I
always have only a partial view of it. When I am constructing the stone tool,
on the other hand, I am observing the (imaginary) stone tools of the recently
visited past, as well as the intended (imaginary) tool of the soon-to-be-visited
future, comparing them with the (material) stone tool under construction,
and accordingly I continue with knapping the stone core: observation of the
past tool, as well as of the future tool, are in fact, quasi-observations, not
real ones. Although quasi-observation is, actually, observation of imaginary
objects, there is still the impression that the real material stone core under
hand processing is the same as the imaginary stone tools both of the past
and of the future used as models of the end-product.
The third characteristic is that “the [artefact-]imaging consciousness posits
its object as nothingness”:
in vain we seek by our conduct towards the object to give rise
to the belief that it really exists; we can ignore for a second, but
cannot destroy the immediate consciousness of its nothingness
[401, p. 14, italics in the original].
Imagination simply points to material nothingness : our imaginary objects,
which are right in front of us, and we can use phantom, or rather imagined,
17
body and hands to touch them, are simply nowhere to be found, never to be
discovered; our imagined stone tools of the past and the future, absent from
the present, have gone beyond space and time, yet they are so closely visible
to us. Still, despite their nothingness, imaginary artefacts display the fourth
characteristic of “spontaneity”:
A perceptual consciousness appears to itself as passive. On the
other hand, an [artefact-]imaging consciousness gives itself to it-
self as . . . a spontaneity that produces and conserves the object
as imaged . . . The consciousness appears to itself as creative, but
without positing as object this creative character [401, p. 14, my
italics].
Since stone tools spanned at least two million years, and most probably tool
construction from materials less resistant to time must have preceded it, it
is almost certain that the construction skills were picked up, for example,
by observing3 older members in a Homo band society, or by having the
technique shown by a more competent group member: modern humans, and
therefore their evolutionary Homo ancestors are born with the ability to
construct stone tools, in general, but social processes sustain and preserve
the specificity of each stone tool. Members of many spider species, on the
other hand, are born with the ability to create cobwebs, and there is no
social process regulating the specificity of each web: every species creates its
own distinct webs, and each individual of a species creates the same cobweb
pattern as any other individual of the same species. In fact, Marx himself
mentioned this human ability in his attempt to differentiate human labour
from animal behaviour:
A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver,
and a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the
construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the
worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds
the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end
3That is social-observational learning.
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of every labour process, a result emerges which had already been
conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed
ideally [310, p. 284].
Stone tool construction, in other words, was already social among Homo
members if the same group, and the materiality of the tool, that is, its pub-
licly available visibility, was sparking the spontaneity of the social imaginary
of the group.
While perception, in other words, is passive, imagination is active, “sponta-
neous”, and creates its own objects out of a material nothingness. It could
be very well argued that a stone tool is a precursor to symbolism, that is,
the semiotic ability of the Homo genus: instead of using a stone tool just for
cutting flesh, in the hands of an individual of a Homo species the selfsame
tool can be used as a territorial mark, or even as a talisman protecting its
owner from evil spirits.4 Whereas the (materially) symbolic function seems,
indeed, to be peculiar to the Homo species, without the imaginary there can
be no symbolism whatsoever:
the imaginary has to use the symbolic not only to ‘express’ it-
self (this is self-evident), but to ‘exist’, to pass from the virtual
to anything more than this. [. . . ] But, conversely, symbolism too
presupposes an imaginary capacity. For it presupposes the ca-
pacity to see in a thing what it is not, to see it other than it is.
[84, p. 127].
In this thesis, in other words, there is limited reference to the social construc-
tion of reality; one of its main underlying themes, instead, is the social in-
vention of (mathematical) reality. Construction of reality, as a phrase, would
invoke an imagery of a construction site, in which the activities of the partici-
pants, that is, engineers, builders, architects, and so on, follow a more general
preset plan. The invention of reality, on the contrary, promotes a view of sci-
ence in which there is no general plan to be followed by the participants, that
4Talismans, in particular, are considered to have been constructed only by Homo sapi-
ens.
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is, the mathematicians; the mathematicians, rather, take research initiatives,
and the whole scientific edifice is the result of each individual imagination,
while mathematical proof is the practice-medium of coordinating the imagi-
native socio-technical interventions into a common social reality. While the
social construction approach presents scientists as following a general preset
plan of construction, the social invention approach, proposed in this thesis,
presents social reality as the result of scientists’ research initiatives. This ap-
proach, in other words, promotes a view of mathematics not as a science, but
as a community of artists whose social reality is coordinated by mathematical
proof.
1.3 Scientific Knowledge and its Discontents
Barry Barnes was working alongside Bloor and developing SSK from another
viewpoint. Drawing on Habermas (see [197]), Barnes claimed that the inter-
ests of scientists dictate the directions of scientific knowledge, even though
scientists themselves might deny such an influence:
the ‘disinterested evaluation’ of knowledge is in most contexts a
harmless enough formulation, which can be taken as practically
equivalent to ‘evaluation in terms of an authentic interest in pre-
diction and control’. [32, p. 91].
Donald MacKenzie picked up on this viewpoint, as an explanatory narrative
in a scientific dispute between two statisticians, Pearson and Yule, that arose
at the turn of the nineteenth century in Britain:
these different cognitive interests arose from the different problem
situations of a statistician whose primary commitment was to a
research programme in eugenics and a statistician who lacked any
such strong specific commitment; and finally, that eugenics itself
embodied the social interests of a specific sector of British society,
and not those of other sectors. Thus differing social interests can
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be seen as entering indirectly, through the ‘mediation’ of eugenics,
into the development of statistical theory in Britain [301, p. 71].
Cognitive interests can, indeed, be considered social constructions;5 MacKen-
zie though, in his narrative, continued to view mathematical statistics, rather
than mathematics itself, as a transcendental and absolute reality, indepen-
dent of the mathematicians themselves: this thesis will attempt to bring this
view into revision.
Harry Collins, another early proponent of SSK, rejected Bloor’s causality
and reflexivity research imperatives, but kept the symmetry and impartiality
imperatives (see [100, p. 216]). Collins, on the other hand, proposed the
Empirical Programme of Relativism, which would consist of three stages :
(1) revealing the inevitable openness or interpretative flexibility
of scientific results;
(2) examining the social processes that are employed to close de-
bates over results;
(3) investigating the connection between these processes and so-
cial forces beyond the immediate community of scientists [472,
p. 29].
Collins’s research agenda could have, very well, included one of the most
debated issues in the history of modern mathematics: set theory, and the
introduction of infinity. As we will briefly see in chapter 5, transfinite num-
bers met with fierce opposition, and their acceptance became wider after
Hilbert’s official endorsement: the acceptance or not of the infinity became
a major controversy at the end of the nineteenth century, because both the
introduction of infinity, as well as its abandonment were acceptable as math-
ematical realities; mathematical reality could be interpreted, in other words,
both ways. Later on, infinity led to standard methodologies in mathematics,
and today there is no widespread dispute over it in the mathematical com-
munity. Acceptance, rather, of mathematical infinity has simplified many
5Habermas went even deeper: interests, in his theory, were unconscious, and (Freudean)
psychoanalysis had to be employed to “liberate” the individual from these.
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methodologies. There have been some efforts to develop mathematics by
dropping the concept of infinity, such as nonstandard analysis, but these have
remained rather marginal curiosities, than widespread practices. Although
Collins himself never conducted any sociological study on mathematics, his
empirical programme of relativism could indeed prove useful in studying,
for example, the controversy over the acceptance or rejection of transfinite
numbers in mathematics at the turn of the nineteenth century, and how this
was solved by later international conferences and research practices. Still,
though, he never considered the social imaginary as a social agent, and never
tried to document the relationship between materiality and imagination.
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, in one of their early sociological studies of
science, attempted to study the “construction of scientific facts” in a scientific
laboratory:
From their initial inception members of the laboratory are unable
to determine whether statements are true or false, objective or
subjective, highly likely or quite probable . . . Once the statement
begins to stabilise, however, an important change takes place.
The statement becomes a split entity. On the one hand, it is a set
of [sound or written] words which represents a statement about
an [imaginary] object. On the other hand, it corresponds to an
[imaginary] object in itself which takes on a life of its own. It
is as if the original statement had projected a virtual image of
itself which exists outside the statement [268, p. 176, italics in
the original].
We can see in Latour’s and Woolgar’s account that the scientific statement
acquires temporary imaginary locomotion in a rather subtle and impercep-
tible way: the imaginary object detaches itself from the (material scientific)
statement, and starts living “a life of its own”. This is typical of Latour’s
style, a style of sociological magical realism:
One of the unique features of magical realism is its reliance upon
the reader to follow the example of the narrator in accepting both
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realistic and magical perspectives of reality on the same level. It
relies upon the full acceptance of the veracity of the fiction during
the reading experience, no matter how different this perspective
may be to the reader’s nonreading opinions and judgements [61,
p. 3–4].
Latour’s magical realism was his way of describing the imaginary locomo-
tion of artefacts; in this thesis, the same will be demonstrated by capturing,
though, the hand gestures of a mathematician during his mathematical de-
scriptions.
One of Bloor’s main aims in his strong programme was to establish the
possibility of an alternative mathematics: in his first major publication he
attempted to establish that there can be an alternative mathematics, and he
tried to demonstrate that ancient Greek mathematics, especially the version
of the Pythagorean secret society of philosophers, were indeed an alternative
one (see [54, p. 118–125]). While Bloor’s earnestness cannot be doubted, he
did miss some important points. The first was that we are not in a position
any more to judge as scientists as to how alternative was the mathematics of
ancient Greece: only a genuine ethnographic research could reveal the social
imaginary underlying the material reading of numbers, whether rational, or
irrational such as
√
2; modern mathematics has been irreversibly socially con-
taminated by the ancient Greek version of it. Another more important point
he could have emphasised more was the inventiveness of the mathematicians
themselves to reverse the reality of mathematics and mathematical practice,
an example of which is the so called “noncommutative geometry”.
During the author’s first master’s course in mathematics, he stumbled upon
what has come to be called “noncommutative” [or sometimes “quantum”]
mathematics. An algebra in mathematics is an algebraic ring with the oper-
ations of addition and multiplication, over an algebraic field. In more simple
terms, an algebra is a vector space with an extra multiplication operation
defined among its vectors. The algebraic ring, for example, of n×n matrices
is an algebra over the fields of real or complex numbers. The algebraic ring of
continuous, or measurable, (real or complex) functions is an algebra over the
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(real or complex) numbers. While, though, the algebra of continuous, as well
as that of measurable, functions is commutative, that is, when multiplied
they commute (fg = gf), the algebra of n× n matrices is noncommutative,
that is, the matrices do not commute (AB 6= BA). The most studied non-
commutative algebras are the operator algebras, that is, algebras of “infinite”
matrices, whose applications are mainly in quantum physics. C* 6 algebras,
in particular, are, usually operator, algebras with a norm, that is, in rough
terms, a modulus function, so as to define limits on it.7
A special theorem, the Gelfand-Naimark theorem, states, in simple terms,
that any commutative C* algebra A is isometrically ∗-isomorphic to the
C* algebra C0(X) 8 for some locally compact Hausdorff space X; if X is a
compact Hausdorff space, then C0(X) is simply C(X), that is, the (Hilbert)
space of continuous functions on X. Leaving aside the technicalities, there
is an important conceptual result involved in this theorem: the “isometri-
cally ∗-isomorphic” means that the Hausdorff space X of the theorem is
unique, and many important topological properties of X correspond to cer-
tain corresponding algebraic properties of A. In other words “all topological
information about X is stored algebraically” in the algebra A [455, p. 24,
italics in the original]. The question, now that arises, and started to arise
after the publication of the Gelfand-Naimark theorem, is what happens when
we have a noncommutative C* algebra to deal with, such as the algebra of
the complex n × n matrices? The Gelfand-Naimark theorem refers only to
commutative ones. The answer given by the community of mathematicians
is that a noncommutative C* algebra should “logically” correspond to a “non-
commutative locally compact Hausdorff space”, whose set-theoretic, that is
point-, representation we simply do not know. In simple terms, noncom-
mutative topological spaces are “point-less”, that is, we cannot draw any
graphs of functions on them. The corresponding noncommutative measure
spaces, for example, are the von Neumann algebras,9 and there is a whole
6Pronounced C-star.
7Denoted by ‖A‖, and pronounced “norm of A”.
8That is, the space of complex functions vanishing at infinity, and defined on X.
9See [432, Vol. II].
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field of noncommutative probability theory and stochastic integration,10 as
well as, noncommutative ergodic theory, dynamical systems, and differential
(Riemannian) geometry.11
Noncommutative mathematics is indeed an alternative, and quite revolution-
ary one could say, mathematics that rendered, in fact, the foundational set
theory, redundant, and promoted a new calculus with different and more
refined types of infinitesimals: the usual (Newton-Leibniz) infinitesimals are
the compact operators in a infinite-dimensional separable Hilbert space, plus
additional types of infinitesimals of many different orders (see [105, p. 26]).
Due to the fact that the commutator of two elements A,B of a noncommuta-
tive algebra M is a nonzero element of M, that is [A,B] = AB−BA 6= OM,
noncomutative mathematics is referred to, sometimes, as quantum mathe-
matics, because the nonzero commutator is the basis of the Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle in quantum physics: the C* algebra of n× n matrices
is, in other words, a quantum topological space.
The example of noncommutative mathematics demonstrates, in the author’s
opinion, that Bloor’s alternative mathematics can be found within mod-
ern mathematics itself, as it reinvents itself: there is no need to speculate
as to the resourcefulness of mathematicians themselves. Mathematical cre-
ativity, in general has been ignored by the sociology of mathematics, that
is, mathematics as an artistic genre. Donald MacKenzie, for example, has
conducted a comparative study of proof in mathematics and in computer
programming [303]. Although MacKenzie provides a convincing account of
“informal proofs” among mathematicians as compared to “formal” and au-
tomated proofs conducted by computer programs, he still missed, in the
author’s opinion, the creative process of mathematical creativity in the in-
vention and formulation of a proof. Even a computer program that compu-
tationally proves a certain class of mathematical theorems has to be invented
by the programmer himself or herself.
Reviel Netz, on the other hand, [340] has focussed on the particular ma-
teriality of mathematical proof in ancient Greek mathematics: the lettered
10See [324, 352].
11See [432, Vol. III], and [105].
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diagram. The lettered diagrams, according to Netz,
– in the specific way they are used in Greek mathematics – are
the Greek mathematical way of tapping human visual cognitive
resources. [Moreover] Greek mathematical language is a way of
tapping human linguistic cognitive resources. These tools are
then combined in specific ways. The tools, and their modes of
combination, are the cognitive method. [340, p. 6].
While human mathematicians, in other words, use the materiality of their
surrounding, and possibly artificially modified, ecosystem, such as lettered
diagrams, computers, on the contrary, conduct automated proofs with the
use of materiality provided to them by the programmers, that is, electrical
signals. In other words, both the mathematical proofs, as well as the au-
tomated proofs have as their agents the humans.12 The human agency of
mathematical, as well as, automated proofs, is possible only because of the
mathematicians’ imagination: there is, in other words, a deeper relationship
between mathematical proof, and the subject of proof and the material re-
sources for proving which have been left out of sociological empirical research.
The view of material resources employed in proving a theorem was taken up
by Eric Livingstone who approached mathematical proof from ethnomethod-
ology’s point of view [293]. Livingston’s approach
formulates and, in a certain sense, solves the problem of the foun-
dations of mathematics as a problem in the local production of
social order [293, p. x].
Livingston takes up Gödel’s theorem and attempts to connect the written
formulation of a mathematical proof to the imaginary reality of the proof by
speaking
of the intrinsically tied pair the-material-proof /the-practices-of-
proving- to-which-that-proof-is-irremediably-tied [sic] [293, p. 145].
12At least as along as there is no artificial intelligence yet.
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In this way he refers to a “material proof” as “as the achievement of a prover’s
lived-work”, in a similar way that a written musical score is a musician’s live
performance. This view is taken up, as well, in this thesis, by focusing on
what happens when the usual technical materiality employed in a proof,
such as paper, pencil , and formulas, or chalk, blackboard, and diagrams,
is missing; when, in other words, the more “natural” materiality of hand
gestures takes up the role of “proving by explaining the proof”.
Sal Restivo has developed a very interesting viewpoint, quite similar to some
aspects of this thesis. Social organisation over objectivity, according to
Restivo, is concreted over by two permanent everyday processes:
Total immersion in, commitment to, and subordination to an or-
ganization, institution, or community undermines objectivity –
even if the organization, institution, or community is oriented
to goals of “discovery and explanation”. On the other hand, an
extremely weak coupling between individual and collectivity will
isolate the self and undermine the ability of the individual to
communicate with others. Striking a “balance” between these
extremes in the interest of objectivity leads to some form of an-
archistic (mutual aid) system [382, p. 132].
The creativity of the individual scientist is, in fact, the act of “striking this
particular balance” between social isolation and group membership which
leads to a more anarchistic organisation of science: the scientific enterprise is
basically devolved from the state, that is, from a state authority, and mainly
decentralised from an internal central authority, and its operations expand
as the result of the initiatives that each individual scientist takes (see also
Restivo’s more recent book on scientific anarchism [383]). Pure mathemat-
ics, in Restivo’s view, is then the mathematics of a large group of scientists
which has been institutionally insulated from other groups of a society, have
become internally differentiated and “form a community oriented inwardly
and develop a set of community ideals” [382, p. 138]. He mentions, as an ex-
ample, that ancient Greek mathematics was the result of the social processes
of public discourse in Athenian democracy, while the Babylonian culture, al-
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though they had scribes with very good algebraic knowledge, never developed
a theorem-proving culture similar to the Greek one. Mathematical proof, in
other words, according to Restivo, becomes a Greek proof proper, rather
than a Babylonian one, when it is being exposed to the public criticisms of
an audience, and the authority of the individual prover becomes irrelevant,
and therefore, invisible.
1.4 The Imaginative Lives of Scientific Others
Bettina Heintz, in her doctoral dissertation, has presented some interesting
results on the sociology of mathematics. She notes, quite early in the text,
that
[i]n contrast to other disciplines, which disintegrate into various
and partial contradictory theories, the edifice of mathematics is
still being formed as an interconnected whole. In view of the
enormous specialisation, [. . . ] this [scientific] coherence is by no
means natural. Mathematics is a collective product, but not cen-
trally coordinated. There is no authority that would take care of
matching individual [scientific] results [210, p. 19, my translation].
She does note, though that there are still new connections being “discovered”,
and new theories being proposed which cross over fields, the most striking ex-
ample of which has been Alain Conne’s noncommutative geometry research
initiative,13 which has involved operator algebras, algebraic geometry, dif-
ferential topology, Riemannian geometry, category theory, and homological
algebra, all fields once separated and largely unknown to mathematicians
outside of each one of these fields. Although Heintz touched upon the idea
of scientific [creative] anarchism as an organising principle of science, which
Restivo has recently proposed [383], she fell short by insisting on the inflexible
scientific consensus among mathematicians:
13Heintz does not mention this; she dealt mostly in her book with algebraic topologists.
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[i]n contrast to other sciences, it seems that there is no interpre-
tative flexibility in mathematics. The inferences of mathematics
are conclusive. Anyone who holds on to the rules of mathematical
methods will reach the [self]same results [210, p. 20, my transla-
tion].
Heintz, in the end, concludes that “[m]odern mathematics is marked by fea-
tures which hardly allow any room for sociological analysis” [210, p. 274, my
translation]. Although that, of course, is what many non-mathematicians
might think, it is a conclusion undermined by continuous innovations in
mathematics; and these innovations, in fact, do not involve mathematical
proof itself, but new mathematical entities which override the inflexibility of
previous proofs. The most characteristic example, in this case, is Rieman-
nian geometry. While Euclidean, and non-Euclidean geometries were sep-
arate disciplines during most of the ninteenth century, Bernhard Riemann
unified them under the two mathematical concepts of the geodesic on a sur-
face, that is, the curve that connects two points on a surface with the shortest
distance, and the [Riemannian] metric, that is, the “rule” of measuring the
distance through a curve. Einstein picked up on this new geometry named
after Riemann, at the beginning of the twentieth century, and formulated
his general theory of relativity, a new theory of mechanics that rendered
Newtonian, and, later on, Hamiltonian, mechanics special cases of relativity
theory, that is, special cases in mathematical terms, not in physical terms.
In terms of physics it was indeed a scientific revolution which made Ein-
stein, overnight, into a media superstar; in terms of mathematics, though,
Newtonian mechanics became an undergraduate research assignment.
Heintz ends up in the conclusion that mathematics is not amenable to socio-
logical analysis because, in the author’s opinion (and this in general happens
with the sociology of mathematics) mathematics is an “abstract”, that is a
highly imaginative, discipline and the sociologists with a deeper understand-
ing of it are very few. It has been noticed, some thirteen years ago, by
MacKenzie, that “the sociology of mathematics is sparse by comparison with
the sociology of the natural sciences” [303, p. 2]. The situation today has
not changed much. The idea of today’s mathematicians as modern shamans,
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proposed in this thesis, intends to promote the difficulty of an outsider to be
initiated to the shamans’ spirit world, the “blindness” that a social researcher
suffers from, when attempting to “go native”. What is exactly Einstein’s
general theory of relativity? It is a special case of Riemannian, or rather
semi-Riemannian, geometry, or is it a groundbreaking gravitational theory?
Is noncommutative probability a generalisation of probability, or is it func-
tional analysis “at large”. Moreover, how can a social scientist answer to these
questions, when he or she is not himself or herself a trained mathematician?
An if he or she is, indeed, a trained mathematician, to what extent must he
or she be trained: to an undergraduate level? To a postgraduate level? Or
to a postdoctoral level with a few mathematical publications in his or her
portfolio?
A very interesting answer to these emerging questions has been provided by
Peter Galison, who, in his historical study of high energy theoretical and
experimental physics, asserted that
in focusing on local coordination, not global meaning, I think
one can understand the way engineers, experimenters, and the-
orists interact. At last I come to the connection between place,
exchange, and knowledge production. But instead of looking at
laboratories simply as the place where experimental information
and strategies are generated, my concern is with the site –partly
symbolic and partly spatial– where the local coordination be-
tween beliefs and action takes place. It is as domain I will call
the trading zone [162, p. 782, my italics]
Galison was interested in how the experimental physicists were communi-
cating with the theoretical ones: the former were using mostly images from
experimental measurements, the latter were mostly focused on the mathe-
matical aspects. He proposed, as a result, the metaphor of the trading zones
which are very common in the trading practices among landowners and peas-
ants in the southern Cauco valley of Colombia:
For the landowners, money is “neutral” and has a variety of natu-
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ral properties; for example, it can accumulate into capital –money
begets money. For the peasants, funds obtained in certain ways
have intention, purpose, and moral properties. [. . . ] So when we
narrow our gaze to the peasant buying eggs in a landowner’s shop
we may see two people harmoniously exchanging items. [. . . ] Out
of our narrow view, however, are two vastly different symbolic and
cultural systems, embedding two incompatible valuations and un-
derstandings of the objects exchanged [162, p. 804].
Galison, in other words, talked about different social imaginaries, whose point
of contact was located on the common intersection of these imaginaries which
is sparked by the common trading practices between peasants and landown-
ers. The important aspect of the trading zones, for this thesis, is the ma-
teriality of the practices: the moving bodies of the exchanging agents are
mutually visible during the trading, the money and products are mutually
visible while being exchanged 14, and, in general, the whole social activity
of this exchange is mutually visible while taking place and can be mutually
recalled, later on, in a conversation between the exchanging parties. Mate-
riality, or rather moving materiality, in other words, creates a local material
public sphere, which coordinates the social activity, and sparks a common
local imaginary between the exchanging agents. Materiality, in other words,
acts as a router in a computer network: although one computer can have
installed MS Windows operating system, and another one Mac OS operat-
ing system, two operating systems incompatible with each other, when they
are being connected through a Cisco router, the operating system of which
is Cisco IOS and is different from both MS Windows and Mac OS, both
the MS Windows and the Mac OS can perfectly communicate with each
other through the router without any problem whatsoever; they both share
a common communication protocol with the router. Material practices, in
other words, are the (network) routers between (otherwise incompatible) so-
cial imaginaries. This human ability, that is, the sparking of a local social
imaginary by material practices is a Homo sapiens ability, not shared by
any other animal species. Material practices, in other words, are, in fact,
14Even in a credit/debit card transaction the card itself is visible
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the material traces of the locally overarching social imaginary; and the most
often neglected material social practice is the social practice of human sound
language, and not simply human language.
In addition, Harry Collins and Robert Evans, in proposing a new direction,
a “Third Wave”, in the STS discipline, have tried “to shift the focus of the
epistemology-like discussion from truth to expertise and experience” [101,
p. 236]. They divide expertise into three broad categories:
1. No Expertise: That is the degree of expertise with which the
fieldworker sets out; it is insufficient to conduct a sociological
analysis or do quasi-participatory fieldwork;
2. Interactional Expertise: This means enough expertise to inter-
act meaningfully with participants and carry out a sociological
analysis;
3. Contributory Expertise: This means enough expertise to con-
tribute to the science of the field being analysed; [101, p. 254].
Although there are many research objectives shared by Collins & Evans’ re-
search proposals and the present thesis, the main difference lies in language
and its definition. While Collins and Evans implicitly accept the definition of
language as the human ability to speak about, for example, science without
going into further detail, this thesis espouses the current implicit consensus
in archaeology that language speaking, artefact construction and, quite pos-
sibly, hand gesturing are material expressions of one unified cognitive ability
that could be called, anew, human language.
The second chapter initiates, in fact, the reader into the relevant archaeo-
logical, biological, and cognitive research literature, in order to demonstrate
that empirical research in the social imaginaries is not only lacking, but also
a new research imperative has to be observed. Expertise and experience, in
other words, are embedded in the social imaginary, and in this thesis this
is demonstrated in two ways: the first, presented in the third chapter, is
the conduct of gesture analysis as a material, that is, visible to the social
researcher, evidence of the phantasmatic support of mathematical discourse;
moreover, it is demonstrated, in the fourth chapter, that in the Soviet case,
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mathematics was organised as a gift economy, a type of economic organisation
that is still latent and alive even in modern science. Reformulating Collins
and Evans’ categorisation in this thesis’s terminology, interactional expertise
would mean the ability to observe, but not to participate economically in, a
certain expertise group, while contributory expertise would be the capacity
to donate, and thus to participate economically in, the practices of a certain
scientific expertise group. Separating expertise from its imaginary dimen-
sions is not only artificial, but also rather detrimental to scientific research,
because it presents a limited view of science by cutting off its phantasmatic
dimension. Let us not forget the phantasmatic dimension of money: we do
not eat money, we do not drink money, we do not dress ourselves in money;
yet we are made happy by money, we are ready to engage into a fight for
money, and we get anxious about money. What moves societies forward (or
backward), as a general rule, is not its material culture, but the phantasmatic
support of that culture.
An example of exploring the phantasmatic support of a scientific theory has
been offered in Loren Graham and Jean-Michel Kantor’s monograph on pre-
revolutionary Russian mathematics: they present a history of set theory in
pre-revolutionary Russia, emphasising the social-imaginary aspect of math-
ematics [183]. Descriptive set theory in mathematics 15 is an intellectually
demanding subject: it deals with analytic and coanalytic sets, which are infi-
nite and quite difficult to handle.16. According to Graham & Kantor, nascent
research on descriptive set theory in France, a major mathematical centre in
the beginning of the 20th century, was becoming something close to a disap-
pointment. When the theory reached the scientists of imperial Russia, it was
welcomed by those involved in a mystical religious movement, still alive even
today, which had been, and still is, condemned as heretical by the Russian
Orthodox Church: Imiaslavie or Onomatodoxy, that is, Name-Worshipping.
The main idea behind Name-Worshipping is that (the Christian) God, was
the same as his name when pronounced, a religious practice which, according
to Graham & Kantor enhanced mathematical creativity:
15Different and more advanced from Cantor’s (also called naive) original set theory.
16For a modern mathematical treatment of analytic and coanalytic sets see [235, p. 85–
87]
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While the French were constrained by their rationalism, the Rus-
sians were energized by their mystical faith. Just as the Russian
Name Worshippers could “name God,” they could also “name in-
finities,” and they saw a strong analogy in the ways in which
both operations were accomplished. A comparison of the pre-
dominant French and Russian attitudes toward set theory illus-
trates an interesting aspect of science: if science becomes too
cut-and-dried, too rationalistic, this can slow down its adherents,
impeding imaginative leaps. [183, p. 190].
Today descriptive set theory is used in other mathematical fields such as op-
erator algebras and (noncommutative) ergodic theory, fields which are very
demanding, even for postgraduates under supervision. Today, in other words,
there are more refined and more enriched versions of infinity in modern math-
ematics, than those proposed by Cantor at the end of the nineteenth century.
The mathematicians, though, specialising in operator algebras, or in (non-
commutative) ergodic theory, as well, as in other fields, still need imagination
to approach these phantasmatic scientific realities, yet the descriptive arte-
facts of these realities available are only mathematical formulas. The fifth
chapter is devoted to a similar mathematical subject: Hilbert spaces, that
is, infinite-dimensional mathematical imaginary entities, which are of funda-
mental importance in developing mathematical models for modern quantum
physics.
In conclusion, this thesis started out to answer two questions: How is math-
ematics possible? How was Soviet mathematics possible? A widespread
purview is that mathematics is something given and taught from a very
early age in a pupil’s career, and therefore there is no question posed in the
first place: “mathematics has to do with numbers”, is the usual view, incul-
cated in lay perception, as well as circulating in social science circles. The
author, having being a postgraduate student of mathematics himself, has
always been dissatisfied with this kind of lay perception, especially among
practitioners in the social sciences; in the end of the day the perception that
“mathematics has to do with numbers and figures” is a high school pupil’s
perception, and, therefore, not appropriate for a social scientist. Moreover,
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influenced by the ancient Greek geometry and its methodologies of proof, an-
other stereotype of mathematics has become prevalent among philosophers
and social scientists of science: “mathematics is the science [and maybe the
craft as well] of proof”. One of the objectives, therefore, of this thesis is to
promote a more balanced perception of mathematics, and demonstrate that
modern mathematics has very little to do with the usual lay perception of
a number, and proof is only an incidental, rather than an essential part of
modern mathematics.
As to the question of Soviet mathematics, another view is prevalent among
historians of science and of mathematics: “Soviet mathematics is Andrei Kol-
mogorov, and Andrei Kolmogorov is Soviet mathematics”, neglecting always
the simple practical fact that only one person could never have proved on
his own thousands and thousands of mathematical theorems of major impor-
tance. Most of the available literature on the history of Soviet mathematics
is in fact a hagiography of Kolmogorov, as if after Kolmogorov’s death all of
the Soviet mathematical research had come to a complete halt. This view
has been adopted by most of the members of the community of the former
Soviet mathematicians as well, due to a certain institutional and personal
modesty on their part. Soviet mathematicians have always disregarded their
own contributions in favour of Kolmogorov’s, not without a reason though:
in practical terms he did set, in most of the cases on his own, the institutional
foundations of mathematics research in the Soviet Union. Still, without Kol-
mogorov’s intellectual descendants, all of his edifice, and efforts, would have
become dust in the winds of time and history. Kolmogorov’s descendants not
only preserved his vision alive, but they themselves expanded it to unprece-
dented proportions: the author thinks that both them, and the rest of the
world need to become aware of this.
1.5 Spelling Out The Questions
This particular thesis is scheduled to be the first in a series of future research,
as a an imperative call to return to Talcott Parsons. Parsons was originally
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known to the author by social rumour, rather than by personal study of
his theories; until one day he stumbled upon The American University, one
of Parsons’s last books. When, in particular, the author started reading a
chapter mentioning the inflation and deflation of scientific knowledge, calling
the universities banking institutions, and the university professors as their
fiduciaries, the author was simply and genuinely flabbergasted: how was it
possible for a book that old, published in 1973, to sound so recent, in the light
of the recent global economic recession of 2008–2015? How was it possible
for modern sociologists to have forgotten about Parsons in general, as well
as in toto, placing him on a cadre of classical authors in sociology, but to
a status similar to that of a dinosaur: a museum exhibit of the sociological
Jurassic period, interesting to know of, but extinct in today’s data-oriented
sociological research. A second major impetus for this thesis was another
discovery in the dust aisles of the University of Edinburgh’s old library books:
André Leroi-Gourhan’s Gesture and Speech. Leroi-Gourhan was a noted and
highly respected French archaeologist and palaeoanthropologist with major
interests in aesthetics and technology. His two-volume book Gesture and
Speech, published in 1964–1965, was a milestone for archaeology: he proposed
the idea that gestures, speech, and stone tools were three sides of the same
coin: language. If Parsons today is a museum exhibit, then Leroi-Gourhan
has not even made it to the footnotes of modern English-speaking sociology.
The STS community, in particular, would benefit a lot from Leroi-Gourhan’s
theories, since he has proposed a very radical view of social constructionism.
In a Parsonian spirit, the study of Soviet mathematics would necessitate a
start from the micro level, then moving to the meso level, and ending up
with the macro level. The author decided to add an extra level, to study
the “quantum physics proper” of social interaction: the pico level, that is, the
level of sociology going “under the hood”, or, to use a computer-programming
expression, what happens when “close to the metal”, that is, the “deep guts”
of the [brain’s] hardware system. The prefix pico was inspired by the work
of the psychiatrist and behavioural economist George Ainslie. Ainslie coined
the term picoeconomics, and his “approach is based on analysis of compet-
ing interests within the individual over time” [328, p. 116] (see also [2, 398]).
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While, in other words, STS so far has been studying negotiation of knowledge
within groups, i.e. in microeconomic terms within a household, this thesis
attempts to present the view of multiple negotiations of knowledge within
the individual scientist. And while Ainsley uses the term motivational states
to denote the intrapersonal conflicts and negotiations happening over an in-
dividual economic decision, this thesis employs the term states of conscious-
ness to denote the intrapersonal conflicts and negotiations happening over
an individual knowledge assertion.The first, therefore, question that was set,
in the beginning, was the following: what exactly is human language, and
how is it related to materiality and technology? The second chapter starts
off by answering this question. At the pico level one would expect univer-
sal phenomena happening not only across different societies, but also across
archaeological time. Following Leroi-Gourhan’s ideas, the second chapter
starts with stone tools, not as the first sign of technology, but as the most
sustainable sign of language, already present in early Homo species: what is
the (brief) history of stone tool technology based on archaeological findings
up to this day? Then, the following section presents a brief outline of the
modern theory of biological evolution. The sections on stone tool technol-
ogy and evolution theory are well known to any undergraduate student in
archaeology, but mainly unknown to the STS community, and that is the
reason for including them in the thesis. The next section, in fact, answers
the subquestion: what is the neurobiology of language? In this section, we
will see that, in fact, language, gestures, and stone tool use are hardwired
on the same regions on the human brain: and this is, most probably, the
point that Leroi-Gouran’s early insights are today being validated. The last
section answers another subquestion very important for studying modern
research mathematics: what kind of new experience did the appearance of
stone tools, and materiality, in general, have brought about? The answer
given is the rise of imagination, and the appearance of the sociotechnical
imaginary. The mathematical sociotechnical imaginary, in particular, is not
visible, in its totality, to the lay eye.
Moving from the picosociology of imagination to the microsociology of math-
ematics, the third chapter answers the very important question for this thesis:
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how can mathematical artefacts such as geometrical objects of four, five, and
in general n dimensions, become visible to the specialist mathematician?
Speech is not enough any more in describing certain mathematical objects,
such as a Hilbert space, or an algebraic variety, or an Einstein manifold. In
this chapter, therefore, again folowing Leroi-Gourhan’s line of thought, the
author decided to present gesturing while describing certain mathematical
objects during an interview with a mathematician. Since the reader was al-
ready initiated in modern evolution theory, archaeological developments, and
neurobiology during the reading of the second chapter, it would be much eas-
ier to present current research on gestures and speech, in one section. The
following section then answers a quite intriguing question: how is gesturing,
speech, and mathematical description related to one another? The author
draws on material from video recordings he conducted during an interview
with a mathematician, a pioneer in his field. The next section then answers
another fascinating subquestion: what is, in fact, the relation between math-
ematics, art, and aesthetics? In this section, it is demonstrated that current
research on gestures is, actually, reminiscent of the aesthetic theory of Roman
Ingarden, a very prolific Polish philosopher of the first half of the twentieth
century.
The fourth chapter moves on to the levels of mesosociology and macrosociol-
ogy; it answers, in other words, how was the social system of Soviet mathe-
matics, in particular, organised? A very striking finding during the author’s
field research was that Soviet mathematics was organised as a gift economy.
The beginning section of this chapter analyses, in a Maussian spirit, the fol-
lowing subquestion: how a gift economy, and, in particular, the gift economy
of Soviet mathematics led the individual to “latch onto” the social system of
science as a reward system? Then, the following section, answers, in a Marx-
ian way, the following subquestion: what was the mode of academic mode
of self-production of Soviet mathematics? In a Parsonian spirit, then, the
next section, answers another interesting subquestion: how was the banking
system of science in Russia organised? And, finally, the following section, in
a Weberian fashion, answers the subquestion: what made the community of
Soviet mathematicians a social estate, rather than, a scientific community?
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The final section, examines the very interesting question: was the social sys-
tem of Soviet mathematics a Soviet version of a city-state or a postmodern
nation-state? English language, in particular, is very helpful in this way.
The words state and estate have a common etymological root. The social
estate of Soviet mathematicians had its own system of rewards: it was a gift
culture; it had its own mode of industrial self-production: the universities
and the research institutes were, and still are, its factories; it had its own
banking system: the scientific journals were its banks and the scientific ar-
ticles were its monetary coins. The element that kept the social estate of
mathematicians from becoming a state proper was Weber’s definition of a
state: it lacked the monopoly on violence.
The fifth chapter of this thesis examines the following question: what was,
and still is, the material culture of Soviet mathematics? In this chapter,
following once more Roman Ingarden’s aesthetic theory, we study the levels
of reading a mathematics text. Three innovations, in particular, of twenti-
eth century mathematics are presented, as close as possible, to the way they
would have been presented to a working Soviet undergraduate mathemati-
cian: countable infinity, metric functions, and Hilbert spaces. This section is
intended mostly for the uninitiated, as an instance of artefacts which cannot
be grasped in a conventional sense, such as these in a museum. This chapter,
in fact, answers the question: how is the psychoanalytic concept of phantasy
related to reading and understanding a mathematical proof? Another, more
subtle, subquestion is: why should we consider mathematicians as a com-
munity of shamans, rather than scientists? If shamans are the only ones in
a community who see the spirit world, what exactly is that spirit world of
mathematicians? The deciding principle, in fact, in this chapter is blindness :
the lay reader will be blind to the proof, that is, unable to see the proof. And
another very interesting subquestion of this chapter: is there a universal way
of proving, or does each field of mathematics have its own ways of proving?
A proof in mathematical logic, in fact, is very different from a proof in func-
tional analysis, and both of them are very different from a proof in algebraic
number theory. The last section raises a very interesting issue: were there





The Spectre of Artefacts
2.1 Introduction
A spectre has been haunting human society all along: the spectre of artefacts.
It has been on the background pulling the strings of historical movement since
the beginning of human time, since the dawn of consciousness. Prometheus
Bound became one of its mostly known victims for his successful attempt
to bring humankind down to its technical destiny. Since then its victims
have increased exponentially, embracing in due arrogance the prophets, the
priests, the proletarians, the revolutionaries, the citizens. Any resistance has
been rendered futile; any escape became a dream; any freedom has turned
into an illusion offered today laboriously and diligently to an unsuspecting
public by our politicians, our patriotic and populist politicians. Nobody has
ever been able to question this omnipresent merciless master, this Olympian
demigod, this archangel without a soul. It surrounds with its coldness all of
society’s most illustrious activities: in war there are guns; in disease there
are medicines; in science there are books; in religion there are shrines. Judge-
ment day, the nuclear apocalypse, is nowadays one button away. Even human
copulation, the most intimate of moments, has not totally escaped the in-
filtration of barrier devices. Every human activity has been contaminated
by the spectre of artefacts, which lives on the twilight of perception, on the
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margins of consciousness, within our technical human essence. Historians of
technology have failed to illustrate this unseen reality, focusing on superficial
arguments. Sociologists of technology in their turn renewing the effort to
reinvent the wheel countless times, they have ended up themselves running
in a theoretical hamster wheel, exercising their intellectual prowess without
offering any research breakthrough of practical importance. Fortunately for
this tortured field of science and technology studies (STS) its saviour has
arrived, rather late admittedly, and it has a commonplace, and boringly
bourgeois, name: archaeology.
Archaeology today has become a very mature science, and indeed a very
sophisticated one. This fact has been hastily neglected by the field of STS,
maybe out of the enthusiasm of a newly-founded field, maybe out of the ar-
rogance of a novice. Nevertheless, the birth certificate of STS was issued by
archaeology, since it has been the only science studying technology up to 2.5
million years ago. Due to the increased influence of philological studies, or
the linguistic and literary studies as they are nowadays called, the general
public of the social sciences and the humanities has been deeply misinformed
on a crucial matter: history started not with the appearance of written mon-
uments but with the appearance of artefacts ; prehistory has never existed,
except only as a useful taxonomy created because of division of labour. The
artefact is a symptom of consciousness, a symptom of the emergence of time
on social groups of the biological genus Homo. This and other later and re-
cent scientific and theoretical developments will be presented and discussed
in this chapter, developments that have eluded systematically STS, having
rendered it as a field rather scientifically impotent. A number of interviews
conducted by the author will be consulted, as well, to present some of the
arguments formulated in this section. This thesis intends be the first of
a projected series of social studies with an eye directed to scientific fields.
The first field to be studied, the subject of the present thesis, is the field of
mathematics, geographically located in the former Soviet Union, and today’s
Russian Federation. Archaeology will be just one among other disciplines
employed in this study mostly as a theoretical guide, imposing an order, its
own order, on the potential explanation narratives. And narrative, this latent
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demon omnipresent in every molecule of social interaction, will be brought
under extreme scrutiny, and the deeper relations of narration and mathemat-
ical proof will be examined. This new aspiring field will be housed under a
most appropriate name for a deeply technical animal, such as Homo sapiens :
Anthropology of Engineering and Industrialisation.
2.2 The Rise of Artefacts
Figure 2.1: Moscow State University - Main Building
Among the most interesting buildings in Moscow, offered to the Western
tourist eye to feast upon, are the “Seven Sisters” of Moscow: these are seven
buildings which were designed and built in the so-called Stalinist-Gothic style
of architecture. The Main Building of the Moscow State University named
after M.V. Lomonosov, located on the Sparrow Hills of Moscow, formerly
known as Lenin Hills, is one of them (see Fig. 2.1), and the statue of the
Russian polymath Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov is a permanent guard in
the small park in front of the building. There are two more buildings on
the left and right side of the statue and during the summer it is a fabulous
place to visit and relax from the continuous buzz and noise of a very busy
city. Walking in the park and with the building on the visual background
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of a scientific discussion with a colleague is a very pleasing experience. The
Main Building used to be for some time the tallest building in Europe, and it
was build, along with its other six sisters under the leadership of Stalin. The
interesting thing that concerns us in this thesis is that the Main Building
houses the administration of the university, on the top floors along with the
School of Mechanics and Mathematics, on the middle floors. The other two
shorter buildings on the left and right sides of Lomonosov are the School of
Physics and the School of Chemistry. The Main Building leaves a very strong
stamp on the visitor’s memory and lends Lomonosov University its distinct
identity.
The location of the Mechanics-Mathematics School (or MekhMat in Rus-
sian), a few floors under the Dean’s office, is indicative of the significance the
Communist regime placed on the positive sciences: dominating over the hu-
manities and the social sciences. After all, the nuclear and hydrogen bombs
were built by mathematical and experimental physicists, at a time when the
Cold War was about to start and rendered the Soviet Union a world class
superpower. Once one gets inside, there are some chandeliers hanging from
the ceiling on the ground floor, remnants of a revolutionary architectural
propaganda, but still impressive enough. What is interesting to note is that
as a workplace, the Main Building most probably is hardly noticed in its
details by a member of staff, as it happens with most workplaces, unless an
employee has a special interest in architecture. Despite its distinctiveness as
an architectural artefact, the Main Building performs all the main functions
a building performs: it houses the offices and lecture theatres of the depart-
ments, it provides protection from harsh weather conditions, provides with
the equipment the teaching staff needs to execute their everyday tasks. A
visitor still has to use the stairs or the lift to move between floors, still has to
open doors to enter rooms, still has to grab chalks with his or her hands to
write on the blackboard a mathematical formula. In other words, despite its
“revolutionary” background, as a building it still performs the same funda-
mental functions a “capitalist” one would perform. Even an ancient Egyptian
pyramid designer would probably have no problem in understanding the main
functions of the Main Building of the Lomonosov University.
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And some of these functions can be performed, for example, by a closed sta-
dium. A car can be similarly used as a temporary housing facility, as well as
a cave, maybe without the comforting company of a heating radiator during
heavy winter time. And there is something more interesting than the Main
Building of Lomonosov University, that was discovered during fieldwork in
Russia, during interviews with Russian mathematicians, in particular, some-
thing that no other historical sources could reveal. When asked particular
questions on some technical-mathematical topics related with their scientific
work, the majority of the professors tried to explain these not only with
words, but they were using hand movements, as if they were describing a
building. When someone tries to describe a building to someone else, quite
often he or she uses gestures to describe, among other things, what is on top,
which room is next to which, or to draw an imaginary picture of the shape
of the building. The cases where no hands were used were either because
some object was held, or due to some social reasons, as, for example, when
an interview had to be conducted in front of a small audience and there was
some social stress involved. It is, for example, common knowledge that some
shy people, as part of their effort to control their social image, try to control
the movement of their whole body, hands and arms included, during social
interactions depending on the comfort they feel at the time. Nevertheless,
this line of observable behaviour showed that mathematics, especially its ex-
planatory part in a classroom for example, is no simple fact, but more things
are involved. And does this have to do with Russian mathematicians only?
Well, actually no. As it was pointed out long time ago by a palaeoanthro-
pologist,1 in order to comprehend the emergence of stone tools, we have to
see human language as an extension of artefact construction, and we have to
see the writing of a scientific formula on a blackboard in the same fashion
as the construction of a paleolithic stone tool. We have, as social scientists,
although not customary for a social scientist, to go back in time a few million
years ago, and become for a while palaeoanthropologists.
A very widely accepted definition of tool use, and, temporarily useful for our
purposes, in general of artefact use, is:
1Leroi-Gourhan in particular; later on, more will be mentioned on this.
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The external employment of an unattached or manipulable at-
tached environmental object to alter more efficiently the form,
position, or condition of another object, another organism, or
the user itself, when the user holds and directly manipulates the
tool during or prior to use and is responsible for the proper and
effective orientation of the tool. [37, p.5, italics in the original]
The italics denote the additional elements of the revised definition originally
proposed in [36, p.10]. Although this definition of tool use is a general defini-
tion for animal tool use, and thus no particularity is attributed to the human
species, a second definition, that of tool manufacture, is necessary, as well:
Tool manufacture is simply any systematic structural modifica-
tion of an object or an existing tool so that the object serves, or
serves more effectively, as a tool.
This definition is again a revised definition of Beck’s original one proposed
in [36]; the additional element, not contained in the original one is denoted
in italics. Since “we now know that ... some apes and monkeys sometimes
use tools to make tools,” [37, p.11, my italics], the author of this thesis has
added an extra element to the definition, denoted in typewriter fonts, to lend
a more Homo-sapiens-centric orientation. This definition, as happens with
every definition, is not perfect, and for more information the interested reader
can look for a history of definitions of tool use and alternative definitions in
[42] and [37, p.1-23]. The key word of the second definition that concerns us
in this thesis is the modification aspect: modification of an object necessarily
implies intentional modification, that is, modification with a plan, with a
picture of an approaching and desired future. This intentional modification
of “inorganic” material artificially detached from the surrounding ecosystem
requires an unusually higher level of animal intelligence.
The oldest of archaeological industries,2 that is, archaeological sites with a
high number of a certain type of artefacts scattered over an area of land,
2Also sometimes called techno-cultural complexes or simply technocomplexes.
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usually stone tools, are the Oldowan industies. They they were first discov-
ered by the British archaeologists Louis and Mary Leaky back in the 1930s,
and have been named after the discovery site of Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania.
The oldest such industry is located in Gona, Afar, Ethiopia, and has been
dated at around 2.6 mya (million years ago) [407], without excluding the pos-
sibility that the actual use of tools started much earlier [70]. The first tool
users seem to be members of the species Australopithecus garhi, in the genus
Australopithecus, a species which appears to be the evolutionary missing link
between the genus Australopithecus and the genus Homo [23]. Main users of
Oldowan stone tools were the species Homo habilis and Homo egaster [386].
A later species, Homo erectus, seems to have picked up on the Oldowan
techical culture and then spread outside of Africa, before 1.8 mya. Homo
erectus Oldowan industries have been found in Java [428], dating at 1.8 mya,
in China, dating at 1.66 mya. Remainings of Oldowan technology, but no
fossil skeletons, have also been found in Spain, dating at 0.78-1.77 mya [350].
Many more other Oldowan industries have been discovered in Africa, Asia,
and Europe. There are many other Homo species and subspecies identified
by archaeologists,3 but we are interested as social scientists, at this point,
more in the artefacts, rather than in the biological history of their users.
Oldowan stone tools, also sometimes called pebble tools, have been called
Mode 1 tools. These are the oldest and simplest tools that have been found
(see Fig. 2.2 4). A major function of stone tools was to process large animals
[70]. In order, most probably to eat, the first tool users had to cut the raw
meat, which is very difficult to cut without a knife. Carnivorous animals,
unlike all the Homo species are very well equipped with teeth specialised for
this function. Stone tools were also used to break the animal large bones to
gain access to the marrow inside. These are known due to the fact that when
stone tools are used for this functions they leave distinct traces on the bones,
traces which have been found on fossilised bones. Similar traces have been
found on fossilised wood, which led archaeologists to conclude that, quite
probably, wooden tools were used, as well, in everyday routines. Different
3For more on taxonomy see, for example, [463].
4Downloaded from Wikipedia.
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Figure 2.2: Oldowan chopper: side views and a view from above.
tools might have been used for digging the ground or for processing useful
plants. The archaeological focus has been also on the hand anatomy of the
early Homo species, when compared with modern nonhuman primates, such
as the great apes or capuchin monkeys (see Fig. 2.3 5). Although the use
and manufacture of tools is indeed related to the anatomy of the hand, the
hand itself is related to other uses, as well. It is important to note, at this
point, that the hand is the mediator between the tool and the brain, and
therefore, as we will see later on in this chapter, it is not only the anatomy
important, but also the neural coordination between the executive brain and
the executing hand.
Mode 1 tools are called also pebble tools because they have not been pro-
cessed too much. They are still visibly stones, like pebbles. The chopper of
Fig. 2.2, for example, is still a stone on its lower half. The lower half is the
5Figure and text taken from [70].
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Figure 2.3: “The great apes have relatively opposable thumbs and thus are
able to make pad-to-pad contact between the index finger and thumb, al-
though not as completely as humans can. They are also capable of a
wide range of manipulative behaviours. Capuchins have a pseudo-opposable
thumb and are capable of both power and precision grips.” MC = metacarpal
[70, p.240].
part that is held by the hand in order to chop the animal’s meat. What is
interesting though is the fact that this stone tool has been constructed by
using other stone tools: a large hammerstone held by hand has been used
to strike off flakes from the original stone intended to be the chopper, which
is the core (see Fig. 2.4 6). The possibility also of having used a large flat-
like very hard stone as anvil on which the core was put cannot be excluded.
These processes have been conjectured by experimental archaeologists, who
themselves have tried to (re)construct stone tools (see for example [449]).
What is important to remark is that the first production line, although very
6Downloaded from Wikipedia.
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primitive, appeared: tools being used to produce other tools on a systematic,
that is on a planned and repetitive, basis, not just out of problem-solving
abilities circumstantially called forth. In other words the oldest surviving
evidence of human culture is industrial culture. Animals, and nonhuman
primates in particular, are circumstantial tool users, but the species of the
genus Homo started as engineers.
Figure 2.4: Using a hammerstone, on the right, against a stone core, on the
left.
The next industries, in terms of time and technological development, are
the Acheulean industries. They were named after Saint-Acheul, a suburb
of the city Amiens, in northern France, where they were first discovered.7
These industries are most commonly related to the Homo erectus, that is,
“Human the standing” in Latin, species [284, p.166-169]. The upright position
was instrumental in the development of tool-using biological mechanisms, as
we will see later on in the text. Acheulian artefacts seem to have been
firstly used 2.8 mya [280] in certain African locations, which means that the
Oldowan and Acheulean technologies were not necessarily mutually exclusive
technologies. Probably “the Acheulian [industry] was either imported from
another location yet to be identified or originated from Oldowan” tool-users
in the vicinity of the industry at issue [280]. Homo erectus migrated from
Africa to Eurasia as early as 1.7-1.6 mya, most probably in three waves
7Actually Acheulean tools had been discovered much earlier; see [184, p.55-56].
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[26]. Possible reasons for these migrations seem to have been environmental
changes, population pressures or expansion of predatory range. Homo erectus
seems, additionally, to have been the earliest Homo species to have used
fire [46], maybe circumstantially, with important implications on the dietary
regimes of the individuals, another development which has been recently
conjectured to be an important factor in the increase of the brain volume of
later Homo species.8 It has been suggested that Homo erectus could travel
over the open sea on rafts [169], and it is thought to have been the first Homo
species to be organised in hunter-gatherer band societies [56, p.198].
Figure 2.5: Construction of an Oldowan tool (top) and an Acheulean one
(bottom).
The Acheulean tools, or Mode 2 tools, are more widely known to the gen-
eral public: these are the hand-axes, or bifaces, in the technical parlance of
archaeology. They were more elaborate in their construction, and the end
result was a two-sided stone tool, that is, a biface (see Fig. 2.5 9). When com-
pared with Oldowan and post-Acheulean industries, Acheulean industries is
actually an understudied subject in archaeology [88] (but see [409]). Without
special training as an archaeologist, even a lay person cannot avoid noticing
the increased elaboration of a hand-axe when compared to a pebble tool.
8More on this later on.
9Taken from [94].
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Both sides of the stone have been processed, or reprocessed for a second time
[322], and even for a modern human it is necessary to spend some time in
training to achieve such a sophistication in manual skill:
The production of bifacial tools is a complex system integrating
long-term planning (using both working memory and planning
memory) and its step-by-step implementation to obtain the de-
sired end-product. This requires knowledge, experience, commu-
nication and the flexibility to change the procedure according to
the circumstances [177, p.1044].
In spite, though, of the high sophistication of the handaxes, there is a certain
uniformity in shape, which led some archaeologists to assume, the existence
of a mental template common to all Homo erectus [466]. In other words, the
handaxe makers had a certain aesthetic intention in mind when constructing
a stone tool (see Fig. 2.7 10). The variability of the available stone material
resources over a large number of Acheulean industries, for example, did not
seem to affect the variability of the handaxe shapes [410]. Other researchers,
on the contrary, have claimed that this observed common shape reflects its
better functionality and the processing construction sequences, rather than
a common aesthetic mental template [322]. What unifies these seemingly
divergent scientific judgements, is that Homo erectus had indeed some kind
of intention in mind, whether this was an elevated aesthetic one or a more
fundamental functional one.
The emergence of a new discipline studying the interaction between the brain
of the Homo species and material culture, called Neuroarchaeology, has led
to some new scientific explanation narratives within the field of archaeology.
From experimental archaeology we now know that “[t]he circumstances of
knapping involve[d] complex feedback between limbs, objects, the visual sub-
system, and the acoustic sub-system (because there are distinctive sounds as-
sociated with the successful removal of a flake)” [112] (see Fig. 2.6 11). Since
the act of knapping is actually a series of acts, until the stone tool has the
10Figure and text taken from [467].
11Fig. 2.6 is taken from [422].
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Figure 2.6: “Knapping as enactive cognitive prosthesis (ECP). The knapper
first thinks through, with and about the stone (as for example in the case
of Oldowan tool-making) before developing a meta-perspective that enables
thinking about thinking (for instance as evidenced in the case of elaborate
late Acheulean technologies and the manufacture of composite tools)” [306,
my emphasis].
desired shape, the whole process of knapping plus past stone knappings ac-
tually become part of the tool maker’s cognition informing future knappings.
In other words, the act of stone knapping becomes an enactive cognitive
prosthesis (see Fig. 2.6). As Dennett had quite early noticed,
tool use is a two-way sign of intelligence; not only does it require
intelligence to recognize and maintain a tool (let alone fabricate
one), but a tool confers intelligence on those lucky enough to be
given one. The better designed the tool (the more information
there is embedded in its fabrication), the more potential intelli-
gence it confers on its user [120, p.99-100, my emphasis].
The act of knapping, in other words, participates in the construction of a
stone tool, and the stone tool being constructed is actually lending intelli-
gence to its user, who is no more a user, but simply an operator in the whole
process. There is a marked similarity at this point between stone knapping
and solving mathematical equations, as both are actually enactive cognitive
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prostheses, but still the tool maker is not yet, at this point of our scien-
tific narrative, a fully fledged Homo sapiens. Stone tool knapping actually
marks the beginning of discharging the human species of its societal duties
and highlights the promotion of a new actor in its place as a social agent:
matter. 12
Figure 2.7: “1.4 million year-old handaxe from West Natron, Tanzania. The
artifact has a ‘global’ bilateral symmetry. The lateral edges mirror one an-
other in quality of shape, but are not congruent.” [467]
There is another aspect of the Acheulean industries not so well researched
in archaeology based on the concept of autopoiesis, that is, how stone tools,
although inorganic, produce and reproduce themselves. In 1959 the ento-
mologist Grassé introduced the concept of stigmergy 13 in order to explain
how the collective behaviour of ants emerges as the result of the individual
behaviour of each ant:
The basic principle of stigmergy is extremely simple: Traces left
[e.g. pheromones] and modifications made by individuals in their
environment may feed back on them. The colony records its ac-
tivity in part in the physical environment and uses this record to
12For more on the extended mind theories and the material agency approach see [95,
249, 307, 344, 400, 446].
13From the Greek words stigma =sting, and ergon =work.
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organize collective behavior . . . Stigmergy also solves the coordi-
nation paradox: Individuals do interact to achieve coordination
but they interact indirectly, so that each insect taken separately
does not seem to be involved in a coordinated, collective behavior
[437, p.111].
As the individual ants, for example, walk on the ground in search of food, they
leave traces of pheromones, which other individuals from the same colony can
smell. When food is found the other members of the colony simply follow
the traces, or lay down their own. In this way this network of pheromone
traces act as an external memory of the colony, with respect to its every day
running tasks. Moreover the individuals are in position to differentiate the
pheromones of their colony from that of other colonies, and from other envi-
ronmental smells, and also can optimise paths to food sources (see Fig. 2.8 14).
In other words, the pheromone traces confer meaning to the individuals, and
they mediate between the colony and each individual. Following up on the
last paragraph, we can now say that the pheromones have become external
agents both to the colony and to each individual ant. Stigmergic behaviour
has been found to organise the everyday work of builders conducted on con-
struction sites [92]. Besides the study of social insects, stigmergy is being
used extensively as optimisation algorithm in computer programming [128],
in artificial intelligence analysing swarm behaviour [55],and, recently, in so-
cial network theory modelling the emergence of leadership [286], and as an
explanation narrative of spontaneous economic order [129].
Let us now return to the problem of the uniformity of shape in Acheulean
handaxes. It has been found that the ratios of a handaxe’s dimensions,15 such
as that of its length over its width, are dominated roughly by the “Golden
Section”, usually denoted by the Greek letter φ [phi] [368]. The Golden
Section has been related quite often to aesthetics and beauty [294]. Moreover,
it has been studied and used in Euclidean and post-Euclidean geometry [215].
The stone tool makers, obviously, did not know any mathematics or any
Euclidean geometry. This led many archaeologists to claim that Home erectus
14Text and graphics taken from [55, p.47].
15These are called allometric relationships in archaeology.
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Nest Food ✈✈✈Nest Food
(a) All antsarein thenest. Thereis
no pheromone in the environment
(b) Theforagingstarts. In probabil-
ity, 50% of the ants take the short
path (seethecircles), and 50% take
thelongpath tothefoodsource(see
the rhombs)
✈✈✈Nest Food ✈ ✈
✈
Nest Food
(c) The ants that have taken the
short path have arrived earlier at
thefood source. Therefore, when re-
turning, the probability that they
again take the short path is higher
(d) The pheromone trail on the
short path receives, in probabil-
ity, a stronger reinforcement, and
the probability of taking this path
grows. Finally, due to the evapora-
tion of the pheromone on the long
path, thewholecolonywill, in prob-
ability, use the short path
Figure 2.8: An experimental setting that demonstrates the shortest path find-
ing capability of ant colonies. Between the ants’ nest and the only food source
exist two paths of different lengths. In the four graphics, the pheromone trails
are shown as dashed lines whose thickness indicates the trails’ strength [55,
p.47]
had a sense or a feeling of visual symmetry. Even by looking today at Fig. 2.7
any reader can identify a certain symmetry on the biface:
Essentially stone artefacts must have form - or we could not reco-
gnize them. [. . . ] If it was the same as natural form - we would not
know that they were artefacts. [. . . ] [Moreover a]rbitrary form
need not be diagnostic of humans - it is diagnostic [in general] of
[animal] artefacts [179, p. 6-7].
In other words the handaxes can still talk to the modern Homo sapiens,
that is, their original Homo erectus meaning is still perceivable by modern
humans. And the meaning of a hand axe is not only its form, but also its
potential technical usefulness or uselessness: it can be picked up, thrown
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away or hidden away. It is interesting now to note, that whatever the per-
sonal meaning the stone tools had for each Homo erectus, it has begun to
emerge that the discard of hand axes is actually structured and patterned ac-
cording to stigmergic principles, when considering the whole land areas, that
is, where the Homo erectus moved, lived, and hunted [368]. If Acheulean
stone tools, therefore, were “discarded contextually within stigmergic sys-
tems, [they could] fullfil key semiotic roles beyond simple technological func-
tion” [368, p. 53]. In other words the smell of the organising feromones in ant
colonies, might have become visual symmetry, or functionality, in the case of
Homo erectus band societies, which, unlike the organic ant feromones, could
persist over time. One could be led, as well, to claim that a major part of
modern experimental archaeology, that is, the part that tries to reconstruct
stone tools, along with many amateur enthusiasts over stone tool manual
(re)construction, are actually the products of 1 million years old reactivated,
previously latent, nonhuman material agency, whose original purpose was to
reproduce itself by means of the Homo erectus species.
The Mousterian industries, which are called Mode 3 stone tools, are as-
sociated with Homo neanderthalensis, that is, the Neandertals, which as a
fully devevoloped species appeared 150,000 years ago [381, p.379], although
skeletal remains with proto-Neandertal traits date back to 350,000 to 500,000
years ago [49]. The name comes from the Neander valley in Germany,16 where
the first fossilised remainings were found. There has been an ongoing debate
on whether the Neandertals were a species of their own, or a subspecies of
Homo sapiens [434], since there have been findings of Cro-Magnons, that
is, early modern humans, with “Neanderthal traits” [131]. Recent genetic
evidence points to the direction of possible interbreeding between the Nean-
dertals and the sapiens ; however other possible scenarios cannot be ruled out
[185]. Neandertal remains have been found in western Europe, the Balkan
peninsula, middle East and central Asia. They formed hunter-gatherer band
societies, and their prey was, quite often, large animals, a very strong sign
of cooperative behaviour and organisation [469, p.22-48]. They seem to have
been using a form of proto-language and they had developed symbolic percep-
16Written as Neanderthal in old German spelling, and Neandertal in modern German.
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tion: the gene FOXP2, identified with an important role in human language,
has been found in Neandertal gene, as well [256]; moreover, a Neandertal
hyoid bone, which is involved in the articulation of human language sounds,
has been discovered in Israel [20]. They buried their dead, but there is no
evidence so far as to the performance of a burial ritual. It is also believed
that they practised cannibalism [445]. While some of them lived in caves,
some others have been found to use mammoth bones to built shelters [117].17
The Neandertals disappeared around 30,000 years ago [469, p.1]. It is known
that they coexisted with Homo sapiens for a few millennia [323]. Various
theories have been proposed as to their extiction: excessive attacks on very
dangerous animals [419], repeated attacks from Homo sapiens groups [316],
spongiform encephalopathy due to cannibalism [90], and inability to adapt
to climate change [411].
Mode 3 tools, as one would expect, are more complicated and demand ex-
treme skill and experience. Much research focus has been lately on the chaîne
opératoire, or operational sequence, in tool construction, according to which
“an assemblage of lithics is not a random but a methodically interconnected
association of artifacts” [27]. In other words, the assemblages are never
random, and their artefacts were scattered according to a pattern, which
depended upon the every day life of Neandertals. Archaeologists have, for
example, identified the Levallois technique in, mainly Neandertal, stone tool
construction 18 which consists of three steps:19
1. “The first prepares a core with two distinct but related surfaces, one,
a more convex platform surface that will include the striking platform,
and a second flatter production surface from which the blank or blanks
will be removed.”
2. “The second step prepares the striking platform itself in relation to the
axis of the intended blank.”
17See also [469] for a recent, updated, and fascinating account of Neandertal life from
many perspectives.




3. “The third step is the removal, by hard hammer, of the blank or blanks.
The first two steps each encompasses its own sequence of action, as does
the final step if multiple blanks are removed.”
The main change we can notice in the construction of stone tools are the steps
involved: not the steps themselves as to what is constructed, or how the con-
struction is being done, but the fact that there are discrete steps involved. In
other words there is now an obvious planning of the whole procedure, rather
than simply knapping flint. And, since future material movement can now be
planned, all the artefacts involved in the construction process acquire imag-
inary locomotion, a fundamental property of the ability of modern humans
to narrate. There are Mode 4 and Mode 5 tools, identified by archaeologists,
whose appearance and construction coincides with the appearance of modern
humans. At this point of our narrative, though, the archaeological evidence
is quite eloquent on the emerging relationship between artefacts, human cog-
nition and societal organisation. Archaeology, and cognitive archaeology in
particular, has actually become the continuation of ethnography by means
of materiality, an approach which will be useful, later on, not in its details
as a particular archaeological method, but as a stepping stone for a new
method more appropriate for modern complex societal (scientific) industries:
an archaeology of modernity. But our story is not over yet.
2.3 The Revolution and Convolution of Evolu-
tion
In February 2011, an important article was published on the Journal of Ar-
chaeological Science, which went largely unnoticed by the STS community
[241]. The authors conducted a very interesting experiment. A group of 60
people were divided into two groups: one group was given steel blades, while
the other was given flint flakes produced by the scientists themselves. The
participants were instructed to cut a rope with the cutting tool each one was
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given, using their dominant hand (see Fig. 2.9 20). None of the participants
any experience in flint knapping, nor any formal education on this subject
prior to the experiment. Certain biometric characteristics were measured,
handsize and grip strength in particular, and then certain measures of cut-
ting efficiency were set up: number of “total cutting strokes required,” and
“total time taken” until the task was accomplished. Since the hand size and
the grip strength are highly correlated [97], and since the biometric measure-
ment that survives through time and remains measurable by archaeologists
is only the hand size, the statistical analyses conducted after the experiment
were focused on the hand size measurements and their relation to the cut-
ting efficiency of the tools. Without getting into too many technical details,
the results “demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between the
biometric parameter of handsize [sic] and the efficiency of cutting ability as
measured by two different measures of efficiency” (p. 1667). Considering the
fossil findings of early hominids, such as Homo habilis and Homo erectus
we know that the hand, along with the whole human body, has evolved.
This evolution has happened under the strong influence of environmental
factors. In other words, as the hominids started to branch out from the com-
mon ancestors of all modern primates, at some point the correlation between
hand and tools started to increased, while in the rest of primate evolutionary
branches, this correlation remained very low. This statistical significance dis-
covered between the hand size and the cutting efficiency, actually shows that
the use of stone cutting tools was an environmental contributing factor to the
evolutionary transformation of the hominid hand.The current archaeological
evidence, therefore, suggests that stone technology was indeed a contribut-
ing factor to human speciation, that is, to the emergence of Homo sapiens
as the latest hominid species. Another equally interesting conclusion of this
study was that the type of the cutting tool, that is, flint flakes versus steel
blades, did not actually affect its efficiency, reiterating thus “the efficiency of
simple stone flakes as cutting tools (at least in tasks of short duration), even
compared to industrially produced steel cutting blades” (p. 1668).
The previous narrative is typical of evolutionary anthropology and sociobi-
20Both picture and text taken from [241].
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Figure 2.9: Example of flint flake cutting through hessian rope [241, p. 1666].
ology, disciplines which are necessary for the production of a scientific nar-
rative suitable for STS. The fundamental textbook of this line of thinking
is Darwin’s famous, and infamous, “The Origin of the Species” [110]. It is a
well established fact today, that Darwin’s theory met with fierce opposition,
not to mention his own initial hesitance to publish his ideas [122]. A few
decades later another similar book by Wilson [460] merging biological and
sociological narratives popularised the term “sociobiology” causing a lot of
controversy, even within the discipline of biology (see [6], and for a more
extended account see [406]). A more recent anti-Darwinian campaign is the
neo-creationist religious movement of intelligent design [19]. These heated
debates indicate the continuous prevalence of ideology over science, in our
societies in general, an ideology which has not left unscathed the social sci-
ences, and STS in particular. The purpose of this section is to introduce
briefly this evolutionary-anthropological argumentation and explain some of
its controversial arguments, which, according to the author, are mostly the
result of misunderstanding, rather than the result of ideological-religious dif-
ferences. In fact, any toddler can see that a cat, a dog, and a human have
four legs, spine, head, and fingers, toes, and nails: that has been obviously
not accidental.
Probably the most heated debates on evolutionary biology have circled around
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the concepts of natural selection, and adaptation. When Darwin talked about
natural selection, he used this expression as opposed to artificial selection,
which is what we would today call selective breeding. We could also alterna-
tively call it spontaneous selection. Probably the choice of the word selection
has not been quite successful, since it implies the existence of a concrete se-
lecting agent, but it has become standard in biology. An adaptation could be
called “a characteristic that enhances the survival or reproduction of organ-
isms that bear it, relative to alternative character states” [161, p. 279]. The
first thing that has to be mentioned is that the adaptation characteristics of
a species have to be identified by scientists themselves first, then proposed as
such to research peers, and then be established as standard by the scientific
consensus reached after a period of time has lapsed. In other words, it totally
depends on the limitations of the human intelligence and the visionary abil-
ity of the biological scientific community, as members of a biological species.
The same holds, as well, for the scientific consensus of the mathematical
community. “ ‘[N]atural selection’ [on the other hand] is not synonymous
with ‘evolution’ ” (p. 283), since evolution can be the result of other means,
such as genetic drift, a way of spontaneous genetic variation. Natural selec-
tion is very closely related with fitness, that is, the reproductive success of
a species as a group, which can be measured by the survival probability of
the subsequent generations of a species, or the average number of offspring
over a number of successive generations. There are levels of selection, such
as on the genetic level, cellular level, individual level, or group level (see the
discussion in [314]). By far the most discussed in the scientific literature are
the levels of the individual, phenotypic variation, and that of the gene, geno-
typic variation. The most cited teaching example of natural selection in the
literature is the evolution of peppered moth [305]. About a hundread years
ago the peppered moths had light coloration, which helped camouflage them-
selves against their predators by sitting on light-coloured trees in the English
countryside. With the advent of industrial revolution, many trees in urban
industrial areas became covered in soot. As a consequence, the population of
the light-coloured moths begun to diminish, resulting in their disappearance
from these ares. At the same time a new population of dark-coloured moths
appeared which could camouflage themselves easier in a dark and polluted
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environment (see Fig.2.10 21).
Figure 2.10: Typica and carbonaria morphs [i.e. phenotypes] resting on the
same tree. The light-colored typica (below the bark’s scar) is nearly invisible
on this pollution-free tree, camouflaging it from predators.
A more recently established instance of human natural selection was the
evolution of lactase persistence, that is the ability of adult humans to di-
gest the milk sugar lactose.22 Digesting lactose is of vital importance to an
infant mammal, but later on, after weaning this Mendelian, that is, inher-
ited, trait declines [426]. Intolerance to lactose can be dangerous, and can
lead to “ “abdominal pain, diarrhea, nausea, flatulence, and/or bloating after
the ingestion of lactose or lactose containing food substances” [216, p. 1280].
Lactose persistence, therefore, would be an extremely important evolution-
ary advantage, in the first agricultural human societies, when cattle were first
domesticated, and the cultural practice of adult milk consumption started.
21Photo and text downloaded from Wikipedia.
22Lactase is an enzyme whose (only) function is to break down the molecule of lactose
during metabolism into glucose and galactose molecules, which are easily digestible [426].
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Modern humans are actually the only mammals today, whose adult individ-
uals can digest milk, that is, they are lactase persistent. Lactase persistence
is very frequent among northern Europeans, less frequent in south European
and middle eastern populations, and diminishes significantly in nonpastoral
populations of Asia and Africa; quite interestingly it is a trait of very high
frequency in pastoral populations of Africa [64]. In a study conducted in
2006 , various African pastoral populations were checked as to the corre-
sponding gene mutations, that kept the lactase persistence gene “switched
on,” ([438]). Three more mutations were discovered which were independent
of the European one, and of each other. Moreover, these mutations were
more recent than the European. The advantage that these mutations could
confer on the individuals would be tremendous, since, besides the steady con-
sumption of milk, the water contained would be also useful during periods
of drought. These findings were actually “one of the strongest genetic signa-
tures of natural selection yet reported in humans,” (p. 32). We can see, with
this instance of natural selection, individuals without this mutation would
be actually deselected. In other words, natural selection is actually natural
deselection: species without appropriate survival traits, simply perished. In
a book published in 2009 [465], the cooking hypothesis was formulated and
presented: the human brain needs a lot of energy, which cannot be acquired
simply by eating raw food; cooked food, on the contrary, offers lots of energy
in smaller quantities, more digestible, less time in cutting meat, and less time
in foraging. Cooked food, in other words, offered, according to this view, new
survival traits to the hominids one million years ago. Although this view was
initially criticised as simply a theory due to lack of evidence, last year archae-
ological evidence was discovered, confirming that Homo erectus had already
acquired control of fire 1 mya [46]. This was one of the, still, very rare cases
in evolutionary biology, in which a theory anticipated evidence.
During the last decade, more and more biologists are turning to a new con-
verging research direction: the coevolution of culture and human biology.
The problem of culture, that is, of the definition of culture, has always hin-
dered scientific consensus among the social scientists: there exist practically
as many definitions as many researchers. In the biological sciences, on the
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contrary, “[r]ather than attempting to describe the entire culture of a soci-
ety, culture is broken down into specific traits (for instance, milk users or
non-users, or consumption of a starch-rich or starch-poor diet), which al-
lows their frequencies to be tracked mathematically” [267, p. 138]. Moreover,
this definition allows culture to be transmitted through (observational) so-
cial learning, and, therefore, animal behaviour can be included, as well (for
more on animal culture see [265]). There are two areas studying gene-culture
co-evolution: one is gene-culture co-evolutionary theory [63, 87, 142, 147],
which employs mathematical models of population genetics, and studies cul-
tural and genetic processes in the course of evolutionary time; the other is
niche-construction theory [262, 266, 346]. Niche-contruction theory explores
the impact of an environment modified by a species, such as nest building,
on its evolutionary history. In human societies, this constructed niche is evi-
dently material culture. Actually, it is now openly asserted that “gene-culture
co-evolution could be the dominant mode of human evolution” [267, p,137]
(see also [139, 387, 264]). The population genetics models assume the exis-
tence of a hypothesized gene function as observed in phenotype, and study
their dynamics with cultural behaviours. Such an evolutionary model was
proposed in 1986 [12] to explain adult lactase persitence which, as we saw
earlier, had its conjectured gene confirmed some 25 later by genetic stud-
ies on populations. There are now many available mathematical models of
gene-culture co-evolution which connect certain cultural traits with a con-
jectured gene phenotype. There have been also many genes identified whose
function was subjected to cultural environmental pressures (for more on the
mathematical models and the identified genes see [267] and the references
therein).
Turning now to the neurobiological sciences, the effects of biological evolu-
tion are becoming more and more visible. The human brain now is being
examined with respect to its functionality in comparison to other mammal,
in general, and primate, in particular, brains. But before going into details, a
brief review of the human brain anatomy is necessary. The major part of the
brain consists of “[t]he cerebral hemispheres [which in their turn] consist of a
heavily wrinkled outer layer - the cerebral cortex - and three deep-lying struc-
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tures: the basal ganglia, the hippocampus, and the amygdaloid nuclei. The
basal ganglia participate in regulating motor performance; the hippocampus
is involved with aspects of memory storage; and the amygdaloid nuclei co-
ordinate the autonomic and endocrine responses of emotional states. The
cerebral cortex is divided into four lobes: frontal, parietal, temporal, and
occipital” [232, p. 9, italics in the original] (see Fig. 2.11)23. The cortex is
fundamental in organising most of the major cognitive functions, such as
awareness, language, thought, attention and memory. The first six outer-
most layers of the cortex comprise the neocortex. The neocortex appeared
later in the history of evolution, and it is a distinctive feature of mammalian
brains, although there is some ongoing debate on terminology as to whether
this six-layer cell structure in mammals other than primates should be called
neocortex, as well, or not (see for example [229, 380]). Each of these six
layers is numbered in Roman numbers from I to VI, the first one, i.e. layer I,
being the outermost, and the last one, i.e. layer VI, being the innermost. In
larger mammals, such as chimpanzees, the neocortex consists of sulci 24, i.e
grooves, and gyri 25, i.e. wrinkles, while in smaller mammals, such as mice,
it is almost smooth-surfaced [219, p. 147].
Figure 2.11: The four lobes of the cerebral cortex.




It was formerly assumed that the various cortical areas are specialised in
certain cognitive abilities. Broca’s area, for example, located on the left pos-
terior inferior frontal gyrus of the brain, that is, on the back lower frontal left
lobe, used to be assumed to be involved in language generation [69]. This
view of the specialisation of brain areas has become known as the modularity
of the mind [151]. Nowadays, though, “[t]here is increasing evidence that
language regions in the brain - even classic Broca’s area - are not specific
to language, but rather involve more reductionist processes that give rise to
language as well as nonlinguistic functions” [57, p. 152-153]. Tool use, our
major concern here, has been found to be involved as well in the function
of language brain areas [217, 423]. Since all the primates have a common
ancestor, in terms of biological evolution, they have developed functionally
homologous regions on the brain, that is regions which perform the same or
similar functions and are usually anatomically and physiologically similar,
although anatomy and similarity are not always good advisors on functional
homology (see, for example [425]). Five-finger hands with a thumb, for ex-
ample, are homologous limbs on all primates, and grasping is an homologous
function. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that areas on the brain of
other primate species functionally homologous to the language areas of the
human brain are involved as well in tool use [217]. This has given a new rise
to the formerly proposed, but later largely ignored, evolutionary mechanism
of exaptation [178], that is, the functional reassignment of an evolutionary
biological characteristic. One commonly cited example of exaptation is that
of feathers in birds: while feathers were developed originally as a mechanism
of temperature regulation in Archeopteryx, a transitional genus between the
late feathered dinosaurs and the early modern birds, and whose members
were too heavy to fly [471], “[l]ater selection for changes in skeletal features
and feathers, resulted in the evolution of flight” [178, p.7].These findings,
therefore, in the functional activity overlap of brain regions, “supports the
gradual view that the neural correlates of sequentially organized behaviour,
exemplified by tool use, were already present in a rudimentary form in our
last common ancestors with primates, and were later exapted to support
language in humans” [217, p. 1381].
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In 1991 a scientific report was sent to Nature, but the editors rejected the
“paper for its ‘lack of general interest’ and [they] suggested publication in
a specialized journal” [393, p. 223]. After some discussions with editors on
other journals, the article was finally published after a few months [124],
marking the appearance of mirror neurons in the scientific literature; two
types of visuomotor neurons had been discovered: “canonical neurons, which
respond[ed] to the presentation of an object, and mirror neurons, which re-
spond[ed] when the monkey sees object-directed action” [392, p. 170]. The
object alone, i.e. the sight of it, did not trigger the neuron; an interaction
between the object and the hand and/or the mouth triggered it. Two types
have been identified in animals: ingestive mirror neurons, and communicative
ones, involving, among others, gestures. Mirror neurons have not been di-
rectly observed in humans, for the very simple reason that on ethical grounds
researchers cannot implant an electrode directly on a human brain, but there
is more than enough indirect evidence, pointing to that direction [272]. What
is, indeed, intriguing is that animal mirror neurons are located on brain areas,
e.g. area F5 on monkey brain, which are homologous to Broca’s area in hu-
man brains [430], rendering the modularity approach in language production
obsolete for good [362]. All these have led to the Mirror System Hypothesis,
according to which “this primitive action-matching system underwent suc-
cessive evolutionary modifications to support imitation, pantomime, manual
‘protosign’ and ultimately vocal language, thus providing a neural underpin-
ning for ‘gestural hypotheses’ of language origins” [423, p. 76]. Although the
Mirror System Hypothesis has been viewed as an explanation panacea for
many human culture domains, such as empathy, understanding intentions,
self-awareness, language, imitation, even gender differences, many gray ar-
eas remain, as well as some skepticism among the scientific community (for
more on these see [14, 359], and for some criticism see the peer commentary
following the main article in [13]). In the framework of the present the-
sis, the mirror neurons will be considered as the first evolutionary pangs of
imagination, as the lowest level building blocks of vicarious social action.
Going back, now, to where we started, that is the stone tools, we could
attempt to give a definition of human culture from the point of view of an
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external observer: “[. . . ] culture, in addition to being ‘. . . that complex whole
. . . shared by man as a member of society,’ is also the imposition of arbitrary
form upon the environment” [220, p. 395, his emphasis], and form means ma-
terial form. In the case of language form refers to: (a) its phonology, or sound
production, which in the case of tools “involves such units as striking a flake;
(b) its grammar,26 that is the ordering of (material) sound units to a mean-
ingful whole, which in the case of tools can be “the concatenation of smaller
unit operations that produces the tool;” and (c) its semantics, or meaning,
which in the case of stone tools can be “the use of the tool as finished product,
and the meaning of each unit action as an outcome of the preceding one and
as preparation for the next.” One more element could also be added: (d) its
pragmatics, that is its meaning as embedded in social activity. Human cul-
ture, in other words, cannot be symbolic, only material: “[p]roperly speaking
there are not signs, but only sign-functions. . . . A sign-function is realized
when two functives ([material] expression and [semantic] content) enter into
a mutual correlation” [136, p. 49, his emphasis]. It has been demonstrated by
Greenfield that primate infants, humans included, adopt certain action pat-
terns in combining linguistic utterances and motor activities; these patterns
have been called “grammars of action” [186, 187]. These action grammars
have been found to be similar among primates infants, and begin to diverge
later on with age, and it has been concluded that these are similar due to
the existence of a common evolutionary ancestor. The research emphasis
was more on utterances, rather than on motor activities, “because there is no
fossil record of behavior” [186, p. 545]. Modelling after these studies, some
archaeologists have proposed “a model of the ‘design space’ of knapping -
the essential actions of stoneworking - in terms compatible with Greenfield’s
model” [329, p. 14]. In conclusion, although there are many gaps in the ar-
chaeological record, and many objections and doubts exist as to the precise
explanation narratives proposed, there is a widespread general belief in the
archaeological community, that stone tools and language are actually more
intimately related, than it was generally believed 20 or 30 years ago (see for
example [423], and the references therein). The present thesis follows up on




2.4 O Mind, Where Art Thou?
It is important to note, at this point, that the social-constructivist approach
in the social sciences, although in high vogue, is not fully adequate for the
purposes of this thesis. Studying science in general, and mathematics in
particular, from the singular point of view of social construction, normally
would not necessitate a literature review of archaeological and biological ev-
idence. It seems, though, to the author that there is, in the first place, a
certain “dialectic between social construction and neurological foundations”
[287, p. 112] which is too important to be ignored. This legitimates partly
the adoption of the evolutionary scientific narrative so far, and in the follow-
ing sections as well. The attempt is to redefine scientific rationality based
on every appropriate evidence available, producing thus a method of study
appropriate for the ethnographic disciplines. The turn to the interaction be-
tween material culture and human consciousness is a further attempt to lend
cultural anthropology and linguistics, two of the traditional anthropological
disciplines, the status of positive sciences, a status which, so far, is being
enjoyed only by archaeology and physical anthropology, the other two tra-
ditional anthropological disciplines. The main problem lies in the Cartesian
brain/mind duality:
If we are speaking of evolution, we are speaking - essentially -
of the human body, our physical, material make-up of bones,
blood, tissue, brain matter. By contrast, mind is a projection, an
abstraction; it cannot be placed on a table and dissected as can a
brain. Nor, it seems, can mind be placed on a philosophical table
and defined and described [287, p. 104].
Sociologists have indeed tried to define mind, or rather consciousness, but
their accounts have still remained within the boundaries of social construction
per se; no attempt has been made to redefine consciousness and rationality
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in a more universal manner. In [298], for example, an attempt is made to
redefine consciousness cross-culturally, but in the end of the article, it all
falls back to a consciousness determined by social-cultural discursive defini-
tions, ignoring, thus, its neurological basis. During an interview with a Soviet
mathematician, the interviewee mentioned that shortly before sleep he could
imagine certain topological spaces and thus proceed to a proof of a theo-
rem without any need to write down notes. His specialisation was in general
topology, the main objective of which is to generalise the common perception
of space, based on a generic perception of spatial nearness. This personal
account, when considered under the social constructivist approach, would be
unaccountable, or simply ignored. But when considered under the proposed
framework, which takes into account the neurological basis of consciousness,
it leads to a concept of science as an altered state of consciousness, and as an
alternative to psychoactive drugs.27. Moreover, it demonstrates the tremen-
dous effect of material culture on the human self. Besides, any inventor, and
any scientist, during her trial and error method, has to imagine and plan the
course of trial and error, just like a Neanderthal had to imagine and plan the
complex construction of a sophisticated Mousterian tool; and this imagining
and planning are the psychoactive effects of material agency.
Imagination takes place, as an experience, within the framework of fantasy.
In order to explore the concept of fantasy, we have to resort, once again, to
biological evolution, and its emotional and psychological effects on human
evolution.28 It is a common scene, when a mother cat walks, her kittens
always follow her; wherever she goes they are always around, not very far
away. The same happens with a female dog with her puppies and so on. This
is a lay person’s observation of what came to be called attachment theory,
a cybernetic theory of human emotional bonding [62]. It had already been
observed quite early in the 20th century that children have fantasies, as well,
without necessarily resorting to neurotic stress [246]. Part of the children’s
27Another well known example is Kekulé’s dream and his discovery of the aromatic
chemical bond (see [396])
28In older psychological-psychoanalytical literature the spelling phantasy used to be
reserved for technical description of the workings of the unconscious.
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fantasies are transitional objects, that is, certain kinds of artefacts used by
children to alleviate their anxiety when the parent, for example, is away and
they feel alone, or just before they sleep [461, 353]. The most well-known
such example is a teddy bear; it could also be a blanket that the child feels
secure with. Although the lay view is that children attached to certain inan-
imate objects are, or seem, insecure, infact this is an evolutionary adaptive
mechanism, common to all mammals and birds [3, p. 84-89], [154].29 The
evolutionary function of this mechanism is to keep the young and still weak
members of the family in constant alert as to the distance of parental figures
in order to increase their survival probabilities. Additionally, the parents
themselves are on alert, as well, as to the potential loss of their young. The
semantics, therefore, of this systemic unit is distance between family mem-
bers. Attachment theory, in other words, “is essentially a regulatory theory,
and [emotional] attachment can be defined as the interactive regulation of
biological synchronicity between organisms” [403, p. 23]. Fantasy, in the con-
text of attachment theory, becomes an internal working model, that is, “a
representational system that allows us, for example, to imagine interactions
and conversations with others, based on our previous experiences with them
[66, p. 103]. Fantasy, therefore, is a systemic mediating mechanism of emo-
tional regulation in animal family groups, birds and mammals in particular.
Following up on the previous sections of this chapter, we have to consider
that any later development in the cognitive functions of the later species of
the Homo genus, took place by embedding itself in the ability to fantasize:
fantasizing predates stone tool use. Since fantasy takes place unconsciously,
and stone tool use is a conscious activity, research recently has been di-
rected to the construct of working memory, which “serves to focus attention
by maintaining memory representations (plans of action, short- or long-term
goals, or task-relevant stimuli) in a conscious state despite interference or re-
sponse competition” [201, p. S150]. The Neanderthals, for example, now are
generally considered to have acquired a high level of expertise in stone tool
construction, though the capacity of their working memory was limited, as
documented by the rarity of stone tool innovation [468]. Any proof in math-
29In the context of bird attachment ethologists talk about imprinting.
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ematics demands a highly developed working memory mechanism, especially
a long one written over many pages; one needs to bear in mind that a proof
has always to be read, in order to be understood, or, in the case of innovation,
many facts leading to a potential proof have to be remembered and used as
leads. Activity, in other words, is modularly organised in operational units.
Neanderthal everyday activity was organised in a similar way (see Fig.2.12,
both figure and text taken from [201, p. S160]). But the stone tools in the
case of a mathematical proof are no longer material; they have instead phan-
tasmatic support, though the use of the hands has not yet been eliminated,
but refined, with the use, in a similar way, of a chalk and a blackboard, or
a pencil and some paper. The main components of working memory that
have been so far identified are four: the phonological store, which is related
to sound language; the visuospatial sketchpad, which holds visual and spatial
information for a short period of time; the central executive, which has has
“overall attentional control of the working memory system” [214, p. 21]; and
last, but not least, the episodic buffer , which brings together various sources
of information into the working memory brain system (see [214, p. 1-36]; [24]
is currently the most authoritative source on the working memory model).
One could very well argue that perfumes and food dishes are also artefacts,
mainly ignored by cognitive psychology, and it cannot be claimed that work-
ing memory is not necessary to a perfume maker, to a professional chef or
to a connoisseur. There have been expressed some complains as to the po-
tentially misleading construct of working memory [338]. In a similar fashion,
it has been pointed out that different theorists have proposed different ver-
sions of working memory, and these have been invoked to explain virtually
all cognitive psychology research projects [373]. Despite these criticisms, the
concept of working memory is still useful for the claims of this thesis.
Although working memory, or working attention, directs attention to a task,
or to an object, it still does not, as a concept, answer to a very crucial
question: to where exactly is attention directed at? During many of the
interviews conducted, many interviewees, when asked specifically to explain
and elaborate more on their past or present research, they used hand move-
ments, i.e. gestures, as part of their description narratives. That use of
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Figure 2.12: Effective chain of raw materials and tools that can be used
to hunt with a spear with a split-based bone point. Boxes indicate small
operational units that can be put together in a modular way [201, p. S160].
gestures, was very similar to the situation when one uses gestures to de-
scribe to somebody else a house or a building. Herein landed into the scene
the concept of intentionality, “a generic term for the pointing-beyond-itself
proper to consciousness” [163, p. 109]. Simply put, intentionality is the hu-
man mind’s ability to think about something, whether that something is an
object, a task, a concept, one’s social image, or other people’s thoughts; in-
tentionality is always about something. In the case of tool construction this
aboutness is about a future form of the stone, it is foresight. The form of
intentionality that concerns this thesis is similar to the pointing of infants.
It is a well established fact that human “[i]nfants begin to point to things
for other persons from around 11 to 12 months of age” [442, p. 705] (see also
[83]; and for animal pointing see [233, 274].). Two things are interesting here:
infant pointing starts before language acquisition; and pointing is actually
a nonconventional, symbolic gesture. Both mean that actually pointing is a
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more general trait of Homo sapiens, which goes beyond cultures. Another
way of pointing during infancy is following the mother’s gaze. It is the same
as when many people are looking up into the sky, and when we suddenly see
them we feel an urge to look up, as well. The function of pointing is taken
up later in childhood by language use, with the employment of speech acts,
that is, language phrases which mobilise into social action.30 The situation in
mathematics is very similar, with one exception: the mathematical formulas
embedded in human speech are the artefactual fingers pointing to mathemat-
ical invisible objects. The phrase “Let there be an n-dimensional Brownian
motion {Bt|t ≥ 0},” points actually to a mathematical object, but those
without a background in probability theory or mathematical finance, will
be pointed to nothing. This pointing, although a human universal, has be-
come in mathematics symbolic and institutionalised. A mathematical proof
is actually an intentional pointing : it points to the reality of mathematical
objects, and under this light mathematics will be studied in this thesis.
This mixed social world of an infant’s attention, a world of real and imagi-
nary objects, will later be socialised and organised by the parents’ incessant
use of language. And this reorganisation of cognitive reality persists for a
lifetime. It must always be born in mind that the main “function of the hu-
man nervous system at the level of the cerebral cortex is the construction of
a vast network of [neural-cognitive] models of the self and the world” [269,
p. 365]; the totality of these neural-cognitive models comprises the cognized
environment of an individual, in contrast with his or her operational envi-
ronment “which is the real nature of both that individual as an organism
and that individual’s world as an ecosystem” [Ibid.] (see also [378, p. 22] for
the origin of these terms). In other words, genetically determined massive
systems of neural structures produce human knowledge, and these systems
have been shaped, as we have seen so far, by artefact construction and use.
The cognized environment, which produces the human experience, is heavily
based on neurognosis, that is, on a genetically-neurally preorganised epis-
temic mind, which, in the course of its life reorganises itself continuously
30In fact some authors refer to infant, and possible animal, pointing as pre-speech acts
[233].
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through creating countless new neural synapses (see also [271], and [270]
for the similar concept of Jungian archetypes). Knowledge, therefore, can
be considered as a materially induced altered state of consciousness. Even
telling a funny joke among a group of people, and then have everybody laugh-
ing involves hypnotic states [81]. In fact “many pre-industrial societies are
’polyphasic’ ... that is, they value altered states [of consciousness] as sacred
and socially constructive, whereas the post-industrial West is ’monophasic,’
that is, it exclusively valorizes a waking state that is assumed to be pre-
dominantly ’rational’,” [457, p. 181] (see also [397, 458], also [384] describes
the quite interesting concept of a cultural neurohermeneutic system). It has
been argued, moreover, that behavioural modernity, that is, the appearance
of cave art as the main characteristic of Homo sapiens differentiating him as
a species from the Neanderthals, was actually the widening of the spectrum
of consciousness, which lead the path beyond tool construction: cave paint-
ings, figurative and decorative art, and full-blown language actually have no
apparent practical use, except for social-aesthetic purposes [287, 101-136].
Considering the fact that actually stone tools and human consciousness are
more intimately connected than generally thought, it can be, and will be,
additionally argued that actually the new tool abilities of Homo sapiens are
the abilities of of producing material narratives, and the ability to produce,
in particular, sophisticated imaginary material mathematics; and it will be-
come evident how narrative, actually, unifies human consciousness, language
and materiality, and mathematical proof is just one aspect of that.
2.5 The Rise of the Social Constructions
Very recently a scientific article was published that presents
data [that] support the hypothesis that a gene-culture co-evolutionary
dynamic between tool use and social transmission was on-going
in human evolution, starting at least 2.5 mya [million years ago]
and potentially continuing to the present [330, p. 2].
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The organisation and structure of the underlying ingenious experiments,
though, were as important as its results from an STS point of view. A
sample of 184 adults was assembled and each participant would be tested on
his or her performance on stone knapping, and then he or she would be tu-
toring on stone knapping the next participant who, in turn, would be tested
on his or her stone knapping performance, and so on. The participants were
divided into five different transmission chains according to the way of being
taught stone knapping (see Fig.2.13):
(i) Reverse Engineering : pupils were provided with a core and
hammerstone for practice, but saw only the flakes manufactured
by their tutor and not their tutor themselves;
(ii) Imitation/Emulation: in addition to having their own core
and hammerstone, pupils also observed their tutor making flakes,
but could not interact with them;
(iii) Basic Teaching : in addition to demonstrating tool produc-
tion, tutors could also manually shape the pupil’s grasp of their
hammer stone or core, slow their own actions and reorient them-
selves to allow the pupil a clear view;
(iv) Gestural Teaching : tutors and pupils could also interact us-
ing any gestures, but no vocalizations;
(v) Verbal Teaching : tutors and pupils were also permitted to
speak. [330, p. 7, my italics]
The first link in each transmission chain was a trained experimenter.
The idea behind this experiment was to test the fidelity of information trans-
mission over successive teachings along each chain. Each teaching method,
including self-teaching (i.e. reverse engineering), was conducted over six
chains, four small, and two longer, chains, and the researchers had developed
six measures of performance. A major difference between human cumulative
culture and animal cultures is the ability of humans to transmit informa-
tion with high fidelity, and teaching quite possibly has “evolved in humans
because cumulative culture renders otherwise difficult-to-acquire valuable in-
formation available to teach” [152, p. 2760] (see also [85, 115, 285]). Given
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that stone tool knapping is cognitively very demanding [395], and taking
into consideration that early hominids had to survive in a very demanding
ecological environment [369], teaching would speed up the process of acquir-
ing the necessary cognitive skills to provide “access to the expanded array
of foods made available by sharp and effective crushing implements” [369,
p. 10] such as the biface Acheulean hand-axes. The major objective of this
experiment, in other words, was to statistically test the co-evolutionary re-
lationship between stone tool making and variations of a particular mode of
social construction, that is, teaching.
The experimenters found that stone tool construction performance was greatly
enhanced in almost all ways of teaching, with two exceptions: performance
after reverse engineering and after imitation/emulation dropped to the level
of the individual’s intuition and personal cognitive abilities. Verbal teaching,
on the other hand, provided, in general, the highest fidelity of information
transmission. Even gestural teaching enhanced personal performance and
maintained it along each chain; still performance after gestural teaching was
rather low, when compared to verbal teaching. The authors of the article
suggest that gestural teaching probably corresponded to a proto-languange
which maintained construction performance over generations of early ho-
minins to a level satisfactory for species survival and, moreover,
the appearance of [biface] Acheulean tools 1.7 mya [million years
ago] reflects, in part, the evolution of mechanisms of transmis-
sion that facilitated the more effective transmission of Oldowan
tool-making, but also enabled the reliable transmission of the
sub-goals and techniques required to make the distinctive and
regularly shaped Acheulean tools [330, p. 6].
Gestural teaching, in other words, might have been the first appearance
of social construction among hominids which, as the authors of the article
suggest, was a contributory factor to the evolution of the Homo cognition.
Moreover, gestural teaching, demonstrates, in the opinion of the author of
this thesis, the importance of materiality in social constructions: every so-
cial construction happens through a particular material spectacle, and this
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material spectacle is what induces social constructions.31
Still though, to explain the appearance of modern mathematics, such as the
advent of infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces in today’s quantum physics,
stone tool construction combined with gestural teaching is not enough. Full
verbal teaching is not enough, as well: Einstein’s theory of relativity requires
four dimensions of spacetime, and there are other gravitational theories, such
as superstring theories, which use mathematical geometrical models of ten
dimensions. Ten-dimensional artefacts, though, do not exist, and even if
they do exist, if we accept modern physics to be valid in its conclusions, they
remain in a realm not accessible to usual and everyday human cognition.
Mathematicians, on the other hand, have no problem in mentally handling
them when writing down a (two-dimesional) proof with this kind of ten-
dimensional, or even infinite-dimesional, artefacts. And that is, exactly, the
point where mathematics meets art, religion and shamanism: visual access
to these multidimensional transcendental space entities is provided by the
neurologically duplicate brain of a shaman cave artist who can “see” the “spirit
worlds” of spacetime, superstrings, or noncommutative geometry. And the
interesting thing about shamanism is that astrology today, though generally
discarded as a science by the modern scientific community, is not only alive,
but very well kicking with both of its legs: everyone, whether scientist or
not, knows his or her star sign; if two star signs can pair well, according to
astrological wisdom, then their marriage will be very blissful.
The usual answer given when one is very good at mathematics is that he is
clever, that is, mathematics is a matter of exceptional specialised intelligence.
And indeed human, as well as animal, intelligence has been claimed to be
modular (see for example [164, 244]). The “great transition” from Neandertals
to modern humans, then, was that these initially independent brain modules
began to communicate with each other (see [325]). A major opposing position
to this view of modular intelligence as the all-resolving and all-encompassing
concept that explains “everything in human cognition” has been David Lewis-
Williams’s view:
31More on this in the next chapter.
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[T]he emphasis on intelligence has marginalized the importance of
the full range of human consciousness in human behaviour. Art
and the ability to comprehend it are more dependent on kinds
of mental imagery and the ability to manipulate mental images
than on intelligence [287, p. 111].
Under this light, human intelligence is a Western construction and intelli-
gent people are those “becoming more and more like Western scientists” [287,
p. 111]. Modern human consciousness, in Lewis-Williams’s view, became in-
ternally more expanded than Neanderthal consciousness: evolution, in other
words expanded the spectrum of consciousness, that is, the continuum from
full cognitive alert, to a state of being half-awake, half-asleep, to dreaming
and deep unconscious sleep. The spectrum of consciousness, in other words,
is a continuum between two states: one of alert [i.e. purely extrospective]
consciousness and one of autistic [i.e. deeply introspective] consciousness
(see Fig. 2.14), and the centre of scientific attention now moves to “the neu-
rology and functioning of the brain [that] creates a mercurial type of human
consciousness that is universal” [288, p. 9, italics added]. And a mercurial
consciousness means one thing: instead of talking about one (type of stable
and crystallized) consciousness, we should be talking about altered states of
consciousness moving in a continuum between alert, that is, purely extro-
spective, and autistic, that is, deeply introspective, states of consciousness.
Lewis-Williams, though, quite wisely hastens to comment that
[t]he phrase “altered states of consciousness” is useful enough, but
we need to remember that it carries a lot of cultural baggage [287,
p. 126].
The theory that religion and its material expressions such as cave art are
hardwired on the brain had already been formulated earlier (for example
[86]), and later on became more well known in the archaeological community,
as one branch of post-processual, or sometimes interpretative, archaeology.32
Lewis-Williams, in particular, proposed that cave paintings can be explained
32For a good overview of archaeological theories from past to now see [230].
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as the products of prehistoric shamans: instead of passing into “naturally
induced” autistic states of consciousness, prehistoric shamans artificially in-
duced states of consciousness through psychoactive chemicals found in par-
ticular plants, or though repetitive sounds combined with ritual dance and
singing: they moved along an intensified spectrum of consciousness in three
stages leading up to hallucinations (see Fig. 2.14). Lewis-Williams’s three
stage model has received considerable criticism, one strand of which is that
it “inherently seeks to understand the meaning of rock art based modern or
historical San narratives” [315, p. 226].33. Moreover, while inducing trance
through the consumption psychoactive plant substances is indeed possible, it
seems rather implausible since “in Europe, especially where caves containing
Upper Palaeolithic cave art are located, the evidence for hallucinogenic sub-
stances is very sparse” [213, p. 91] (see also [98]; for more recent debates see
[160, 212] and the references therein). In spite of the criticisms over the par-
ticular causes, though, the idea of a hardwired expanded spectrum of Homo
sapiens consciousness, and the corresponding altered states of consciousness
have remained resistant to criticism, and, in the author’s opinion, provide
the missing link between human biology, human consciousness, and human
societies.
The idea of the spectrum of human consciousness as a continuum between
alert and autism, in the author’s opinion, goes far beyond Lewis-Williams’s
original intentions to describe the neurobiological origins of cave art, and
later on early religion. Alert, in Lewis-Williams’s definition is the state of
“waking”, and “problem-oriented thought” (see Fig. 2.14). But what exactly
is waking, and what exactly is problem-oriented thought? If we consider a
mathematician deeply absorbed in a solution of a difficult problem, then he
or she is obviously awake, in a state of intense problem-oriented thought, but
also in a deeply autistic state of consciousness. Or someone who is talking
on the mobile phone with a creditor using hands-free equipment, while cross-
ing a street and at the same time checking both sides of the street to alert
himself or herself of any dangerously approaching vehicle, is indeed in a state
33The San people, formerly also known as Bushmen, are indigenous hunter-gatherers in
the Kalahari desert of the South part of Africa.
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of alert, but at the same time he is or she is in an autistic state of being
absorbed in the conversation over negotiating a better financial deal. More-
over, when a university student is cramming for a whole week to prepare for
the incoming exams, we could very well say that he or she is temporarily in
an intensified trajectory of states of consciousness (see Fig. 2.14), since cram-
ming means both overloading short-term memory with lots of information
and, quite often, extended sleep deprivation.
Altered states of consciousness, in other words, are part and parcel of the
“normal” everyday life of all the members of any society, either Western
or not, and is, therefore a universal phenomenon. When mathematicians,
in other words, are reading and writing the proof of a theorem in infinite-
dimensional Hilbert spaces they are in an altered state of consciousness; a lay
person can see only the letters and the symbols of the text of the proof, but
cannot “see” the mathematical (fictional) entities employed in the proof. All
the mathematicians interviewed for this thesis mentioned extended and long
periods of studying, especially while being undergraduate and postgraduate
students. And studying in mathematics means long hours, isolated from
the community, and solving problems; a disciplinary regime quite similar to
a monk’s, but instead of solving mathematical problems, a monk prays in
communion with the christian God. But both a diligent mathematician and
a pious monk have reached their particular states of consciousness without
resorting to ritual dance or psychoactive substances as a shaman would have:
they have domesticated their altered states of consciousness through extensive
and persistent practice.
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Figure 2.13: Experimental design and structure. (a) A diagram of the stone
knapping process. The hammerstone strikes the core with the goal of pro-
ducing a flake. The platform edge and angle are important to the success of
knapping. (b–f) The five learning conditions. (g) The structure of the ex-
periment. For each condition, six chains were carried out (four short and two
long); one of two trained experimenters started each chain (equally within
each condition). (Both figure and text taken from [330, p. 2]).
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Figure 2.14: The two spectra of consciousness: (1) “normal consciousness”
that drifts from alert to somnolent states, and (2) the “intensified trajectory”
that leads to hallucinations [287, p. 125].
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Chapter 3




In the summer of 2011 I was for a month in Moscow in a preliminary en-
gagement with potential sources of data, mainly archival. The first member
of staff employed in the Lomonosov University (MGU) I came across was a
mathematical physicist around 40 years old, who was running a laboratory
on computational weather models. That was not his specialty; he had spe-
cialised in quantum physics, the so-called “string theory,” in particular, a very
arcane mathematical subject. We arranged a meeting at the park in front of
the Main Building, and I was keen on meeting him, thinking about what kind
of questions to ask him about the MGU. . . . I met with Aleksei 1 at around
twelve o’clock at noon, under the discreet gaze of Lomonosov’s statue. The
sky was clear of any clouds, and the sun was shining with a nice complacent
grin. We greeted each other, exchanged the customary ceremonial courtesy
of enquiring on each other’s health and general state of mind, and we began
walking towards a direction he seemed to be familiar with. We went into the
building of physics, located on the left front side of the Main Building, he
showed me his laboratory, along with the small-scale supercomputer main-
frame he was using to run his weather models, and then we decided to go for
a walk to Sparrow Hills, a very well known and popular natural park along
the Moskova river, fifteen to twenty minutes’ walk from the main campus.
After a rather interesting walk filled with discussion and argumentation of
academic nature we reach the Sparrow Hills park and begin walking down
towards the river bank. We get to the bank where there are lots of people
strolling up and down: a mother pushing a baby cart ahead and talking to
her hands-free mobile, a grandpa with his two grandchildren listening to his
stories, a few young couples walking hand in hand and occasionally kissing
each other, some youths, probably university students, lying on the grass,
talking loudly and arguing over some subject, football teams I think. We
buy beers from a street vendor, walk a few meters, find some free place
and sit down on the grass. As we discuss, at some point the topic of the
conversation gets to string theory and while Aleksei is trying to formulate
1This is not his real name.
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an idea, or rather acquire a better view of what he already knows, of a
superstring in a ten-dimensional (geometrical) space, he uses his hands, as if
he really held a string between his extended fingers. He then moves slowly
each hand away from the other, while grasping with his extended fingers,
thumb, index, and middle, a “real” and “material” string, which is sliding, at
the same time, between his grasping fingers (see Fig.). During his thinking
aloud I am closely following his train of thought, while at the same time I
can “look at” this “concrete” superstring sliding through his grasping extended
fingers, as he moves away slowly one hand from the other.
This seemingly unimportant incident, which actually prompted the previous
chapter, leads to some very interesting observations-questions. It seems that
conversations, and in fact every single conversation, to be related to the flow
of time, or rather, to be a cinematic movie, with the interlocutors “watch-
ing” the unfolding scenes, while at the same time each one and all of these
participators“direct” their own scenes. The hand movements, along with the
voice intonations play a major role in that. Assuming that any conversa-
tion is indeed a cinematic film, then who are the protagonists, who are the
screenwriters, and who are the “material” film producers? If there are discus-
sions on music or on dance, then what exactly the spectators-directors “see”,
and especially “watch”? Focusing our attention to mathematical discussions,
lectures, or workshops a certain very important and pressing question draws
itself forward: how are Hilbert spaces, that is, infinite-dimensional modern
versions of the ancient Greek Euclidean geometrical spaces, being conceived
and communicated through proofs? How is it possible to conceive these kind
of infinite-dimensional objects using only up to three-dimensional artefacts,
such as paper sheets, black boards, or solid maquettes? In the “superstring
incident,” the superstring materially, simply, did not exist, but the mathe-
matician describing it, along with the listener watching it, would argue to
the contrary. The author would actually redescribe the whole incident as
a case of an everyday-practised shamanism: the superstring along with its
ten-dimensional space was a shamanistic vision, which, at the same time was
certainly not an instance of psychotic hallucination, which would persist over
time. Or was it?
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3.2 The Movement of the Mind
Southern Italy, besides its traditional cuisine, is very famous for the hand
gestures its people use in everyday conversations. Hollywood has repeatedly
used this fact in many films depicting the deeds and misdeeds of organised
crime figures of Italian descent, both real and fictional ones. In Fig.3.1 we
see three scenes with Robert De Niro, a well known actor who has repeat-
edly impersonated fictional American crime figures of Italian descent. De
Niro himself is partly of Italian descent, and grew up in Brooklyn. As part
of his performaces, in order to perform as realistically as possible, he has
been combining in a very consistent and flowing manner Brooklyn American
English accent, which is usually associated with New Yorkers of lower social
status, 2 along with a lot of Italian-descended gestures. But besides the po-
tential ethnic origins of a gesture, some things seem to be universal. On the
left screen shot, although we cannot listen to the dialogue, from the hand
gestures we can deduce that probably De Niro is talking about something
related to him, such as “Why are you doing this to me?”, or "I did so much for
you, and you double-cross me?”, and so on. On the upper right picture, we
can clearly see that De Niro addresses his words to another speaker, such as
“You are a very clever fella!”, or “Careful, you’re walking on a fine line here!”,
and so on. But what is interesting for this thesis is the third screen shot,
which quite eloquently summarises the argument of this chapter.
On the lower right screen shot we see De Niro with Ray Liotta 3 sitting
opposite at a table. Their hands are leaning against the table and De Niro
holds from a corner a pack of paper sheets with the fingers of his left hand.
De Niro seems to be talking and Liotta seems to be listening. From a first
look, although these postures and this momentary glimpse of hand gestures
seem quite usual in everyday life, there is actually one point asking for further
clarification. From a biological point of view, both of their bodies are resting,
partly on the chairs, through sitting, and partly on the table through their
2See the grounbreaking [263] for the various New York City accents and their relation
to social status.
3This screen shot is from GoodFellas, directed by Martin Scorsese.
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Figure 3.1: Robert De Niro: scenes from various films. His hand gestures
can be clearly seen.
lower arms. It does not, therefore, make any sense, from a biological point of
view, that De Niro is holding out a pack of papers with one of his hands, since
this complicates his body balancing; he has to exert extra effort, that is more
energy, to keep his upper body in an upright position. This contradiction
can be easily solved if we assume that this pack of papers is actually part
of De Niro’s statement: either, for example, the pack itself is important, or
using the pack’s size to emphasize his point, or maybe both. So what we
could conclude from this screen shot is that the conversation can be actually
about something not visible to us, and since the body expends more energy
than it would be required normally from a simple sitting position, means
that actually gestures, on the face of it, are actually more important than
generally thought, and actually gestures can involve artefacts as well.
If instead of a paper pack, De Niro was holding out a chalk, like the one used
in mathematics classrooms, he could have used it in a similar way, to point
to something, or to emphasize something he says. And the importance of an
artefact, at least a portable one such as a piece of chalk, or a mobile tele-
phone, for example, is that it can be used as pointer to something, or rather
in a (linguistically) pragmatic way, as an extension of a hand gesture. So the
problem which is going to concern us in this chapter is the use of artefacts
and mathematical symbols as utterances, rather than sentences. The main
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“difference between sentences and utterances is that sentences are abstract,
not tied to contexts, whereas utterances are identified by their contexts”
([192, p. 6]) And a mathematical proof, no matter how abstract it seems to
be, is actually anchored on social context: written language along with spe-
cial symbols employed by mathematicians actually record the social objects
created during the course of a discussion between mathematicians, or during
instruction in the classroom. And the recording artefacts, such as written
language on a published paper, or on the blackboard, have the same effect
as sound language and hand gestures on human working consciousness, that
is the consciousness at the time of a social interaction. The fact that this
holds for both high school Euclidean geometry, which is easily accessible to a
lay person, and for modern infinite-dimensional geometry, which is accessible
only to professional working mathematicians, only enhances the argument:
there are many self-taught mathematicians in ancient Greek Euclidean geom-
etry, but almost none in infinite-dimensional geometrical spaces, the bread
and butter of modern quantum physics. Class instruction, a purely social
event, becomes extremely important in the understanding of very advanced
mathematics. Even child prodigies 4 have to be introduced at some point to
mathematics, and this introduction is always going to be some kind of social
event.
Hand gestures are actually not restricted to humans. There is a lot of ongoing
research on gestures of nonhuman primates (see Fig.3.2). Extending gesture
research to nonhuman primates, however, poses some new challenges as to
how can a gesture be distinguished from instrumental actions such as throw-
ing or pushing an object. Primate ethologists, for example, have considered
hand clapping in chimpanzees [441, p. 141], or chest beating in gorillas [358,
p. 100] as gestures (see [78] for a more detailed view of recent research on
nonhuman primates). From a more practical point of view a primate gesture
could be classified as such as to “whether (i) it is motorically ineffective, (ii)
there is response waiting, (iii) gaze alternation, and (iv) persistence” [290,
p. 119]. There are however differences between humans and nonhuman pri-
4Probably one of the most well known “celebrity” child prodigies in mathematics today
is the Australian mathematician Terence Tao (see also [193]).
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Figure 3.2: Left: An adolescent bonobo male making sexual advances to a
female adds the arm raise gesture. Right: A juvenile chimpanzee tries to
reclaim food that a dominant has taken away by combining the reach out up
begging gesture with a scream vocalization .[365, p. 8185, emphasis in the
original]
mates in their gesturing. Human infants, for example, are generally known to
point in order to share attention with an adult to an object, to show towards
the direction of an object, or to instruct an adult to do something for them
[292]. Apes, on the other hand, while they do deploy imperative pointing
gestures [76], that is, gestures requesting for something such as food, they do
not engage in declarative gesturing mode, that is, gestures leading to shared
attention [77] (see also [440]). Despite the various differences among humans
and nonhuman primates, there are actually many commonalities in gestur-
ing. These commonalities have led to the suggestion that gestures predate
speech from an evolutionary perspective [172, 357], a suggestion which seems
to be supported by both neurobiological evidence and the the mirror-neuron
hypothesis [106, 448]. In humans, in particular, there is a common neural
substratum between gestures and speech [30, 417, 470]. There is, on the other
hand, the view that language and gestures co-evolved, and none predates the
other and it is based on a mirror neuron ‘twist’, the so-called Mead’s loop:
“[t]his ‘twist’ is what we hypothesize evolved – a new kind of response, a
self-response to one’s own gestures via mirror neurons” [320, p. 66].
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No matter what the origin of language may be, whether gestures predate
speech or the reverse, or whether tool construction predates language or not,
as examined in the first chapter, one important fact remains unchanged:
speech, gestures and materiality are based on a common neural substratum.
Their relationship is so deeply ingrained into human cognition, that ignor-
ing this fact can undermine the social, and indeed the whole of scientific
enterprise. There is no science without artefacts, whether these be labora-
tory, scientific article, or even discussions. Human voice is, in fact, a totally
neglected artefact, whose material, like the material of any artefact, is some-
thing prevalent: the surrounding air. Just because we are very well equipped
biologically to handle draughts of air, by producing artificial wind called
breath and voice, does not necessarily mean that we are not affected by it.
Our whole respiratory system is our third arm, and our mouth is our third
hand. We cannot simply ignore this fact in the social sciences just because it
is not a current research trend, and just because the university departments
of the social sciences have not included in the curriculum other disciplines
such as biology, archaeology, or cognitive science. Materiality is enough ac-
tually to undermine the illusion of direct observation: what exactly is being
observed in the social sciences? The ethnographic notes of a field researcher
are second-order observations, that is, observations of observations, not first-
order observations; class instruction is second-order observation, not direct
observation; even a scientific article is based on second-order observation by
simply citing other past articles. Philosophical treatises and religious expe-
rience, the most abstract or transcendental of experiences are second-order
observations: books along with instruction are being observed in order to
reach the ‘next’ level of knowledge or experience. The first step to penetrate
this materiality-observation circle is to start first with hand gestures, that is,
the organic materiality of knowledge.
Gesture studies, actually, can be traced back to Roman antiquity, when the
Roman rhetorician Quintilian wrote his treatise on oratory ([372]; see also
[133]). Since then many authors over many periods of Western history have
dealt with gesture as a subject of a treatise (see [239, p. 17–83]). The most
important development in gesture studies was, in fact, outside of the so-
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cial sciences: the inventions of photography and cinema. With photograpy,
and later with cinematic technology, researchers were in position to collect
material data, that is, data ignoring the ravages of time, available to the sub-
sequent generations of researchers by means of proxy observation, and most
importantly: materiality rendered data a sense of objectivity. One of the pi-
oneers in post-war gesture studies was David Efron (see [138]). Although no
film data have been found, Efron’s “important analyses of the different ways
in which gesture can be employed with speech owe much to the fact that he
was able to employ film” [240, p. 19]. Gregory Bateson also was one of the pi-
oneers in photographic data collection for the social sciences in his field work
in New Guinea [33]. Bateson, actually, later commented that “human kinesic
communication, facial expression and vocal intonation far exceed anything
that any animal is known to produce” [34, p. 614–615]. A major influence
in gesture studies, a rather unexpected one, was Noam Chomsky’s language
acquisition device, a conjectured brain module which helps a child develop
and internally represent “a generative grammar [...] on the basis of [personal]
observation of what we may call primary linguistic data” [91, p. 25], that is,
on the basis of the child’s personal linguistic experience and interaction with
his or her social mileu. Chomsky proposed, in other words, that language
acquisition is, in fact, a biologically predisposed human ability. Although
he has gradually abandoned this particular theory in favour of a Universal
Grammar (see, for example, [402, esp. p. 1–30]), the idea behind Chomsky’s
proposal still remained the same: children are born with the ability to learn
language.
Gestures were actually first studied systematically in connection with phonol-
ogy [236]. A segment in linguistic phonology is “any discrete unit that can
be identified, either physically or auditorily, in the stream of speech” [108,
p. 426]. The word “laugh”, for example, as we can see from its phonetic tran-
scription in Oxford’s Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, that is [la:f], consists
of three sound segments, while the word “leisure” consists of four segments,
in the case of standard American English, i.e. [l"i:Z@r], and three to four
segments in the case of standard British English, i.e. [l"eZ@(r)], depending
on whether a vowel or consonant or no sound follows. It is rather obvious
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that there is not always a one-to-one correspondence between the wrtitten
spelling of a word and its corresponding sound segments in actual speech.
Sound segments are, in fact, more important for gesture studies, since they
are among the first material modalities of language that a child learns, along
with hand gesturing. Analysing the fundamental sound segments is still not
enough. The word “leisure,” for example, consists of two syllables, as we can
see from its phonetic transcription, either its American or its British version.
The word “Aberdeen,” as we can see from its (standard British) phonetic
transcriprion [Ab@d"i:n] consists of three syllables, but of two feet, that is,
of two “phonological constituent[s] above the syllable and below the word”
[196, p. 214]; the two feet of the word “Aberdeen” are [Ab@] and [d"i:n], “the
middle syllable [of which] is very much shorter than either the first or the
third, both of which occur in the strong position of a foot” [196, p. 215]. A
foot is distinct, in general, by its two syllables: one strong and one weak, and
its name derives from metric poetry. In fact there is a phonological hierarchy
involved in speech utterances (see Table 3.1).
It is important to analyse the phonological hierarchy of speech along with that
of hand gestures, in order to proceed to a more detailed analysis of gestures.
The basis of phonological analysis used in gesture studies is the tone unit,
which corresponds to the phonological phrase in the previous diagram, as de-
scribed, for example, in [109](see also [196, p. 246–261] and [195, p. 296–320]
and the references therein for a technically more detailed analysis). Tone,
as well as stress, and prosody, are the suprasegmental, or non-segmental,
elements of speech, and they are more important for gesture analysis, be-
cause they organise the units of meaning during speech. The basis of a tone
unit is the nuclear syllable, which bears the nuclear tone, that is, “the most
prominent pitch movement in the tone-unit” [109, p. 25]. Additionally, the
“boundary features [of a tone unit] may comprise a marked shift in pitch, var-
ious types of pause, and modifications to the final phonetic segments in the
unit” [p. 25]. If we denote the nuclear tone with small capitals, the contours
between the tone units with a vertical dash, i.e. “|”,5 then the sentence in the
previous diagram can be written as: “many pupils |were slow |to respond”.
5This notation is employed from [109] for reasons of clarity.
94
Depending on what the speaker wants to emphasize, the intonation between
them can vary:
• Űmany pupils |Ůwere slow |to respond : this intonational phrase would
most probably emphasize the big number of pupils;
• many pupils |Űwere slow |Ůto respond : this intonational phrase would


























Table 3.1: Phological Hierarchy (taken from [196, p. 246]):
It has to be emphasized, at this point that the above observations are always
dependent on the speaker’s intonational customs and habits, and are not
universally observed. Moreover, if the speaker is of foreign descent, and his
or her speaking language is not his or her native one, then the intonational
organisation of his or her speech can be that of the native languange, or a
mixture of the native and the later acquired one and so on. It has been found,
for example, that modern Rioplatense Spanish, that is, the Spanish dialect
spoken in Buenos Aires, has intonational patterns very similar to Italian, or
rather, to Neapolitan Italian, a fact attributed to the great number of Ital-
ian immigrants to Argentina since the 19th century [99]. In the case of this
thesis, the interviewees were speaking, while gesturing, either in Russian, or
in English with Russian or a mixture of Russian-North-American intonation.
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Despite the different intonational customs. though, the nuclear-tone into-
national model is the standard model accepted today by modern linguists
in speech analysis across the majority of modern languges, and that is the
model employed in this thesis, as well. In the case of Russian, the stan-
dard nuclear-tone model describing the intonational organisation of Russian
speech is that of Bryzgunova [71, p. 772–778], which identifies seven intona-
tional constructions around the tonal centre of a phrase, and is widely used
in teaching Russian as a foreign language.
Corresponding to the previously mentioned phonological hierarchy, there is
a gesture hierarchy (see Table 3.2). The gesture stroke is the most prominent








Table 3.2: Gesture Hierarchy (taken from [321, p. 209]):
and visible part of a hand gesture; that is what is commonly perceived as
a gesture. Before the stroke there is the preparation phase, during which
the hand starts moving from a resting position towards a position in front
the speaker’s gesture space, and after the stroke, during the retraction (or
recovery) phase the limb (or limbs) return to its (their) original resting po-
sition. Both the preparation and the retraction phases are not obligatory
during a gesture excursion. A gesture hold is “any temporary cessation of
movement without leaving the gesture hierarchy (in contrast to a rest, which
means exiting the hierarchy)” [318, p. 83]. A gesture phrase is constituted by
a stroke phase and optionally by the preparation and retraction phases, pos-
sibly along with various holds, which temporarily envelop each stroke. Many
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gesture phrases constitute a gesture unit. A gesture unit is dinstinct from a
gesture phrase in that it starts from a resting position of the limb (or limbs)
and finishes with a return to a resting position. Moving up in the hierarchy,
consistent head movements enclose the gesture units of relevant themes of
meaning. Finally consistent arm and body posture along with simultaneous
discourse correspond approximately to a “paragraph” of speech and body
motion ([321, p. 210]). If we move back to speech (i.e. phonological) hierar-
chy, and follow Kendon’s original article [236, p. 184–190], we can see that
the nuclear tone of a tone unit, i.e. of a phonological phrase, corresponds to
the gesture stroke of a gesture phrase. Gesture phrases on the other hand,
“coincide with and tend to be semantically coherent with the units of phasal
meaning or ‘idea units’ expressed in the tone units” [239, p. 126]. A ges-
ture unit corresponds to a (spoken) locution, that is, a group of tone units,
which “tends to correspond to a complete [grammatical] sentence [... and] it
is separated by a distinct pause from any immediately preceding locution”
[236, p. 85]. Higher in the hierarchy is the locution group, i.e. a sequence
of locutions, and at the highest level of the hierarchy is the locution cluster
(See Table 3.3). Although phonological analysis will not be employed in the
Table 3.3: Kinesic and Phonological Hierarchies Combined (taken from [318,
p. 85]).
Kinesic Hierarchy Phonological Hierarchy
Consistent Arm Use and Body Posture Locution Cluster
Consistent Head Movement Locution Group
One Gesture Unit [One] Locution
One Gesture Phrase Tone Group [Unit]
One Stroke Most Prominent [Nuclear] Syllable
text, it is important for the transcription process of gestures (see the Dun-
can Coding Manual in [319, p. 264–272]). Simply put, a linguistic utterance
has one visual and one auditory component, and this “semantically coherent
gesture–speech ensemble is a speaker achievement” [239, p. 127, emphasis in
the original].
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These ealy observations of gesture and speech coordination [103, 104, 236,
237] were later proposed by McNeill to be two modalities of “outer speech”
which are both produced by a conjectured common process of “inner speech”
[317]. McNeil has stated that his aim was to formulate a theoretical frame-
work which “[a]t a minimum ... should explain how speech, which is linear
through time, is related to the type of thinking that we see exhibited in the
simultaneous gesture, thinking that is instantaneous, imagistic and global –
analog rather than digital” [318, p. 11]. Since this chapter will be utilising
McNeill’s conceptual framework, its elaboration, and justification, will be
left for later on in the text. In a similar fashion Kita has proposed his Infor-
mation Packaging Hypothesis to account for the coordination of speech and
gesture [245]. According to Kita, two modes of thinking are involved in the
coordination of speech and gesture: analytical thinking and spatio-temporal
thinking. Analytic thinking organises information through conceptual tem-
plates whose activation “does not necessarily involve activation of ‘peripheral’
modules such as visual, tactile, and motoric modules, or ‘non-combinatoric’
modules such as affect” (p. 164). Spatio-motoric thinking, on the contrary,
organises information “according to the features of the environment” which
is “normally employed when people interact with the physical environment,
using the body (e.g., the interaction with an object, locomotion, and imitat-
ing somebody else’s action).” Spatio-motoric thinking, in its turn, creates
an imaginary “virtual environment” within which gestures are enacted vir-
tual [bodily-kinesthetic] actions. The speech -gesture coordination emerges
as an effort and accomplishment of the speaker. De Ruiter has extended
Levelt’s linear model of information processing during the speaking process
[282, p. 1–28] and has proposed a sequence of stages of speech and gesture
production, during which each stage is conducted by a separate cognitive
module [399]. The main extra module de Ruiter has added is the Gesture
Planner, which processes gestural information, along the Formulator, which
is the module responsible for speech processing. According to de Ruiter the
Gesture Planner and the Formulator process information simultaneously and
independently of each other.
There are, on the other hand, some researchers who have asserted that the
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function of gestures is that of communicative assistance to, rather than full
participation in, an utterance. Freedman and Bucci, for example, have pro-
posed that “such [hand] such movements may aid in marking logical or gram-
matical relations, reducing the heavy load on short-term memory involved
in generating spoken sentences” [72, p. 621]. They suggest, in other words,
that people are gesturing, in order to buy some milliseconds to organize their
speech utterances which are to follow. Moreover gestures are employed for
their parsing abilities, that is, they act as visual punctuation marks organis-
ing syntactic aspects of discourse [155, 156, 157] (see also [390]). The associ-
ation between gestures and pauses has also been examined, and it has been
proposed that “when retrieval of the phonological word form delays speech
output, the gesture onset occurs in the silent pause preceding the word” [74,
p. 172] (see also [73, 200]). It has also been strongly advocated that hand
gestures could facilitate lexical retrieval and corresponding cognitive models
have been proposed as to that [257, 258, 259]. In one particular experiment,
for instance, conducted to test the correlation between muscular activity
and lexical retrieval, participants were given a certain number of words to
identify, while their Electromyographic muscle activity was measured and
recorded. The researchers “found high rates of gesturing in narrative speech
during clauses with spatial content” [331, p. 422]. While the communicative
effect of hand gestures, in general, cannot be rejected altogether, the mod-
els proposed by authors emphasizing this communicative effect, they seem,
nevertheless, to be “best suited for situations in which there are observers
who are watching others talking [... rather than] suited to the situation of
face-to-face interaction” [238, p. 194]. As to the question of when, rather
than if, gestures communicate a message, the answer “depends on a num-
ber of factors, including whether the speech they accompany is about motor
information, whether the gestures convey additional task-relevant informa-
tion not present in speech, and whether the beneficiaries of the gestures are
children or adults” [221, p. 312].
In fact there is a lot of accumulated evidence pointing to the view that that
speech and gestures are bound together in linguistic utterance. We have
already seen in earlier paragraphs, for instance, that neurobiological and
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neurophysiological experimental “data suggest that comprehension of both
[spoken and gestural] forms of communication is supported by a common,
largely overlapping network of brain regions” although “[t]he neural architec-
ture may differ dramatically at more complex linguistic levels” than those
isolated and studied in laboratories [470, p. 20667–20668] (for a more recent
overview see [209]). Moreover, it has been proposed that words spoken while
executing a gesture, may become one unitary with the aforesaid gesture” [47,
p. 189]. Psychological experiments of delayed auditory feedback (DAF), that
is, “the experience of hearing your own voice continuously echoed back” [318,
p. 273], have demonstrated that although the flow of speech during DAF is
seriously disrupted, the synchrony between gestures and speech remains vir-
tually intact (p. 273–283). Experiments with blind children have revealed
that congenitally blind children do gesture during narration, and they “use
gesture in the same ways sighted children do” [226, p. 464]; children blind
from birth have never seen gesturing and could not possibly imitate them,
or use them intentionally as an extra communication channel. A rather
intriguing argument comes from research on phantom limbs, that is, “the
vivid impression that [an amputated] limb is not only still present, but in
some cases, painful” [377, p. 1603]. Although originally phantom limbs where
viewed as a mental disorder, it was later discovered that limb amputation
in adult primates causes massive changes in the cortical organisation of the
brain and in the neural representation of the body image within the brain
[366] (for a more recent overview see [149, 150]). This post-amputation cor-
tical reorganisation causes phantom limb experiences in the absence of any
corresponding sensory data. Moreover, there have been reports of phantom
limb patients who experience on a regular basis hand gesturing while talking
[376, p. 41], pointing to the fact that “intentions create the sensations of ges-
tures when no motion is possible” [319, p. 244], which can be explained only
if we assume that there is a common neural mechanism organising speech
and gestures simultaneously.
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3.3 The Faces of a Generic Polynomial
One of the interviewees was specialised in algebraic geometry, a branch of
mathematics (in fact an independent scientific field today) that tries, or
rather began as an attempt, to connect polynomials, their zeros and their ge-
ometrical properties. The interview took place in his office, in the university
building, and occasionally there were some interruptions. The part of the
interview which interests us at this point is when he started explaining what
his theory was about. I asked him, in particular, to explain a little bit a part
of his theory on Newton polynomials, and then informed him that I knew
already some algebraic geometry: algebraic curves, in particular, which I had
done a bit as an undergraduate in mathematics. This information was rather
crucial in his explanation, because it relieved the interviewee from having to
explain to a non expert what is an algebraic curve, and made him focus rather
on explaining this to a beginner mathematician. In other words, the effort
to use lay metaphors to explain something technical to a non expert was
spared, and instead his oral exposition was an explanation to a mathematics
student, that is, technically a bit elevated. This kind of question was posed
in order to record his technical explanation while he was gesturing. The use
of the camera helped capture this coordination between speech and gesture,
and the purpose was to try to get a glimpse on the cognitive processes tak-
ing place simultaneously with the speech and the gestures. In rather simple
terms, the main idea behind talking while gesturing is this: when someone
tries to describe to someone else a building which is located away from the
place of the interlocutors, then she is using gestures as a method of describ-
ing the shape or the architecture of the building; that is common knowledge.
The building is absent, it exists though in the interlocutors’ imagination, or
rather, an imaginary building is being constructed on the spot. If both of the
interlocutors are non architects, then their explanation is less detailed, but
understandable to each other. If, on the contrary, they are both architects
then their explanation is more nuanced and detailed, but still understandable
to each other. If one is a lay person and the other an architect, then this
poses an extra cognitive burden on the expert, as to how to explain some
things to a non expert, and, therefore, what kind of visual metaphors to use.
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I was more interested in a dialogue between experts.
The whole exposition, which was similar to a small lecture, was actually di-
vided into four parts, by the interviewee himself, and this was done on the
spot. The numbers in square brackets indicate the timer of the computer
program6 used to watch the interview on the author’s computer. The con-
tents of the interview, along with the fully transcribed first two parts of it
follow:
Part 1: [40:58–42:23] Short introduction;
Part 2: [42:24–44:56] Gives an example;
Part 3: [44:57–47:12] Describes the big picture of it;
Part 4: [47:13–47:20] Conclusion.
In the trancription that follows the following symbols are used ([319, p. 275–
277]):
/ : unfilled speech pause;
< · · · >: filled speech pause;
# : breath pause;
∗ : speaker self-interrupt, self-correction, or restart;
{. . . }: uncertain speech transcription;
% : nonspeech sound.
The interviewer’s interventions are denoted by “Me”.
Part 1:
[40:58–41:00] So you know maybe <er>
[40:00–41:05] consider generic polynomial a general polynomial of degree n
in k variables #
[41:06–41:10] And if you you can do this one thing you have /
[41:11–41:13] polynomial is a sum of mononomials
[41:13–41:17] Each monomial {had it all} degree and monomial /
[41:18–41:22] you know degree of monomial is kind of integral point in a lat-
tice
[41:23–41:27] For example you have ex one to kay one so on ex en to kay en
6That is vlc media player.
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Me: Hhm
[41:27–41:30] you can associate an integral point kay one kay en to it
[41:31–41:37] And polynomial of given degree is just sum of monomials
[41:37–41:41] and monomials corresponds to a point in simplex
Me: Hhm
[41:42–41:46] Some of coordinates are small {wikles} and en and all coordi-
nates are not negative #
[41:47–41:50] And integral points in it corresponds to #
[41:51–41:52] correspond to to this equation #
[41:52–41:57] But you can consider for example generic sum of monomials
<er>
[41:58–42:00] some monomials could be missing here #
Me: Yeah
[42:00–42:04] You can consider generic sum of them and it turns out that
[42:05–42:09] to such polynomial the most natural object one can associate
[42:09–42:13] is a convex hull of all these * of all these points
[42:13–42:15] this is a polyhedron
Me: Aha
[42:16–42:18] And you know #
[42:18–42:19] so let me show to you
Me: %cough
[42:19–42:22] Just, let me show to you two examples maybe the simplest one
Part 2:
[42:23–42:26] # Let us consider just polynomial of one variable
[42:26–42:29] this is a stupid example just to get you an idea of what it is
about
Me: Hhm
[42:26–42:32] # Take a polynomial of degree en
Me: Hhm
[42:33–42:34] In one variable #
[42:35–42:42] You have all monomials from degree zero to en so it will be
segment Newton polyhedron, will be segment from zero to en
Me: Hhm
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[42:43–42:50] # And one can ask well how many solutions equation pee at
ex
[42:50–42:52] ask how many solutions
Me: the usual problem
[42:52–42:54] Yeah the, the usual problem
[42:54–42:57] Yes, and if polynomial is generic
[42:58–42:59] you will have en different roots
[43:00–43:05] If it is not generic some roots can glue together and you will
have multiple roots
Me: Hhm
[43:06–43:10] # But for generic polynomials, for all polynomials but
[43:10–43:14] hypersurface and space of equations number {...} is the same
[43:14–43:20] and it is equal to en and en is just length of that segment #
Me: Hhm, hhm
[43:20–43:28] okay and let me show to you example which is in fact my theory
and which I would say sounds f* sounds funny
[43:28–43:31] Consider polynomial pee at ex wy is equal to zero #





[43:37–43:42] is, er, a, so, geometric object which one can associate to curve
[43:42–43:47] is this sphere with handles, a number of handles is, is a genus
of that curve
[43:47–43:52] Ok so consider generic polynomial with given Newton polygon
Me: Hhm
[43:52–44:02] One can ask, how many handles this curve will have for generic
equation with given Newton polygon, polygon?
Me: Hhm
[44:03–44:05] # And it turns out that the chance is that:
[44:05–44:11] count how many integral points are they strictly inside this
polygon
[44:11–44:18] And it turns out that number of these points is equal to number
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of handles of generic curve
Me: Aha
[44:19–44:21] And so on. So there is a lot of such things
Me: Yeah, yeah
[44:21–44:27] So if you will consider generic system of equations which pre-
scribe a Newton polyhedron
[44:28–44:35] it turns out that basically all discrete invariants from algebraic
geometry # can be found
[44:35–44:38] using geometry of these polyhedra.
[44:39–44:41] This geom* by geometry I mean
[44:42–44:51] say volume of this polyhedron mixed volume integral points
number in this polyhedron inside this polyhedron in this polyhredron com-
binatorics of this polyhedron Me: %cough
[44:52–44:55] So all these objects appear in the answers
Most of the interviewees refused to be video recorded. There were nine
video interviews recorded, but only three were useful for analysis. The most
common reasons were that the camera was not positioned properly, or the
recording started in the middle of the technical exposition. Three were rather
useful in the end: two in English and one in Russian. For an English-speaking
audience the interviews conducted in English would be more useful and in-
sightful, and therefore those two ones conducted in English were selected.
From these two interviews one was conducted in a quite technical explana-
tory way, because the interviewee was convinced that the interviewer was
proficient in the subject to be exposed, so he focused exclusively on the ex-
position of the technical results, rather than the way of how the exposition
itself was conducted; finally this interview was chosen to be presented in this
thesis. The other, although the interviewee was as well convinced that the
interviewer was proficient in the subject, he still presented the subject as if to
a lay person with the most probable reason being that his extensive teaching
experience was inducing him (unconsciously) to such an expository mode of
presentation; still though that presentation could be his everyday mode of
exposing, but to get to that deduction more acquaintanceship was necessary
than that provided by an hour’s interview.
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None of the interviewees were informed on the use of the video recorder be-
fore the interview. Some of them asked about the interview and its use, and
they were informed, among other things, on the use of the video recording
after the end of the interview. It was necessary during their technical expo-
sition that the interviewees did not know about gesturing and mathematics:
had they known that, then their flux of consciousness, the main subject of
research in this chapter, would have included both the imaginary geometrical
objects that the interviewees would be asked upon, as well as their imagi-
nary perception of themselves and of their gestural exposition; this double
inclusion would have been expressed in gestural idiom which could create
great difficulty in differentiating the geometrical-objects gestures from the
self-presentation gestures during gestural analysis.
There have been some other approaches in connecting mathematical concepts
and material “blackboard” technology (see [29]) but any type or level of tech-
nology, as long there is no artificial intelligence to substitute, even partly, for
the human nervous system, human hands will continue to be indispensable,
and therefore the only “natural” access points for an ethnographic approach to
consciousness and its structures. Even the famous British physicist Stephen
Hawking who has a motor neuron disease and is assisted by a speech gen-
erating device to communicate with the people around him, uses a special
keyboard which scans and detects his intentional, and almost imperceptible,
movements of the fingers. Another approach, a video-ethnography of class-
room mathematics has also been developed quite recently (see for example
[191]), but the author considers this method as focusing excessively on ma-
teriality that the ethnographer perceives, and not the user himself or herself.
Blackboard materiality, for example, acts as a temporary external memory,
always available to be mobilised in accordance to cinematic consciousness: it
is not an important factor in the formation of mathematical concepts, but
rather a material vehicle providing stability. The mathematician’s cinematic
consciousness, on the contrary, mobilises imaginary objects, invisible to an
ethnographer untrained and uninitiated in obscure mathematical concepts
represented materially by mathematical symbols. The mathematically un-
trained ethnographer’s attention is limited to the observation of material
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objects, since that consists representable evidence. What is necessary in this
case, as presented later in this section, is to record and examine not the ma-
teriality of objects, but the detailed movement of materiality while it follows
the executive commands from the brain in a patterned way. Moreover, in
the framework of this thesis, mathematicians, and in general any scientist,
does not “form” concepts: a mathematician sees concepts, a musician hears
concepts, a chef tastes concepts. The word “concept” itself is misleading as
well: it has been borrowed from philosophers whose source materiality is
rather textual, than visual, auditory, or gustatory.
The gestural analysis procedure to be followed here is McNeill’s method which
was as follows: McNeill let the subjects watch a popular cartoon, and then
asked them to narrate it to a listener. Then he video-recorded the narration
as well as the gestures. So he could connect the cartoon scenes with the
gesture. In this thesis a similar method was employed, with one difference.
The role of the (material) cartoons was played by research articles. While a
cartoon is understandable, or rather visible, by anybody, a research article,
along with its imaginary objects, is “visible” only by mathematicians. In or-
der, therefore, to proceed into a McNeillean gesture analysis the researcher
must have watched the source footage of the narrative. The procedure for the
transcription that was followed was that described in [319, p. 264–272], and
referred to as the Duncan Coding Manual. In particular, the whole interview
was watched without any annotating activity, in order to “develop an ini-
tial sense of ‘speaker’ style” [319, p. 264]. Then the interview segment under
consideration was transcribed in a very detailed way, “including partials and
unintelligibles”, as well as any perceptible sounds involved. Then the speech
segment was organised into utterances taking into consideration intonational
segments and grammatical syntax rules. Then the gesture phrases were iden-
tified in combination with intonation. The kinesic and semantic annotation
of gestures was done using mainly McNeill’s division into iconic, metaphoric,
deictic, and beat dimension of a gesture [p. 38–44].
The video camera used to take the interviews was a Flip Video camcorder
by Cisco Systems Inc. with a tripod. The software that was used for the
analysis and editing of the video recordings were the cross-platform media
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player VLC by the VideoLAN project, the vector graphics editor Inkscape
by The Inkscape Team, and the raster graphics editor GIMP by The GIMP
Development Team. The VLC media player can play video with audio at
25% of the original speed, which is important for gesture analysis. The
computer operating system on which the editing was conducted was the Linux
distribution Fedora 20 by Red Hat Inc. All the software is open-source and
can be downloaded by anyone free of charge.
1. [consider gene] [ric polynomial general poly] [nomial of degree en] [in
kay variables #] – [00:01-00:07]
The camcorder during this gesture was not positioned properly and the ges-
ture phrases are visible only if one watches the video.
(A) [consider gene]
This is not exactly a gesture; it has only formally been included. The
speaker at this point raises his right hand extending his index finger at
the same time. The stroke, which is denoted in boldface, is a actually a
light scratch of the nose with the index finger. In Fig.3.3 we can see that
the preparation phase is not visible, due to the position of the camera
recorder. The preparation phase takes place between the left square
bracket and the beginning of the boldface, that is, just before the stroke
takes place.
Figure 3.3: Preparation phase of phrase 1A [clockwise].
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(B) [ric polynomial general poly]
In the preparation phase, the right arm along with the hand after the
index’s light scratch of the nose begin to descend towards the desk sur-
face. The palm opens and remains close to the right side of the torso
until it touches the desk surface.
When the whole arm touches, but not leaning against, the desk surface,
the arm, staying close and parallel to the desk surface, starts moving
diagonally along a straight-line trajectory towards the left-hand side of
the speaker: this is the point where the gesture stroke begins. The arm
remains close to the desk surface, and the palm is open and vertical to
the desk surface. The thumb is extended and pointing to the ceiling and
the surface of the right-hand palm faces towards the left-hand shoulder
as it is moving. Then when the tips of the fingers reach the middle of the
front chest area, the arm starts to retreat back to its original position,
that is, with the palm close to the right-hand side of the speaker’s lower
chest. At that point the palm still open becomes vertical while the
thumb is still extended and pointing to the ceiling (see Fig.3.4).
Figure 3.4: Stroke phase of phrase 1B [clockwise].
(C) [nomial of degree en]
During the preparation phase the hand moves a little bit more to the
right, while the palm is open and facing the left-hand side of the speaker,
vertical to the desk surface, and the thumb is extended pointing to the
ceiling (see Fig.3.5). Then there is a momentary hold of the gesture, and
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at the stroke phase the outer side of the palm, that is, the side where
the little finger lies, touches fast and lightly the desk surface.
Figure 3.5: Preparation phase of phrase 1C until the hold [left to right].
(D) [in kay variables #]
The palm is lifted again,while remaining vertical to the desk surface,
and moves a little bit more to the right of the speaker (see Fig.3.6), and
then lands and touches lightly again the desk surface while still vertical.
The stroke is denoted in bold face. The time interval between the end
of the bold face and the right square bracket is the retraction phase of
the gesture: the hand moves to a resting position. The retraction phase
is not visible because the camera at that moment was being corrected.
This denotes, in fact, the end of the semantic content of locution number
one.
Figure 3.6: Preparation phase of phrase 1D until the right-hand stroke down-
wards [left to right].
This locution could very well be the beginning of a mathematical theorem.
A generic polynomial p of degree n = 2 in k = 3 variables would be 7
p(x1, x2, x3) = x
2
1 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x
2
2 + x2x3 + x
2
3 + x1 + x2 + x3 + 1
7It is assumed for easier understanding that the coefficients of the variables are all
equal to one, as well as the constant coefficient. Otherwise more symbols would have to
be employed.
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or, in a different form, rather more “generic”,




























































that is, the addition of the power superscripts in each term (i.e. product)
of the polynomial is at most 2. The last generic polynomial could also be
written as:





xnii , [n1, n2, n3 = 0, 1, or 2],
where
∑
is the sum of the products
∏
. A generic polynomial, therefore, of
degree n in k variables would be written as











help to put the limited space of a sheet of paper,
or of the blackboard, under some control. The speaker has obviously this
in mind, and since a great portion of his career, that is, many hours of his
every day life, have been devoted to writing down polynomials, he can easily
handle symbols in his mind. However we can still see that he uses gestures to
make, or express, his point. Since, so far, the gestures are not conventional,
as is, for example, the case with the OK sign when holding the fist tight with
the thumb extended, we can say that he uses the gestures according to his
individual idiom, rather than based on a common gestural code.
It has to be borne in mind, at this point that the speaker is talking about
generic polynomials, and the listener is listening about polynomials. In other
words the speaker uses his voice, that is, sounded air, to induce a certain
state of consciousness on the listener, the result of which is the cognitive
understanding of the idea of a generic polynomial. The listener can easily
be induced into that state of consciousness since he is a former postgraduate
student of mathematics. This state of consciousness is usually experienced
as memory, which can take, for example, the form of the appearance of men-
tal images accompanied by a sense of profound familiarity. Familiarity with
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particular mathematical concepts means that this particular mathematical
knowledge has become something very personal, something domestic, some-
thing like a daydream on command.
Going back to locution 1, gesture phrase 1A has been included only formally,
since it involves a movement of the hand, without any particular meaning
related to the locution. Gesture phrase 1B is a very interesting one indeed:
the right hand moves diagonally from the right-hand side of the speaker’s
chest, left and forward to the middle of the front chest area, while the palm
remains open and vertical to the desk surface, and the thumb is extended
upwards, and then goes back to its original position, close to the right-hand
side chest. This hand gesture seems to divide the space into two parts, one
from the side of the palm, and the other from the dorsal side of the hand. This
is a metaphoric gesture and involves actually the geometry of polynomials: it
will become clear in a subsequent locution, where it will be employed again.
Gesture phrases 1C and 1D are beats: the open palm moves down and then
slightly up. Their main meaning here is that of a visual-gestural highlighter:
they highlight the degree of the polynomial, that is, n, and the number of
its variables, that is, k. They also function as punctuation marks, separating
these two phrases: 1C functions as a comma, and 1D functions as a full stop.
2. [and if you . . . .you. . . .you. . . .can. . . .do . . . .this. . . .one. . . . . .thing. . . . .you have // / ] – [00:08-00:12]
Locution 2, which is only one gesture phrase, comprises four phases. The
first phase, the preparation phase, starts when the right hand begins to
move from the previous resting position, that is, next to the right left lower
chest, towards the centre of the front chest area (see Fig.3.7). Preparation
phase happens between the left square bracket and the start of the dotted
underline. At the same time the hand forms a fist and the index and thumb
fingers are extended and their tips start touching each other. At the end of
the preparation phase, and the beginning of the hold phase, the extended
index and thumb while touching each other both point to the desk surface.
The hold phase is in fact a virtual hold : the whole hand, that is, fist as well as
index and thumb, shakes repeatedly and very lightly from left to right three
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times.8 The virtual hold phase is denoted on the text by dotted underline.
The stroke phase starts with the boldface and extends over to a pause in
speech denoted on the text with a slash “/”. Double slash “//” means a pause
while a stroke is taking place. At the beginning of the stroke, the index
extends, the thumb folds over the fist and then the finger tip of the extended
index touches the desk surface four times. At the end of the stroke phase a
proper hold phase starts: the fist is hanging still over the desk surface while
the thumb is folded over it and the index is extended and pointing towards
the desk surface. The proper hold phase is denoted on the text with dashed
underline. The hold continues over the speech pause.
From the start of the preparation phase on, the eye gaze of the speaker is
directed to the gesturing of the right hand, until the second proper hold
phase; when the second hold starts, the gaze is being directed somewhere to
the left area of the front chest space. In other words the speaker during the
second hold phase seems to rearrange his exposition. Before the second hold,
though, while he was looking down to the desk, the impression he gave off
was that he was about to write something. He was looking at an imaginary
sheet of paper, at an imaginary polynomial on the desk surface, and he was
trying to manipulate it appropriately in order to explain to the listener the
polynomials potential properties or its possible algebraic manipulation. In
other words, while there was only the empty desk surface present, he was
behaving as if something was written on it, or as if he himself could write on
it. Since the polynomial was imaginary, that is, there was no material trace of
it, as when written with white chalk on a blackboard, for example, the listener
could not get a material-symbolic grasp of the speaker’s thoughts. Since there
was a continuity in the presentation, actually one cannot be talking about
thoughts, as in a plural number of separable pieces of information, but one
should be talking about the flux of the speaker’s consciouness, which is in
fact a cinematic consciousness. The polynomials were all passing by in front
of the speaker; they were not visible by a third party because they were not
materially visible in a written form. They were, on the other hand, audible,
8A proper gesture hold occurs when the hand remains still for a few tenths of a second.
The frame rate of the video interviews was half a tenth of a second.
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due to the speaker’s [materially audible] voice, as well as visible as effects of
the gesture movements.
Figure 3.7: Preparation phase of locution 2 until the gesture hold [left to
right].
3. [polynomial is a sum] [of monomials #] – [00:12-00:15]
This locution comprises two gesture phrases. The hash sign “#” denotes a
breath pause.
(A) [polynomial is a sum]
The gesture begins with the stroke phase 9 The folded fist along with the
thumb folded around the fist is dangling above the desk surface twice
from left to right, while the index extended follows the fist’s movement
pointing to the desk surface (see Fig.3.8). The tip of the index figure
during the stroke follows a circular-like trajectory. Then the fist retracts
to a semi-resting position leaning against the lower front of the right-
hand side of the chest. The index remains half-extended during the hold
and the little-finger side of the fist touches the desk surface. The hold
is a proper hold, that is, the hand is not moving for a few tenths of a
second and is denoted on the text by dashed underline.
The gesture is a very close to a beat gesture, since it comprises only of
two movements twice. As a beat it highlights the semantic meaning of
the gesture phrase, that is, that a polynomial is a sum of monomials.
A monomial q of degree n in k variables is an algebraic product of the
form




2 . . . x
mk
n , m1 +m2 + · · ·+mn = n;
9The division into gesture phrases is always more or less arbitrary, since there is always
continuity of speech; even pauses are a vital element of conversation.
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A polynomial, therefore, is a sum of algebraic products of the above
form. Note at this point that the speaker quite often does not use the
English indefinite article “a”, as in “a polynomial”, that is, a representa-
tive of the class of polynomials. This occurs because occasionally he is
using Russian syntax. He is not a native speaker of English. In Russian,
as well as in Polish and Latin, there is no definite or indefinite grammat-
ical article. For example, in Russian one says “mathematician is writing”
meaning both “a mathematician is writing” and “the mathematician is
writing”. The accurate meaning is defined by the context.
Figure 3.8: Stroke phase of phrase 3A until the gesture hold [clockwise].
(B) [of monomials #]
The phrase begins with the stroke. The loose fist with the index pointing
towards the desk surface rotates and at the same time the palm opens
up. When the palm points towards the ceiling, with the fingers slightly
adducted, the hand moves downwards until its dorsal side touches the
desk surface. Then the gesture reaches a resting position (see Fig.3.9).
At this point the presence of the listener enters the scene. This ges-
ture is a communicative one, and it belongs to the so-called open hand
supinefamily of gestures.10The main characteristic of the palm-up ges-
ture family is that the palm is exposed to the interlocutor, and it has
10The other gesture family complementary to the Open Hand Supine family is the Open
Hand Prone family, that is, palm down (see [239, p. 248–283]).
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Figure 3.9: Stroke phase of phrase 3B until the gesture hold [clockwise].
been found to be used in some nonhuman primate species, as well. It
is used here because it complements the previous highlighting gesture
as an explanation of the whole locution, that is, that a polynomial, or
rather, any polynomial is a sum of monomials. It is a self-referential
gesture which refers back to what has just been said and at the same
time implicates the listener as to that reference. While a few seconds
ago the speaker was looking at an imaginary polynomial on the desk
surface, now he turns his attention to the listener, and therefore the
imaginary screen of his cinematic consciousness now projects the lis-
tener. At the same time the flux of the speaker’s consciousness is not
being interrupted at all; it just moves into a new cinematic scene.
4. [each monomial {...had it all} degree #] – [00:15-00:17]
This locution consists of one gesture phrase only and ends with a breath,
denoted by the hash sign “#”. The breath is included in the stroke. The
curly braces with the ellipsis denote unclear speech, and the words in the
curly brackets denote an approximation by ear of what that unclear speech
could be. During the preparation phase, the right-hand fist is raised from
the resting position (see Fig.3.10). As the fist is being raised, the index
and thumb fingers are being extended and start touching each other at their
tips, while their direction is downwards to the desk surface. Then the finger
tips perform a small circle as if holding a pencil and attempting to write
something, and start moving downwards to the surface until the adducted
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to the fist little finger and then the rest of the adducted fingers as well as
the finger tips of the extended and touching each other index and thumb all
touch the desk surface. Then, at the stroke, the finger tips of the extended
thumb and index„ while leaning against the desk surface, both press hard on
the surface.
Figure 3.10: Preparation and stroke phase of phrase 4 [clockwise].
This gesture is again a beat, that is, it emphasises again the importance of
the degree of the polynomial. We can also see from the figures of the last
gestures, that is locutions 3 and 4, that the left palm is leaning against the
desk surface open with the thumb extended in front of the chest area. It is
as if the left palm kept the desk surface stable to perform writing on it with
the right hand.
5. [and mono. . . . .mial . ./] [you know degree of monomial] [is kind of integral]
[point in a lattice] – [00:17-00:23]
The gesture here comprises four gesture phrases.
(A) [and mono . . . .mial. ./]
The gesture starts with a stroke and ends with a virtual hold, that is,
the hand moves almost imperceptibly back and forth over a few tenths
of a second and virtually remains still. The virtual hold is denoted
by dotted underline. At the beginning of the stroke the folded right fist
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starts to rise, while the index and thumb fingers are lightly abducted and
touching each other on the tips (see Fig.3.11). Then halfway through
the tips of the index and the thumb suddenly change direction and move
downwards fast while touching each other, and the whole fist follows
suit. Then it stops at about ten centimetres above the desk surface and
remains there for a while during the gesture hold. The stroke is fast and
lasts about fifteen frames, that is, three quarters of a second.11
Figure 3.11: Stroke phase and then hold of gesture phrase 5A [clockwise].
This gesture is very similar to a beat gesture, and again expresses the
emphasis and importance the speaker ascribes to a monomial, which is
an important component to a polynomial: it emphasises the importance
of it. From what immediately follows on, it appears that the speaker is
now thinking about some important property of a monomial that he is
about to describe it and connect it to the bigger picture.
(B) [you know degree of monomial]
This is another beat gesture which actually clarifies and emphasises the
previous locution phrase. At the beginning of the stroke, the finger tip
of the index, while the index is extended follows a circle-like trajectory
twice upwards and then downwards (see Fig.3.12). The trajectory is
first towards the chest, and then away from the chest. The thumb while
11One frame on this particular video interview is one twentieth of a second (0.05 seconds).
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extended in the previous gesture phrase, now it is folded on the fist, and
at the same time the fist follows the movement of the index finger tip.
At the end of the stroke, the index finger remains virtually still above
the desk surface in a lateral position. The fist still retains its shape.
The whole stroke lasts 1.4 seconds.
This beat gesture again emphasises, or rather draws attention to, the
fact that what is to follow briefly concerns the degree of the monomial
which is a special number with a particular mathematical property. The
movement over space of the index finger tip does not seem to play any
role at this point.
Figure 3.12: Stroke phase and gesture phrase 5B until hold [clockwise].
(C) [is kind of integral]
This is a beat gesture performed in a circular movement. At the begin-
ning of the stroke, while the right-hand fist is hanging above the desk
surface, and the index finger is abducted in a lateral posture and point-
ing towards the desk surface (see Fig.3.13), the index finger tip starts
to move in a circular way towards the chest, then upwards, and then
away from the chest and downwards until it remains still again for a few
tenths of a second.
This seems to be a beat gesture, that is, performed in in a two-way
movement upwards and downwards, emphasising the fact the the degree
of a monomial is an integral point. The circular movement of the finger
tip, that is, starting from a certain point above the desk surface, and
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Figure 3.13: Stroke phase of gesture phrase 5C until the hold begins [clock-
wise].
then returning to a position close to it, after having carved a circular
imaginary trajectory, seems to add a certain mapping movement to this
beat gesture: starting from the degree of the monomial we are then
transferred by means of the index finger tip to an integral point in a
lattice. The finger tip in other words is a kind of a pilot who picks
up the degree of the monomial and delivers it in a lattice-land on a
position of an integral point. This kind of imagery is more common
among algebraists: in an algebraic context quite ofen one talks about
mappings rather than functions. In Galois theory, for example, if a
certain polynomial can be “mapped” onto a certain permutation group,
then the corresponding polynomial equation can be solved using radicals.
(D) [point in a lattice]
At the beginning of the stroke, the right-hand fist hangs above the desk
surface with the index finger half-extended and pointing to the desk
surface (see Fig.3.14). As the stroke starts, the finger tip of the index
moves down fast until it touches the desk surface. Meanwhile the index
and the fist follow suit and move down. The index finger tip then,
after it touches the desk surface, pushes a little bit further the surface
downwards. The whole stroke lasts six video frames, that is, 0.3 seconds.
Then, when the gesture hold starts, the fist, the extended index finger,
remain still for a few tenths of a second while the index finger tip keeps
touching the desk surface.
This first thing we can say about this gesture phrase is that it is a
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Figure 3.14: Stroke phase of gesture phrase 5D until the beginning of the
hold [clockwise].
deictic one, that is, it points to an imaginary geometrical point on the
desk surface. That imaginary point on the surface is an integral point
belonging to a particular algebraic-geometrical set called a lattice. A
monomial of degree n in k variables




2 . . . x
mk
n , m1 +m2 · · ·+mk = n,
is usually written in a multi-index notation in algebraic geometry:
p(y) = yα,with y = (x1, . . . , xk), and α = (m1, . . . ,mk).
The point α = (m1, . . . ,mk) is actually a point in a k-dimensional space
with coordinates m1, . . . ,mk, and we can see that this particular point
lies somewhere on the desk surface, that is, where the index finger point
leans against at the end of the stroke. While the discussion is a discussion
on a general type of, “generic”, point, this imaginary point, although not
materially concrete, as is a point drawn by chalk on a blackboard, its
location is a rather concrete one: on the desk surface in front of the
speaker. Additionally α is an integral point, because its coordinates are
integer numbers.
This gesture phrase seems to be a beat gesture as well: while the first
movement of the index finger is moving down and touching the surface,
the second movement seems to be after the relaxation of the slight push
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on the desk surface: the finger moves down, touches the surface and con-
tinues moving down, but since the surface is hard and immovable, this
continuation of moving down becomes instead pushing down. Then the
second move of the beat is the moving back which becomes a relaxation
of the push. During the push the extended index seems to slightly bend
away from the fist. As a beat, therefore, we can say that it highlights
the importance of this integral point being in a lattice.
6. [ # for example you have ex one to . . .kay. . . . .one] [so on ex en to kay
en] – [00:23-00:28]
This gesture comprises two gesture phrases and is a very important one.
(A) [ # for example you have ex one to . . .kay. . . . .one]
The gesture starts with a stroke and then goes into a virtual hold denoted
by dotted underline. The speaker uses his finger as a pen and actually
proceeds into an imaginary writing down of the first term of a monomial
that is, as we saw previously. xm11 . In fact, what he writes down, if one
plays back and watches carefully frame to frame the video (one frame
in this video is every 0.05 seconds), is xk1. During the breathing in,
denoted in the text by “#”, the index finger moves lightly away from
the chest to the front and lands down on the desk, touching the desk
surface with the finger tip, about to start writing, as if the finger itself
were a pen (see Fig.3.15, top left screenshot). If we assume that the
letter “x” consists of two lateral lines, one slash “ / ” and one backslash
“ \ ” then we can clearly see the following: the speaker first carves an
imaginary slash, “ / ”, that is, the extended right-hand index finger, while
the finger tip is touching and sliding on the desk surface, moves from
an upper 12 right point on the desk surface, to a lower 13 left one along
a straight-line trajectory [top middle and then top right screen shots in
Fig.3.15]; after that the extended index finger raises a little bit above
the desk surface and moves a bit to the front away from the chest; then
12Upper meaning at a distance from the speaker’s lower chest.
13Lower meaning closer to the speaker’s lower chest.
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the extended index finger moves down to the desk surface again and
it carves an imaginary backslash, “\”, that is, the extended right-hand
index finger, while the finger tip is touching and sliding on the desk
surface, moves from an upper left point on the desk surface to a lower
right one along a straight-line trajectory (bottom right and then bottom
middle screenshots in Fig.3.15).
After carving an imaginary backslash “\” and then an imaginary slash
“ / ” crossing each other on the desk surface, that is, creating an imagi-
nary diagonal cross “X”,14 then the extended index rises from the desk
surface, goes to the right lower side of the imaginary “X” and draws an
imaginary small vertical line “|”, which is, in fact, the subscript 1 when
handwritten. Then the extended right-hand index rises again from the
desk surface, the finger tip moves upwards towards the right upper side
of the imaginary diagonal cross “X”, and lands there; then it starts carv-
ing an imaginary superscript small case “k” (bottom left screenshot in
Fig.3.15). If one plays this moment frame by frame, then it emerges
that actually the speaker carves an imaginary calligraphic “k” in three
strokes of his finger tip, that is, k or «. The loop of the calligraphic and
handwritten letter “k”, in other words, is very evident at this point. A
second less probable, but still plausible scenario, is that the third imagi-
nary finger stroke after the “loop” stroke might be the subscript 1 of the
superscript k1 in consonance with the speech locution.
(B) [so on ex en to kay en]
This gesture phrase comprises a stroke and a retraction phase. The
retraction phase is very short and it is performed in order to join the
left hand in a coordinated movement in the next gesture phrase. After
the hold of the previous gesture phrase, that is phrase 6A, the right hand
moves down towards the desk surface (Fig.3.16 top left screen shot) and
touches lightly the desk surface (top middle screen shot). Then the index
finger still extended moves up (top right screen shot), then to the right,
and then down again until the finger tip touches the desk surface again
(bottom right screen shot). Then again the finger tip moves up (bottom
14Like the Saltire on the national flag of Scotland.
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Figure 3.15: Stroke phase of gesture phrase 6A [clockwise].
middle screen shot), moves further to the right and lands down again to
the desk surface (bottom left screen shot), and attempts to write down
the last term of the generic monomial: carve an imaginary diagonal cross
“X”, then carve a subscript n and then a superscript kn. This time, if
one watches carefully frame by frame the video, the imaginary carvings
are not as accurate as in the previous 6A gesture phrase.
Figure 3.16: Stroke phase of gesture phrase 6B [clockwise].
By comparing the audio recording along with the video images of the
interview, it is inferred that in this gesture phrase the stroke is a visual-
semantic continuation of the previous one: the speaker uses again the
extended index as an imaginary pen, and his finger tip as the tip of
this imaginary pen. We can also infer that the first two touchdowns
of the finger tip are actually the ellipsis in the mathematical formula
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which is, in fact, the variables that are missing in the writing down of
the monomial for lack of space; he tries, in other words, to write down
“ . . . xknn ”, with one dot short during the gesture stroke.
The first thing we can notice in gesture phrases 6A and 6B is that while the
speaker talks earlier about a generic monomial of degree n in k variables, he
describes verbally its mathematical formula as
xk11 . . . x
kn
n
which, in fact, is a monomial in n variables, and of degree k1 + · · ·+ kn. His
explanation was an impromptu one, and that would be expected. It raises
though a question more important in mathematics: the written mathemat-
ical formulas and their memorisation. If the speaker had been writing on a
sheet of paper or on the blackboard he would have spotted his mistake and
corrected it; in fact this kind of mistake is a very simple one. If, on the
contrary, he was writing a very detailed and very long proof of a theorem,
such as that provided by the British mathematician Wiles in his proof of Fer-
mat’s Last Theorem, or by the Russian Perelman in his proof of Poincaré’s
Conjecture, then the written formulas become much more vital to mathe-
matical proof. The generic polynomial of degree n in k variables, during this
interview, is, in fact, a temporal object : it cannot be seen or heard, and its
existence depends purely on sound voice, and hand gestures; its existence
also depends on the memory retention abilities of the interlocutors after the
conversation has ended. Memory retention can be conscious, that is many
details later can be consciously recalled; or unconscious, that is, few or no
details can be recalled later on, apart from the remembrance of the event of
conversation.
A generic polynomial in a conversation is elusive as an object in itself. Even a
mathematical formula is only a material representation of it. The polynomial
can be perceived only in its material modalities: as a written formula, as a
geometrical graph, and so on. Moreover, in the case of mathematical innova-
tion, and actually in any kind of innovation, material representations are, at
first, absent, and only approximations of them exist. And this what has led
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twentieth-century mathematics to an explosion in mathematical innovation:
the mathematician proposes new entities; in the case of polynomial algebra
an example of these new entities were the “algebraic varieties”; then he or she
writes down some formula he or she thinks will improve his or her imagina-
tion, and then corrects himself or herself. At the time of invention, one could
suggest, materiality plays a secondary role: imagination has taken control,
and the formulas have only become imagination’s material prosthesis. At
this moment the only available objective means for a sociologist of science to
observe the process of innovation are only the mathematician’s gestures, his
or verbal descriptions, and the way he or she handles the relevant materiality,
such as written formulas. The new mathematical object is temporal, it oc-
cupies the flux of the mathematician’s cinematic consciousness, and changes
imaginary form all the time. The final innovation product is in fact not the
beginning or the middle of innovation processes but the end of it: that is the
moment when the imaginary reality acquires a material cloak and becomes
continuously visible.
7. [ # you can associate] [an integral point kay one kay en] [to it] –
[00:28-00:31]
This gesture consists of three gesture phrases.
(A) [ # you can associate]
During the brief retraction of the right-hand index finger in the previ-
ous gesture phrase 6B, the right-hand extended index finger to rises up
from the right to the left, while the left hand palm starts to rise from
left to right and approaches the left-hand index finger (Fig.3.17, top left
screenshot). The preparation phase of the gesture phrase 7A occurs dur-
ing the breathing in, denoted in the transcription by the hash sign “#”.
When the right-hand extended index finger, along with the right-hand
fist, reaches a high point in the front right-hand higher chest area, it
starts to descend towards the desk surface, while the left hand palm in a
reverse cup formation hovers above the desk surface (Fig.3.17 top mid-
dle screenshot). Then the extended right-hand index finger continues
to descend, the left-hand palm, still in a reverse cup formation, starts
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to descend until they both touch the desk surface (Fig.3.17, top right
screenshot). Then the left-hand palm, still in a reverse cup formation,
remains still, while the right-hand performs a gesture. The stroke of the
right hand consists of three parts: the index finger after the touchdown
begins to carve with the finger tip on the desk surface an imaginary
left parenthesis “ ( ” (Fig.3.17, top right screenshot); then the finger tip
rises again and moves over the desk surface to the right for a few frames
(Fig.3.17 bottom right screenshot), and then lands down again on the
desk surface. Then the finger tip, after the touchdown starts sliding
on the desk surface forming the trajectory of a right parenthesis “ ) ”
(Fig.3.17, bottom middle screenshot). When the right-parenthesis tra-
jectory finishes the finger tip stops there for a few screen shots.15 While
the right-hand index finger is standing on the finger tip, which, in its
turn, leans against the desk surface, the right-hand fist begins to push
down, with the effect of causing the extended index finger to slightly,
almost imperceptibly, to bend (Fig.3.17 bottom left screenshot). Then
the preparation phase of the next gesture phrase begins.
Figure 3.17: Gesture phrase 7A [clockwise].
The fact that the two hands start moving means that they had received
instructions form the brain to coordinate. In other words, the meaning
of the particular gesture phrase demanded more cognitive energy to be
consumed, since coordination of hands means increased attention. That
15The time span between two screen shots, which is actually a video frame, lasts for
0.05 seconds in the video of the interview.
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alone would be enough to demonstrate the importance of the meaning
of this gesture phrase. Moreover, the stroke could actually be analysed
into three substrokes. First the carving of an imaginary left parenthesis
“ ( ”, then the carving of an imaginary right parenthesis “ ) ”, and then
the light push of the right index finger on the desk surface. The first
two strokes, as well many of the strokes in the previous gesture phrases,
would be iconic, since they imitate the writing of the two parentheses,
to form an ordered n-tuple in the next gesture phrase. The interesting
thing, though, is that since this demonstration was impromptu, that is,
unplanned, th gestures actually have to do mostly with how the speaker
organised his thoughts spontaneously, rather than following a plan. The
carving of the parentheses means that the parentheses where indeed on
the desk surface; their material form was the hand movement, which
the listener was in a position to follow, since himself had mathemat-
ical training. If there was no relevant training, probably this would
have eluded him. The hand movement of the speaker, in other words,
was the material cinematic substratum of the imaginary public sphere
of the conversation. Both the speaker and the listener could envision
a common spirit world, unavailable to the uninitiated. They were mo-
mentarily both shamans sharing a common state of consciousness, which
could be called a common knowledge. If this had been a presentation
of a more advanced mathematical topic, then this common spirit world
most probably have been more exclusive.
The third stroke, is actually a stroke of a beat gesture, because it con-
sists of two movements: one downwards, that is the pushing down, and
one upwards, which is the relaxation of the pushing. As a stroke of a
potential beat gesture it highlights the semantic content of the locution
phrase, that is, the connection of the degree of a polynomial with an
integral point in a lattice.
(B) [an integral point kay one kay en]
During the preparation phase the extended right-hand index finger rises
and begins to move towards the left-hand side of the speaker (Fig.3.18,
top far left screen shot). Then it stops in front of the central chest area
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above the desk surface (Fig.3.18 top middle left screenshot), and it starts
moving down towards the desk surface (Fig.3.18 top middle right screen
shot). Then the finger tip remains hovering above the desk surface for a
few frames, and then it moves down until it touches the screen surface
(Fig.3.18 top far right screenshot). Then the finger tip rises slightly
above the desk surface, moves a bit to the right-hand side of the speaker
while in the air (Fig.3.18 bottom far right screen shot), and then lands
again on the desk surface (Fig.3.18 bottom middle right screenshot).
And then once more the finger tip of the right-hand extended index
rises above the desk surface (Fig.3.18 bottom middle left screenshot),
moves a bit further to the right-hand side of the speaker and then lands
again on the desk surface. The left palm still in a reverse cup formation
remains on the desk surface and the left arm is positioned in a diagonal
direction with the left-hand ankle next to the lower left-hand side chest
area, and the reverse-cup palm touching the desk surface in front of the
lower middle chest area.
Figure 3.18: Gesture phrase 7B [clockwise].
This gesture phrase is a continuation of the previous one. After having
carved an imaginary left and then a right parentheses the speaker now
populates the parenthesis pair with numbers. What he does, in other
words, is putting the coordinates of an integral point in an ordered n-
tuple, that is, if the monomial is written as xk11 . . . xknn , he inserts the
coordinates k1, . . . , kn into the previously written imaginary parenthe-
ses ( ), and through an imaginary montage of the just previously writ-
ten parentheses and the light touches between the parentheses a new
imaginary temporal product has just been created: the ordered n-tuple
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(k1, . . . , kn). The ordered n-tuple when written down has a certain spa-
tial ordering of symbols:
“ ( ”, “ k1”, “ . . . ”, “kn”, “ )”
The flux of consciousness, therefore, based on its short-term memory
of the listener, or rather the watcher, after having formed a mental
projector slide of the parentheses ( ) projects upon it the next mental
projector slide of the ordered coordinates k1, . . . , kn and forms a new
imaginary slide, the n-tuple (k1, . . . , kn). A real slide on a projector is
transparent. In a similar way the desk surface is transparent, or rather
invisible. What matters is the voice and the hand gestures. In that
particular moment of the interview the hand gestures were not that
visible to the watcher, but they were visible to the speaker; in fact the
hand gestures were following the instructions of the mental projector
slides of an imaginary blackboard or an imaginary sheet of paper with
written formulas and words. In fact, in long mathematical proofs, for
example those with more than thirty pages, it is almost impossible, in
the author’s experience, to understand the proof without this kind of
imaginary montage. Many proofs conducted on a blackboard demand
the erasure of the first steps of the proof, in order to write later ones,
because of lack of space. The students write down notes in order to keep
a record of the steps. But still notes cannot be easily spread out over a
surface next to one another, and the reader still has to turn pages, and
then turn back again to check what he or she has forgotten.
(C) [to it]
This gesture phrase consists of a preparation phase and a stroke phase,
and both of the hands are involved in it. The preparation phase begins
with the lifting up of both hands: the right-hand extended index finger
starts to rise up diagonally upwards towards the centre of the front lower
chest area, while the left palm still in reverse cup formation begins to
rise vertically (Fig.3.19, far left and middle left screenshot). Then, just
before the stroke, the right-hand extended index finger along with the
fist, as well as the left palm stop above the desk surface simultaneously
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(Fig.3.19, middle right screenshot). The right-hand extended index fin-
ger is pointing now downwards to the desk surface while the palm is
hanging parallel above the desk surface with the left-hand fingers ad-
ducted together and pointing down to the desktop, and the left-hand
thumb slightly extended and bent pointing to the left. Then the stroke
begins: the right-hand extended index finger moves down to the desk
surface and the finger tip touches the desk surface, while the left-hand
palm remains still in its previous position and bent with the fingers ad-
ducted and pointing to the desk surface (Fig.3.19, far right screenshot).
Figure 3.19: Gesture phrase 7C [left to right].
The fact that both hands coordinate, and therefore more cognitive ef-
fort is exerted, betrays the importance that the speaker accords to the
semantic content of the locution: that the degree of a monomial corre-
sponds to an integral point. If a monomial is written in the multi-idex
notation
yα = xk11 . . . x
kn
n , where y = (x1, . . . , xn), and α = (k1, . . . , kn),
then the degree k1 + · · · + kn of the monomial corresponds (is mapped
onto) an integral point, that is, a point on a Cartesian coordinates
system with integer coordinates. The gesture is a deictic gesture, that
is, it is pointing to the integral point somewhere on the desk surface,
or more specifically to the touchdown point of the right-hand extended
index finger tip. In other words, that particular imaginary “integral
point” is located, on the desk surface. The desk surface, therefore, plays
in fact the role of an imaginary blackboard, or of an imaginary blank
sheet of paper. The flux of the speaker’s consciousness has assimilated
for good now the desk surface as a necessary imaginary performance
prop equipment to complete the mathematical exposition. The desk
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surface has now become transparent, that is, a prosthetic extension of
consciousness and therefore invisible.
8. [# and # polynomial of given] [degree is just // ] [sum of mono] –
[00:32-00:38]
This gesture phrase consists of three gesture phrases. The third gesture
phrase comprises only a stroke phase.
(A) [# and # polynomial of given]
The hash signs denote breath-ins. During the preparation phase the
wrists, both the left and the right one, start rising, the palm start form-
ing a cup formation facing towards the chest. As the palm continue to
rise the fingers of one palm, while adducted meet on the air the adducted
fingers of the other palm (Fig.3.20, top left screenshot). Then during the
stroke they continue to rise simultaneously while the adducted fingers
of one palm touch the dorsal side of the adducted fingers of the other
Figure 3.20: Gesture phrase 8A [clockwise].
palm for a few frames, and then they start moving away from each other
(Fig.3.20 top middle screenshot). At the same time both of the palms
start descending, while open with the fingers adducted; the palms now
are in a diagonal position facing each other, while their dorsal sides are
facing towards the desk surface (Fig.3.20, top right screenshot). Then
both of the palms, still in a diagonal position and facing each other and
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upwards start moving ahead until the tips of the adducted fingers on one
palm came close to the tips of the adducted fingers of the other palm
above the desk surface (Fig.3.20, bottom right screenshot). Then the
palms withdraw backwards towards the chest (Fig.3.20, bottom mid-
dle screenshot). At the end of the backward withdrawal the palms are
open, facing each other and in a vertical position with respect to the
desk surface, the fingers are extended and adducted, and the thumbs
are extended and pointing to the upwards; at that point the palms start
descending until their little-finger sides touch the desk surface (Fig.3.20,
bottom left screenshot). Then the palms remain in this position during
the hold phase of the gesture phrase.
This gesture is again a member of the family of Open Hand Supine
(“palms-up” family), that is, a communicative one. Its meaning is that
the speaker operates at the moment under an explanatory mode with
respect to the semantic content of the locution. At the same time it has
serious indications of a deictic gesture: both of the vertical palms during
their forward movement component of the stroke end up with extended
and adducted fingers very close, almost meeting each other above the
desk surface (Fig.3.20, bottom right screenshot). This forward move-
ment seems to point to the degree, that is, the sum of the exponents,
of the imaginary monomial that was written a few seconds ago on the
desk surface
(B) [degree is just //]
This gesture phrase consists of a preparation phase and a stroke, which
occurs during a pause. A stroke during a pause is denoted on the text
by a double slash “//”. At the beginning of the preparation phase,
the right palm starts to rise upwards, while the the left palm starts to
withdraw backwards towards the lower left chest area, just above the left
front area of the upper abdomen (Fig.3.21, top left screenshot). Then
the right hand forms a fist, the thumb is folded on the fist and the
index finger extends and points down to the desk surface, while at the
same time the left palm starts hanging on the desk surface edge from
the index from the index, the middle and the ring fingers (Fig.3.21,
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top middle screenshot). At the beginning of the stroke, which is the
beginning of the pause in the speech as well, the extended right-hand
index finger starts moving towards the left of the speaker (Fig.3.21, top
right screenshot). Then it stops, the index finger tip follows a circular
trajectory twice, then moves back and forth, and finally jumps into the
stroke of the next gesture phrase.
Figure 3.21: Gesture phrase 8B [clockwise].
This gesture actually has no meaning, or rather has no meaning related
to the speaker’s speech. It has been named by McNeill a “Butterworth,
after the Bitish Brian Butterworth who mentioned these kind of gestures
as speech failures (see [73] and [318, p. 77]). What happens at this point
is that the speaker is momentarily reorganising mentally the exposition,
or maybe he saw something irrelevant to the exposition, but relevant to
his attention, and the listener missed, or whatever. In the terminology
of this thesis, the speaker’s flux of consciousness “tripped over”, or came
across “a mental road bump”, and as a result, the hand could not follow
a clear neural executive order from the brain, or rather it was receiving
many contradictory executive orders. So, in fact, this gesture stroke was
more of a gestural pause, rather than a gestural clause.
(C) [sum of mono]
After the stroke of the previous “gesture pause”, during which only the
index finger is extended and the other right-hand fingers are folded into
a fist, the next gesture stroke immediately follows. At the beginning
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of the new stroke the other right-hand fingers join the extended right-
hand index finger and they all form a bent palm facing the speaker’s
chest (Fig.3.22, far left screenshot). Then the whole right-hand palm
starts to rotate around the wrist: the right-hand finger tips move down
in a circular trajectory, then move upwards towards the chest (Fig.3.22,
middle left screenshot); then finger tips continue their rotation around
the wrist upwards until they reach the apex of their trajectory; then
continuing their circular trajectory start descending and moving away
from the speaker’s chest, with the palm facing upwards (Fig.3.22, middle
right screenshot); finally the open palm with the fingers adducted stops
right above the desk surface with its face up and its dorsal side facing
the desk surface (Fig.3.22).
Figure 3.22: Gesture phrase 8C [left to right].
Again this gesture phrase is a “palms up” gesture: the speaker is in
an explanatory mode, that is, in a communicative mode, rather than
in a manual-constructive mode as in many of previous gesture phrases.
During the communicative mode the listener and probably the listener’s
reactions enter the flux of the speaker’s consciousness. This phrase has
only a stroke phase, and after the stroke the hand moves immediately
to the preparation phase of the next gesture phrase.
9. [mials and monomials corresponds to a point] [# in a simplex] –
[00:38-00:42]
This gesture consists of two gesture phrases and it will be analysed in a more
detailed way than the previous ones: it is most probably the most revealing
gesture in this whole interview segment presented here.
(A) [mials and monomials corresponds to a point] Gesture phrase 9A
consists of a preparation phase, a gesture hold phase, and a gesture
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stroke phase. We left the last gesture phrase with the right-hand palm
hovering above the desk surface: the palm slightly bent is open and faces
the ceiling, the fingers are adducted, and the dorsal side of the hand faces
downwards (Fig.3.23, top left screenshot). And the preparation phase
begins. The open right-hand palm starts to rotate around the wrist,
with the axis of rotation being the along the palm; it rotates clockwise
from the point of view of the listener, counterclockwise, form the point
of view of the speaker (Fig.3.23, top middle screenshot).
Figure 3.23: Preparation phase of gesture phrase 9A [clockwise].
In other words, during the hand rotation, the open palm initially faces
the ceiling, then faces the office wall on the left-hand side of the speaker,
and the rotation ends up with the palm half bent and passing into a fist
formation facing the desk surface (Fig.3.23 top right screenshot). During
the time that the right hand rotates and simultaneously is passing from
an open palm formation into a fist formation, the index finger starts to
extend pointing downwards, while the rest of the fingers are beginning to
fold over the face of the lower palm (Fig.3.23, bottom right screenshot).
When the rotation is complete the right hand is in a fist formation with
the index finger extended and pointing to the desk surface (Fig.3.23,
bottom middle screenshot). Then the right-hand index finger tip moves
a bit towards the left-hand side of the speaker and at the same time
descends a few centimetres towards the desk surface (Fig.3.23, bottom
left screenshot). At this point the gesture hold begins, which lasts for
34 frames, that is, for 1.7 seconds, during which the whole hand remains
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almost still.
Figure 3.24: First stage of stroke phase of gesture phrase 9A [clockwise].
The stroke phase of the gesture phrase will be divided into two stages
(Fig.3.24 and 3.25). After the gesture hold, during which the right-hand
extended index finger tip hovers above the desk surface away from the
speaker’s chest, the finger tip of the right-hand extended index finger
moves down and touches lightly the desk surface (Fig.3.24, top far left
screenshot). Then the finger tip rises, moves closer to the speaker’s
chest (Fig.3.24, top middle left screenshot) and then descends again and
touches lightly the desk surface (Fig.3.24, top middle right screenshot).
Then the finger tip rises for a second time and moves above the desk
surface closer to the speaker (Fig.3.24, top far right screenshot) and
descends and touches the desk surface for a third time (Fig.3.24, bottom
far right screenshot). Then the finger tip rises for a third time above the
desk surface, moves towards the speaker’s chest (Fig.3.24, bottom middle
right screenshot), and then descends for a fourth time and touches the
desk surface (Fig.3.24, bottom middle left screenshot). Just when the
second stage of the stroke is about to begin, the middle and the ring
fingers of the left palm which was hanging all the time from the edge of
the desk make their appearance (Fig.3.24, bottom far left screenshot).
Figure 3.25: Second stage of stroke phase of gesture phrase 9A [left to write].
137
At the beginning of the second stage of the gesture stroke the right
hand in fist formation hovers above the desk surface in front of the
central chest area of the speaker, the right-hand index finger is extended
pointing to the desk surface, and the finger tip of the right-hand index
touches the desk surface (Fig.3.25, far left screenshot). Then the whole
right-hand fist keeping formation starts moving along the edge of the
desk to the right-hand side of the speaker in front of the speaker’s chest:
the right-hand fist crosses the front chest area of the speaker from left to
right, while at the same time the right-hand extended index is touching
the tip of the desk edge, and the right-hand index finger tip is sliding
along the tip of the edge desk (Fig.3.25, middle left, and then middle
right screenshots). At the end of the second stage of the stroke the
right-hand index finger tip stops almost imperceptibly above the edge
of the desk surface close to the left lower chest area of the speaker, while
the fist hovers above the desk surface, and the right-hand index finger
still remains extended (Fig.3.25, far right screenshot).
During the first stage of the gesture stroke the extended right-hand index
finger touches the desk surface four times successively while at the same
time the speaker talks about the points to which a monomial correspond:
in other words these light touches are actually the places where these
imaginary points are located. On the blackboard the points become
visible by the trace a chalk leaves on the surface. At the moment of
the interview, though, a point becomes visible through hand, palm and
finger movements. During the second stage of the gesture stroke we see
the extended index finger of the right hand carving actually a straight
line, which considering what preceded and what follows, seems to be the
x-axis of the Cartesian coordinates, or at least a reference axis. This axis
is imaginary, but visible because of the sliding of the tip of the extended
right-hand index finger. At the same time this axis is visible to someone
with an elementary training in geometry, a state of consciousness that
is induced mainly by the speaker’s voice. A little child could never
have imagined these without actual drawing of the straight line on a
blackboard. Considering that the interaction under consideration is part
of an interview on spaces of arbitrary dimension, that is 1, 2, . . . , n, n+
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1, . . . , these particular gestures are in fact incomprehensible to a lay
audience, especially to an audience without any training in algebraic
spaces. These potentially incomprehensible hand gestures, though, are
a sociologist’s access to a mathematician’s “spirit world.”
(B) [# in a simplex]
This gesture phrase consists of a preparation phase, which is denoted
by normal typeface between the left square bracket and the beginning
of the boldface fonts, of a stroke phase, denoted by boldface fonts, and
of a retraction phase, denoted by normal typeface between the end of
the boldface fonts and the right square bracket. The preparation phase
happens during breathing in.
Figure 3.26: Gesture phrase 9B [clockwise].
At the beginning of the preparation phase the right-hand fist hovers
above the desk surface, the right-hand index finger is extended and
pointing downwards to the desk surface (Fig.3.26, top far left screen-
shot). During the preparation phase the fist opens up above the desk
surface and changes into an open palm which is vertical to the desk
surface and facing the office wall on the left-hand side of the speaker
(Fig.3.26, top middle left screenshot). Then the stroke phase is per-
formed in three stages. First the thumb is extended and abducted while
the open palm preserving orientation moves forward into a straight-line
trajectory (Fig.3.26, top middle right and then far right screenshots).
At half an arm’s distance away from the speaker’s chest, the right-hand
palm rotates clockwise with respect to the listener, and counterclock-
wise with respect to the speaker, and starts facing downwards to the
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desk surface (Fig.3.26, bottom far right screenshot). Then the palm
moves towards the speaker’s body closing in on the central upper chest
area (Fig.3.26, bottom middle right screenshot). Finally the open palm
diagonally positioned and (still) facing downwards with the thumb (still)
extended and abducted, moves away from the speaker’s chest while at
the same time descending towards the desk surface in a chop-like move-
ment and stops for a few frames above the desk surface(Fig.3.26, bot-
tom middle left screenshot). Then during the retraction phase, the open
right-hand palm descends and touches the desk surface on its little-finger
side in a diagonal position, with the thumb finger (still) extended and
abducted, and remains there on hold, until the preparation phase of the
next gesture.
The interesting point here is the meaning of the word simplex. A simplex
is a generalisation in n-dimensions of a triangle or a cube. A triangle or
a square are two-dimensional and the triangle has three edges, and the
square has four edges. A tetrahedron is a three-dimensional pyramid
with four faces, with each of its faces is a triangle, while a cube is a
three-dimensional geometrical solid with six faces. The tetrahedron is
the three-dimensional geometrical object which corresponds roughly to
the two-dimensional triangle, while the cube is a three-dimensional ge-
ometrical object which corresponds to the two-dimensional square. The
two-dimensional faces of the tetrahedron and the cube correspond to the
one-dimensional edges of the triangle and the square; and they all have
angles. The triangle and the square are two-dimensional simplices,16
while the tetrahedron and the cube are three-dimensional simplices. In
a similar way, using algebraic definitions, n-dimensional simplices can
be defined. One well known simplex in geometry is the hypercube, that
is, the four-dimensional cube. Having that in mind, what one can in-
fer, is that actually the stroke phase of this gesture phrase is a gestural
representation of two of the faces of the n-dimensional simplex in con-
sideration at the moment. The first face of the simplex is during the first
stage of the stroke (Fig.3.26 top middle left, then top middle right, and
16Plural of simplex.
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then top far right screenshots), and the second face of the simplex are
the second and the third stages of the stroke (Fig.3.26, bottom far right,
then bottom middle right, and finally bottom middle left screenshots).
In other words, momentarily an imaginary n-dimensional simplex was
present between the interviewee and the interviewer, and it had all been
constructed by the interviewee himself on the spot. It was not visible,
though, in the same way to each one of them. Since that simplex was
in fact a temporal object, that is, it had no permanent material trace,
after a few seconds, when the talk moved into other topics, that simplex
dissolved like smoke in a windy day.
3.4 A Multitude of Worlds in Everyday Life
There has been recently an increasing interest in the relationship between
hand gesturing, mathematics understanding and communication in the class-
room. Besides McNeill’s groundbreaking research, another major impetus
was cognitive research on creativity. For quite long the human brain had
been considered modular, that is, the brain was assumed to be divided into
brain modules, each one specialising in certain functions. Quite recently,
though, this view has changed, as we saw in the second chapter. One major
defining characteristic between the early Homo species and modern Homo
sapiens seems to have been a newly evolved cross-modular brain architec-
ture. According to Steven Mithen, the early Homo species brain was like a
Romanesque cathedral which had compartmentalised chapels: every module
was like a separate chapel specialised in its functions without communicat-
ing with other chapels. Modern humans, on the other hand, evolved a brain
more like a Gothic cathedral with
a new architectural feature: direct access between the chapels
[i.e. brain modules]. With this feature, knowledge once trapped
within different chapels can now be integrated together. It is not
quite clear how this direct access was achieved. [325, p. 76].
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The major conceptual mistake, in other words, that many archaeologists (as
well as the majority of social scientists one could add) until very recently had
been making, in Mithen’s opinion, was that they assumed that
the Early Human mind was just like the modern mind – that there
was a cognitive fluidity between social, technical and natural his-
tory intelligences. We can only make sense of the archaeological
record, and solve the puzzles we have found, by recognizing that
these were isolated from each other. Just as there was a cogni-
tive barrier between technical and natural history intelligence, so
too were there barriers between these and social intelligence [325,
p. 154, italics added].
Cognitive fluidity, though, means more “fluid” artefacts, as well as, more
“fluid” materiality. In the case of hand gestures during sound discourse while
explaining geometrical concepts we can say that the brain modules processing
kinesthetic, auditory, as well as spatial information communicate internally
and produce a new more “fluid” mathematical artefact called simplex, as we
saw in the interview presented in the previous section.
The “fluidity” of mathematical artefacts has taken various directions in recent
research. Tall has presented the view that pupils, and later students, acquire
mathematical thinking by engaging during their studies with
“three worlds of mathematics” – the “conceptual-embodied” world
based on perception, action and thought experiment, the “proceptual-
symbolic” world of calculation and algebraic manipulation com-
pressing processes such as counting into concepts such as num-
ber, and the “axiomatic-formal” world of set-theoretic concept
definitions and mathematical proof. Each “world” has its own
sequence of development and its own forms of proof that may
be blended together to give a rich variety of ways of thinking
mathematically[433, p. 5].
Hand gesturing, according to Tall, takes place in the “conceptual-embodied”
world of mathematical practice. Fauconnier and Turner have proposed the
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idea of mental spaces, that is,
small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for
purposes of local understanding and action. They are very partial
assemblies containing elements, structured by frames and cogni-
tive models. [. . . ] [I]n terms of processing, elements in mental
spaces correspond to activated neuronal assemblies and linking
between elements corresponds to some kind of neurobiological
binding, such as co-activation. [145, p. 102].
During everyday human interaction these mental spaces induced by natural
and social context become conceptually integrated, or conceptually blended,
which “is an invisible, unconscious activity involved in every aspect of human
life” [145, p. 18]. In the case of hand gesturing while explaining mathematics,
for example, grounded blends “result from the blending of elements from a
mental space with elements of one’s immediate physical environment” [289,
p. 283]. When explaining, for example in a calculus course, the notion of
anti-derivative, the physical gesture space, that is,
the space in front of the body in which gestures are typically
performed, which usually extends vertically from the waist to the
eyes and horizontally between the shoulders [473, p. 374],
becomes “endowed with mathematical meaning” [473, p. 377, italics in the
original].
In mathematics education gestures, in general, play an important role: they
help the pupil in learning counting [4], facilitate the knowledge of numbers
[68], mediate in explaining and understanding graphs [50, 339, 375, 385], as
well as the derivative of a function [22]. Gestures, in other words, have come
to
be considered as a part of individuals’ sensuous attempts at deal-
ing with abstract cultural ideas. Gestures may be seen as part of
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one of the sensuous modes – the tactile mode – which is demon-
strated in the efforts at conceptually grasping something [375,
p. 115, italics added].
When a pupil, for example, is being explained a mathematical concept, such
as the derivative or the antiderivative of a function, the employment of ges-
tures, along with voice, graphs and written symbols, during class instruction
can lead to
the creation of virtual mathematical constructs – multimodal con-
structs that are created via sensuous cognition using gestures,
speech and other related semiotic systems [474, p. 891, italics in
the original].
Arzarello, expanding on the semiotic approach of mathematics learning (see,
for example, [135, 374]), has described the various communicative modalities
in class instruction, such as speech, written symbols, gestures, and so on, as
semiotic resources and has furthered this theoretical approach even more by
defining the concepts of a semiotic set, and a semiotic bundle:
A semiotic set is: (a) A set of signs which may possibly be pro-
duced with different actions that have an intentional character,
such as uttering, speaking, writing, drawing, gesticulating, han-
dling an artefact. (b) A set of modes for producing signs and
possibly transforming them; such modes can possibly be rules
or algorithms but can also be more flexible action or production
modes used by the subject. (c) A set of relationships among
these signs and their meanings embodied in an underlying mean-
ing structure. [. . . ]
[Moreover, a] semiotic bundle is: (i) A collection of semiotic sets.
(ii) A set of relationships between the sets of the bundle. Some of
the relationships may have conversion modes between them [21,
p. 281].
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When a teacher engages, usually unconsciously, as well as consciously, in such
a semiotic bundle with the students during instruction he or she participates
in, what Arzarello has called, a semiotic game:
he coordinates with the semiotic resources used by the students
and then guides the development of knowledge using these re-
sources. Typically, the teacher uses the same gestures as the stu-
dents and rephrases their sentences using precise mathematical
language. Doing so, he supports the students towards a correct
scientific meaning [22, p. 106, italics added].
The previous paragraphs are very reminiscent of Roman Ingarden’s aesthetic
theory whose “contribution to the philosophy of art remains unmatched –
and virtually unknown, especially among Anglo-American philosophers” [113,
p. 365]. According to Ingarden, a work of art has a multi-layered existence.
A literary work of art, for example,
is stratiform, possessing at least four strata: (1) the stratum of
word sounds; (2) the stratum of language meanings (the first and
second forming the bistratum of language); (3) the stratum of
perspectives in which the objects and situations represented in
the work appear; (4) the stratum of these objects and situations.
Once finished, the work of art forms a whole, but its parts are
so ordered that it unfolds while read in time; this is called the
quasi-temporal structure of the work of art [170, p. 13–14].
The strata of the book itself, i.e. the bound paper pages, as well the printed
letters on the, usually, white pages precede those strata already mentioned
for the literary work of art. A sculptural work of art, on the contrary,
is a form with two and sometimes three heterogeneous strata: (1)
the stratum of schematic aspects, (2) the stratum of the three-
dimensional form of represented objects or situations, and (3) the
stratum of literary or historical content, whenever present [364,
p. 261].
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The work of art, in other words, is not identical to a real object as perceived
by the senses, but it is an aesthetic object, cognized in a gradual process
over time: it is an act of consciousness, rather than a real-material object;
it is a “change of attitude from a practical one, assumed in everyday life, or
from an investigating one, to an aesthetic attitude” [223, p. 295, italics in the
original]. The aesthetic object, in other words, is the product of the aesthetic
experience of the reader of a novel, the viewer of a sculpture or a painting,
or the listener, in the case of music.
Ingarden went further on and included dance, theatre, and cinema as aes-
thetic objects. At this point it would be more appropriate to swap Ingar-
den’s term “work of art” for the term “artefact” as used in this thesis with
one caveat, though: artefacts, in contradistinction to works of the (fine) arts,
one could argue, bear almost no sign of Walter Benjamin’s aura which
registers the irreducible specificity or uniqueness of the traditional
art object. It derives from the origin of art in ritual. In modernity,
art is characterized by the destruction and decay of the aura from
technical [as well as from massive-industrial] reproduction [355,
p. 37, italics added].
The social semantics of an artwork’s aura, in other words, would refer to
“an elusive phenomenal substance, ether, or halo that surrounds a person or
object of perception, encapsulating their individuality and authenticity” [64,
p. 340]. Apart, therefore, from the aura that surrounds a work of art, and
differentiates it from being a generic artefact, we can formulate the working
assumption that aesthetic perception of an artefact is quite similar to aes-
thetic perception of a work of art. If we include in the list of artefacts dance,
theatrical plays, and cinematic films, we can, then, grasp much better what
an artefact, in fact, is: an experience rather, than a single material detach-
able object. The prehistoric stone tool now becomes the human body which
is put under a disciplinary regime both consciously and with a plan in mind.
King Lear, the Shakespearean King Lear, that one sees in a theatrical play, is
an embodiment, or incarnation if you like, of King Lear, and not the concrete
person of King Lear. Martha Graham’s choreography and dancing technique
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did not arise accidentally but it was the the result of conscious design and la-
borious effort in a similar fashion to the construction of a handaxe. And who
could not accept that Marcel Marceau, the famous French mime, was very
“verbose” with his “silent” narrative pantomime? What defines an artefact,
in the end of the day, is not the material from which an artefact is made, or
its final form, but the nervous system, and especially the human brain, which
organises the information received from the sensory neurons, and arranges
the construction of the artefact into its final form.
The artwork which is the closest one in its aesthetic structure to mathematics
teaching and classroom instruction is the dramatic artwork. According to In-
garden the dramatic work of art is aesthetically structured in four ontological,
or existential, if you like, steps [326, p. 166]:
Step 1 The written work: The author composes the main text (text a) and
the side text (text b). Each text consists of undetermined objectivities
that exist as potentially determined.
Step 2 The stage play: The director, actors, et al. actualize the potential ob-
jectivities of text b and, in so doing, partially actualize the potentialities
of text a.
Step 3 The performance: The actors further actualize the potentialities of text
a.
Step 4 The aesthetic object: The spectator further actualizes the potentialities
of text a.
Starting with the first step in the aesthetic experience of class instruction
we can identify the main text of the “instruction” artwork as the material to
be taught, e.g. the derivative, or antiderivative, of a function, and the side
text, which is usually not written down, as the way that the material will
be taught. An “instruction” dramatic play on the derivative of a function
is, usually, one of many plays in a “theatrical series” called “Calculus”. Each
play has a certain number of characters, or rather, following Paul Ricoeur, a
number of quasi-characters in the “Calculus narrative”:
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nothing in the notion of character, understood in the sense of
someone who performs an action, requires that this character be
an individual human being. [. . . ] [T]he role of character can
be held by whomever or whatever is designated in the narrative
as the grammatical subject of an action predicate in the basic
narrative sentence “X does R” [388, p. 197, italics in the original].
Since a derivative is not a human, or rather it is known by the audience not to
be human, it cannot be impersonated in front of the class; other means have
therefore to be employed to “embody” it in a more “impersonal” way, such
as a blackboard graph or hand gestures. The graph, or the set of gestures,
to be employed are part of the side text of the “instruction” play, that is,
how the characters are to be presented and impersonated, and not of the
main text, that is, of the way the story is presented to an audience. Since a
derivative is not human it cannot engage into dialogue, and, therefore, has
to be narrated using the voice and the body of the instructor along with the
appropriate props. The authors of the main text of the instruction theatrical
play are mathematicians of the past, as well as the authors of the textbook
being used in the classroom. The author of the side text of the instruction
play is, usually, the instructor himself or herself. The side text can become
a side text proper when the instructor has written down notes on how to
present the material.
Moving on to the second step of a dramatic artwork we can say that in class
instruction the director, as well as one of the main actors is the instructor
himself, or herself. He is one of the main actors as a narrator, rather than the
protagonist. Moreover, as one of the actors he or she makes himself, or herself,
appropriately presentable to the audience as the social role of an instructor
dictates. The social role of an instructor is part of the side text of the
instruction play, but usually not written down; it has usually been acquired
through personal experience. At this step the instructor-director gathers
the appropriate props for the instruction play, such as chalks, projectors,
slides, and so on. The third step is the execution of the theatrical instruction
performance itself. The quasi-characters take up their role in the narrative,
and the instructor-narrator using hand gestures, his or her voice, his or her
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body, as well as other objects as props brings to life quasi-characters such
as a derivative. What is interesting, as well as the major difference between
a traditional theatrical play, and the instruction theatrical play is that the
instructor-narrator breaks the fourth wall, that is, he or she not only talks
to the audience, but also encourages to audience to participate; the audience
in other works participates quite actively in the plot as assistant directors.
Getting to the fourth step, the step of reaching the aesthetic object, we reach
the level where the derivative of a function has acquired, or at least it has
been attempted to acquire, a status similar to the Shakespearean King Lear:
an imaginary entity engaging the (cognitive) attention of the audience as a
real king in his own flesh and blood would have done.
Going back to the previous section and seeing how the interviewee was ex-
plaining what an integral point is we have some interesting observations to
make. Gesture 7, as it was demonstrated, consists of three gesture phrases:
7A, during which the speaker uses his index as an imaginary pen to write
down on the desk surface an imaginary left-hand-side and then a right-hand-
side parentheses, that is, “(” & “)” ; 7B during which he populates the paren-
theses with the imaginary symbols “k1”, “. . . ”, and “kn”; and 7C during which
he points with his extended index to these imaginary populated parentheses
on the desk surface. The interviewee was sitting on a swivel chair behind
his desk, and the only theatrical props he was using to present his argu-
ments were the desk, his hands, ans his voice. But then some new props
appeared as the explanation was unfolding: first the imaginary parentheses,
and then the imaginary letters and the ellipsis. How can we say that these
were props? Simply because the third gesture phrase was pointing to them.
There is though another reason for that. When in classroom an ordered n-
tuple (k1, . . . , kn) is written on the blackboard, so that the students see it,
and not just hear it. It is written because the instructor wants to keep it
visible for some time during the class instruction, so that the students can
go back to seeing it any time on the spot. So both the interviewee, and
the interviewer during the gesture both knew what was that written down
on the surface table: it was an invisible to an uninitiated viewer. The act
of using the index finger as an imaginary pen or an imaginary chalk, would
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be difficult to understand, as well, for someone who had been illiterate, and
had never written, or had never seen other people write. The pointing to
that imaginary prop in gesture phrase 7C means that the ordered n-tuple
(k1, . . . , kn) had become an aesthetic object visible only to those initiated
into polynomial algebra. In other words, although these particular props
of mathematical symbols were imaginary, they still directed joint attention
along all gesture phrases 7A, 7B, and 7C.
The use of the desk as a paper page or blackboard substitute was the use of
an object the presence of which was rather stable: an earthquake or an explo-
sion were most probably the only events that could destabilise the presence
of the desk surface during the interview. The voice, on the other hand, as
well as the hand gestures were rather of unstable presence and therefore the
employment of memory was a necessity. The interviewee’s hands, as three-
dimensional visual objects were on the move most of the time, while the
voice was changing pronunciation and intonation constantly; both changes
depended on whether the interviewee wanted to emphasize, point, illustrate
his point and so on. Gestures, as well as voice, in other words were tempo-
ral artefacts, or rather, temporal material props functioning as pipelines of
consciousness : they helped both the speaker and the listener to elevate their
consciousnesses to a new perception of particular (aesthetic) mathematical
objects. During gesture 7 three consecutive gestures occurred: 7A, 7B, and
7C. In the beginning, during 7A, a pair of two imaginary parentheses was
written with an imaginary blank space between them. After a few seconds the
blank space was populated with numbered letters (letters with subscripts),
and an ellipsis. In other words 7B was added onto 7A, forming an imaginary
ordered pair, i.e. k1, . . . , kn. After 7B the speaker, as well as the listener, can-
not see 7A as separate, but only 7A and 7B together. i.e. as an ordered pair.
Then 7C “points” to the imaginary ordered pair. In other words, although
there are no mathematical symbols written on the desk surface, the imaginary
ordered pair gradually becomes “visible”. While cognitive attention is being
directed towards the ordered pair, it is being directed towards an imaginary
cluster of artefacts, i.e. written mathematical symbols. The order pair has
now become, in Ingarden’s terminology, a “purely intentional object”, which,
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as Ingarden has always emphasised in his works, is an “act of consciousness”,
rather than a real object. This particular ordered pair, towards the end of
the gesture phrase 7C, is becoming an (Ingardenian) aesthetic object which
has been concretised in the particular context of that particular interview:
“[t]he outcome of the process of the aesthetic concretization of the work of
art is the aesthetic object” [429, p. 24, italics added].
A very important property of human consciousness is intentionality which is
that property of many mental states and events by which they
are directed at or abour or of objects and states of affairs in the
world [405, p. 1].
The word intentionality is “derived from the Latin word intentio, which
meant, roughly, ‘having an idea’ or ‘the directing of attention in thought’
” [299, p. 1]. When Ingarden, therefore, refers to an aesthetic object as a
purely intentional object, what he means is that the aesthetic object is a
result of “mental states and events” of consciousness, whether that object
exists, or is a figment of one’s imagination. This thesis refers to mathemat-
ical objects as products of altered states of consciousness to emphasize the
fact, that mathematical objects are imaginary, rather than real-material, and
that they are so due to the extensive training a professional mathematician
has been put through in order to be able to perceive the imaginative ends
of a mathematical proof. Gesture phrases 7A, 7B, and 7C, in other words,
refer to aesthetic objects, rather than real. They can be easily considered as
real while they are being presented in this thesis for a very simple reason:
the reader of this thesis, and in fact any reader, as a very well literate per-
son has been schooled for years, if not for decades, and therefore, he or she
will automatically, that is, as a reflex, will “see” these mathematical ordered
pairs. The imaginary symbols in gesture phrases 7A and 7B are, therefore,
momentary products of the altered states of consciousness of each reader or
viewer of the video interview, but as such they are forgotten to be so.
Bernard Stiegler, initially following Heidegger, distinguishes between the
who, that is, the user of the tool, and the what, that is, the tool being
used which is the tool as ready-to-hand:
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The who is opposed to the what in that it has hands, being itself
neither present-at-hand [i.e. held but not being used] nor ready-
to-hand [i.e. already being used]. Having hands, it has whats [sic]
present at and ready to hand. This what that the hand handles
makes up a system. It is a “technical system” that completely
saturates the world [421, p. 244, italics in the original].
During the interview, a part of which was presented in the previous section,
both the interviewer and the interviewee were quite competent in understand-
ing what a polynomial, monomial, as well as a convex hull, and so on, are
about: the interviewer as a former student in a mathematics department; the
interviewee as an innovator himself. During the presentation of polynomial
theory the interviewer had a personal interest in polynomial theory apart
from the sociological interest dictated by his doctoral research. The inter-
viewee, on the other hand, had a personal interest because, as it unfolded
during the interview, and not just as a logical conclusion, it was a chance for
him to present his own personal contribution: when asked, in other words,
on his own theory, that was a personal question, rather than a formal and
impersonal one. As the part of the interview on the exposition of polynomial
theory unfolded over time, at some point time itself was disappearing and
the whole “world” at these particular minutes was becoming “saturated” by
polynomials. Although the hands and hand gestures of the interviewee at
the start of the exposition were visible to the interviewer, as objects as well
as subjects of research for the interviewer, at some point they disappeared,
and polynomials started to appear on the spot: consciousness of the inter-
viewer, in other words, withdrew to the next layer of existence, to a world of
purely intentional objects, as Ingarden would say. The hands and voice, in
other words, as tools, that is, as material vehicles of meaning, were gradu-
ally disappearing, and the craftsman himself, that is, a craftsman of his own
bodily movements and voice generation, was gradually becoming transparent :
the distinction between the who, and the what was becoming quite unclear.
Hand gestures, and voice intonations, in other words, during the exposition
were, in Stiegler’s terminology, instances of tertiary retention,that is, a third
type of memory, as opposed to primary retention, or short-term memory,
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and secondary retention, or long-term memory. Tertiary memory is a mem-
ory type which needs artefacts to become activated and starts functioning
by becoming forgotten as an external memory support:
A tool is, before anything else, memory: if this were not the case,
it could never function as a reference of significance. [. . . ] The
tool refers in principle to an already-there, to a fore-having [sic] of
something that the who has not itself necessarily lived, but which
comes under it in its concern. . . . A tool functions first as image-
consciousness. This constitutivity of “tertiary memory” grounds
the irreducible neutrality of the who – its programmaticality,
including above all the grammar governing any language [421,
p. 254–255, italics in the original, teletype font added].
Stiegler borrowed the idea of the programmaticality of tertiary memory from
the archaeologist André Leroi-Gourhan’s concept of programs as activities of
animal intelligence, back in the 60s:
the nervous system is not an instinct-producing machine but one
that responds to internal and external demands by designing pro-
grams [281, p. 221, italics added].
Human intelligence, in Leroi-Gourhan’s view, with respect to artefact con-
struction and their use, goes beyond the biological imperatives of genetic
code:
A program emerges from the contact between the nervous system
of an individual organism and the contingent stimuli of a spe-
cific environment. . . . There is thus no originary and inescapable
program laid down by genetic code, because programs are “con-
structed” en route, so to speak, in the existential process of con-
fronting situations and actualizing a “disposition” under condi-
tions that cannot be envisioned in advance [345, p. 100].
Human speech and hand gestures during particular social contexts, following
Stiegler, as material assemblages of auditory and visual artefacts, are, in fact,
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a complex set of programs “constructed en route” which, though, do follow a
certain syntax as to their “rules of engagement”. As it was demonstrated in
the second chapter, there is an increasing awareness among the archaeologi-
cal, cognitive, and artificial intelligence communities that language, tool use,
and hand gestures are more deeply related, than previously thought, and the
direction now is toward their common neurological substratum: language, in
other words, is not just a medium for social construction, as the majority
in the STS community seems to hold, but artefact use and hand gesturing
are social construction proper. One such research trend, for example, is
the research on action grammars, that is discovering the underlying syntax
of human activities such as tool use, or hand gesturing (see, for example,
[194, 354]). Speaking a language, such as English, French, or Chinese, is
already a technical skill acquired during one’s childhood: it can take years to
learn a foreign language, and sometimes linguistic competence equal to that
of a native speaker can never be accomplished in one’s life.
Harry Collins, in his attempt to redirect the research STS has proposed
new definitions for expertise, taking into consideration the level of expertise.
Interactional expertise, according to Collins,
allows that the language of a community whose members are
embodied in one way can be acquired by individuals with bodies
that are shaped differently and in ways that prevent them from
participating fully in the physical activities of that community
[102, p. 80, italics added].
Collins then defined the minimal embodiment thesis, according to which
[al]though bodily form gives rise to the language of a community,
only the minimal bodily requirements necessary to learn any lan-
guage are necessary to learn the language of any community in
which the organism is embedded [102, p. 79, italics added].
The emphasis of interactional expertise is placed on language, and as lan-
guage is considered the sound version of it, and not in its totality, as we
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saw earlier. Although the author of this thesis would totally agree with
Collins’s call for a new research direction in STS, he still considers Collins’s
approach rather flawed in some respects. The most important has to do with
how Collins implicitly defines language, that is, as speech, rather than as a
more general engagement with materiality, which is the underlying definition
in the implicit consensus in the archaeological, neurobiological and cognitive
science communities. The notion of interactional expertise needs to be broad-
ened, this thesis argues from language as speech to language as gesturing ,
as well as artefact construction. Moreover, speech, in particular, has such
an important position in all human cultures because of another reason, in
the author’s opinion: the abundance of material resources for speech. Any
artefact needs a certain amount of resources to be constructed. Hand ges-
tures, for example, need hands to create visible movement, and human speech
needs atmospheric air with a certain percentage of oxygen and nitrogen as
well as a very well developed respiratory system to create voice. Every diver
who goes to great depths and uses oxygen and helium instead of oxygen and
nitrogen to breathe air knows that the human voice is quite different in that
case when helium and oxygen are exhaled. Creating the Parthenon, on the
contrary, or a skyscraper, poses certain limitations on artefact construction.
Collins’s definition of interactional expertise, in the author’s view, seems to
be an attempt to domesticate materiality for the purposes of data generation
in social research: in the end of the day a main method of data collection
in the science studies is audio recordings, or in the case of this thesis video
recordings. Moreover, the culinary arts, or even the perfume industry, have
in general eluded the attention of the STS community, although innovation
in that area has been tremendous in the last three decades; it can be indeed
quite difficult to create audio or video recordings of gustatory or olfactory
artefacts and concepts. Let us not forget that both Collins, as well as, all the
well known and academically successful social scientists are not famous only
because of their innovations: they are famous because of their high compe-
tence in using a purely auditory in its origins, and slighlty visual in its use,
artefact to communicate their innovations: the discursive scientific article.
The social scientific community is a systemically closed community, that is, it
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cannot accept cognitive stimulation from its social surroundings unless it has
materially translated these social surroundings into its own institutional se-
mantics, and the main material resource for this institutional translation are
its monetary resources which, as we will see in the next chapter, in the case
of science, are the (discursive) scientific journal and the (discursive) scientific
article. In the next chapter, we will see how the Soviet mathematical social
system, in fact, as a special case of a global scientific system was socially
embedded in the Soviet society.
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Chapter 4
The Banks are Always to Blame
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4.1 Introduction
The open source movement in computer programming is considered today
fully legitimate (see for example [148]). The idea behind open source is to
share the computational knowledge, rather than hide it from the program-
mers’ community. When a new computer programme is written, the program-
mer writes it in a certain, programming language, such as C, C++, Java, or
Python. Most of the Facebook social networking service, for instance, has
been written in PHP, a programming language especially designed for inter-
net applications, while some parts of it have been written in C++, for very
high performance. The part of a computer programme that has been written
in a programming language is called the source code. Then the source code
is translated into machine code, that is, simply put ones and zeros that the
particular computer machine can execute. This translation is carried out by
another programme, designed especially for the computer machine that the
programmer is using, which can be a compiler, when the translation is per-
formed separately from execution,1 or an interpreter, when the translation
is carried out at the same time as the execution of the programme.2 When
the programmer who wrote the original source code publishes it online, and
shares it with the community, then the programme is open source, otherwise
it is closed sourced. Big and well known companies, like Microsoft Corpo-
ration, or Apple Incorporated, are using the closed-source model, because
they base their business models on copyright laws and intellectual property
to generate income. They sell their programming applications (apps) and
they charge their customers for these. Closed source programming, on the
contrary, is scoffed at by the hackers’ various communities and advocates of
free software because knowledge should be free. We should not be thinking,
in the case of open source, of “free as in free beer... [but] free as in free
speech” ([459, p. 132]).
A closer look, in fact, reveals that software programming has a lot in com-
mon with mathematics. If the source code of a programme is written in
1Compile time is separate from runtime.
2Compile time is during runtime.
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an appropriate programming language comprehensible to the programmer,
then the source code of a mathematical theorem is written in a human lan-
guage along with the appropriate mathematical symbols comprehensible to
the mathematician. The machine code of a programme is “comprehensible”
to the particular computer machine; the machine code of a theorem is “com-
prehensible” to the particular brain of the mathematician proving ad hoc the
theorem. When a mathematician executes the proof of a theorem he or she
picks up a pen or a pencil and starts writing on a sheet (usually) of paper;
there are of course the archetypal images of ancient Greek mathematicians
drawing geometrical figures on sand with a wooden stick. When a program-
mer formulates a programme he or she writes it on the computer screen using
some special programme for that, like a text editor or a word processor, and
executes the programme with the use of another third programme, that is a
compiler, or an interpreter.3 Since in mathematics the processes of theorem
formulation and proof execution are not separate, the mathematician can
much easier pre-experience the execution through his or her imagination. In
software engineering, on the contrary, due to this separation of programme
formulation and programme execution, pre-experiencing is quite difficult, and
almost impossible in large software projects. The whole phase of checking the
validity, execution and performance of a software project is called software
testing which is part of the software development life-cycle (for more on these
see [300]). The equivalent of software testing in mathematics is conducted
in the form of peer-reviewing of articles during which the validity of a proof
is “executed” by brains specialised in the corresponding field, i.e. by experts
on that particular discipline.
When a hacker writes a programme it is mainly because “the pure joy of
craftsmanship is the primary motivation” [379, p. 82]. Technical excellence
in programming is in high demand, actually, since today’s programming is
very complicated, and large businesses such as Google, or Oracle Corpora-
tion count their assets in tens of billions in dollars: they cannot rely only on
people who work only for profit; long hours of work time demand intrinsic
3Actually it is much more complicated than that, and the whole process in software
engineering is called software building(see [418]).
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motivation, that is, enjoying programming as a hobby at the same time. The
situation is no different in mathematics, especially in fields such as algebraic
geometry, or functional analysis, which are both very demanding in terms of
intellectual effort, and by common conception they would be considered as
useless in everyday real life in terms of applications; of all the mathematicians
teaching at the university level whom the author has personally met, includ-
ing the intervewees for the present thesis, not a single one has ever said that
mathematics is boring; on the contrary, they where all deeply interested in
their fields and the neighbouring ones.4 Moreover, all the hobbyist hackers,
and the professional mathematicians, as well, share a common custom: not
only do they enjoy their hobbyist or professional activity, but they want to
give it away. Open source movement is actually based on the the idea that
by publishing online the source code of a programme and sharing it with the
rest of the community improves both the programme and the community. It
would be beyond imagination, in the case of mathematical physics, if Ein-
stein had kept his theories to himself, by keeping his manuscripts private. In
fact, in both programming and mathematics there is actually an underlying
gift culture, since “success in gift exchange becomes a matter of giving away
as much wealth as possible, so as to gain a social advantage” [180, p. 36].
And the most obvious social advantage in science can be social status. What
is more interesting is that gift economies “arise in populations that do not
have significant material-scarcity problems with survival goods” [379, p. 81]:
the Pythagorean Theorem is an abundant intangible asset; it is available
to anybody, even to those who cannot decipher it. Gift-economy narratives
formulated and presented by anthropological studies on various indigenous
peoples would actually seem to be the most appropriate initial models to de-
scribe the economy of science. Is the number of published scientific articles
not a display of an author’s wealth within that particular scientific discipline?
4There where, of course, occasional complains such as low salary, or less interested
people, etc.
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4.2 The Gifts of Science
Part of the fieldwork conducted for this thesis were face-to-face interviews
with Russian mathematicians. A great portion of the questions concerned
their personal biographies as related to their profession as researchers. Al-
though there were many expected commonalities to be found, one, rather
unexpected, began to surface. In communist Russia, as would be expected, it
was important for a university student to have a kind of an unofficial patron:
some very well established professor who would help the talented student to
find employment in some mathematical, or at least mathematically oriented,
institute or establishment. In the case of the Lomonosov University, for ex-
ample, Kolmogorov for a few decades was such a patron. But during the
seventies, there were many such patrons and factions began to form: some
subjects were more popular than others, some new subjects were introduced,
and some attracted more students than other ones. They could be called
schools, as well, as in philosophical schools, but the word faction seems more
appropriate, because the students and the professors who were “members”
were emotionally quite close. There was, of course, always the problem with
the approval of the communist party and its leadership, but in the case of
mathematics this did not affect the developments in research: “Whatever
Stalin said, one plus one is always two,” as one of the interviewees half-
seriously and half-jokingly remarked. In one noted exception, Kolmogorov
had tried to expand his mathematical interests to cybernetics and biology,
but his research was cut short rather abruptly, because biology was a rather
dangerous topic in Stalin’s period [167, p. 56–61]. Nevertheless, these “re-
search factions” were not actually competing with each other, because the
Soviet Academic of Sciences, the Division of Physico-Mathematical sciences,
was providing ample support to any new mathematical research endeavour
that was proposed by any of its senior member. There were though perse-
cutions of Jews and implemented especially during the Stalinist period (see
for example [360, 361]). This persecution policy had an effect on the math-
ematical community as well. Lev Pontryagin, for example, one of the most
influential mathematicians of the 20th century, who became blind at the age
of 14, was repeatedly accused for anti-Semitism to the point that he felt
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obliged to defend himself against such accusations publicly on the Science
Magazine in front of an international academic audience [367].
After Stalin’s death these persecutions were officially banished from the po-
litical agenda, but their impact was still strongly felt, as the case with Pon-
tryangin had showed. Many of the interviewees in the United States were of
Jewish descent and they stated that they felt discriminated against during
their professional lives in the Soviet Union. It became a difficult task for
some of them to find employment after the submission of their candidate’s
thesis,5 and they ascribed it to a general antisemitic policy of higher ranks
in the academic establishment. Their employment by well known American
universities is evidence that their work was indeed considered by their North
American peers as important, but in the end of the day it is indeed very dif-
ficult to establish what exactly had happened in each individual case, except
only by police investigation; but this lies outside the realm of this thesis.
Nevertheless, what emerged from interviews was that some mathematicians
who found it almost impossible to be employed by research institutions spe-
cialising in some branch of mathematics, finally did manage to find a job, in
institutes irrelevant to their specialty. In one such case, the interviewee
“found a job in [a] power institute... It was a huge institute [with]
about 1000-1500 researchers. I still don’t know what they were
doing... It was a part of Soviet Union life. So, they were supposed
to do kind of research in power production, distribution. Nobody
cared about anything, so it was a waste of time. So I formally
was in this power institute for 15 years... For 15 years my job was
just to sit, but luckily I was able to continue to do my research.”
He then went on to describe the difficulties of publishing articles in his case,
because he needed a clearance from the institute: that was meant to prevent
state secrets from being published. And when the head of a power insti-
tute has to approve an article, for example, on “quantum deformation” or on
5The candidate’s thesis was, and still is, equivalent to the the doctoral dissertation in
English-speaking universities.
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“rational varieties”,6 it is not in the best of circumstances for the author of
that article. Sometimes he published his articles as an appendix to another
author’s article, in which case the article author was officially responsible for
the content of the whole article. During many of his working days he would
go to his office, sit and write his research papers. This pattern of research
activity, that is, employed by an institution irrelevant to the employee’s of-
ficial training, was found in about 20% of the interviews, and some official
CVs posted online.
If we focus our attention for a minute on a scientific article, that is, the fact
of being a scientific article, we can consider the author of it as its owner, its
proprietor; its author, or authors, do consider it as his or her article any-
way. And, especially in mathematics, as in any other scientific discipline,
the author is always mentioned, on the header. No article is being published
without mention of its author or authors. And an author in mathematics, es-
pecially in twentieth-century, has gone through extensive training for at least
seven to eight years; in the case of the Soviet Union considering the existence
of mathematical specialised schools, that training rises up to 9-10 years. So
a published article is indeed quite significant, given the human labour that
has been invested. And herein bursts into the scene an unexpected, or rather
neglected, aspect of mathematics in the Soviet Union: the gift economy of sci-
entific mathematics. The Russian mathematician of the previous paragraph,
who worked in the power institute for fifteen years, whose job responsibili-
ties where vague both to him, and to many around him, instead of giving up
research, decided in the opposite direction: he decided to donate his articles,
to devote his personal labour to the pursue of his research interests without
any visible benefit. His salary, as everybody’s salary in Soviet times, was
too low to be considered as a motivation to excel, and he did not consider
it himself at the time. And this was in general the mentality that emerged
during the interviews in general: they were all eager to participate in a sys-
tem of redundant transactions [89, p. 19], that is publish articles, without
the expectation of drastically improving their social standing, or receiving
6If the reader does not know what these mean then he or she could feel much more
accurately what the head of that power institute would have felt.
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any other apparent economic benefit whatsoever. Today, for example, the
situation in English-speaking academia is quite different: there is spectac-
ular funding involved, especially in subdisciplines of high demand such as
financial mathematics, or business administration. Publishing articles in a
specialty of high commercial demand has become a business enterprise now,
and cannot be considered any more only as a system of gift economy.7 Even
Kolmogorov, who had the world reputation and the social standing any work-
ing mathematician would envy, and had no apparent reason to pursue any
more research, was so productive, that after probability theory he moved into
mathematical logic and algorithmic theory and published in these fields ar-
ticles of substantial importance. Today in computer science a computability
measure bears his surname, that is, “Kolmogorov complexity.”
One could of course argue that publishing an article has future expected re-
wards for the author. So the author’s peers could not consider it as a gift,
that is, as the product of “genuine” scientific motivation. In some interviews
there was indeed mention of prestige, respect by peers, and even ambition.
And that indeed is a plausible counterargument: they are not actually gifts,
but investments. It can be argued actually that those mathematicians work-
ing in research institutes other than their specialty were working there in
the hope of getting a better post in the future in a proper mathematical
institution. And a job in such an institution had the advantage, for instance,
of travelling abroad to international conferences, meet foreign scientists, sci-
entists from “capitalist countries” as they were referred to in the official re-
ports of the Steklov Mathematical Institute, or meet other countries from
the Eastern Bloc, that is, scientists from “democratic countries.” Economic
explanations of profit maximisation are indeed plausible as accounts of per-
sonal motivation. There were many benefits actually of acquiring a job in a
mathematical institute for the researcher to think about. It has to be borne
in mind, though, that if the submission of an article can be considered an eco-
nomic transaction, then it is not barter: there is no simultaneous exchange of
some goods, and the parameter of time is involved. And besides that “[g]ift
7In Britain, actually, due to the Research Assessment Exercise publishing articles has
become compulsory.
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exchange is an exchange in and by which the agents strive to conceal the
objective truth of the exchange, i.e. the calculation which guarantees the
equity of the exchange” [60, p. 22]. A gift, in other words, in order to be
considered a gift, it has to be presented as such, that is, as the outcome of
generosity, or, in the case of scientific articles, as the outcome of intellectual
interest and scientific curiosity. The time between the exchange of gifts and
counter-gifts is what makes them gifts, and the existence of this time period
ensures that the official pretense of the pursuit of pure knowledge, and not
of profit, is observed. And in science, in particular, the time that elapses
from the publication of an article the moment it pays back various benefits
can be a rather long period to wait for an “investment” to pay off few gains,
not to mention the limited gains of a communist country when compared to
the Western ones. Nevertheless, an article can indeed be considered as a gift
for one more reason: due to the time that intervenes between its publication
and its potential future benefits, it provides, at least in the case of Soviet
Union it did so, the pretense of a genuine scientific motivation.
One of the author’s favourite theorems in functional analysis is the Gelfand-
Naimark 8 Theorem [166]. What is says, although indeed intriguing, is not as
important as another aspect of it. Israel Gelfand and Mark Naimark, two of
the most important Soviet mathematicians, published their article in 1943.
It is a very fundamental theorem in modern quantum probability and some
aspects of quantum mechanics: it established actually overnight the very
fascinating and intricate field of C∗-algebras.9 In 1993 a book was published
by the American Mathematical Society to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary
of C∗-algebras since the first publication of the Gelfand-Naimark theorem
(see [127]). This volume is actually the proceedings of a conference on C∗-
algebras. The first chapter of it is the republication of the original article
with some minor corrections. So from a lay persons point of view, there are
still people dealing with something written some 50 years ago. It could be
said, as well, that the Bible is much older. But here is the interesting aspect:




theorem is Gelfand’s and Naimark’s gift to mathematics, or rather, to the
future students of mathematics. The original article of 1943 has acquired a
special name, that is Gelfand-Naimark theorem and has acquired a special
property that some special artefacts possess: it has become an inalienable
possession [456]. Neither Gelfand, nor Naimark can be any more separated
from the gift they themselves gave away, even now that they have passed
away. It can be said that indeed their memory has remained in the hands
of posterity, but in fact another aspect is more interesting: the act of giving
away a gift when still in life. A king, for example, can donate his crown to his
son, or a father bequeath his surname to his children. Insignia of rank can
be given away, as well, but they still belong to an abstract authority which
has accorded them. Gelfand and Naimark gave away one of their gifts, but it
became something more: it became their common heirloom; it is not a usual
gift any more.
Any article, therefore, published in a mathematical journal, especially a very
well known one, from the moment it acquires the name of the original author,
becomes a donated heirloom. And this is actually very close to recognition
from peers. Recognition in mathematics, in terms of cultural anthropology,
is achieved when a mathematician’s heirloom becomes, not only publicly ac-
cepted, but also well known and widely shared within the community of peers.
This is actually another aspect of immortality, or in a rather more Marxian
terminology, another aspect of the mode of self-production of mathematics,
and science in general. If we were talking about Homer’s Troy and Achilles’
feats, that would be one of the many “[e]xamples of heroic ventures through
which individuals strive for immortality in efforts to deny death” [456, p. 7].
But we are talking about something more mundane: the leading personages
of a scientific profession. They were not the descendants of the Olympian
gods, neither were they demigods to possess superhuman abilities, nor were
they cult leaders: they were the victims of the Weberian disenchantment of
the world and rationalisation of society. But they did accomplish impor-
tant feats that intrigued their academic descendants. And when we see first
Gelfand’s and Naimark’s original article, and then the book celebrating that
article fifty years later, we realise immediately that this is the preservation
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of oral tradition by more modern means. We see therefore that the particular
discourse of mathematics is not simply a proof coming forth to the reader; it
is a narrative, with its own fictional universe, and fictional entities such as
C∗-algebras, or probability densities, or rational varieties; entities inaccessi-
ble and invisible to the uninitiated. An article in other words is a modern
version of an ancient Egyptian scroll, with its own hieroglyphs understood
by some, with a particular originator, which is carried through time by the
younger generations, who then, in their turn, get inspired to construct their
own Egyptian scrolls. It has to be borne in mind, though, that an Egyptian
scroll is important to some and not to everybody. Those interviewed were
mathematicians who were somehow fascinated by a certain branch of math-
ematics and pursued their interests persistently up to the point of receiving
later recognition in terms of tenure. Not all of their fellow students ended up
professional researchers in mathematics. In one such case, the interviewee
ended up working for the private sector after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union: he left the community and went on in pursuit of different ancient
scrolls.
The authors, therefore, of published articles in mathematics still have own-
ership of their articles, but no longer possession: the whole community now
shares them and has property rights over them. And sharing an heirloom
with the community detonates reciprocity of a special kind: “to give in return
does not mean to give back, to repay; it means to give in turn” [174, p. 48,
my emphasis]. One of the interviewees described his time as a postgraduate
student in the Landau Institute on Theoretical Physics:
“I mean, it was very good. It was a very interesting place. Ap-
proximately around that time they were creating the theory of
conformal invariants, the theory of two-dimensional fields: Polyakov,
Zamolodchikov, Migdal, Belavin, Knizhnik. I mean all these peo-
ple were there, and were, kind of, creating that theory. Just to
watch it was amazing. We were doing our stuff, we were doing
our research, which was quite interesting in itself. There were
very few mathematicians there... and then I was accepted as a
mathematician ... It was a small group of mathematicians but it
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was very well integrated.”
To put the reader into perspective, Alexander Polyakov and Alexander Migdal
were among the first in the 60s to publish a paper on what later came to be
known as the Higgs mechanism, named after the the British mathematical
physicist and Nobel prize laureate Peter Higgs. In such an exciting research
environment,
“men who give more [gifts] than they have been given, or who give
so much that they can never be repaid raise themselves above
other men and are something like gods, or at least they strive to
be” [174, p 30].
And an interesting aspect of gift giving is when it is conducted between peo-
ple of different social position or rank, since sharing decreases the distance
between the two parties, while at the same time indebtedness increases their
social distance. In a conference in Lomonosov University, during the author’s
fieldwork, the head of the organising committee was Albert Shiryaev, a major
contributor to stochastic calculus and financial mathematics. After he de-
livered the introductory speech there was a break. As it would be expected,
many participants during the break, went to greet him and talk a bit with
him. But there was a rather unexpected incident for such a rather solemn
event: one participant asked Shiryaev to take a picture with him. Now this
would be expected to happen with a Hollywood star who enjoys a celebrity
status, not with a modest mathematician. From the eagerness of the major-
ity of participants to greet professor Shiryaev, to the rather extreme case of
asking a picture with him, all point to an undeniable fact: celebrities do not
exist only in Hollywood show business, but to any professional field, irrespec-
tive of the existing political regime this celebrity lives in. And only gods, or
those close to gods enjoy celebrity status.
So when a postgraduate manages to publish an article he donates it not only
to researchers of equal status, but to researchers of very high status, of a
god-like status. But when a member of the community of god-like status
publishes an article to whom, besides his or her peers, he donates his or her
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gift? When a member is close in terms of status to the sacred spiritual world,
who can be of higher status? Actually “giving [a gift] to a superior does not
necessarily imply that the recipient is a human being” [174, p. 13]; it can be
now a disembodied god, an immaterial one. But what kind of god can exist in
a rational disciplinary enterprise such as that of mathematics? In fact, there
is a candidate god in a disenchanted scientific world such as ours: scientific
truth. Scientific truth, a concept created long before the rise of the communist
states, is supposed to correspond to some kind of objective reality. If this “
‘correspondence’ is supposed to be utterly independent of the ways in which
we confirm the assertions we make [...] then the ‘correspondence’ is an occult
one, and our supposed grasp of it is also occult” [370, p. 10, my emphasis].
Scientific truth as correspondence to an objective reality in any discipline
“can only be the combined work of imagination, metaphor and authority”
[207, p. 242]. Scientists imagine an external reality which cannot be observed
by humans,10 they employ metaphor to formulate narrative explanations, and
they rely on the authority of the book, the article, or the lecturer to clarify
truth. What is scientific truth in biology, or chemistry, and how is it related
to mathematical truth? Can the methods of reaching truth in mathematics
be employed by physicists, or the methods of sociologists be employed by
biologists? The answer is clearly no. An interview is not data collection
in probability theory, and proving a theorem is not proper methodology in
biology; at least as yet. At least until there is a new fusion of methodologies to
be imagined, a new metaphor to be formulated, and a new book or author to
render a new methodology scientific status. Scientific truth, in other words,
is a character in the fictional universe of the scientific community, hidden by
public view as such, unofficially raised to the status of a god, to whom the
learned elders of science give away their own published truths. The “Sokal
affair”, for example, while it was allegedly an attempt to expose the “lack”
of scientific validity in the humanities (see [137]), in fact, it was an attempt
to impose methods of one scientific cult to another one, and it ended up by
exposing the necessary illusion that the scientific enterprise can be unified in
its pursuit of a transcendental truth as its own grand narrative; and exposing
10Gravity, for instance, has never been directly observed; only its effects can be observed
and measured.
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illusions is necessarily a controversial event.
Any scientist, of course, can lay claim as to the personal motivations of why
joining a particular field, and that will be indeed valid. Curiosity was the
most main reason in the interviews, and personal interest. Some were in-
volved in mathematical activities quite early in their lives, or at least, they
traced an interest in mathematics quite early in their lives during the inter-
view. Others added the fact that there was more freedom in mathematics
research during the Soviet period, when compared, for example, to other dis-
ciplines, such as physics or chemistry. In one such case, for example, when
the interviewee had to choose between mathematics and physics, he chose
mathematics, because, as he had been told, studying physics involved labora-
tories as well, besides theory, and laboratory equipment involved many more
approvals by higher ranking officials, than those needed by a mathematics
department. Other interviewees mentioned personal ambition and eagerness
not only to survive in a communist society, but to thrive, as well: being a
university professor in the Soviet Union commanded quite a high respect.
People in general can give as many reasons for their personal motivation, as
the number of those asked. But when a god of science comes in, when a divine
entity enters the scene of science, it enters “idealized, transmuted into the
common good, into a sacred principle which brooks no argument, no opposi-
tion, which can only be the object of unanimous consent” [174, p. 174]. Let
us not forget that Marxism-Leninism considered itself to be scientific. More-
over, any university graduate, in order to be accepted as a doctoral candidate
in a higher institution, had to be examined and succeed in three areas: his
or her own disciplinary field, a foreign language considered appropriate for
his or her field, and scientific communism. There were even textbooks on
scientific communism, especially for students of tertiary education (see for
example [146]). It was, therefore, not difficult in the USSR to establish a new
institution of scientific standing, once the approval of the corresponding reg-
ulatory bodies was acquired. But, in any case, raising a building of baroque
proportions such that of the Main Building of the Lomonosov University,
and hosting a large group of people under its roof, can be done only when a
divine entity, such as that of scientific truth, comes down to earth from his
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residing place in heaven. Such a divine entity unifies a large number of peo-
ple of various persuasions and motivations under its auspices; and, moreover,
it provides its people with a legitimate pretence and an encompassing local
grand narrative for becoming organised around a gift economy, such as that
in the Soviet scientific institutions.
Gift economies in general have attracted the attention of cultural anthropol-
ogists for many decades. Mauss was the first to consider gift transactions
among indigenous people [312, 313] and connect it to specific social action,
or prestation in his own terminology. It is interesting to note that the first
translation into English of the The Gift the translator found “no convenient
English word to translate the French prestation” [312, p. xi], while in the
most recent English translation the editor notes that the French term has
“been referred to in the translation for brevity’s sake, as ‘total services’,”
[313, p. vii]. According to the Langenscheidt’s Standard French Dictionary,
prestation can be translated as (money) lending, (insurance) benefits, al-
lowances, or services (performed). What Mauss was trying to convey with
this lexical relic of feudal France was a meaning of “a service performed out of
obligation, something akin to ‘community service’ as an alternative to impris-
onment” [204, p. 50]. So what Mauss actually accomplished was to point out,
quite eloquently one could say, the deeper connection between artefact ma-
teriality, social action, and individual, or group, identity of Homo sapiens.11
The difference between a gift economy and a modern capitalist commodity
economy “is that the latter is created by the exchange of alienable objects be-
tween transactors who are in a state of reciprocal independence,” whereas the
former “is created by an exchange of inalienable objects between people in a
state of reciprocal dependence” [188, p. 640] (see also [189]). While commod-
ity transactions, such as oil or gold, are based on a mutual independence, and
can be conducted even among strangers, gift transactions, such as talismans
or wedding presents, are based on a mutual dependence and cannot easily
be conducted among strangers. Moreover, while a gift transaction leads to a
qualitative relationship, a commodity transaction establishes a quantitative
relationship between the transacting parties. Commodities have a financial
11That is, of the modern, and last, descendant species of the Homo genus.
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price, but gifts have an emotional price. Scientific articles can be considered,
as well, commodities, in this quantitative sense, since a researcher can always
cite the number of articles published in scientific journals, or the number of
articles published by other researchers based on his own articles. So a pub-
lished article can be considered, up to a point, that it stands in between a
gift and a commodity.
A commodity, due to its fungibility, can easily be alienated from its owner
temporarily, in the case, for instance, of a deposit: a barrel of oil can be given
to a safe-keeper for a while, and then retrieved back the same in quantity
and quality ; there is no need to ask back for the very same barrel of oil
that was given in the first place. Fungibility, on the other hand, is not
a property of a scientific article: an article cannot be given back in half,
or an author cannot publish a “quarter of an article; but he can publish
parts. Moreover, a commodity is fungible, that is, it can be subdivided
by trading parties into smaller quantities, because the exchanging agents are
interested more in its marginal utility, rather than its total utility. The utility
function is a concept used in neoclassical economics, and has been defined as
a multidimensional (mathematical) “function that specifies the utility (well-
being) of a consumer for all combinations of goods consumed (and sometimes
other considerations)” [114, p. 287]. In mathematical terms, a utility function
is assumed to be differentiable, that is, its partial derivatives exist, although
this property of differentiability, in general, “is almost always imposed but has
not been translated [adequately] into behavioral terms” [342] (see also [116]
for a mathematically more rigorous exposition). However, if one needed to
employ a non-mathematical narrative, rather than the geometrical one from
differential geometry and measure theory, to “explain”,12 for example, to an
undergraduate audience,13 then utility could be defined as this “common
something that enables two heterogeneous things to be compared and valued
so that a choice can be made” [190, p. 18, my emphasis]. In this way we
can deduce that “the marginal utility of diamonds can be very high (because
diamonds are very scarce) relative to the marginal utility of water (because
12Or rather to legitimate its definition.
13That is to university students, as well as, to non specialists.
172
water is very abundant)” [159, p. 39].14 The economic utility approach can
partly account for the fact that the number of publications on stochastic
analysis today has proliferated in exponential function, while those on ergodic
theory has remained rather stable. Both fields descended from probability
theory; on both fields there have been substantial contributions by the Soviet
mathematicians; but, while stochastic analysis is heavily applied on financial
research and practice, that is, a field in high demand today, ergodic theory
is used in statistical (quantum) physics, a field with demand limited mainly
to academic research institutions.
By the late seventies and early eighties the mathematics departments were
becoming in general very popular among school pupils: they offered a ca-
reer prospect with a secure future insulated from party interventions. In the
words of one interviewee “many students wanted to be mathematicians, rather
than work as mathematicians,” meaning that they aspired for the security
resulting from tenure, rather than for the research presupposed by tenure.
And considering the fact that in order to proceed to postgraduate studies
an undergraduate was expected to have published within the five years of
his or her studies at least 2 scientific articles, it could indeed be claimed
that scientific articles were important economic goods, with a high slope in
their marginal utility: they influenced substantially the personal choices of
the future researcher with respect to their projected marginal utility. In
gift transactions, as we saw, “objects are personified,” while in a commodity
economy “persons are objectified” [348, p. 233]. It should be borne in mind,
at this point, that human labour, although it is not something material such
as oil or gold, and cannot be measured in grammes, litres, or seconds, in
our modern “capitalist” Western society it has become a commodity and can
be sold, rented, or acquired, as a normal material commodity. Whether a
scientific article is, or can be considered to be, an economic good, a commod-
ity, or a gift, it is because what lies under all these assumptions is a deeply
Western concept: personal property, whether this person is a concrete, bio-
logical Homo sapiens, or an imaginary, legal person managed through human
14The marginal utility of the diamond is the partial derivative of the total (or general)
utility function with respect to the diamond dimension.
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trustees. Soviet communism, in fact, did not change the Western concept and
experience of property, which dates back at least to the ancient Greek and
Roman antiquity, if not earlier. Communism changed only the biological
trustees managing property, according to how property was distributed in its
own social and political context. From anthropological research conducted
in non Western societies, such as Papua New Guinea, it has emerged that
the idea of property in these societies and its value is related with “the per-
son’s own appropriation of his or her activity that gives it value, in so far
as the person is a microcosm of the social process by which exogenous ap-
propriation by others, by the system, also gives it value” [424, p. 142–143,
emphasis in the original]. The whole first chapter of this thesis was actually
a theoretical anticipation of an inescapable fact: materiality is hardwired on
the human brain, and gift transactions are actually its manifestation upon
social action, in the same way as hunger is hardwired on the human brain,
and regional cuisines are the manifestation of hunger upon social action. Ma-
teriality, whose one manifestation among many are the regional cuisines, in
fact, seems to emerge as a biological instict, rather than just a theoretical
conceptual tool. But we will come back later on in the text on this theme.
4.3 Value and its Spacetime of Content
On the 26th of April 1965 the American mathematician Paul Halmos arrived
in Moscow. He was there as a result of “recent exchange agreement between
the Academies [of science] of the USA and the USSR,” [the purpose of which]
“was that each country was to sent to the other 20 prominent scientists some
time during the years 1964–1965, ‘at least half of whom shall be members of
the respective Academies, for a period of up to one month each, to deliver lec-
tures, conduct seminars, and to study scientific research on various problems
of science’ ” [202, p. 290]. Dmitrii Anosov, a mathematician who would make
major contributions in dynamical systems later on, was assigned as Halmos’s
translator and guide. Halmos, gave some lectures in Moscow, and then in
Leningrad, met with various other mathematicians, with Kolmogorov, took
part in Yakov Sinai’s seminar, and did also some tourism [17]. Anosov would
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later in that year receive his Soviet degree of Doctor of Sciences [16]. Halmos
was a well known mathematician both in the USA as well as in the USSR. He
had published influential textbooks in measure theory and on Hilbert spaces,
which were translated into Russian within less than a year. Many intervie-
wees mentioned his books, especially when asked specifically questions on
how they acquired knowledge of infinite-dimensional spaces. Halmos in his
autobiography mentions the touristic attractions he visited in a rather vivid
narrative, along with his talks and discussions with Soviet mathematicians;
he was keeping a daily diary all over his life, and probably this helped him
as to the vividness of his “exploits” there. Tourism and travelling are, of
course, personal events, not scientific ones, and Anosov’s report on Halmos’s
stay ([17]) was not as vivid as Halmos describes it in his memoirs. One of
the interviewees in the Ukraine, after the end of the interview, he pointed
to a big world atlas hanging on the wall which had pin flags attached on it
and he explained, as if bragging, that each pin flag represented a country
or a place he had been for a conference, or for some other reason under the
capacity of a researcher mathematician. I have to admit that I counted at
least thirty-forty such pin flags scattered all over the atlas. He seemed to be
bragging about these, but most probably this was faked bragging, because
there was a junior researcher present, translating from English into Russian,
and vice versa, during the interview. Most probably this was one of his ways
to motivate the young mathematician as to the potential side benefits of re-
search in mathematics, one of which could be travelling as well as tourism.
In the archives of the Steklov Mathematical Institute, on the contrary, we
do not find such reports of tourism and travelling, not just because these
reports are written in bureaucratic language, but because these activities are
considered as unrelated to the business and conduct of scientific research.
Instead of talking about travelling as coincidental and “unrelated to the busi-
ness and conduct of scientific research,” we could actually reformulate this
last assertion of the previous paragraph in different terms: travelling and/or
tourism do not assist in publishing articles, that is, as activities themselves
do not improve the social-scientific standing of the mathematician, or rather,
they do not bring in value to scientific activities. What brings in value to
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science can be a discussion with other researchers, attending a conference,
giving a lecture and answering questions, and so on. And again we bump
into the question of value once again, since in a gift economy, besides gifts
themselves there is the act of gift-giving, possible discussions before and after
gift-giving, creating acquaintanceship with other regular gift-givers, or gift-
constructors, or even planning a course of a sequence of gift-givings. The
scientific article itself, in other words, is not the only source of value, but
many activities leading to that, or even simply reading one, can be valuable.
So the next step in identifying the gift economy of scientific activity in the
Soviet Union is finding a way to define economic value, but that kind of
value that is intrinsic to science. The first thing to notice is that there can
be as many definitions of value as there are people alive: everybody will have
their own definitions, whether economists, or sociologists, or, in general, any
member of the general public. An ambitious politician would find value in
improving her oratory skills, and a aspirant mafia leader would find value in
killing certain competitors; a professional dancer would find value in learn-
ing some new dancing moves, and a computer cracker would find value in
writing a script to hack an ATM machine. It would be also scientifically pru-
dent not to give our own arrogant definition of what is valuable, a common
research custom in many scientific circles. It would be wiser, as social sci-
entists proper, to “let the people speak,” to let, in other words, social action
define itself, or rather, to let the specific group in question to define what is
valuable to it, and what is not. A gift economy, after all, is not created only
by objects, but by relations between its human agents, by the circulation of
gifts, by the action plans and the desires of human agents, by the creation
of new material and social relations and so on. So “[r]ather than having to
choose between the desirability of objects and the importance of human re-
lations, one can now see both as refractions of the same thing” [180, p. 45],
that is, both as refractions of economic value. And at this point, anthropo-
logical research on economic value, especially research on stateless societies,
has some very interesting things to contribute. A scientific community, in
the end of the day, is a stateless society.
Let us begin with a fictional university student in Moscow during a normal
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day of his studies. He would wake up in the morning, after breakfast would
catch the bus, or the tram, and after some time he would get off at the
Lomonosov university’s Main Building and stay inside most of the day, until
he went back home. This fictional student, in other words, during one of
his normal days, he moves from one enclosed space into the next one. This
scenario would not be very plausible in a Mediterranean country such as
Greece: students there can go out on the parks as well, or to a coffee shop,
and study, for example. In Moscow, on the contrary, especially during winter
time, the temperatures are so low, minus 20 degrees Celsius on average, that
it is almost impossible to stay outside of a building for very long. When in one
day of February, the author made the mistake to buy a hot chiburekki15 from
a street bakery, with the intention of eating it on his way to the archives, he
felt this aspect of living in Moscow quite strongly: the hot chiburekki within
thirty seconds was already cold, and his naked hand holding the chiburekki
was already frozen and after a minute of walking he had to finish eating and
put his exposed hand back to his pockets; after a whole minute of holding
the chiburekki he could hardly move his fingers because of the cold. It was
the same situation during fieldwork in Kiev. Even smoking outside is also
very difficult, but at the Soviet times smoking indoors was something both
legal and normal. Most of the social life in Moscow, in other words, at the
end of autumn until the beginning of spring happens within enclosed spaces,
and people do not stay out for very long, unless there is a reason for that,
as in the case, for example, of police patrols, or militia patrols in the Soviet
times. This is one of the reasons that in Kiev, for example, there are a lot of
underground markets and shopping malls. During autumn, as well as during
spring, there is also a lot of raining, at least in Moscow, which keeps, as
well, people indoors. Summers in Moscow, as well as in Kiev, are very close
to Mediterranean ones: lots of sunshine and high tempretures, sometimes
even 30 degrees Celsius. Our fictional student, in other words, would stay
most of the time of the year during his studies somewhere indoors. A similar
kind of life would live a postgraduate, or a researcher. In other words, the
scientific community, in Moscow, as well as in many other major cities, such
as Kiev, Leningrad, or Novosibirsk, was, and still is, very close to that of an
15It is a traditional Crimean Tatar type of a pie filled with minced meat.
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island community in Papua New Guinea, or to the communities of a complex
of scientific research stations in the Antarctica. Everyday mobility in this
kind of community is, in other words, similar to moving from one island to
another.
The archetypical peripatetic school of ancient Greece, in other words, in
which the student philosophers walked side by side with the teacher philoso-
pher, could not have existed in Russia under these weather conditions. But
academic buildings, such as the Main Building of the Lomonosov Univer-
sity served another purpose, apart from protection from the weather: the
industrialisation of higher and tertiary education. After the victory of the
Bolsheviks in Russia, Vladimir Lenin and many others saw it as vital to erad-
icate the high percentages of illiteracy inherited from the Imperial Russia:
they could not survive otherwise in a hostile “capitalist” world. A special
committee was formed, People’s Commisariat for Enlightenment, Narkom-
pros, whose sole purpose was the eradication of illiteracy. This campaign
was named likbez, literally translated as “liquidation of illiteracy (for more
see [96]). After the second world war Narkompros was renamed into Min-
istry of Education. During the 50s, when most of the older generations
of the October revolution had died, the literacy rate reached almost 100%.
Then a second wave of expanding the “higher education literacy” system to
tertiary education took place, especially during the Stalinist period, that is
from the 1930s to the 1950s. This wave swept over mathematics research,
as well: Steklov Mathematical Institute was created in 1934; St. Petersburg
Department of V. the Steklov Institute of Mathematics split from its mother
institution in 1940; the Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics in Ekater-
inburg was founded in 1956; the Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics
in Moscow in 1966; the Sobolev Institute of Mathematics in Novosibirsk
was created in 1957; the Landau Institute for Theoretical Physics outside
of Moscow in 1965; to name just a few, apart from mathematical institutes
all over the former Soviet republics, as well as institutes employing a great
number of mathematicians to conduct research such as the Kharkevich In-
stitute for Information Transmission Problems, in Moscow founded in 1961.
To give a comparative view of the size of these institutes, as one interviewee
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mentioned, who was a postgraduate student in the 1970s:
[The] Landau Institute was [an] extraordinary organisation. It
was the strongest institute on theoretical physics in the world at
the time. [. . . ] So, by Western standards it was a rather big
institution, which had maybe eighty plus researchers, by Soviet
standards it was [a] negligibly small institution. The institute
was eighty people, it was just nothing.
The reader should also bear in mind that so far postgraduate institutes only
in mathematics have been mentioned, not full-blown universities, with their
own additional postgraduates and researchers on mathematics. The most
well-known equivalent such postgraduate institute in the West, is the Insti-
tute of Advanced Study in Princeton, were Albert Einstein worked after the
second world war until for the rest of his life; but the number of its employees
is much less than those of the USSR, and moreover, it employs researchers
from all over the scientific disciplines, not only from mathematics.
One need that led to industrialisation of education, in general, was the con-
tinuous supply of academic researchers. But besides buildings to house future
researchers, there were some other technologies employed, basically borrowed,
which usually go unnoticed, but still are vital. Due to the great number of
students, the expansion of tertiary education leads to increased complexity
problems. In one of the interviews, for example, the interviewee, in order to
show some part of a mathematical proof, invited the author to the table she
was sitting, picked up a pen and begun writing on a sheet of paper which
she had already placed on the table. This could be repeated up to a certain
number of attendants. If the number of those in her audience had risen to
a hundred, for example, using a sheet of paper placed on a table, the proof
could not have been demonstrated to the audience: there would be too many
people, or rather, too many human bodies, to fit into such a small place. The
lecture theatre, along with the use of the blackboard solved this mundane,
but fundamental problem (see Fig.4.1). The lecture theatre is actually a
special case of the Roman amphitheatre, which in its turn descended from
the ancient Greek theatre. Amphitheatre, which originates from the ancient
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Greek language, means a theatre from both sides: in an ancient Greek the-
atre the spectators were sitting in a semicircular fashion in each row, and
each succeeding row was raised higher from the previous row, as the specta-
tor was sitting in longer distance from the centre of theatrical activity. The
architectural success of the theatre was employed by the Roman emperors to
build “double theatres,” the most famous of which was the Colosseum, which
“experts believe it could have held 50,000 spectators” [75, p. 1075]. The lec-
ture theatre solved the problem of talking to a large audience, as well as,
the problem of establishing face-to-face communication of each student with
the lecturer during the lecture: any student can ask the lecturer something,
and the lecturer can answer directly by looking at the student while talk-
ing to him. The height of the Main Building of the Lomonosov University
also serves to house more people in less space: it is comprised of thirty-two
floors,16 thus scaling up the operations of the university, and handling at the
same time problems of increased complexity.
Any building has to provide a life-support system for its temporary or per-
manent inhabitants. Its main purpose is to protect from natural phenomena
which can be threatening to the human health, such as cold and rain. In the
Soviet case protection from very low subzero temperatures, is an additional
case in point. Air usually is not such a big problem, unless it is heavily pol-
luted, a rather plausible scenario today.17 A university building, therefore,
has to provide to its inhabitants with a life-support ecosystem, its own artifi-
cial ecosystem, at least for as long as it houses its inhabitants. Moreover, the
inhabitants within the building, form their own temporary small society of
everyday life. In the Main Building of the Lomonosov University, there are
students in classes, and students out on the corridors; there are secretaries
talking with professors, or with students; security guards checking the docu-
16That is 31 floors in the British scheme of floor numbering. In Russia the first floor is
the ground floor, as in the American scheme of floor numbering.
17In China, for example, there are many cities suffering from heavy smog, one of which
“was hit by 129 days of ‘unhealthy air’ or worse – the threshold at which pollution is
considered at emergency levels” [447]; one could easily imagine that in cities such as these,
the university buildings would keep their widows closed all the time and would be equipped
with special air-conditioning systems.
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Figure 4.1: Typical lecture theatre in the School of Mechanics and Math-
ematics, Lomonosov University. One can easily see the blackboard on the
bottom, and the (modern) projector screen.
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ments of those entering. Steklov Institute building, on the contrary seems a
rather more dull place: the main reason is that there are no undergraduates
there, although there is more social activity on the self-service restaurant
(stolovaya) on the ground floor. There are also lifts in the Main Building,
which are used on a constant basis. In lifts, as well as in buses and trams for
example, unacquainted strangers may come into interaction: if one person
is waiting on the fifth floor, wants to get to the fifteenth, and the door of
the lift opens, he asks whether the lift goes up or down, in order to decide
as to whether he will board on the lift or not; either he is acquainted with
the person he asks or not, the other person may answer, or otherwise his
silence would be considered as impolite. In Russia, in particular, the “thou”
pronoun (singular grammatical number) is used in a familiar setting, and
the “you” pronoun (plural grammatical number) is used either in a setting of
people more than one, or as a pronoun of politeness; this distinction has been
lost in modern English. Returning to the previous scenario with the lift, we
would say that this brief information and politeness social exchange between
two otherwise strangers to each other, may happen because of the lift itself:
they come into a brief moment of acquaintanceship under the capacity of
“fellow users of a public place” [175, p. 7, n. 5]. This scenario is actually more
widespread in science: if a scientist has published an article that is relevant
to some other scientist’s published research, during a conference, for exam-
ple, the latter could take the initiative to become acquainted with the first
one with the purpose of further discussion: they have become both of them
“fellow users of a public artefact” [i.e. a scientific article], whether they were
previously personally acquainted with each other or not.
One of the students of Vladimir Arnold, a major figure in mathematical
physics, described his days at the Lomonosov University as an undergraduate
as follows:
I spent the first half of the day at the university. Of course, as
far as I remember, the courses started at nine o’clock, or some-
thing like that; then the courses lasted until two or three o’clock
in the afternoon; then we had a lot of special courses, a lot of
special seminars, and so on. So if one particular day I had these
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additional courses and seminars I was at those courses; otherwise
I went home, and I worked at home; and then, of course, even
in the days when we had our special courses, I went home, and
I worked at home. And actually this was from Monday to Sat-
urday. Saturday was a normal working day. And only Sunday
was a day off. But all the time apart [from] my studies in the
university, I worked at home, so I did my home work, exercises. I
worked at the scientific problems Arnold gave me, and so on. So
actually all the time from early morning to late evening, all the
time, 7 days per week were devoted to studies, to studying and
so on. [. . . ] This was typical for most good students.
Very few of the interviewees described their first year as a year without much
studying and more like socialising only for the purposes of leisure, but then
from the second year on their everyday undergraduate life was similar to
that described above. Postgraduates and researchers conducted a life with
a similar pattern, but with less pressure like that of the undergraduates.
Moreover, since only the heads of the departments had an office, most of
the postgraduates met with their supervisors at the supervisors’ home. The
whole mathematical community of the university, in other words, was a vir-
tual island community, rather separate from other communities: its people
were enclosed most of the time, and its members met with one another most
of the time only with other members of the same community. Let us not for-
get that in that time there were no social electronic media, such as Facebook,
or Twitter, to enhance social interaction among large parts of the population,
as it has been happening for the last 5 years of today. In fact any professional
community can be considered as a virtual island community, depending on
how the everyday life of its members is organised, and on to what extent
restrictions of membership exist.
If therefore we consider for a moment the mathematical university commu-
nities over the whole geographical area of the former USSR as virtual island
communities, all of them organised around a gift economy of published arti-
cles, then what begins to emerge is “[a]n intricate time-space-person system
covering hundreds of miles and several decades, linking many hundreds of
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people in respect to thousands of strictly individual objects [i.e. scientific
articles]” [363, p. 12–13]. The members with this island world “can make
connections not only with ‘consociates,’ but also with more distant contem-
poraries with whom they have few or no face-to-face relationships” [334,
p. 6]. If one, additionally, considers the Gelfand-Naimark theorem, which
was previously mentioned, then it can be said that connections can be made
even posthumously across the physical time continuum; the whole modern
research movement on noncommutative geometry, along with its implica-
tions on quantum field theory, is practically based on this single theorem
(see [211, 225]). The case with the impact of the Gelfand-Naimark theorem
entails a certain mode of institutional spacetime [334, p. 9–11]: Gelfand and
Naimark themselves, those mathematicians before them whose mathematical
results Gelfand and Naimark used; those after them who used Gelfand and
Naimark’s theorem. The buildings and the artefacts, such as pencils and pa-
pers, being used by each one involved around this theorem. Due to the gift
economy of scientific articles people who are not personally acquainted can
be connected as well. Another mode of institutional spacetime are confer-
ences, as we saw earlier with Halmos. The Main Building of the Lomonosov
University, due to its endurance over spacetime, whose materiality provides
the spatiotemporal stability of the institution. A small child, and indeed any
person, who sees for the first time the Main Building will remember the
Lomonosov University as that building, although the building itself is not the
institution. Predecessors, contemporaries and successors are continuously
connected over a geo-historical spacetime: one interviewee mentioned Hal-
mos’ book A Hilbert Space Problem Book although he had never personally
met Halmos; many interviewees narrated stories about people they were per-
sonally acquainted with, such as supervisors, or colleagues, or stories about
people they heard from third parties. There is a multitude of published arti-
cles “celebrating the 60th, 70th, or 80th anniversary” of this or that professor
written by former students; these published articles are, in fact, monuments
of institutional memory, rather than scientific articles proper. Another inter-
viewee mentioned that “he knew how the system worked” and he planned his
career accordingly: he was talking about a projected institutional spacetime,
what today is commonly referred to as a “career.” A mode of institutional
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spacetime, quite important in other parts of society, is bodily spacetime [334,
p. 16–18]: in the case of the mathematical community of modern Russia, and
from many photographs and a few Soviet documentaries on science that the
author saw and watched, there was, and still is, no particular dress code
observed apart from some very senior members of the community, who wear
on a regular basis costumes, as an indicator of the formality of their official
position, rather than as a personal choice. The dress code is rather plain,
the process of dressing itself, as in any modern Western society, is conducted
in a private space away from the institution’s building, and its purpose is to
go unnoticed, rather than attract attention.18
The spacetime of social practices, that is, patterns of social action repeated
on a regular basis, such as attendance to classes, solving problems, or going
to examinations, and so on, is an important mode of institutional spacetime.
Ivan Vinogradov, a very important Soviet mathematician with substantial
contributions in analytic number theory, was the head of the Steklov In-
stitute of Mathematics in Moscow, during 1934-–1941, and then from 1944
until his death in 1983. In his report for the year 1965 [15], he mentions
the following as his activities during the year in the first paragraph of the
report: director of the institute and head of its department of number theory;
chair of the national committee of Soviet mathematicians; head editor of the
journal “Izvestia Academy of Sciences, Series on Mathematics”; member of
the organisation committee and chair of its section for the coming interna-
tional conference of mathematics to be held in Moscow in 1966. He mentions
the positions, and not the activities springing from them, which means that
he already assumes that the readers of the report, who are going to be the
members of personnel administration of the presidium of the Academy of
Sciences,19 already know what these activities specifically entail. The posi-
tion of the head of a mathematics institute can be said to be occupied by
a member of staff of extended experience, “extended experience” meaning,
18This can be contrasted to the body decoration during certain rituals in some native
stateless societies, or to that in modern fitness clubs, which provide public outlets of
private space to change clothes.
19Today we would talk about the human resources department of the Academy of Sci-
ences.
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among others, that he or she has identified the important patterns of social
practice and he or she can become an accepted guardian (proper) and a visi-
ble imitation example of the social practices mode of institutional spacetime.
A guardian of institutional practices, in other words, among other things,
keeps the institution’s projected spacetime stable and predictable. In the
second paragraph of Vinogradov’s report he refers to his own research activ-
ities in mathematics, and in analytic number theory specifically: he may be
a guardian of institutional practices, but he never stops to be a member of
a research community, still giving away his own gifts to the community, i.e.
publishing his own articles. Institutional practices, however,
“do not simply go in or through time and space, but . . . they
form (structure) and constitute (create) the spacetime manifold
in which they ‘go on.’ Actors must ‘make’ this manifold, thus
concretely producing their own spacetime” [333, p. 280, emphasis
in the original].
During their undergraduate years every student had an advisor, who at the
same time was a supervisor. There were many seminars offered to the under-
graduates, and usually these advisors where the organisers of these seminars.
These seminars were optional as individual courses, but it was compulsory
to choose a number of them. In addition, these courses were deeply re-
lated to the course organiser’s research at the time. One such seminar in
the Lomonosov University, for example, was Yakov Sinai’s course on ergodic
theory and dynamical systems, a pioneer in statistical mechanics and chaos
theory; Sinai received the Abel prize in mathematics for lifetime achieve-
ment in 2014. Another seminar was Vladimir Arnold’s, which later became
a well known book in mathematical physics [18]; although Arnold’s book is
intended for undergraduates, or rather Soviet undergraduates, its material
is very advanced for the undergraduates of American and British universi-
ties. These seminars attracted many students, and the advisors gave the
students problems to solve, which were actually unsolved problems at the
time. This pattern of undergraduate supervision was quite common in most
of the interviews: the most frequent phrase in the interviews was “he [or
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she] gave this [or that] problem to solve.” A very basic social structure in
the social organisation of scientific research is supervision. In the case of
mathematics in the Soviet Union this involved a certain component of its
gift economy: each advisor gave a problem to a student to solve; then the
student reciprocated with a solution. Each problem was usually something
unsolved at the time, so it was, in fact, a future potential article when it was
given to the student. The whole of the gift economy of the Soviet university
was fundamentally organised around the social structure of supervision. In
this special kind of gift transaction the first thing to note is that supervi-
sory “activities which produce the [supervising, or a supervised] person also
produce the sociocultural system and vice versa” [144, p. 3]: the current su-
pervising, and a past supervised, party transmits the particular scientific
culture to the current supervised, and a future supervising, party. In this
way supervision, at least in the Soviet case, created a cyclical process which
connected the past of the mathematical institution with its future. Quite
often the students went to the professor’s house, because there was limited
space provided for office purposes; only the heads of the departments and
faculties were provided with office space. Many of the interviewees declared
their supervisors, either those during their undergraduate, or postgraduate
years, as their friends, and many of them are still in touch, quite often. This
social structure, or rather process, of supervision, in order to be considered
as supervision is necessarily of fixed directionality in terms of a gift trans-
action: the supervising party gave an unsolved problem, and the supervised
one, reciprocated by giving it back unsolved. This was happening, of course,
due to the functional differentiation within the institution. Supervision, in
other words, “include[s] the production of the objects exchanged and [of] the
producers themselves” [144, p. 3]; it was a fundamental component of the in-
stitutional spacetime of a Soviet university. If one considers the examination
diets, assignment submissions, as well as their marking, one can easily realise
that the gift economy of the university institution is much more widespread
and more heavily institutionalized than previously thought.
We see, therefore, the genesis of structural loops of everyday social practice
on the microscale: a certain activity is considered a necessary and proper,
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therefore it has to be performed, and because of its performance “on the job”
it is considered as proper and therefore it feeds back on its necessity. The
actor creates his or her own institutional spacetime which he or she inhabits
at the same time. In the case of activities which are not described by some
official textbooks, or prescribed by instruction, and the actor has been “left
to his or her own devices” as to a non-prescribed instance of social action,
something quite similar emerges. When one interviewee was asked what kind
of advice he would give to a student in order for the student to develop his
mathematical imagination his answer was:
So, you know , this was not created by me, I just follow my
teachers. So what they did, they just suggested a lot of problems,
quite different. Some of them very simple, some of them were just
open problems , some of them very famous problems, like Hilbert
problems, during the century. You know, of very different level.
And the point is that it is up to the student. The student has to
choose [for/by] himself. So basically, you just, maybe my feeling is
that he teacher has to show different ways, different possibilities,
different opportunities.
The interviewee in other words upon being questioned was in position to
identify by himself the particular type of social action connecting him to
an imaginary successor, to reflect on it without being pointed to it by an
external authority, ascribe the origin of his own particular choices to his
imaginary, at the moment of the interview, predecessors, and consider his
assertions as valid. None of the interviewees reported any official instruction
during their mathematical career in the Soviet Union, as to how supervision
should be conducted, or as to what type of supervision would be consid-
ered as more appropriate; all the interviewees, therefore, had inferred that
themselves, and then considered it valid by simply performing it, that is, as
a self-fulfilling prophecy. They all were “self-taught ethnographers” for their
own purposes without the usual notes of a “proper,” or rather a “professional,”
ethnographer.20 Classroom instruction, for instance, is not the best type of
20That is, a member of the virtual island community of the social sciences.
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instruction, in general, but “it works,” or “that’s the way it has always been,”
or “everybody does it.”
We can now proceed to a preliminary consideration of economic value as ex-
tendable institutional spacetime, that is, “the capacity to develop spatiotem-
poral relations that go beyond the self, or that expand dimensions of the
spatiotemporal control of an actor” [334, p. 11]. Since economic value is al-
ways related to a projected future, there is always some design and planning
involved. One of the interviewees, when asked about his reasons of choosing
mathematics over other subjects, while at school, he answered as follows:
I had some broad interest in sciences, in general [. . . ] But physics
and mathematics were my favourite subjects. And including as-
tronomy. And at some moment I was doing well in both Olympiads,
in math and in physics. [. . . ] And then at some moment I had to
decide. And it was late sixties, pretty deep in the Soviet Union,
and I realised I wanted more freedom ... including my career too.
I also realised that if I choose physics I will be very much de-
pendent on the state system. Because you cannot do big physics
without big money, and big experiments, and equipment. [. . . ]
So between two equally attractive alternatives, I decided that
mathematics will give me more freedom and doing what I want.
We can clearly see that what is commonly called today “a career” is actually
one projected institutional spacetime over others. What we also saw in the
previous section as marginal utility is actually a projected spacetime for one
more reason: a school pupil can think about attractive potential futures and
choose one over the others through his own experiences, and through his his
own discussions with with other people, such as parents or relatives, and
not by calculating the partial derivative of some marginal utility function;
at least not in the case of the above mathematician, and of all the other
interviewees as well. In this particular case we see an actor deciding over
which virtual island community to join by projecting various branches of the
institutional spacetime of his experiences at school and especially of those in
the mathematical Olympiads. By joining, later on, a community, he will start
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participating in the construction of and constructing his participation in the
community’s spacetime. By thinking about the extension of his spacetime,
he paves an alternative future spacetime of the virtual island community. In
a similar fashion, we can see how recruiting postgraduates, discussing with
other researchers, or going to conferences, has institutional economic value,
because these activities lead to a projected extension of the institutional
spacetime. What is important at this point, therefore, to notice, is that, in
fact, “the [scientific] community creates itself as the agent of its own value”
[334, p. 20].
One particular case narrated in an interview is worth elaborating at this
point, because it is a nice instance of taking an initiative and invest in this
particular gift economy. The interviewee was asked whether he could mention
any example of a bright or talented students. His answer was as follows:
At the time, probably even now, it was prestigious to do things
like algebraic geometry, algebraic number theory, and many peo-
ple were going to this direction, bright people. [. . . ] I think it
was ‘89, when for the first time entry examinations in the Moscow
State University [i.e. Lomonosov University] was not related to
any national issue, Jewish, non Jewish. Nothing. It was just
honest examination. And so they got a very strong cohort of stu-
dents. And I told [my collegue], “if we don’t do anything, these
algebraists will grab the whole pack and we will get nothing from
it; so let’s have a seminar, a seminar on dynamical systems and
ergodic theory for first year students; first year, first semester.”
And we got a group like 10-15 guys coming, and one of them
was Dima Dolgopyat. He was very very young. [. . . ] And the
plan which we developed worked perfectly, because he stayed in
dynamical systems, later became student of Sinai in Princeton,
a PhD student. And he’s now one of the most interesting math-
ematicians in the area, and my close friend. [. . . ] I like this
example because it was designed to “fish” somebody very good,
and we managed to “hook” somebody very good for dynamical
systems.
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In this particular case, we have an interesting example of an initiative that
looks like investment behaviour: employing the resources of the institution
to produce more value, that is, a projected extended institutional spacetime.
The particular interviewee, first of all, had faith in the examination system,
that is, he had trust in the new institutional spacetime. So he decided to
invest his own, as well as his colleague’s labour, in certain activities of value.
The value of one’s own labour, as long as labour is considered institution-
ally valuable, both in general, and teaching in particular, relies basically on
whether an article will be produced in the in of the projected process. How-
ever talented a mathematician is, in the end of the day, his or her value as
a mathematician becomes visible only through the publication of an article.
In the case of the economic value of a supervisor, this could become visible
through a potential publication of one of his or her students. A future ar-
ticle, in other words, seems actually to be the only end result of economic
value in the mathematics research gift economy. With applied mathemat-
ics, for example, the benefit is not to mathematics itself, but to other fields
that mathematics it applied on. In mathematics it is valuable to produce
articles in the form of axiom-proposition-proof-theorem-proof-corollary. A
researcher in material science would be interested in implementing ergodic
theory and dynamical systems in his laboratory experiments, even in theo-
rising about them; a mathematician in the same field, that is, ergodic theory
and dynamical systems, on the other hand, would be interested in inventing
mathematical entities, such as, probability measures, ergodic transforma-
tions, or compact manifolds, in order to formulate axioms, then formulate
propositions and prove them, then formulate theorems and prove them, then
formulate corollaries, and so on. Gravity is of interest to a physicist, not to a
mathematician. The geometry of gravity, or rather the attempt to formulate
and develop a geometrical model of gravity, on the contrary, is of interest
to a mathematician. The physicist is interested in a geometrical model of
gravity as far as this model is the reality, rather than an attempt to describe
it; in a laboratory experiment the mathematical model is taken for granted,
rather than developed on the spot.
Returning now to the economic value of mathematical articles, it seems that
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the whole edifice of mathematics is organised around publications of new
results. The whole of mathematical community is mobilised by theorems,
axioms, corollaries, while at the same time these seem arcane to the lay pub-
lic. In the end of the day the economic value of money seems to share a
common function: mobilising social groups towards organisation. But this
mobilisation is not circumstantial: gifts have to be exchanged first, in or-
der to enter circulation. When an article is published this is a moment of
exchange, that is, “the point at which the latent value created in produc-
tion processes and embedded in the products is transformed into publicly
recognized forms of value” [144, p. 8]. The same happens when a consumer
takes out of her pocket a pack of banknotes to pay a product at the cash
desk she has just selected: tending the hand to the cashier while holding the
banknotes she displays her financial economic value of the spot. The defini-
tion of economic value as extendable institutional spacetime is a definition
of subjective value, that is, of value as the actor experiences it, and it is
closer to the social imaginary of the institution, which is visible mainly to
its members. The articles, on the contrary have both an intersubjective and
an objective value: intersubjective because they have rendered subjective
value visible to everybody beyond the particular institution, and objective
because they are made of material, either paper, or, in today’s scientific ar-
ticles, computer screens. The scientific article, in other words is the meeting
point between materiality, society, and consciousness, and as such it can
circulate all over the world, and not just in the former USSR. An article,
besides its content, which is visible to a specially trained subcommunity, is,
in fact, a token of value, besides being an object of value. And as a token of
value it can certainly now mobilise social groups which are known under the
specialised name of “scientific community.” Another aspect of the scientific
article,therefore, seems to arise: the scientific article, as a token of value,
is the material mediator between the community, or rather the society, of
Soviet mathematicians, and the individual Soviet mathematician.We come
therefore to a rather intriguing turning point: is not an ancient Roman gold
coin not a token of value, as well as an object of value, mobilising people in
a way similar to that of an article? And if an article in the former USSR had
a similar function to that of a gold coin, then who, or where, was its mint?
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4.4 Banking Mathematical Intelligence
A mathematical proof, in order to be called “a proof” proper, besides the
authorial party, needs always a counterparty, that is, its audience. Let us see
a simple proposition along with its proof from a standard Soviet textbook
[254, p. 24, my translation].21
Proposition. Any infinite set contains a countable subset.
Proof. Let M be an infinite set. Let us choose an arbitrary element a1 in it.
Since M is infinite, an element a2 will be found in it , which is different from
a1, then an element a3 will be found, which is different from a1 and from a2,
and so on. Continuing this process (which cannot come abruptly to an end
due to a “shortage” of elements, for M is infinite), we get a countable subset
A = {a1, a2, . . . , an, . . . }
of the set M . The proposition[, therefore,] has been proved.
We can now proceed to a more closer look to each step in the proof. It has
to be always borne in mind that the above proof, as any proof in a published
scientific article, is intended to be read.
• Let M be an infinite set.
The concept of a set is a primary concept. Theoretically it means, that
it cannot be defined by other concepts; practically it means that the
reader already knows how to produce himself or herself examples of
sets, at least at this juncture of the textbook. The particular set is not
referred to, only its property of being a set is mentioned. The third
person imperative of existence, both in the above English translation,
and the original Russian version, is a modern relic of mathematical
21Its partial translation in English is still a popular textbook for undergraduates in
mathematics [253].
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style originating from the corresponding ancient Greek one in Euclid’s
Elements. 22
Although formally it is not compulsory in a mathematical proof to name
the generic set, it is customary, as well as necessary, to use symbols
as names to help the readers “ease themselves” into the proof. The
use of letters is a modern version, again, of the ancient Greek lettered
diagrams, that is, geometric diagrams with important points on them
named after a (Greek) letter (see [340, p. 12–67]). In the words of one
interviewee,
[Symbols] are important, and a good notation, I find, helps
to explain. [. . . ] I like to rewrite, sensing my own way to
understand it. [. . . ] It helps; this is important for me.
The concept of infinity has been defined, in a rather informal way,
earlier in the text [254, p. 21, my translation]:
Saying that a set is infinite, we mean that we can extract
from it one element, two elements, and so on, and after each
such step in that set, there are still elements left over.
We see, at this point, the participation of the reader in the definition
of the infinite set, at least in an imaginary way. It is interesting to note
that while the examples of finite sets provided just before this definition
are, for instance, “all the molecules of water on Earth,” apart from
mathematical ones, the examples of infinite sets are only mathematical
ones: the set of natural numbers, that is, the numbers 1, 2, 3, . . . , the
set of all points in a straight line, or the set of all polynomials with
rational coefficients. Mathematics, now, as a scientific discipline begins
to emerge as a literary genre with its own fictional universe.
• Let us choose an arbitrary element a1 in it.
This is, most probably, the most important part in a mathematical
proof: it asks for the reader’s own active participation in the process.
22
῎Εστω [Estō], “Let there be [one such and such],” third person singular; ῎Εστωσαν
[Estōsan] “Let there be [many such and such],” third person plural.
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The reader has to “choose” an element, and then “name” this element
a1. This is the point of picking up a pencil and start writing down the
proof. Many mathematical proofs have a similar step: to prove is to
repeat the whole, or parts of the, process yourself. How do we know,
in this case, that indeed there is such an element to choose, and then,
when we are certain that it exists, how can we choose it, and write it
down in order to proceed to the next step of the proof?
At this point it starts to become apparent that mathematics, with its
own literary universe, along with its mathematicians, is very similar to
a (video) game in a virtual environment [1, p. 2, my emphasis]:
1. There is, first of all, the “game-play [of mathematics] (the players’
actions, strategies and motives);”
2. Then there is its own “game-structure (the rules of the game,
including the simulation rules);”
3. And, probably, the most interesting of all is the mathematical
“game-world (fictional content, topology/level design, textures etc.).”
• Since M is infinite, an element a2 will be found in it , which
is different from a1,
We see again the participation of the reader in the process. Moreover,
an element of a set, as well as a set, is another primary concept : the
reader, somehow, or rather his or her “mathematical consciousness,”
is assumed to be in a position to distinguish an element of a set; in
practice, though, through class instruction, and then homework, the
reader has acquired the ability to distinguish elements of sets, using a
variety of methods.
• then an element a3 will be found, which is different from a1
and from a2, and so on.
The definition of an infinite set is implicitly called upon once again,
and the reader is implicitly requested to participate and engage with
his or her writing material.
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• Continuing this process (which cannot come abruptly to an end
due to a “shortage” of elements, for M is infinite),
The continuation of this process is a fictional one: there is this imagi-
nary reader, who continues to pick elements from the infinite set in a
fictional timeless universe. At this point it is rather evident the sneaky
and underhand encroachment of imagination in a mathematical proof:
there is no such natural reality or world in which such a process could
ever continue ad infinitum.
• we get a countable subset
A = {a1, a2, . . . , an, . . . }
of the set M.
A countable set is a set that can be written in the above form, that
is, as a sequence of numbered elements, whose subscripts run over all
the set of natural numbers; an alternative written form for the above is
A = {an}n∈N, where n ∈ N reads “n is an element of the set N of natural
numbers.” By keeping the “surname” of each element to one common
letter, that is, to “a,” the reader is facilitated into perceiving the infinite
set A by the “ordered infiniteness” of the “names,” i.e. subscripts, of
its elements, that is, a1, a2, . . . , an, . . . , and so on. The ellipsis, that is,
the three dots “. . . ”, after the generic element an add to the sense of
infiniteness when reading this proof.
• The proposition[, therefore,] has been proved.
This is the official announcement of the ending of the proof. In English
mathematical texts it is most often denoted either by QED [quod erat
demonstrandum], which originates from the ancient Greek mathemati-
cal texts,23 or by the “tombstone,” that is, “ ”, which is sometimes also
referred to as “the halmos” (see [202, p. 403]). The tombstone today
is found also in Russian texts, due to the widespread use of the LATEX
document preparation system in mathematical texts.
23
ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι [oper edei deixe], “which had to be proved.”
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The first interesting result about the previous “simple” proof is that in any
infinite set there is always “embedded” a countable one. To a lay person
this would seem indeed trivial, but to an imaginative mathematician that
could lead to another more interesting question: are there any sets which
are infinite but not countable, that is, that they cannot be written down as
an infinite numbered sequence? As we will see in a later chapter, actually
there are such sets, that is sets which are “bigger” than infinite sequences,
as long as the concept of “biggerness” has been defined in a mathematically
appropriate way. This possibility of further exploration seems to be the
“intrinsic” value of mathematical research, that is, the way economical value
is being experienced by its economic agents. As one interviewee recalled:
I began to work as programmer in the Lebedev Institute. And
after one year I realised that it is very boring for me, to program.
At first it was very interesting. It was the first machines in the
Soviet Union. [. . . ] It was very interesting. I worked with physi-
cists as assistant. I solved in computer some tasks for physics.
[. . . ] And after two years it was very boring for me. And I re-
member that I [. . . ] decided to make a candidate’s dissertation.
And I wrote three chapters of my dissertation.
Economic value has always to be experienced somehow by the economic agent
himself or herself, but in the end of the day what is visible is not the expe-
rience but the action, or rather the material product of the particular social
action, which can range from the sound of human voice, to a bodily move-
ment, or even to the production of an artefact. In the case of mathematics
research the product is the published book, or the published article. The pre-
vious proof on infinite and countable sets has another characteristic which
has been many times cited as valuable: mathematical rigour. Mathemati-
cal rigour refers to the fact that we could do the proof based simply on the
properties of being a set or being a member of a set. The infinite set itself,
which could be an infinite set of numbers, functions, polynomials, or matri-
ces, is totally irrelevant to the steps of the proof. Even the phrase “which
cannot come abruptly to an end due to a ‘shortage’ of elements, for M is
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infinite,” which has been inserted in parentheses in the proof, was redundant:
it has been included only because this particular textbook was written for
students, and not for mathematical researchers proper, in order to facilitate
understanding.
The modern fusion of mathematical physics and theoretical physics is an
interesting case in point in differentiating a mathematician’s experience of
value from a physicist’s corresponding one. Yakov Sinai’s contributions in
ergodic theory and statistical mechanics is one of these grey areas between
mathematics and physics, in which Sinai and his students feel comfortable
and at home both as physicists and mathematicians. But as to whether he
is a physicist or a mathematician, Sinai himself has answered in a rather
eloquent way [412, p. 407]:
Some years ago I proved a theorem in the theory of phase transi-
tions. One Thursday, arriving at Landau’s seminar in the Insti-
tute, I chanced upon a talk about a paper by a Western physicist,
in which the same result was obtained, but without precise ex-
pansions, estimates, and the like. A complicated question arises:
Was it necessary to prove that theorem? Since then, in this sit-
uation and others like it, I have always answered this question
affirmatively for myself, for one simple reason: the pleasure of a
well-proved theorem is the highest possible.
Whatever, though, the individual experiencing of value may be, either in
mathematics, or in some other field of social action, economic organisation
thereof requires integration of this value into its wider community. The pub-
lication of the article serves exactly this purpose: it renders its mathematical
value socially concrete by making this value visible to the community. Each
economic agent of this community, that is, each mathematician, can him-
self or herself read it and borrow its results, or its methodology, or even
both. Publication, therefore, of an article is a point in time where the au-
thor(s) of an article proceed to an economic exchange with the mathematical
community through the economic fund of all the published articles. This eco-
nomic fund is located, as one can easily infer, in the corresponding university
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libraries. In mathematics, there are no property laws basically due to estab-
lished custom, rather than due to any established local laws. Once Pythago-
ras proved his famous theorem, and once Einstein developed the general rel-
ativity theory, or, as we saw earlier, once Gelfand and Naimark proved their
famous theorem in mathematics, the knowledge of these became automati-
cally common property available to all. Copyright laws exist in other fields
of human activity, but not in the field of mathematics.24 Once, therefore, an
article is published, then automatically it becomes the property of every ac-
tive member in the community; it is an economic transaction simultaneously
between the author(s) and the rest of the particular community of economic
agents. The act of printing or photocopying, or even today scanning, an
article from a scientific journal leads to another interesting conclusion: since
every interested member of the community can materially acquire this ar-
ticle, if it is relevant to their research, we can say that a published article
acquires the potential, after the exchange, to circulate. Economic circulation
of scientific value has been measured in Western science through the impact
factor indicators : bibliographic citations are officially declared evidence that
the article author(s) “got their hands on materiality” of the the cited articles
(for more on the impact factor see [165]). We saw, though, earlier, in the
text, that the impact factor does not necessarily imply economic value in
mathematics, although it does have its uses.25
The distinct importance, in other words, of a mathematical article is its being
a material, and therefore visible, token of value. Publication is the exchange
transaction which makes the value of mathematical knowledge visible to the
community. Circulation, now, can be seen as the act of an individual scientist
claiming his or her customary right to the visibility of a published article’s
value. In other words “[d]isplay and exhibition as realized in exchange [. . . ]
verify the resources of giver and receiver: objects and object qualities become
definitely associated with particular persons” [153, p. 24]. But this visibility
property of exchange is very reminiscent of money [394, p. 223, my emphasis]:
24And moreover copyright is a modern Western legal-contractual invention.
25Although the Pythagorean theorem has been, and is being widely circulated, its pub-
lication value today is rather negative: instead of going unnoticed, it will receive a lot of
negative criticism.
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Money serves to distinguish its possessor, yet to do this it must
be “seen” somehow by others. Some sort of public display of a
money sign is needed to reveal the potency of money, or to put
it in another way, money, as a quantitative and relative value,
needs to transform itself into a quality, or at least into an object
signifying quality to others.
Money, in other words, is useless, that is, it cannot mobilise agents into a fi-
nancial transaction, unless it is being somehow produced on the spot, brought
forth into the light. Even in a transaction as simple as in a superstore when
using a debit, or credit, card, the visibility of the money owner’s financial
value is displayed electronically: the PIN number of the card ensures and
verifies the financial identity of its possessor, and then the electronic bank-
ing communication network verifies the financial potency of the possessor.
There is no way that a financial agent will attempt to proceed to a financial
transaction with another financial agent, unless the latter has somehow ex-
hibited, either explicitly or latently, his or her financial potency, or at least
some kind of potential financial potency. The important thing about visibil-
ity is that “[s]eeing, in other words, constitutes not only knowledge but also
control: seeing performatively asserts propriety rights” [153, p. 25]. This is,
for example, what happens when some tax office discovers, that is, “sees,”
a case of tax evasion, and then asserts and imposes extraordinary property
rights, besides ordinary ones, on the evaded sums of money through fines.
Contrary to money, though, a mathematical article can be exchanged only
once: when it is published it becomes common property, which any member
of the scientific community can claim and acquire. On the other hand, since
an article is indeed valuable due to its contents, at least at the time of its
publication, we can say that it is a commodity to be “consumed,” that is,
to be read and understood. This valuable commodity, which both in the
common, and the academic parlance, is called scientific knowledge: here it
will be called intelligence. In keeping with the concept of generalised media
of exchange, (mathematical) intelligence will be, rather loosely, defined as “a
generalized capacity controlled by any acting unit [i.e. any economic agent]
to contribute to the implementation of cognitive values through knowledge,
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through the acquisition and use of competence, and through the pattern of
rationality” [351, p. 70-71, emphasis in the original]. An article, in other
words, is commodity money, both as having value in its content, and as be-
ing a token of value. It is not, though, a fungible commodity, since there is
no officially acceptable accounting or measuring system to create divisions
or multiples of it; at least not in the case of the Soviet Union. Actually
there is one aspect of a scientific article which has not yet been mentioned in
the text: the scientific journal under the auspices of which the mathematical
article is published. Earlier in the text we saw that the Soviet mathemati-
cal community was organised as a gift economy, the gift being the scientific
article. Then we saw that the mathematical article is an heirloom of its au-
thors, which becomes shared property after its publication. Then after the
publication all the members of the scientific community could lay a claim of
acquiring the article. What was missing from the equation was the author-
ity of the journal, behind which were its editors. One peculiarity of Soviet
mathematics, and Soviet science in general, was its lack of a peer-reviewing
process. The journal editors were officially the “peers” who were usually aca-
demicians, that is members of Soviet Academy of Sciences [5]. An article, in
other words, was the two sides of a coin: the “head” was the scientific journal,
that is, the “state” (or rather banking) issuing authority guaranteeing its sci-
entific validity, and the “tails,” was the article itself, that is, the underlying
valuable commodity being used by the “market,” (or rather the community)
of scientists (see [206]). An article, thus, was not only a gift, but also a coin,
its mint being some scientific journal. Or to be more exact: the existence of
authors between the article content, being the commodity, and the authority
of the journal, signifying its token value, made the article something between
a gift and a coin, a gift-coin of mathematical intelligence.
On the 22nd of December 2006, Science magazine for the first time in its
history had on its cover a mathematical theorem as the “Breakthrough of
the Year”: the 100 year old unsolved Poincaré conjecture had finally been
solved [304]. The Poincaré conjecture was one of the most difficult problems
resistant to any attempted solution in mathematics. It was first formulated
in the beginning of the twentieth century by the French mathematician Henri
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Poincaré, its solution was conjectured by him, and since then it had remained
unsolved. In 2002 and 2003, the Russian mathematician Grigori Perelman,
at the time employed in the St. Petersburg branch of Steklov Mathematical
Institute, published three online preprints, 39, 22, and 7 pages, claiming
that he had sketched a proof of the conjecture in his three papers. A sudden
public stir was created in the mathematical community. Perelman was called
by various universities in the USA to present his theoretical programme. In
one of these papers he wrote [356, p. 1]:
I was partially supported by personal savings accumulated during
my visits to the Courant Institute in the Fall of 1992, to the SUNY
at Stony Brook in the Spring of 1993, and to the UC at Berkeley
as a Miller Fellow in 1993-95. I’d like to thank everyone who
worked to make those opportunities available to me.
Three independent groups were set up to verify the proof. Bruce Kleiner
and John Lott, working at the University of Michigan, submitted on 25 May
2006 the first version of an online preprint of 192 pages filling in the details
Perelman had left out. In June 2006 Zhu Xiping of Sun Yat-sen University in
China and Huai-Dong Cao of Lehigh University in Pennsylvania published a
paper of 328 pages on the Asian Journal of Mathematics. In the abstract of
the paper they said that their “proof should be considered as the crowning
achievement of the Hamilton-Perelman theory of Ricci” [222, p. 165]. On
25 July 2006 John Morgan of Columbia University and Gang Tian of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology submitted the first version of an online
preprint of 473 pages providing a detailed proof of Perelman’s papers. In
the meantime, the Poincaré conjecture had been proclaimed as one of the
Millennium Prize Problems, that is, one the seven problems that the scientific
board of the Clay Mathematical Institute had established with the purpose
of recording “some of the most difficult issues with which mathematicians
were struggling at the turn of the second millennium” and of recognizing
“achievement in mathematics of historical dimension” [82, p. vii]. Moreover,
“[a] set of rules was established, and a prize fund of US$7 million was set up,
this sum to be allocated in equal parts to the seven problems.”
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In August 2006, during the International Congress of Mathematicians held
in Madrid, Spain, Perelman, along with other three mathematicians,26 was
awarded the Fields Medal, the most prestigious prize in the field of modern
mathematics. The Fields Medal, named after the Canadian Mathematician
John Charles Fields who established it in 1936, is awarded every four years
to two to four mathematicians who are under forty years old on the day of
the award ceremony and “is intended not only to recognize results already
obtained, but also to stimulate further research” [327, p. 3] (see also [389]).
According to John Coates of Cambridge University “[t]his saves us a lot of
trouble [since w]ith the Nobels many of the old men on the committee are
possible winners themselves, but that’s not the case with the Fields” [51].
Perelman declined to accept it, for the first time in the history of the award.
On 28 August 2006, a few days after the Fields medal award ceremony, a
newspaper article was published, attempting to narrate the full story behind
the proof of the Poincaré conjecture [337]. One of the authors of the article
was a well known journalist who had written John Nash’s biography, a famous
American mathematician struggling for most of his life with schizophrenia,
and it had later turned into a Hollywood movie [336]. The authors of the
article had conducted an interview with Perelman in St. Petersburg, as well
as many more with mathematicians all over the world involved in the Poincaré
conjecture. Sir John Ball of Oxford University, chairman-president, at the
time, of the International Mathematical Union, had gone to St. Petersburg
himself earlier in the year to speak to Perelman as to whether he would
accept the Fields medal or not. Perelman explained to the journalists that
the Fields medal “was completely irrelevant for me; [e]verybody understood
that if the proof is correct then no other recognition is needed.” After the
publication of the newspaper article a rather heated controversy followed in
the mathematical community: the article depicted modern mathematics as a
community ridden with power struggles and infested with machinations over
prizes and awards. Lawsuits were threatened to follow, as well as denials
of statements were issued allegedly made during the interviews before the
publication of the article (for a fuller account see [168]). Perelman’s case
started to attract wider media attention, and finally, in 2010 the unexpected
26One of them another Russian, Andrei Okunkov.
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happened: on March 18, 2010 the Clay Mathematical Institute announces
its decision to award 1 million dollar to Perelman for solving the Poincaré
conjecture; three months later, Perelman, who had already quit his post in
the Skeklov Institute in St. Petersburg in 2005 and had remained unemployed
since, declines the prize [391].
Perelman at an early school age had been to the Leningrad Palace of Pi-
oneers, in the mathematics club for schoolchildren [168, p 18]. The Young
Pioneers were the communist equivalent of the Western Scout Movement.
These were organised around some common-interest topic, such as science,
sport, art, politics, etc. They organised extracurricular activities that the
communist party considered important. In the case of mathematics, for ex-
ample, as well as in other fields, “there were camps for Young Pioneers in
the countryside where students could go on their summer vacations” [308,
p. 403]. Later on, Perelman joined the Physical-Mathematical Lyceum, No.
239, in Leningrad (today St. Petersburg). There were many such specialised
high schools in the former Soviet Union. Quite often “11–12 hours per week
were allocated for mathematics, which was twice the usual amount [of non-
specialised schools]; furthermore, the course content was far more intensive
and challenging” [234, p. 267]. One of the interviewees, employed full-time by
an American university at the time of the interview, commented on the time
he was a pupil in Lyceum 239: “They were school teachers, but very good;
so in America they would be full professors at universities. The level of com-
petence so high.” Perelman, after high school, entered the Leningrad State
University, and then, after graduation he became a PhD student in Steklov
Mathematical Institute, Leningrad Branch.27 During all these years he had
coaches, advisors and collaborators who were close to him, and they all had
a strong influence on him [168]. He submitted his candidate’s dissertation in
1990, just a year after the unexpected by everybody collapse of communism.
In 1996 European Mathematical Society (EMS) awarded Perelman its prize
but he refused to accept it. The EMS prizes, in a similar fashion to Fields
medals, are awarded every four years to ten mathematicians not older than
35 years at the day of the award ceremony. One could easily say that this
27Today St. Petersburg Branch.
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was probably the first sign for what was to follow. While the solution of
the Poincaré conjecture stirred the international mathematical community,
the 10 million dollars of the Millenium Problems prize brought widespread
media attention to Perelman. There were even reports of Russian paparazzi
breaking into his mother’s flat to get interviews from her, and Perelman
bursting into profanities. Gessen has a whole chapter on her book attempting
to explain his behaviour as being most probably a behavioral manifestation
of Asperger syndrome. People with Asperger syndrome,
are typically motivated to interact with others, but find them-
selves socially isolated because of their odd communication style,
which is often overly formal and may take the form of an in-depth
monologue about a topic of special interest regardless of whether
their interlocutor is interested or not [464, p. 3].
Leaving aside the specious scientific validity of an “attempted diagnosis” of
a clinical syndrome by a lay person, there is another aspect of the inci-
dents surrounding Perelman’s case: this was more of an instance of Soviet
mathematics, rather than an isolated case of an alleged madman. Perelman
considered money, in its economic financial value, as just a means to produce
the economic value of an article. He had saved money from his previous
appointments in American universities to fund his own research on proving
one of the Holy Grails of mathematics: the Poincaré conjecture. The gift he
would contribute to the mathematical community had been only projected
and imagined for a century: it was a gift that only a god could donate. The
Fields medal, therefore, was trivial when compared to the Poincaré conjec-
ture. His reclusiveness, which was widely mentioned in the media, actually
kept him close only to the gift economy of Soviet mathematics: his tendency
for isolation prevented him from integrating with the new Russia, the Rus-
sia of American capitalism. He had bonded with his parents and his sister;
he had bonded with his mathematics coaches during his school years; he
had bonded with his advisors and supervisors during his graduate and post-
graduate years. He had adopted, in other words, the gift culture of Soviet
mathematics. With the transition from the Soviet Union to a capitalist Rus-
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sia, he simply did not adapt to the new economic culture which fused the
scientific economic value of published articles with the financial economic
value of banknotes and bank deposits. His reclusiveness, in other words,
prevented him from integrating with the new post-Soviet economic system;
he was not devoid of an economic cultural system. Grigori Perelman, most
probably, was the last great Soviet mathematician proper.
Although Perelman was awarded the Fields medal in 2006, the announcement
for the Millennium Prize on the Poincaré conjecture came out on 2010. In
the rules for the award of the prizes, the Clay Institute specifically mentioned
that
a proposed solution must be published in a refereed mathematics
publication of worldwide repute [. . . ], and it must also have gen-
eral acceptance in the mathematics community two years after
[82, p. 153].
Perelman published his proposed solution on arXiv.28 arXiv is an electronic
repository of preprints, that is, of drafts of scientific articles, not yet pub-
lished in a peer-reviewed scientific journal (see [227]). It was created by the
physicist Paul Ginsparg in 1991 in order to facilitate the exchange of physics
preprints among American universities, in the beginning, and then expanded
to other disciplines, such as mathematics, astronomy, computer science. The
repository is hosted today in the servers of the Cornell University. Although
its content is not properly peer-reviewed, there are some moderators, in lieu
of editors, who check whether the preprints fall into the submitted area, and
they may recategorise them. In the Soviet Union, the editors in a scientific
journal were actually more of moderators, as in the arXiv repository, rather
than peer reviewers proper. In an interview conducted in 2006, when asked
why he had not published his proof in a peer-reviewed journal, Perelman said
that
[i]f anybody is interested in my way of solving the problem, it’s
28Where the capital X is pronounced as the ch in the Scottish word loch, which is the
pronunciation of the Greek letter χ.
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all there – let them go and read about it. I have published all my
calculations. This is what I can offer the public [295].
Finally in 2008 Bruce Kleiner and John Lott published the full and complete
proof of the Poincaré conjecture in Geometry and Topology, a well known
peer-reviewed journal in mathematics [247].
The delay of the Clay Mathematical Institute award poses another problem
in mathematics: that of an increasing complexity in scientific research. More
people had to be involved in the verification of the proof; the scientific validity
of the non peer-reviewed arXiv repository versus the peer-reviewed journals
could be easily disputed. Soviet mathematics had, in fact, gone a long way
ahead since the first turbulent period Stalinist Russsia: it had become a well
established and respected partner along with other countries in the massive
production of mathematical theorems. As one interviewee remebered from
his postgraduate years:
It was decided to organise a very good probability school in
Bakuriani. Bakuriani this is a small village [. . . ] and you can
not only visit the conference, but [also] you can spend some time
by mountain skiing.29 [. . . ] For example when I was a PhD stu-
dent, I visited this school two times as a PhD student, and it was
the time when I first learned such a person as Sinai, Shiryayev,
Prokhorov, Sazonov. So it was very helpful for me because you
can have conversation with all these people. [. . . ] So it was ex-
tremely important for young generation. One day in this Bakuri-
ani school Prokhorov said something very interesting. He tried
to explain how probability theory flourished in the Soviet Union,
and he said that when he was 40 years [old], he knew every PhD
[student] in the probability theory in the Soviet Union. Now
[that] he is 60 he didn’t even know every doctor in probability
29These were the All-Union Winter Mathematics Schools-Colloquia in Probability The-
ory and Mathematical Statistics held every year in Bakuriani, a skiing resort in Georgia.




The development and growth of mathematics had gone from the personal
level to the impersonal. With the massive acceptance of postgraduate stu-
dents the complexity of mathematical research had massively increased, as
well. The human individual, whether modern, premodern, or prehistoric,
still remains tribal in its perception of the world: she perceives the world
in general through stories, personal relationships, and artefacts. The main
artefacts allowing imaginary access to the whole of the scientific world in the
case of Soviet mathematics, and of science, in general, was, and still remains,
the published scientific article. Still the production rate of published articles
was increasing to an unprecedented level. Even if we supposed the existence
of a “super-mathematician” understanding every field and subfield of math-
ematics, it would still be physically impossible to read every one published
article: one lifetime most probably would not be enough. The Soviet scien-
tific social system of research in mathematics, in general, and of probability
theory and mathematical statistics, in particular, was creating by itself “a
problem of overload and of constantly threatened instability” [297, p. 6].
During a conference held in Moscow, the author had at some point a brief
discussion with one of Vladimir Arnold’s students, who is a leading researcher
in algebraic geometry. During this discussion the mathematician mentioned
the fact that he could not understand some of the papers presented in the
conference, and moreover, it was becoming difficult for him to keep up with
the latest developments. The Soviet system of research was very demanding
in many respects. The university graduate, if she wanted to continue to a
Candidate of Sciences degree (Kandidat Nauk), the actual equivalent of a
PhD in the English-speaking universities, was expected to have at least two
articles published at the time of the application. Not to mention that the uni-
versity was five years, not four, as in the Western European universities, and
certainly not with a majoring subject as in the American universities: the
student had already chosen her major from the first year. Moreover, a candi-
date’s dissertation was not, in general, enough: the doctor’s dissertation was
an extra requirement for those with more research aspirations. Despite its os-
tensible similarity with the German and French habilitation, Soviet, as well as
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modern Russian, doctor’s dissertation was submitted in most cases approxi-
mately after ten years of published research and the Doctor of Sciences degree
(Doctor Nauk) was awarded after demonstrating a major breakthrough in the
field. Moreover, the awarding body both of a candidate’s degree, and of a
doctor’s degree, was the Higher Attestation Commission for the whole of the
USSR. German and French Doctor’s degrees, on the contrary, are awarded by
the university in which the dissertation, or habilitation, has been submitted.
As a result, there was more trust in the research judgement, competence, and
the ability of the individual mathematician, which compensated for the lack
of proper peer-review. In the Western universities, on the contrary, there is
more trust in the impersonal scientific journal, and its impersonal processes
of validation, rather than on the author herself.
The problem of trust for a social scientist is how can one measure trust. In
fact, systemic trust is an imaginary economic resource and so far there is no
method to measure it. What is measurable, on the contrary, is the lack of
trust : when there is a widespread rumour, for example, that a commercial
bank is facing financial problems, and is going soon to file for bankruptcy,
then in the majority of the cases a run on the bank follows which is the most
visible evidence of lack of systemic trust.30 Soviet mathematics, in particular,
and Soviet science in general, enjoyed worlwide systemic trust for its scientific
research operations, especially after being the fist country to send a man in
space. In the case of mathematics, this trust in the individual researcher,
and by extension in the whole Soviet social system of mathematical research,
compensated for the increase in its complexity: it was not necessary for
the individual researcher to check and verify the proof of every published
theorem. While, in other words, the inherent tendency of scientific research
to increase the complexity of the scientific social system, the trust accorded
to the individual researcher by her colleagues, backed by the great demands
placed on each individual researcher by the scientific system itself, reduced,
in its turn, the complexity of the whole Soviet scientific social system.
In the Roman legal system there were two special kinds of contracts which
30Galileo, on the other hand, attempted quite successfully to manipulate different mech-
anisms of systemic trust in medieval Italy to his own benefit (see [25]).
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have remained rather unchanged even today:
the contract of deposit (depositum in Latin) is a contract made
in good faith by which one person – the depositor – entrusts to
another – the depositary – a movable good for that person to
guard, protect, and return at any moment the depositor should
ask for it [420, p 4].
The usual example of a deposit contract is when the depositor entrusts a
diamond to a depositary, such as a bank, to guard it until the depositor asks
the diamond back. Depending on the depositary, the execution of the de-
posit contract might entail a certain charge for the service of guardianship,
that is, a commission. If the good is a fungible one, that is, a good whose
quantity and quality can be replaced by another good of the same quality
and quantity (the tantundem), then we have the irregular deposit contract.
In the irregular contract the depositor may entrust a fungible good, such as
oil, and then if she asks it back after some time, the depositary returns the
same amount and quality of oil, that is, the tantundem. Returning the same
amount means that the depositary has some commonly, or at least mutu-
ally, acceptable counting, or rather accounting, method of a certain natural
property of the oil, such as weight, or volume. Returning the same quality
means that there is some mutually acceptable way of identifying quality such
as chemical ingredients contained, or point of origin. Gold coins stamped by
the same issuing authority are always fungible: a depositary can always re-
turn upon request any gold coin that has been issued by the same issuing
authority as that, which had been given in the first place. Moreover, if two
gold coins, are genuine, and have the same weight, they can be considered
as equivalent in personal transactions anyway, since gold, and therefore gold
coins, has always been considered a commodity of universal value, indepen-
dently of the issuing authority.31 It has to be clarified, though, that the
deposit contract, whether regular, or irregular, does not transfer the owner-
ship of the deposited good: the depositary cannot sell and then buy back a
31Nature could be said to be the issuing authority in this case, an authority beyond all
human authorities.
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diamond, or an amount of gold coins that have been entrusted to her. The
idea of a deposit contract is to attract depositors who are risk-averse, that
is, being a depositor means that one wants to avoid risk. These where the
initial reserve banking systems in the Roman times. Today we have frac-
tional reserve banking: in the case of money, the banks acquire temporary
ownership of the deposited amount, and can then invest it, apart from a frac-
tion, usually 10%, of the total amount deposited in them which are obliged
to retain for everyday transactions with the public. In case of a bank run,
the central bank provides the rest 90% of the money expected to be missing
from the private banks. The modern banking system, in other words, is the
result of continuous violations of the original Roman contract of depositum
(see [420, p. 1–166]; for the Roman depositum contract see also, the rather
demanding, [476, p. 188–229]).
A banking institution, in general, consists of three “sections”: the directors,
the accountants, and a vault. If we consider the scientific journals as the issu-
ing authorities of published articles, that is, the banking institutions minting
the coins of science, then the editors are actually its corporate directors with
fiduciary duties, a custom dating back to the Roman period:
Roman law provided for certain situations where one party acted
for another not as an agent but in his own right. This was the
concept of trusteeship: the trustee held a right in somebody else’s
interest; on account of the fiduciary relationship he was bound,
however, to safeguard these interests of the beneficiary [476, p. 50,
my emphasis] (see also [119]).
The journal editors, in fact, are entrusted with certain duties. The Soviet
mathematicians, who were editors in scientific journals, in other words, had
the fiduciary duties of a “capitalist” corporate director. The important thing,
though, to distinguish at this point is the sociological aspect of contractual
customs. One of the oldest contractual customs, which actually dates back
to the Babylonian and Assyrian empires is debt (see [181]). Contractual cus-
toms, in other words, are part and parcel of civilisation, or at least of societies
with writing systems. Since modern European culture, as well as imperial
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Russian and Soviet ones, is a legal descendant of the Roman legal culture,
contractual customs have been backed by artefacts, i.e. written contracts.
The fundamental form of contract in the Roman republic was the stipulatio,
also known as contractus verbis that is, the verbal contract [476, p. 68–94].
In the late Roman empire, a new development was the contractus litteris,
that is, the literal (written) contract. Justinian put an end to the contractus
litteris, but it was later “rediscovered” by medieval lawyers [476, p. 546–547].
There is, therefore, the Roman social custom of appointing the directors of
a scientific journal, and then this is backed by the additional (Roman) so-
cial custom of recording the social event of the appointment on a piece of
paper.32 The names of the editors of each Soviet mathematical journal was
always mentioned on the first pages of the journal, as well as in the internal
documents of the journal. No matter what the Soviets could claim as to the
revolutionary essence of their society, in terms of some of their contractual
customs they were more Roman, than they would have, most probably, be-
lieved themselves to be. The vault of the scientific journal was the room with
the journal archives. But, most probably, the most important “section” in the
journal were its accountants: the individuals who decided whether an article
should enter the “vault of mathematics” or not. In the Western universities
these accountants were, and still are, the peer-reviewers: they decided as to
the scientific validity of an article.33 In the case of the Soviet Union, the
editors, were not only the directors, but also the accountants of scientific
validity, as well as any senior member of the scientific community, who could
identify gaps in the proofs. We see now, that actually the authors of a sci-
entific article were actually the depositors of the banking system of Soviet
science. Moreover, since by custom there were no, and still are no, property,
or copyright, laws as to the contents of an article, a deposit of one scientific
coin, that is, a published article, rendered automatically all the members of
the community depositors of the same coin. In addition the deposit made
was a regular deposit, rather than an irregular one, since scientific articles
32Which could also be an Egyptian scroll or a pdf file in a computer file; that depends
on the technology of artefacts, and what types of artefacts are considered as valid in a
particular civilisation.
33That is, in simple terms, whether a mathematical theorem is true or not.
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are not fungible, at least in science, and at least up to today’s publishing
accounting customs.
The university library has also played a very important role in mathemati-
cal research. It is actually the external memory of the scientific community.
The university library, has, in fact, been the material vault of scientific in-
telligence: it contains the actual paper articles, and books of mathematical
knowledge. Destruction of a library is a major event in any academic in-
stitution. The most infamous destruction of a library, probably, has been
the burning down of the legendary Alexandrian Great Library of the Hel-
lenistic period, an event that reverberated all over the academic world for
many centuries to come (for a general history of libraries over the ages see
[335]). Even the Third Reich has been stigmatised, among other things, in
the public opinion for institutionalising the public burning of books: the feel-
ing that a book belongs to everybody had been inculcated for many centuries
in the West, as well as later in the USSR. A researcher can borrow books
and articles to “use”, that is, to read and understand them. Then she can
extend many times the period of borrowing; still, though, at some point she
has to return the books, and the articles if she has borrowed whole journals.
If we want, in other words, to understand the social customs in regulating
the university library as external memory, we have to go back again to Ro-
man contractual law and then return back to modern banking practices. The
Roman commodatum contract
refers to a real contract made in good faith, by which one person
– the lender – entrusts to another – the borrower or commodatary
– a specific item to be used for free for a certain period of time,
at the end of which the item must be restored to its owner.[420,
p. 2].
The mutuum contract, on the other hand,
refers to the contract by which one person – the lender – entrusts
to another – the borrower or mutuary – a certain quantity of fun-
gible goods, and the borrower is obliged, at the end of a specified
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term, to return an equal quantity of goods of the same type and
quality (tantundem in Latin) [420, p. 2].
A typical example of a commodatum contract, or rather of commodatum
contractual behaviour, is when someone lends her car to a friend, the com-
modatary, for a specified period of time, such as a week, and then, after
having used it for his business, the commodatary returns the car intact af-
ter a week. When someone lends a basket of cherries, on the contrary, to a
friend for a week, with the provision that her friend, the mutuary, returns
a basket with the same quantity and quality of cherries, after a week, then
it is a mutuum contract. Contract here refers to the social custom of mu-
tual agreement as to the particular terms of that contract. The additional
Roman custom of writing down the contract on some kind of artefact, such
as a piece of paper, or a scroll, will not concern us. Since scientific articles
are not fungible, the mutuum contract is not related to scientific research.
The commodatum contract, as well as the mutuum one, is actually a loan
contract: the commodatary, that is the lender, acquires full ownership for the
period of the loan. In the case of a university library, ownership refers to the
material vehicle of a book, that is, the white printed pages, the binding, the
hard covers, and so on. Ownership of the book means to be in a position to
materially carry it with the hands, to open its pages with the fingers, browse
for as long as one likes, and so on. The mathematical content, though, of a
book can be used, and cited as having being used, in any other later article,
or book.
A special case of a commodatary was actually the postgraduate student (As-
pirant). The officially prescribed and accepted period of postgraduate study
was three years. One interviewee, in particular, finished his dissertation ear-
lier:
I was not paid, but I was his aspirant. I was working in a research
institution in Novosibisrk itself, but I made [the] dissertation in
one year. Yes, yes I did. For some purely technical reasons, I was
unable to defend it for two more years. [But t]he results were in
one year.
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This was one of the infinite examples of the frequent irrationality of Soviet bu-
reaucracy: in the end of the day it was not the Soviet system’s fault that this
particular interviewee as a student had proved to be more prepared and more
talented for postgraduate research than the system itself had anticipated; he
should have been more frugal and more reserved in his aspirations. Most of
the interviewees mentioned their postgraduate years as a period of freedom.
What is actually more important, especially in the case of postgraduates, is
how the banking system of mathematical intelligence was actually organised
around credit expansion. The purpose of a commodatum contract, and of
any bank loan in general, is about how much is the charge of the loan, that
is, how much is its interest. A postgraduate student before entering officially
the postgraduate research, had already been a depositor in some bank by
having published already at least two articles as an undergraduate. Then,
at the proposal of her supervisor, by becoming a postgraduate researcher,
as an aspirant she could “borrow” resources from a university library, and
at the end of the three years he would return the economic resources he ini-
tially borrowed, as well as an amount of interest, that is, added economic
value: the publication of her dissertation. And any outsider could clearly
see that this credit process was conducted with Renaissance Italian double-
entry bookkeeping in mind (see [276, 349]): the university library, or rather
the university institution itself, was crediting its vault with resources to the
postgraduate student for three years, and at the same time debiting its vault
with the obligation of the student to return the borrowed resources as well as
the added value of a published dissertation. On the opposite side, the student
was debiting herself with the economic scientific resources of the university
and crediting herself to the university vault with her double obligation both
to return the resources she had borrow, as well as to deposit to the vault the
added economic value of a published dissertation. The public defence of the
dissertation in front of an audience of academics was the accounting proce-
dure, in which a collective decision was made as to whether the submitted
dissertation would be acceptable as added value to be debited to the scien-
tific vault or not. Such a system of credit, and actually any banking system
with credit expansion, was based on cross-institutional, or rather systemic,
trust, that is, its depositors never questioned, or doubted about it; in fact,
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all the interviewees, especially those in the USA, who had come into contact
with another university social system, when asked during the interview, they
still considered the Soviet system as superior to others. One interviewee, for
example, who was a professor in a North American university, was asked if he
considered accidental the fact that during the last sixteen years, in each one
of the four International Congresses of Mathematicians that were organised
in 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010, there was at least one Russian mathematician
who was awarded a Fields medal; his answer was as follows:
No, no, no. There was a wonderful culture, and still, it spread
[. . . ] not at all. Well, accidental, it was a historical moment,
when the Russian school was really prominent, and it had big
advantages over other schools, even the famous French school, and
we have our Bourbakis34 there [. . . ] but it’s difficult to separate
it from the history, from the society.
Moreover, many Russian mathematical scientific journals were translated into
English intact, in spite of their lack of peer-reviewing in the Western sense:
in other words, the Soviet banks of mathematical intelligence were indeed
enjoying the trust of their Western counterparts.
4.5 The Estates of the Soviet Realm
During the middle ages, a certain model of society was widespread among the
intellectual, and political elites of western Europe. According to this model
the medieval western European society comprised three “social orders”:
there was a distribution of tasks in the city of God (identified here
with Christianity): the oratores (those who prayed), the bellatores
(those who fought) and the laboratores (those who worked). They
all lived together and could not imagine being separated. Each
group supported the other two [39, p. 59–60].
34Bourbaki was a collective author name of a group of French prominent mathematicians
who were publishing many influential books on very advanced mathematics.
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These three orders were the three Estates of the Realm. The First Estate,
in order of importance, was the clergy: they were the ones who espoused
and proliferated this social model as the model ordained by God Himself.
The Second Estate was the nobility: their social function, as perceived in
this model, was to protect God’s realm from any potential intruders, who
would threaten its existence. The Third Estate were the commoners, those
basically excluded from the previous two, that is, artisans and peasants:
their (perceived) mission had to do with what we would be calling today
the “logistical operations of the God’s realm.” The interesting thing about
the three estates, in terms of social mobility, was that, although the second
and the third ones were hereditary, the first, and most important one, was, in
principle, open to all: anyone joining the ranks of the Church could reach the
highest possible social position during a single lifetime. This social model of
medieval Roman Catholic historiography, which was “[i]nspired more or less
remotely by St. Augustine’s City of God ” [39, p. 59], passed on later to the
monarchy of the French ancien régime, since
the fitting of social relations into ternary structures made it possi-
ble to integrate those into global structures, which extended over
the entire visible and invisible universe [132, p. 2].
The social order of the Estates of the Realm led to the creation of the French
legislative body of Estates General, which met until 1614: it was “the last
to meet before 1789, and the ability of the French kings to govern without
a national representative body was a defining feature of absolute monarchy”
[427, p. 140]. The French ancien régime, with the appearance of new socially
visible types of commoners, such as the merchant class, became less rigid in
terms of social mobility. The second estate of the nobility, though, still gave
off social prestige:
Throughout the eighteenth century concern for reputation and
status continued to exert a strong influence on the use of wealth
. . . [S]tatus was able to co-opt wealth by establishing standards
for the acceptable use of money [59, p. 45].
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The Estates General was reconstituted, and representatives from all three
estates were called upon to participate in 1789, in an attempt to control
to civil unrest that was about to break out in France, under the name of
National Assembly. During the French Revolution the Estates General was
finally dissolved as a legislative body of the three estates, and reconstituted
as National Assembly.
In medieval England this division into the three social estates lead to a bi-
cameral parliament. It originated from medieval king’s councils, which were
becoming more established after the granting of Magna Carta. In the be-
ginning only the nobility and the clergy were participating in the official
meetings with the king. But later on,
the “commons” (the knights and burgesses) came to be summoned
with much greater frequency, and after 1325 no assembly which
excluded representatives of the Commons was described as a par-
liament [173, p. 16].
This compulsory “inclusion of representatives of lower status” lead the Lords,
that is, the nobility and the clergy, “to insist upon their exclusiveness as
a separate ‘estate’ in parliament” [173, p. 16]. In medieval Scotland “ ‘the
community of the realm’ – a phrase that would sum up the whole political
nation – was often understood to mean parliament” [176, p 301]. In 1357 the
first official recording of the phrase “three estates” was made and this
threefold division into estates reconciled two existing sets of twofold
divisions: clergy and laity on the one hand, and ‘lords’ and
burgesses on the other” [176, p 302].
In 1707, with the Treaty of the Union, the British parliaments were unified
into one, as the Article III stated:
That the united Kingdom of Great-Britain be represented by one
and the same Parliament, to be stiled the Parliament of Great
Britain [205, p 170].
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The Treaty of the Union, in contradistinction to the developments with the
French Estates General, was the result of many political interactions and ne-
gotiations 35 among factions and interest groups belonging to a self-described
society of three estates. The modern British House of Lords, an institutional
relic of medieval Britain, still comprises the modern versions of the first two
medieval estates: the Lords Spiritual, that is, the archbishops and bishops of
the Church of England; and the Lords Temporal, that is, representatives of
the modern British nobility (see [35, p. 14]).
In the Russian middle ages the situation was much more complicated. Af-
ter the Great Schism between the Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern
Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church had no influence on early
medieval Russia. Medieval Russia had converted to the religious doctrines
of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the three-estates social model of the
Roman Catholic Church was not initially adopted: by 1054 the Patriarchy of
Constantinople and the Holy See had excommunicated each other. During
the time of Peter I the Great, Russia “consisted of numerous, small groups
and lacked collective terms for legal aggregation” [158, p. 14]. Then Peter the
Great introduced the Table of Ranks
“which stressed the link between service to the crown and noble
privilege, and created the rule that officers and civil servants ac-
quired noble status automatically upon reaching defined ranks”
[291, p. 229].
The Table of Ranks introduced “the chin [i.e. rank]36 system, or system of
rank ordering and niche assignment” [41, p. 2]. Although the chin system of
the Table of Ranks expanded and refined the social base of the nobility, it
left out large portions of the general population. In the seventeenth century
an influential Russian thinker
described an ideal society strictly divided into classes or estates
35Or political conspiracies and machinations, depending on the narrative a historiogra-
pher might prefer.
36Or chinovnik [i.e. official, functionary].
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(soslovia)37 — nobles serving the state, merchants dedicated to
commerce, artisans pursuing crafts and peasants ploughing the
land [203, p. 121].
In the last two decades of the eighteenth century two new legal terms were
introduced: sostoianie and zvanie. While zvanie “tended to be closely as-
sociated with specific occupational groups” [158, p. 16, n. 17], sostoianie “re-
mained the basic legal term until the end of the ancien régime” [p. 16]. Histo-
riographers of Imperial Russia at the time found social-semantic similarities
of soslovie, the Russian word most commonly associated today with the social
estates, with the corresponding European terminology:
Soslovie (ordo or status, Fr. état, Ger.Stand) is a term of state
law and marks a well-known rank of political institutions. We call
soslovia the classes into which society divides in terms of rights
and duties [248, p. 225, my translation].
On the other hand, the Russian soslovia “did not play a political role equiv-
alent to that of the French États or German Stände, but they did share
important features with these groups” [462, p. 245]. A dictionary published
in 1847 by the Russian Academy of Sciences described soslovie as “a category
of people with a specific occupation, distinguished from others by their spe-
cial rights and obligations” [158, p. 19]. At some point the legal definitions
and the cultural origins of a soslovie became too complicated to organise im-
perial Russia into manageable groups by the state: Cossacks, a historical east
Slavic ethnic group, had the legal-cultural designation of a separate soslovie
while at the same time they could belong to the military soslovie; physicians
belonged to the medical soslovie and lawyers were members of the juridical
soslovie. On the other hand a large number of
underclass of beggars, wanderers, the homeless and the diseased
. . . evaded the soslovie (estate)-based categories of nineteenth-
century statisticians [. . . who additionally] ignored the emergence
37Plural of soslovie, that is, estate.
220
of significant new social groups, most notably middle classes and
workers [143, p. 272–273].
Until the end of the Russian ancien régime, in spite of the state’s effort to
expand or particularise the soslovie paradigm, “social identities remained in a
high degree of ambiguity and flux, oscillating between legal estate, economic
status, and occupation” [158, p. 34]. When the Bolsheviks came to power in
1917, they issued a decree abolishing all social estates and state ranks.
In the British, the French, and the Russian cases we can clearly see something
in common: a historiographical blueprint, circulating among the members of
a political elite, and in the end: in France, it led to a revolution which finally
abolished it, or rather all the estates became one, that is, all citizens became
equals; in Britain it survived as an institutional relic, which still can exert
some political influence. In Soviet Russia, on the other hand, a new social
estate was officially brought to the fore of historical processes: the proletariat.
In ancient Rome the proletarii 38 were
[m]en without property. Originally the term was applied to per-
sons not registered in the classes of the centuriate organisation 39
because they had not even the minimum property required for
the lowest class. Their sole possession was their children, proles ;
hence the name. The proletarii were the poorest stratum of the
population [44, p. 657].
The proletariat was resurrected after almost two millenia in the Critique of
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, which is generally “regarded as a crucial text in
Marx’s intellectual development” [251, p. 105]. In it Marx attacks the Roman
Catholic Church’s three-estate model, and famously declares that
38Latin plural of proletarius.
39The comitia centuriata was a “popular assembly based on the division of the people
into centuriae, classified according to the value of the property of the individual citizens”
[44, p. 398].
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[r]eligion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a
heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium
of the people [309, p. 131, my emphasis].
Later on in the text, he announces his discovery of “the positive possibility
of emancipation”
in the formation of a class 40 with radical chains, a class in civil
society that is not of civil society, an estate 41 that is the dissolu-
tion of all estates, [. . . ] [in] a sphere, in short, that is the complete
loss of humanity and can only redeem itself through the total re-
demption of humanity. This dissolution of society existing as a
particular class is the proletariat [309, p. 140–141, my emphasis].
The intentional dissolution of society would correspond “to a political tran-
sition period in which can be nothing else but the revolutionary dictatorship
of the proletariat” [311, p. 95, emphasis in the original]. The dictatorship of
the proletariat entered a heated debate among the theoretical descendants of
Marx, and finally it was picked up quite early by Lenin himself, the founder
of the Soviet state:
The mere presentation of the question – “dictatorship of the party
or dictatorship of the class;42 dictatorship (party) of the leaders,
or dictatorship (party) of the masses? – testifies to most most
incredibly and hopelessly muddled thinking [. . . ] the Russian Bol-
shevik . . . cannot help regarding all this talk about “from above”
or “from below” . . . as ridiculous and childish nonsense, something
like discussing whether a man’s left leg or right arm is of greater
use to him [279, p. 41, 49, emphasis in the original].
40Marx uses the word Klasse in the original German text, which is considered the
German lexical equivalent of the English word class.
41Marx uses Stand in the original German text, which is considered the German equiv-
alent of the English estate.
42In the Russian original Lenin uses the word класс [klass] which is considered the
Russian equivalent of the English class.
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We can clearly see that in Lenin’s political theory there is no distinction
between a social estate, a social class, or even a social caste. The only that
matters is the proletariat which is basically identified with the communist
party, and which is going to establish its own dictatorship towards a classless
(or estateless) society. The one-party state was established after the October
revolution, and the one-class, or rather no-class, society was proclaimed.
The early Soviet regime became totalitarian, and controlled every aspect
of social, intellectual and academic included, life. It reached its apex with
Stalin, whose death in 1953 marked a major change in the Soviet regime.
In 1961, during the Twenty Second Congress of the Communist Party of the
USSR, with Khrushchev as General Secretary,
[t]here were several major ideological innovations brought out in
the Programme [of the Communist Party]. The most significant
was the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in
favour of an all-people’s state [439, p. 15].
All-people’s state was the last and failed attempt to revive the original com-
munist project: “[t]he widening gap between official rhetoric and ordinary
lives . . . can ultimately be traced back to Khrushchev’s failure” [p. 22] to de-
liver.
The defining characteristic of the proletariat, and in general of the social
classes in society, according to the Marxist-Leninist sociological worldview,
was labour, and the way the system of resources, means of production, and
economic value were organised around it. They obviously ignored any con-
cept of gift economy, as most of today’s policy and decision makers do, as
well; they considered as banking system only the financial capitalist banking
system; and they scoffed at any other theoretical construct different from
their own as “bourgeois”, that is, as excessively middle-class and oriented
to property and means-of-production relations. Among the first, in fact, to
introduce the social-estate model into sociological literature and expand its
anthropological semantics was Weber. According to Weber a social estate 43
43An alternative translation of Weber’s Stand has been status group. Here the use of
“estate” has been employed due to the grand scale of occupational groupings in the USSR.
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“shall mean an effective claim to social esteem in terms of positive or negative
privileges” [453, p. 305], and manifests itself is mainly through connubium,
that is, low percentages of group intermarriages, commensality, that is, the
people one eats with on a regular basis, and “monopolistic appropriation
of privileged modes of acquisition or the abhorrence of certain kinds of ac-
quisition” [p. 306]. In other words, membership in a social estate is mainly
“revealed in consumption patterns, leisure activities, and friendship circles”
[435, p. 4]. The first and foremost characteristic, though, of any social estate
is its exclusive access to a number of certain resources and privileges.
Being a socialist state, private ownership of property in the USSR was pro-
hibited, at least until Gorbachev’s reforms in 1986, and housing space was
allocated by Soviet enterprises or by local councils. In the beginning of the
1980s “the public sector accounted for 77 percent of all urban accommoda-
tion” [8, p. 26]. Private housing, on the other hand, “[i]n Soviet terminology
. . . belongs to individuals on the basis of their right to ‘personal’ property
[lichnaya sobstvenost’ ], and is never referred to as ‘private’ property [chast-
naya sobstvenost’ ]” [p. 26] which is supposed to be a means of production, and
therefore a source of illegal (in socialist terms) income (see also [332]). There
was also accommodation owned by trade unions and various co-operative or-
ganisations (for more see [8]). It has been widely acknowledged though that
“Soviet citizens have suffered from a dreadful housing shortage; [. . .moreover]
inequalities have existed in the distribution and consumption of accommo-
dation” [9, p. 190]. Most well known forms of housing were the communal
apartments (kommunalki), and
living [there] consisted of an apartment space shared by anywhere
from four to seven families. Each family had its own room, which
functioned simultaneously as living room, study, bedroom, and
dining room. Shared with other families were the corridor, the
kitchen, the bathroom, and the telephone. [31, p. 615].
“Status group” does not seem to connote this magnitude in scale in the same way as “social
estate” does. See also Parsons’s comments on this [452, p. 347, n. 27; p. 424, n. 1], as well
as [450].
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If someone wanted to get their own flat, then they had to follow a certain
time-consuming allocation procedure and any “attempt to improve one’s own
housing situation [could end up] a full-time occupation” [332, p. 239]. Even
more difficult was to acquire a dacha, that is, a second country house. Aca-
demicians, on the contrary, that is, members of the Soviet Academy of Sci-
ences, were among those “[p]articularly favoured by law, presumably because
many work at home” [p. 241]. One of the interviewees described how her
father, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, was given by the state
a piece of land to build a his own “personal” dacha:
And there was an academicians’ settlement where only members
of the Academy could get a piece of land. There were other
academicians’ settlements, like Mozzhinka,44 if you know. Before
the war Stalin donated a piece of land with a building. But
after the war the government gave the land to the Academy to
build something by yourself if you want. And this settlement was
built after WWII. And there were great people there. We had for
example such settlements for theatre actors, for movie actors. We
have still that dacha. There are not any more academicians there,
you can buy land there now, after perestroika; it’s very expensive
by the way. That settlement was founded, around 1957.[. . . ] In
my childhood I was acquainted with many scientists there, like
Ginzburg was my neighbour, a Nobel laureate, ans so on. There
were physicists, mathematicians, and others.
A very important moment in all of the interviewees’ life was when they went
to the mathematical secondary schools, a Soviet tradition established mainly
by Kolmogorov. The pre-university school in the Soviet Union lasted initially
ten, and later eleven years, with the last two spent in specialised schools for
gifted pupils. The Kolmogorov Boarding School of the Lomonosov Univer-
sity was set up with the intention of inviting pupils from rural areas of the
USSR and in 1993 it instructed “about 200 pupils in grades ten and eleven
each year from Russia, Byelorussia, Tatarija, Baschkirija, Osetija/North Os-
44A village outside Moscow.
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etija, Checheno-Ingushetija and Kabordino-Balkarija” [93, p. 110]. There
were other schools specialising in mathematics for Moscovites, in Leningrad
(today’s St. Petersburg), in Novosibirsk, as well as in other Russian cities
and all capitals of the other Soviet republics. One interviewee recalled his
years there:
School no. 63, as far as I can remember. [. . . ] We had a very
special atmosphere. We were all in love with science. We were all
dreaming to become scientists. We had a special teacher in math-
ematics Sergei Nolaievich Voskresenski. He passed away though.
He was very romantic about us. He was in love with science.
He encouraged us. So at once I knew I must go to one of the
highest universities, in Novosibirsk, and therefore, after classes
I took homework [laughs], then, I remember, I made a schedule
for myself at exactly 6.30, 18.30, I went to walk with my cousin,
his name was Yuri, he passed away later. We went to walk for
two hours. And at 8.30 I came home, and I studied mathematics
with a special collection of problems in mathematics. It was very
advanced at the time. Most of it was Modenov.45 It was pub-
lished as far as I remember in 1957, and it a collection of almost
all problems which were given in Russian universities in entrance
exams. [. . . ] so I solved all of them, all of them. Therefore when
the next day, whatever [they did] in mathematics, I was prepared
much more than anyone else, as I was the first one who answered
the questions Not because I knew what kind of questions there
will be, but because I was trained.
We could easily say that this pupil was very diligent. But all the interviewees
were in fact diligent pupils, as well as thousands of others not interviewed.
We cannot therefore talk about pupils’ diligence on the grand scale, but that
solving problems was actually a consumption pattern characteristic to the
social estate of Soviet mathematicians, and physicists, up to a point. Solving
problems could easily become a consumption pattern taking up a lot of one’s
45Petr Sergeevich Modenov: his books with solved problems are still in print in Russia.
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leisure time for a very simple reason: solving mathematical problems, is
like playing golf; it is not necessary to have a great number of resources at
one’s disposal. Conducting a chemical, or even a nuclear, experiment, on the
contrary, is a more resource-demanding consumption pattern, and because
of that it does not become a consumption pattern, but remains in the sphere
of work. Solving problems in fact becomes a lifestyle, and in the end the
boundaries between work and leisure become rather blurred. In colloquial
Russian there is actually a certain word describing the cultural stereotype
of a pupil or student who is absent-minded and very absorbed in his or her
academic thoughts: botanik, the original meaning of which is botanist.46
In one of the interviews, the interviewee’s eldest son was present, in order to
assist in the interpretation from Russian into English. He is a mathematician
himself and graduate student of the Lomonosov University, and he made
occasionally some interventions in the interview:
Interviewee. We had very good life there [i.e. in the boarding
school]. We had professor Dynkin, professsor Gelfand, professor
Smilga, if you know, and so on. And we had very good professors
in literature. [...] Now there is a community in the whole world.
Former students of the school.
Son. Actually I was recently in some gathering, maybe anniver-
sary of that school. People from all over the world come to
Moscow and they come from other countries once a year. Not
many of them, but a lot of people come every five years, ten
years, on anniversary. Great “crowd” of people.
Interviewee. It was a very interesting time in the Soviet Union.
From one side there was no freedom, and on the other side, you
had your own community, you have your kitchen to speak about
these themes. There was a lot of pressure from the government.
And as a result people got very close to each other, and very
friendly to each other. It was Krushchev-Brezhnev period.
46Compare with the English words egghead, geek, or nerd.
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In general, informal networks in the Soviet Union were very important, a
pattern which, as we can see from this interview excerpt, passed, and still
passes, on to the younger generations. In general, though, the specialised high
schools had made a general impact on the interviewee’s lives in many respects.
Older-generation interviewees, especially those who had finished school before
1953, had not attended specialised schools, because these became widespread
later. Still, they went to krushki, that is, mathematical circles, which were
extra-curricular activities on mathematics. The krushki were part of the
Pioneers movement, the Soviet equivalent of the Western Scouting movement.
There were also similar extra-curricular activities on chess, ballet, and others.
In a centrally organised state, although the elite “does its best” to control
everything, the end result is increased reliance on informal networks: it is
both impossible and very costly to try to control every detail of the state
apparatus. Moreover the designers of state control might have missed some
aspects of social behaviour. Informal connections might become then not only
acceptable, as “legitimate initiatives”, but also necessary for the viability of
the economic organisation of the system. There was, for example,
the informal role of the tolkach [“expediter”] in Soviet enterprises,
who, though his position is never mentioned in enterprise statis-
tics, serves the vital function of coordinating the material-technical
supply in an inadequately functioning market-like distribution
[435, p. 14].
A Soviet university was indeed an enterprise whose resources were mainly
human resources. The expediter in that case was more institutionalised, but
still he would take an “institutional initiative”, as we can clearly see from the
narration of an interviewee:
It was in ’52. And that time, after high school, I had a diploma
with very good grades. And then people who had the diploma
of this kind could avoid just entrance examinations. But they
could have some kind of discussion with the examination com-
mittee. This committee gives them some problems, some general
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questions, and all that. And I must say that my exam in this
committee was very bad. I could not solve the problems which
were given to me when I’m surrounded by three people. [. . . ] So
I was not accepted to the Moscow university. [. . . ] My grand-
father had many students. And when they learned that I was
not accepted they went to see the rector of Moscow University,
Petrovski, a very good mathematician, and a very nice person,
and told him that this is really a very bad thing, what has hap-
pened to me. And Petrovski had some quota, some number of
possibilities just to accept people from his list. So he just took
me this way.
The rector, in other words, had the quota at his disposal, and, therefore, he
could easily take “legal initiatives” according to his judgement.
These informal networks among Soviet mathematicians, and among Soviet
fellow workers in general, were not only networks of acquaintanceship, as is
usually the case in most Western European and North American universi-
ties. One interviewee explained how he was studying mathematics with other
fellow students in the Lomonosov University:
We taught ourselves. For example I had friends who are a little
bit older than me. Two years older, one year older. But because
they were older they new much more than me. And they taught
us. I asked them a lot of questions. And at least two of them
became really great mathematicians. [. . . ] They are really great
mathematicians, and they were great when they were students.
They taught me a lot. And you know I can just take the receiver
[right now], call, many different guys, and they will explain all
questions I ask with great pleasure. They want nothing special on
that. Ah, yes! Another one friend of mine during these years was
Grisha Margulis. Eventually he got a Fields medal. And all them
you can call them and ask them. It was very very usual thing.
So for example, I can get a one-hour lecture by phoning them
[laughs]. You know. So the whole situation was quite different.
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And this is basically how we learned mathematics.
Many interviewees, when referring to other fellow Russian mathematicians
with whom they had been together in the Soviet Union as fellow workers,
mentioned them as their friends. In fact, “the Russian word drug has a
stronger connotation [of intimacy] than the English friend and even stronger
than the German Freund ” [435, p. 94] In one interview, for example, during
which the interviewee was narrating an event, at some point paused for a
few seconds, and starting thinking by filling the pause with the conversation
filler “er”: she was looking for an English word similar in meaning to the word
“acquaintance”. My knowledge of Russian at the time was rather limited and
I proposed the word “friend” in an interrogative grammatical mood, having
in mind the idea of a “casual friend”, that is, an acquaintance whom one
meets on a regular basis. She rejected immediately my proposal, and then
elaborated as “someone I knew.”
When an interviewee was asked on his everyday life as an undergraduate
student in MGU [Lomonosov University] his answer was as follows:
You know. People were staying there for a very long time. So
They didn’t really have a need to leave the building. So they were
walking, in this corridor in a circle, say two–three students, maybe
with professors or without professors. They were all talking. And
it was interesting that from the back of the elevator, you could
see, from the conversation you could understand on which floor
which people would get out. You know, physics, mathematics,
you name it. [. . . ] The seminars started always in the evening,
because from all Moscow people could go to the MGU seminars.
What was happening with the universities, in other words, was that they
were institutions of socialisation and social integration into the Soviet society.
This is a conclusion that has been little referred to in the English-speaking
Russian and formerly Soviet, studies.There has been excessive analysis on
the political system, that is “from above,” and later on the everyday life of
Soviet citizens, that is, “from below”. In fact in the Soviet Union, there seems
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to have existed, actually, social estates, rather than social classes, or castes,
or, needless to say, a homogeneous proletariat. And mathematicians seem to
have been no exception to this. The concept of a class is basically related
to income, which was in general not that important in the Soviet Union.
So other social-economic phenomena seem to have made their appearance.
The only Western scholar who supported this view, and inspired actually
this section, was the German sociologist Teckenberg, who in 1981 declared
that “Soviet enterprises are functionally equivalent to Western communities”
[435, p. 15] (see also [436]); and while communities are characterised by social
inclusion, enterprises are defined by social exclusion. A very similar approach
to the estatist approach is Shlapentokh’s feudal model of modern Russia (see
[413]).
The most prestigious award one could get as a Soviet mathematician, was
to become Doktor Nauk, that is doctor of sciences. The first doctoral degree
awarded in the Soviet Union, and is still awarded, was the Kandidat Nauk,
that is, candidate of sciences. This was actually equivalent to the American
or British Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), and was highly esteemed in the both
in the USSR, and in the West. When a Kandidat Nauk was awarded by a
university, it then had to be a approved by the Higher Attestation Commis-
sion [Visshaia Attestatsionaia Komissia (VAK )], an all-union governmental
agency regulating the awarding of higher academic degrees and ranks, such
as that of a professor. In Western Europe the award of a doctorate degree
is conducted by the universities, without governmental intervention. In the
Soviet Union this awarding had to be approved by this governmental agency,
and usually the members of VAK were already recognised senior mathemati-
cians, and members of the Academy of Sciences. Moreover “its membership
had to be approved by the Central Committee [of the Communist Party]”
[260, p. 39]. The really important academic degree, adding social standing
within the academic world, though, was the Doktor Nauk, which was awarded
either on the basis of a major scientific breakthrough, or on the grounds of
the overall contribution to the field. The Soviet mentality as to the contribu-
tion on the field was eloquently described by an interviewee, working today
in a North American university:
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The scientific level was essential. But since the level was very
high, it was difficult to reach this level. In other institutions a
person could be considered extraordinary; at Landau [Institute] it
would be considered good, not extraordinary. . . I would give you
the example of Grisha Margulis. You probably heard the name:
a Fields medalist. He got Fields medal, and didn’t get a doctor
degree. It was not considered education, the Fields medal, that
somebody should be considered a doctor. No, not necessarily
[laughs].
And when asked in his case, his answer was as follows:
In my case I never got it. I went to the West where it doesn’t exist,
in the USA, so I am not a doctor. No I am not a doctor. It doesn’t
matter for me now. But, in fact, if I go back to Russia, it will be
important to be a doctor. I think I have enough [publications] to
be a doctor [laughs].
A major contribution in the fields of differential geometry and ergodic theory
was made by the Soviet mathematician Dmitri Anosov, which was published
in English in 1969 [10]. He introduced in this publication what later came
to be called Anosov diffeomorphism. Its subject had to do with dynami-
cal systems, that is, systems whose behaviour evolves over time, like the
flow of a liquid in a pipe, or the population of a species in an ecological
niche. The dynamical systems in that book were actually more abstract,
than those mentioned, and n-dimensional, that is their representation was
done in n-coordinates; this is a very simplistic presentation, but it is al-
most impossible to analyse further without assuming that the reader is at
least a post-graduate student in mathematics. This publication was actually
Anosov’s (second) doctoral dissertation, awarded to him by the Steklov In-
stitute of mathematics in Moscow. The process of defending a candidate’s
dissertation was the same, and still is, as that of a doctor’s dissertation in
Soviet Russia. Every research organisation in the Soviet Union had a scien-
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tific council [uchenyi soviet ].47 The scientific council was the equivalent of
the Western academic senate. Moreover, the public defence of the disserta-
tion had to be carried out in front of the scientific council. In Anosov’s case
the scientific council met on 4 November 1965 [16]. From the thirty mem-
bers members of the Steklov scientific council, there were present at that day
twenty-one: three academicians, that is full members of the Soviet Academy
of Sciences, seven corresponding members of the Academy, nine doctors of
science, and two candidates of science. On 4 June 1965 five months exactly
before the dissertation defence, the research personnel of the Department of
Differential Equations of the Steklov Institute had met, listened to Anosov’s
preliminary defence, and proposed Anosov’s dissertation be publicly defended
in Steklov Institute [16, p. 35–38]. The department’s decision was based on
the preliminary review of the dissertation by professor V.A. Rokhlin of the
Leningrad.48 The chair of the department’s meeting, had been Pontryagin,
Anosov’s postgraduate supervisor.
Back to Anosov’s public defence, the chair of the council’s meeting is Vino-
gradov, the head of the Steklov Institute, and the secretary keeping the min-
utes is the candidate S.A. Telyakovski. Among the participant audience of
mathematicians are well known personages in the mathematical world: Pyotr
Sergeyevich Novikov, an academician very well known in group theory and
father of the Fields medalist Sergei Petrovich Novikov; Alexander Osipovich
Gelfond, a corresponding member of the Academy whose name bears an im-
portant theorem in number theory, and allegedly he was the Soviet navy’s
secret cryptographer during WWII; Igor Rostislavovich Shafarevich, a leg-
end in algebraic geometry and a well known dissident in Soviet times; Sergey
Mikhailovich Nikolsky, another legend in function theory, functional analysis,
and partial differential equations, who kept giving lectures until the age of 92;
Yuri Vasilyevich Prokhorov, a famous student of Kolmogorov, whose theorem
on probability measures extended probability theory to abstract spaces.
47Although there have been proposed reforms in the educational system of modern
Russia, what is going to be mentioned in the text still holds.
48Today St. Petersberg State University.
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Vinogradov, the chair, announces the commencement of the meeting, and
then he proclaims the three official opponents [opponenty ] to the dissertation
defence: Alexandr Kirilov, Ilia Pyatetskii-Shapiro, and Yakov Sinai. He then
gives the floor to Telyakovskii, the secretary of the council. Teliakovski reads
Anosov’s application documents, and then gives back the floor to Vinogradov.
Vinogradov asks if there are any questions, there is none, and then gives the
floor to Anosov to report the results set forth in his dissertation. After
Anosov’s presentation, Andrey Andreyevich Markov, whose father proposed
the well known Markov chains, asks a question, and Anosov answers. Then
Pontryagin asks a question and Anosov answers. Pontryagin asks another
set of four questions, and Anosov answers another four times. Pontryagin
was Anosov’s postgraduate supervisor and blind since the age of 14. Then
the secretary receives the floor from the chair and reads aloud the report
from the meeting of the Differential Equations Department of the Steklov
Institute, as well as Rokhlin’s preliminary review of Anosov’s dissertation.
Then the chair gives the floor successively to the official opponents of the
defence, and each time each opponent finishes, asks Anosov if he would like
to add something. Anosov has nothing to add to each opponent’s remarks.
During the third opponent’s speech, Pontryagin asks him two questions, and
the opponent answers them. Then the chair asks if someone wants to open a
debate – nobody wants – and gives the floor to Anosov for some concluding
remarks. Anosov then comments on some points that the opponents raised.
The chair then announces the end of the defence. Then three members of the
council are elected on the spot as a vote counting committee: Shafarevich,
Kudryavtsev, and Prokhorov. Then an intermission is announced to vote
in favour or against the awarding of the doctoral degree. A ballot is set up
and everyone votes secretly, as to whether Anosov should become a doctor.
At the end of the voting, the head of the voting committee announces the
result: from the twenty-one present members of the scientific council, Anosov
unanimously received twenty-one (secret) votes in favour. The chair of the
meeting announces the official acceptance of the results. He then summarises
the two final decisions of the meeting: the council considers Anosov’s doctoral
dissertation as fully publishable; the council should petition to the Higher
attestation Commission for awarding Anosov with the Doktor Nauk degree.
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The most usual waiting time mentioned for a doctor’s degree the intervie-
wees mentioned was around ten years. Some got it earlier, some others due
to their Jewish origin had to wait for more rigorous results, and were sim-
ply stuck and had no good research ideas for some time, something like a
“researcher’s block,” similar to writer’s block. In one case, for example, an
interviewee mentioned a time of ten years without a fruitful idea, until a ma-
jor breakthrough in his research. Some others simply jumped onto another
field, more interesting for them. In one case, in which the interviewee was of
Jewish descent got his doctor’s degree outside of the Russian Soviet republic:
An in about ten years or so the idea came that I have enough to
defend the doctor thesis. Because in Russia they have two, two
theses. [. . . ] So after talking to Khasminski we decided that I
could start writing another, that I had enough publications and
stuff to write another [thesis]. And all that was already based on
my second research. The first was more famous, but the second
thesis was based on the second direction [of my research]. It
was second order optimality, or second order optimal estimation.
[. . . ] And in 1986 I defended my doctor thesis but at that time
. . . there were a few places where a Jew could defend a doctor’s
thesis. And one of such places was Lithuanian, Vilnius University.
So it was tradition that almost all Jews went there. And so every
other meeting they had, was one their own, and one guest [laughs]
. . . They were sufficiently independent, and I think they kind of
liked it that they could afford this kind of independence.
The doctor’s degree was actually a prerequisite to become a member of the
Academy of Sciences, and there were many privileges for the academicians, as
we saw earlier. But in spite of the collapse of communism a doctor’s degree
is still a very valuable academic rank, as one of the interviewees mentioned,
when asked if the doctor’s degree had improved his financial situation:
Actually in my case it wasn’t so. In the former Soviet Union this
was extremely the case. For example, your salary could increase
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twice. But in the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately in my
case I obtained my doctor’s degree exactly when Soviet Union
collapsed. So in my case I didn’t get this. But I still get an
increase in salary. You must have a doctor’s degree to enter some
positions.
The doctor’s degree actually freed the holder from many other problems
that arose due to the communist regime: it did not provided only tenure and
better salary, but also those talented started to attract many students. And
as social mobility in the Soviet Union was very limited, every doctor could
create his or her own research niche much easier within the system. There
was, in other words, a very high level of intra-estate functional differentiation.
One interviewee from a North American university, for example, mentioned
that in the USA the research mentality is
that students have to see a bigger world. And it’s good for them
to switch between places, advisors. So if you are a good student
it’s better to go somewhere else. Say Harvard, Princeton. And
when you get your PhD, probably you can come here as a postdoc.
As a result the whole field of mathematics is more homogenised
here in the States . . . but as a result there is very few of what can
be called a school.
In the Lomonosov University, on the other hand,
there were the schools of Gelfand, of Novikov, of Arnold, of Sinai,
because typically the best students in the university go to gradu-
ate school as aspirants [postgraduates], to write their PhD under
the same advisor. And at the same time it creates a kind of
pyramid because senior students teach the younger ones and that
unified certain areas. [. . . ] I was lucky that I was in this Novikov
school. And because of such people like Novikov they attract
the best students. It was very strong. So I went [to him] and
defended my Phd.
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The Soviet system of organising mathematics research, in other words, was
very heavily relying on the charismatic authority of its senior research staff;
it was, in other words, very close to the peripatetic school of Aristotle in
Classical Greece. And one faculty could host many such leaders. Although
the fieldwork conducted for this thesis centred for practical reasons, basi-
cally on the Lomonosov University and the Steklov Institute of Mathematics
both of which are in Moscow, it seems actually that this model, due to the
Soviet-Communist political and social context, was actually widespread all
over the USSR. Moreover, what kept this scientific social estate alive, was
not the resources it could pool: they were meager in any case. What kept
alive its members, both new and old, was its socio-techical imaginary of a
mathematical kind, as one interviewee recalled during his postgraduate years:
Like in a seminar, I mean, you became an important part of the
seminar. People were listening to what you were saying, it was
interesting for them to know your opinion.
One interviewee of the old generation when asked how he had developed his
geometrical imagination he answered as follows:
When I was at school, seventh grade, 14 years old, I wanted to
solve a stereo-metrical problem. I couldn’t understand it com-
pletely, because I i didn’t have any imagination. Science imagi-
nation. I asked my parents, to buy me constructor [construction
set]. [With] this constructor I constructed the problem stereo-
metric tasks and analysed this problem with real scheme [3D
design]. After that during the summer, three months, I had
completely improved my imagination so that I could solve any
stereo-metric problem without any. . . with closed eyes. I calcu-
lated. After that I could write only result[s].
In other words, his visual imaginary had assimilated the technical artefact,
and he ended up solving problems only by imagining their solutions, and
then writing them down. The written solutions were not the real three-
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dimensional solutions, because they were on a two-dimensional sheet of pa-
per; they were imaginary three-dimensional solutions, but the technology im-
plementing the solutions was two-dimensional. In another instance, another
interviewee was asked how he could imagine Hilbert spaces and Hilbert-space
geometry which is infinite-dimensional:
It comes when you start to explain to students the four dimen-
sional, and then the five dimensional space and they have dif-
ficulty. When you tell them “look I mean that mathematicians
feel so comfortable there, it’s like their home, it’s like their sleep-
ers [sleeping berths].” It’s just time, I mean take time to adjust
and just to feel comfortable. To get this experience. It’s also
suddenly you can feel I can do anything I like. And if you start
to live in Hilbert space suddenly you also feel that you are very
comfortable. [. . . ] It’s just accumulation of intuition, so you solve
problems, you read some books, some theorems, and then it accu-
mulates in you and then you feel comfortable. Just it gets inside
you. And to say when it will happen I cannot but suddenly you
feel very comfortable. It’s your good friend. Hilbert space is a
good place for mathematicians to be.
Mathematicians are the only ones who can understand infinite-dimensional
proofs, but they do not have infinite-dimensional construction sets to use;
and if infinite-dimensional objects do indeed exist, as some quantum theories
imply, the human biological system brain–eye simply cannot perceive these
artefacts. All mathematicians have as a construction set is two-dimensional
pieces of paper with two-dimensional drawings on them. Another interviewee,
working on general topology, a branch where generalisations of spaces are
studied, he attempted to describe his own perception of the mathematical
objects in his field:
I don’t see these visually. . . . I can’t describe how I see. The
best time I have when I think about mathematics, this is when I
go to bed, and when I cannot sleep. But you try to sleep. And
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so I think about these things, and it’s almost like a dream. I
mean you are awake, you’re not sleeping, you’re not having a real
dream, but you’re in the middle somewhere. And I don’t know, I
see some things, but I can’t describe what I see. Also it depends
a lot on what kind of problem you are thinking. Say I spent
several years, my kids where growing up then and they played
with my dots with all these papers I had written, and all these
papers where full of diagrams. I really had to draw diagrams to
see some things, those aren’t really geometrical objects.
And here comes the most interesting thing in the life of mathematicians,
that is, geometric proof: they have a subjective vision of space, they write it
down on paper, and then their fellow mathematicians assimilate the material-
artefactual modality of the proof, and then they form their own subjective
vision of space. So actually, the Soviet mathematicians were not only a
social estate; they were a social estate of shamans for a very single reason:
membership to the estate presupposed envisioning imaginary proofs, which
nobody else could see, a socio-technical imaginary with exclusive visionary
access. And probably this exclusive vision which was unseen to the political
elite protected them from the Marxist-Leninist Moloch.
4.6 Modern City-State or Post-Modern Nation-
State?
Gift economies, on the individual level, have many similarities with prosocial
behaviour,49 that is,
behavior which is
1. performed by a member of an organization,
2. directed toward an individual, group, or organization with
49As opposed to antisocial, or psychopathic, behaviour (see, for example, [53]).
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whom he or she interacts while carrying out his or her orga-
nizational role, and
3. performed with the intention of promoting the welfare of the
individual, group, or organization toward which it is directed
[67, p. 711] (see also [208]).
A subgroup of prosocial behaviours is altruism, that is, “intrinsically moti-
vated voluntary behavior intended to benefit another” [140, p. 647]. When,
for instance, a parent in a context of very scarce resources gives to his or
her child the remaining amount of food to eat and himself or herself starves
to death, so that the child survives, is not only an instance of prosocial
behaviour, that is, altruism, but also and instance of gift donation. It is
believed that prosocial behaviours have biologically evolved
because they
1. increase individuals’ survival to reproductive age,
2. increase the reproductive capacity of the individual, and
3. increase either or both of these tendencies in other members
of the species that likely carry the same genes
Inherent in this argument is that evolutionary forces favoring al-
truistic behaviors often come into conflict with those forces that
favor behaviors maximizing the survival of the individual [140,
p. 652].
Gift donation among infants in stress has long been considered as a sign
of empathy-related behaviour, as we can see from the following quite early
observation:
In the second incident, Michael, aged 15 months, and his friend
Paul were fighting over a toy and Paul started to cry. Michael ap-
peared disturbed and let go, but Paul still cried. Micheal paused,
then brought his teddy bear to Paul but to no avail. Michael
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paused again, and then finally succeeded in stopping Paul’s cry-
ing by fetching Paul’s security blanket from an adjoining room
[218, p. 612, italics added].
On the face of it we could say that Michael attempted to appease Paul’s
distress by “bribing” him with his teddy bear; Paul declined the “bribe” and
stuck to his own security blanket. We can clearly see the importance of
materiality in early childhood, i.e. the teddy bear and the security blanket,
as well as gift donation as an empathically informed attempted appeasement,
or “positive manipulation”, of Paul’s emotional distress. We can also see
that children can learn gift donation as early as they can start speaking
a language. The author of this thesis, in other words, believes that gift-
donating behaviour is hardwired on the brain in a similar way as language
is hardwired, and, moreover, gift-giving activities are socially regulated, as
well, in the same way as language is socially regulated.
Today, an example of social regulation of gift-giving behaviour is the modern
open source software movement, that is online communities of programmers
who collaborate in software projects voluntarily and contribute as unsalaried
workers. Linux, most probably, is the most well known such open source
software project (see, for example, [451]). Each end user can download for
free Linux, install it in his or her computer, modify its operations, and then
redistribute the modified version free of charge. Closed source software, on
the contrary, can be downloaded as binary code only, that is, in code read-
able only by computer, and not as source code, that is, in code readable
by programmers. In this way closed source software, can be sold, but it
cannot be modified and then resold. Although closed source software can be
non-rivalrous in consumption, it can easily become rivalrous, that is, in “con-
sumption of a unit of the good by one person [that] precludes consumption
of that same unit by another person” [273, p. 155]. A case in point is Adobe
Photoshop, owned and distributed by Apple Inc.: it is a graphics editor that
gives a great edge to a professional photographer over his or her competitors
who do not use it, because it can manipulate digital pictures and produce
a multitude of new graphical products; when more and more professional
photographers, though, in the same pool of potential customers start using
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it, the competitiveness of each photographer who owns it diminishes until
the group of professional photographers is saturated with the same software;
then closed source software becomes nonrivalrous. Still, though, possession
and use of a new and more updated version of Adobe Photostop can, again,
give a great edge to the owner, until, again, the pool of professionals be-
comes saturated. The definition of a rival good, in other words, is not always
useful for economic goods, such as software, as well scientific knowledge, the
scarcity of which cannot be always taken for granted. Open source software
programs, on the contrary, are modifiable by programmers who can read and
understand the source code, and as such they have been characterised as
antirivalrous goods, that is “the value of a piece of [open source] software to
any user increases as more people use the software on their machines and in
their particular settings” [454, p. 154]. And here is a great similarity between
the open source movement and mathematics: the producers of the antiri-
valrous goods are, at the same time, its end users; mathematicians prove
theorems for other mathematicians, not for the general public. The general
public, though, is always free to copy and read theorems, but in practice, as
with open source programming, reading a theorem of today’s mathematics
is close to impossible due to the extremely high sophistication of modern
mathematics.
Under normal circumstances the open source movement would not have sur-
vived in a modern free market economy, which places excessive importance on
corporate profits, and therefore on closed source software. Richard Stallman,
the mastermind programmer behind the open source initiative, proposed the
copyleft licence with four essential freedoms, to “protect” open source soft-
ware from copyright attempts [454, p. 48]:
1. Freedom to run the program for any purpose
2. Freedom to study how the program works and to modify it to suit your
needs
3. Freedom to redistribute copies, either gratis or for a monetary fee
4. Freedom to change and improve the program and to redistribute mod-
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ified versions of the program to the public so others can benefit from
your improvements
He, then, called his copyleft copyright licence General Public License (GPL)
and added one extra requirement that came to be called the viral clause:
[i]t is not permitted under the GPL to combine a free program
with a nonfree program unless the entire combination is then
released as free software under the GPL [454, p. 48–49, italics in
the original].50
It very easy to see that, in general, the General Public License has held, in
fact, for mathematics, as well, for centuries; that happened, though, more
due to scientific custom, rather than to (modern Western) copyright law.
Any mathematician is free to use a theorem for their own purposes, as the
first Freedom prescribes; most of what has been called “applied mathematics”
is, in fact, implementation of the first Freedom. Any mathematician is free
also to study how any theorem runs and to modify it to suit his or her needs.
Bernhard Riemann, actually implemented the second and fourth Freedoms:
he redefined the former definitions of straight line, named his new definition
geodesic and unified theorems in both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geome-
tries. Albert Einstein in his turn, implementing the first Freedom, adopted
Riemann’s definition of geodesic, and, postulated, based on experimental
data of his time, that light travels along a geodesic; the theory of general rel-
ativity was then born. The third freedom pertains, in fact, to the publication
of scientific articles and monographs.
In spite of the “openness” in open source software, though, as well as in
mathematical theorems, understanding Linux, or a complicated theorem in
mathematics, such as Poincaré’s Conjecture, can be extremely difficult for
a lay person, most probably impossible: these are for professionals to be
understood with extended and persistent training. Even mathematicians
themselves cannot understand theories outside their fields, as one interviewee
admitted. Still, though, in a gift economy, such as the economy of Soviet
50For more on open source software and public licences see [7, 43].
243
mathematics, a gift could be donated only by a craftsperson of the trade,
and not by an outsider; a gift, in other words, was, and still is, material
evidence of contributory expertise, which, according to Harry Collins,
enables those who have acquired it to contribute to the domain
to which the expertise pertains: contributory experts have the
ability to do things within the domain of expertise.” [102, p. 24,
italics in the original].51
If we turn to the training of social scientists to see how contributory exper-
tise can be achieved there, then, according to [243], teaching approaches of
research methods in the social sciences can be grouped roughly in three cate-
gories: methods that make social research visible; methods promoting learn-
ing by doing research; and methods focusing on the research process. Active
learning, in particular, that is, “any teaching method that gets students ac-
tively involved” [242, p. 35], as opposed to the lecture mode of teaching, is
one method of making research visible to the trainee, the purpose of which is
to prompt the undergraduate student to engage more actively with a certain
topic during classroom instruction. One parameter, though, that seems to
be missing here is that classroom instruction is, in fact, active learning in
“blackboard disciplines”, such as mathematics, philosophy, and the older dis-
cipline of philology. Solving mathematical problems, in particular, is active
learning in mathematics during which chalk and blackboard have been sim-
ply replaced by pencil and paper. When later on, the experimental sciences
of physics, chemistry, and biology came to the scientific fore, active learning
extended from writing to engaging in the laboratory mode of instruction.
Still though, contributory, as well as interactional, expertise on its own is not
enough to organise a scientific community in the grand scale, such as that of
Soviet mathematics. If, for a moment, we consider Soviet mathematics as a
scientific cult in a grand scale, then we can glean some interesting similarities
to the sacrificial model of early ancient Greek religion:
[T]he act of killing and eating [the sacrificed animal] is in itself
51See also [130, p. 101–121] and [102, p. 24–27]
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transient. It may, despite the emotion of the dramatic killing
and of the collective participation in the meal, leave no physical
trace of itself. The consequent vital need for continuity [along
institutional spacetime] may be expressed in three ways:
(a) in the continuity of deity, who remains to demand the same
form of sacrifice at regular intervals or in specific circumstances;
(b) in the subjective continuity of the human insistence that in
the future the animal be killed and distributed in the same way;
(c) in continuity of an established object or place (altar, shrine,
temple), in which the preservation of the durable part of the
animal, or of the implements of sacrifice, may be a first step [404,
p. 48–49, italics in the original].
The deity behind the workings of scientific activity is Truth: a disembodied,
and depersonalised deity, that is, a universal signifier mobilising, even in
a perfunctory fashion, the scientific community. The subjective continuity
of the human insistence is the imaginary resource of systemic trust in the
scientific social system as a human society always in transition, always in
search of truth. The objects or places, whose materiality preserves the social
system over institutional spacetime, are (mainly) the scientific articles and
monographs, as well as the university buildings where research takes place.
Moreover, if we consider classes, lectures, research meetings, oral defences,
and so on, as the repeated patterns of everyday scientific activity, than we
can propose that, scientific activity involves ritualization, that is,
the strategic production of expedient schemes that structure an
environment in such a way that the environment appears to be
the source of the schemes and their values [40, p. 140].
The involvement of ritualized behaviour embedded in everyday activities, in
other words, transforms, indeed, the mathematical community into a scien-
tific cult.
The materiality of the scientific article does not reduce the importance of in-
formal discussions among scientists, or the struggle among political factions
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within scientific communities. These, though, are not the concern of this the-
sis, since they have always been considered as implied and their existence has
always been accepted as self-evident among social researchers in STS. What
seems to have been neglected more, though, in the STS community is the
scientific article as the stabilising factor of the scientific communities, rather
than the destabilising processes of informal discussions and political factions.
A project of such a grand scale, such as the Soviet mathematical enterprise,
could not reach so gigantic proportions without strongly stabilising elements
within its institutional structure. The insistence on the monetary aspects of
Soviet mathematics illustrates the importance of systemic trust in the Soviet
scientific social system as a strong stability element. The most important
aspect in the coinage of money, dating back to ancient Greece was the in-
volvement of the city-state, or rather a state authority, as the guarantor of
materially produced52 trust:
[t]he state may be involved in issuing money, controlling it, guar-
anteeing it, enforcing its acceptability, and so on. For instance
the state may decide to guarantee the weight and purity of pieces
of metal by stamping them. Or it may decide to so guarantee
merely the value. In other words, the state may either exclude
the possibility of disparity between substance and appearance or
make it irrelevant [404, p. 19].
In the Soviet system the guarantor of (materially produced) trust was(were)
the editor(s) of the scientific journal, since there were no anonymous peer-
review processes involved. At the same time, the scientific article never
reached a level of fiduciarity proper, that is, an “excess of the fixed conven-
tional [i.e. nominal] value of pieces of money over their intrinsic [i.e. com-
modity] value”. The scientific article remained attached to its authors, and as
such, its commodity value remained attached to its authors/private-issuers
as well as to its journal/institutional-issuer.
52“Trust produced” not only as in “products produced” but also as in “documents pro-
duced”.
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The materiality of the article, that is, the material container of the imaginary
commodity of mathematical intelligence, made also hoarding possible. One
of the interviewees mentioned that Alexander Gelfond,53 known from the
Gelfond–Schneider theorem in number theory, was the chief cryptanalyst of
the Soviet Navy during WWII with the rank of a general. Although this
information could not be confirmed by an independent source during the
author’s fieldwork in Russia, that could indeed be possible. Number theory,
as well as its adjacent field of commutative algebra, is known to be used in
cryptography and cryptanalysis (see for example [250]); as it was written
back in 1987,
it is no longer inconceivable (though it hasn’t [officially] hap-
pened yet) that the N.S.A. (the agency for U.S. government work
on cryptography) will demand prior review and clearance before
publication of theoretical research papers on certain types of num-
ber theory [250, p. v].54
An article, though, written by two of his students and celebrating Gel-
fond’s sixtieth birthday anniversary mentions that “[d]uring the war years [i.e.
WWII] Gel’fond [sic] served in the VMF” [Voyenno-Morskoy Flot (SSSR) =
Military Maritime Fleet (of the USSR)] [371, p. 234]. A more interesting
aspect of the Soviet scientific social system was that its systemic trust ex-
tended well over its borders: shortly after the success of the Sputnik satellite,
in a Cold War political climate, many research projects on the Soviet edu-
cational system were launched by American universities and institutes, and
many English translations of Russian books and monographs as well as of
Soviet scientific journals flooded the North American universities; Russian
was now becoming one of the compulsory language choices for North Ameri-
can PhD students in both mathematics and physics along with German and
French which were the traditionally required languages for PhD research in
the natural sciences (see [231]).
53Not Gelfand, but Gelfond.
54Actually such an incident did happen in 1991 with Phil Zimmerman’s cryptographic
program PGP (see [283, p. 187–225]).
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The material container of a scientific article or a monograph points to a
fundamental property of materiality, that is, to the property of visibility : a
word has to be heard, an article has to be read, and, in general, the imaginary
aspect of any material artefact has to be induced by its material container,
that is its material trace. The material trace of an article is the way the
article’s physical properties enter human consciousness, and as such it is im-
portant for integrating its value in the community. The visible aspect of
an article, the aspect that a university library lends, or the aspect that a
mathematician reads on a computer screen, is not the article itself, but its
material trace which can be carried along by any human. The imaginary
object, though, corresponding to its material container, cannot be “grasped”
with the hand any more. This misunderstanding has led to a confusion as to
what is an exchange economy, and what is circulation of an economic com-
modity. Although not everybody in a particular field can understand what
exactly an article is about, the details of a proof or a theorem, everybody can
understand what a scientific article is, and what its social function is, that
is, to to integrate its social value into the community. We saw earlier that
in gift exchange “[d]isplay and exhibition as realized in exchange [. . . ] verify
the resources of giver and receiver: objects and object qualities become def-
initely associated with particular persons” [153, p. 24]. If defining then gift
exchange, in other words, as the integration of a gift to the community, an
article as a gift is a generalised medium of exchange acting as “a structured
expectation as well as a [material] symbolic mode of communication to others
and to the [social] actor himself” [351, p. 312], that is, its social semantics
is simple enough to be understood by every member of the community; at
the same time its social semantics points to its author(s) as concrete per-
sons within the community. As for the circulation of an article, its material
container, that is, the paper pages as well as the printed words and symbols
on them, have to circulate: while exchange has to do with authorship and
a community of authors, circulation pertains to utility and a community of
users.
Before going further into the social semantics of a scientific article, though,
it would be useful to briefly flash back once more to early ancient Greece.
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Religious sacrifice in Greece involved burnt up animals (holocaust), or, more
usually, commensal sacrifice which involved the cooking over fire and then
sharing of the meat among the participants (see [123]). It is believed now
that the first artefacts used as coins in Homeric Greece were iron spits that
had been used for ritual sacrifice:
The characteristics that qualify iron spits to perform money func-
tions are portability, countability, durability, economic value that
is neither too great nor too small, standardisation of shape and
size, mass production, the kind of familiarity that creates commu-
nal confidence, and substitutability for other objects [404, p. 104,
italics in the original].
We can see that, apart from substitutability, scientific articles qualify for all
the other properties. Another important development leading to the inven-
tion of ancient Greek coinage were the cylinder seals which were being used
in ancient Near East the
common purpose [of which] [. . . ] seems to have been to signal to
any viewer that a certain person as an individual or member of a
group was present at a certain act, be it as witness, as overseer,
or as controller [343, p. 19, italics added].
Later on, in ancient Greece coinage, though,
[w]hereas seal-marks seem to embody the power of the owner of
the seal, coin-marks create no imagined attachment between the
coins and their source. [. . . ] [C]oin-marks, unlike seal-marks,
relate to the material on which they are impressed (metal, not
clay). They authenticate the metal as possessing a certain value.
And they do so not by transmitting power (magical or otherwise)
to the piece of metal, but by imposing on it a form that recog-
nisably assigns it to a distinct category of things, the category of
authentic coins [404, p. 119, italics added].
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The ancient Greek city-state, in other words, used metal sealing technology
in the capacity of guarantor of coin authenticity, and as such, of controller
(as well as comptroller) of money circulation. Ancient Greek coin marking,
in other words, is very reminiscent of modern commercial branding practices;
the branding, though, conducted by a scientific journal, is that of scientific
validity.
Coming back to authorship and utility, we can now say that the inalienability
of a scientific article under the capacity of a donated gift means that during its
circulation its authors remain the same, but its users can constantly change.
A user, though, can become an author by modifying knowledge in older
scientific articles, and exchanging his or her knowledge with the community,
that is, putting new knowledge into circulation. Turning our attention, for
a while, to modern usual coins and banknotes, we can see that there is no
individual author on it: the only “seal” present is that of the corresponding
central bank issuing the banknotes. Since we have many scientific journals
issuing articles on different subjects, we can say that in science, in general, as
well as in Soviet mathematics, in particular, we have a free banking system,
rather than a central banking one. Moreover, the central bank in a financial
social system, as well as the scientific journal in a scientific social system, are
the authors of systemic trust. In a financial social system a central bank, is
the single author of systemic trust, while in the scientific social system there is
double authorship: the scientific journal, as an institutional author of general
scientific validity, as well as the individual author(s) of each particular article
as authors of specialised scientific validity.
The main institution in the USSR behind the “branding” of science was the
Academy of Sciences of the USSR, apart from the Ministry of Education,
uniting the scientific lives of its members and employees as an overarching
super-institution:
The Soviet Academy of Sciences . . . was the place of employment
of the most outstanding fundamental researchers in the country.
These scientists spent their lives in its service, and their places
of residence, travel and vacation privileges, and health and social
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services were traditionally controlled by it [182, p. 2].
Most of the mathematical journals were published by the Nauka 55 Publishing
House, called Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences before
1963. Moreover, the chief editors, and quite often the majority of the assist-
ing editors, the collegiate of editors, were academicians, that is, members of
the Academy of Sciences . Future mathematicians, though, were funnelled
quite early in their careers into the mathematics departments through spe-
cial high schools with a curriculum quite enhanced in mathematics. Most of
the prestigious mathematical faculties, though, such as those of Lomonosov
University, for example, Leningrad State University,56 or Novosibirsk State
University, were extremely demanding for students who had not attended
special schools; one interviewee, for example, mentioned that some of his fel-
low students in Lomonosov University who had not attended classes in math-
ematical schools as pupils simply dropped their studies, or were registered
to less prestigious mathematical departments. And after five years of study,
not four as in most Western European countries, 57 a student who wanted
to pursue an academic research career as a professional mathematician, was
obliged to have by the end of the final year in the university published al-
ready two articles. Then to become a postgraduate research student had to
pass three exams: one in a foreign language important for his or her field,
that is, English, French, or German, for mathematics; one exam in his or her
scientific field; and one exam in the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism.58
American universities, on the other hand, are organised in a different way.
Pupils, after finishing high school, apply for admission to a college which
awards an associate degree, if it is a two-year college, or a bachelor’s degree,
if it is a four-year college. Initially, in colonial America, colleges were inde-
pendent institutions offering general education curricula to pupils of differing
55That is, science, in Russian.
56Today Saint Petersburg State University.
57Communist Poland, until very recently, had also five years of compulsory university
attendance, the final year being an integrated Master’s degree.
58Today these entrance exams are still the same with the exception of Marxism-




[b]ecause of the backwardness of isolated rural schools and the ab-
sence of national standards of primary and secondary education,
students with widely differing academic skills found themselves
entering colleges at the same time, but unable to cope with the
work [444, p. 253].
As a result the first two years in a college were devoted in homogenising
the educational background of the students. After the devastating American
civil war, though, a merging process between colleges and universities began:
[i]t proved more economical for colleges to merge administra-
tive facilities with nearby medical schools, law schools and other
schools of graduate studies. Although some colleges continue to
function independently, most American colleges are now part of
larger, all-encompassing universities [444, p. 253].
The first two years of attendance to an American college there is no special-
isation offered; on the contrary students are offered a curriculum of general
education. In four-year colleges, during the last two years of attendance the
student chooses a primary specialisation, a major, and quite often a sec-
ondary specialisation, a minor :
Designed to encourage students to explore the limits of knowledge
in a particular subject, the major often requires studies in one or
more related fields. Such secondary studies are, at some colleges,
called a minor and usually involve far fewer courses than the
major [444, p. 673, italics added].
After college a student with academic aspirations enrolls to a university as a
postgraduate research student. Postgraduate studies, for a student of math-
ematics, last about five years. A few of the interviewees employed by Amer-
ican universities mentioned the main difference between the Soviet and the
252
American university in undergraduate majoring: in the Soviet Union math-
ematicians were specialising very early in their careers, while in the US they
specialise quite late. Still, the American universities kept US on the edge
of science and technology for many decades during the Cold War. After,
though, the disintegration of the Soviet Union
over 1,000 Soviet mathematicians migrated to other countries,
with a large fraction settling in the United States. [. . . ] [More-
over,] the American mathematicians whose research programs
most overlapped with that of the Soviets experienced a reduc-
tion in productivity after the entry of Soviet émigrés into the
U.S. mathematics market. [. . . ] [There is also] evidence that the
students of the Soviet émigrés had higher lifetime productivity
than other students from the same institution who had nonémigré
advisors [58, p. 1146].
When John Charles Fields, a Canadian mathematician, proposed an award
for major accomplishments in mathematics research back in 1932, he
proposed to found two gold medals to be awarded at successive
International Mathematical Congresses for outstanding achieve-
ments in mathematics. Because of the multiplicity of the branches
of mathematics and taking into account the fact that the interval
of such Congresses is four years, it is felt that at least two medals
should be available. [278, p. 62].
These medals, later on, became four in number, were later named after
Fields, and acquired a rather legendary and controversial status in the in-
ternational mathematical community (see [28]). It is indeed interesting to
note a rather informal indicator, not very rigorous in mathematical terms,
but still quite illuminating as to the impact of the Soviet scientific social
system in mathematics research: since 1990 until 2010 there has always been
a Soviet mathematician awarded a Fields medal with the exception of 2006,
during which there were two former Soviet mathematicians. Every four years
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Mathematics as a science has changed tremendously during the 19th and
20th centuries. After Descartes’ innovation of coupling algebra and geom-
etry into, what is called today, analytic geometry, four fundamental major
changes of tremendous importance occurred, without, of course, downgrad-
ing other equally important innovations. The first, during especially the 19th
century, was what has come to be called differential geometry : the theory
of curves and surfaces was generalised to n dimensions, called now differ-
entiable manifolds, and the concept of curvature was introduced. This was
Einstein’s theoretical base in his mathematical formulation of the theory of
general relativity, where spacetime, as a 4-dimensional manifold, that is a
generalised surface, can be curved in the presence of vast concentrations of
mass. The second major innovation has come to be called algebraic geome-
try, and has gone unnoticed by the lay and the general sociological public.
It took place during the 50s and 60s and its major innovation was to ex-
pand, like in differential geometry, the definition of curves and surfaces, now
called algebraic varieties. The defining property was to connect a generalised
curve or surface to the zeros, i.e. the solutions, of polynomial equations on
n variables, by considering them as a set of numbers with the locally defined
operations of addition and multiplication, i.e. as an algebraic ring or field, to
use the current mathematical terminology. The overall concept of a math-
ematical space, as a generalisation of the usual natural space of everyday
living, changed for a second time. The third major change of a mathemati-
cal space, which has also gone unnoticed, has taken place in the last 20 years,
and has come to be called noncommutative geometry. Explaining the change
in simple terms is impossible, for the very simple reason that this was actu-
ally a fusion of differential and algebraic geometry (initially this theoretical
venture was called algebraic differential geometry) under the influence of the
fourth fundamental major innovation in mathematics, that is functional anal-
ysis, which is going to be the object of the present chapter. The idea behind
functional analysis was to create an infinite-dimensional Euclidean geome-
try, and modern probability theory, for example, is actually this: a version of
an infinite-dimensional calculus, if calculus is defined as differentiation and
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integration techniques on a Euclidean n-dimensional, that is finite, geomet-
ric space. These four fundamental changes were of course gradual, and not
explosive, and each one of them happened within a generation. They led to
a multitude of major new mathematical innovations, some of which are very
popular today in the insurance and finance industries: these of probability
theory, mathematical statistics and stochastic analysis.
The general public, including sociologists of science, are, in general, unaware
of these developments. There is a general perception that modern math-
ematics have to do with numbers, geometry, or proof. But if one tries to
prove a theorem in an infinite-dimensional geometry to a lay person he or
she will get deeply confused. What could be the point of a proof, in the
end of the day, if the intended audience of that proof cannot simply com-
prehend it? Yet, mathematicians have proved theorems which are beyond
the common comprehension. This chapter, as a text presenting specialised
knowledge, could have three kinds of potential audiences: a lay audience, an
early postgraduate in mathematics audience, and an audience of professional
mathematicians. An audience of professional mathematicians would spend
most probably no more than five minutes in reading and understanding it.
The geometrical figures presented to demonstrate and strengthen a mathe-
matical fact, would be practically useless: professionals have assimilated the
textual artefacts and they can simply think the proof. The early postgrad-
uates would most probably be at a mild loss; they would try to copy and
complete the proofs they do not understand and it would take them a bit of
a time to read it. The act of writing down the proof in fact has the reverse
effect of gesturing: instead of a hand following the directives of a mind in
its cinematic flux of consciousness, now the mind restructures its cinematic
consciousness following gesture; and accompanying figures now help more in
that.
A lay person would most probably be at a loss: symbols would simply be
impenetrable, figures understandable only as geometrical paintings without
any deeper meaning, and in general the whole text, apart from the scattered
English words and phrases, everything would “be like Greek” to him or her;
assuming, of course, that this fictional lay person is literate. A lay per-
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son would understand nothing about the “proofs”. We have in other words,
three kinds of audience: an audience of professionals, that is, the fully blown
shamans who have no problem in “seeing” the spirits; we have the postgrad-
uates, that is, the apprentice shamans, who are still on probation “trying
to see” the spirits; and finally we have the outsiders, the “infidels”, who will
“never see” the spirit-world of mathematicians and they will have to rely on
the mathematicians’ word. This is a good illustration of the idea of a sci-
entific cult, that is, a community of shamans. Some of the developments,
though, of modern mathematics, in the author’s opinion, have to be pre-
sented to a general public, and then let the public decide for themselves: do
they want to expend the extra effort necessary to understand it or not? But
the general conclusion in the sociology of science that comes out of this pre-
sentation of professional mathematical proof is of fundamental importance:
is it possible any more, or in the future, to pursuit a sociology of science by
someone who is not versed in that particular arcane discipline? This question
becomes more pressing when the field under research is quantum physics, fi-
nancial mathematics, or algorithmic financial trading, three highly technical
fields. For the time being, though, there seems to be no such a problem.
5.2 The Artefactuality of the Book
Most of the mathematical books of the 50s, 60s and 70s were hardbacks, for
reasons of endurance: they would be publicly available, and lots of pairs of
hands would open and touch them; many thumbs, index and middle fingers
would turn the pages, with or without saliva; sometimes they would fall
on the floor and forced open. There had to be a technology of resistance.
Such were most of the mathematical books in the Soviet Union. So the first
qualities that someone would notice in a hardback book immediately are its
weight and hardness. If a toddler is given a book what would he do with
that? Lift it and experience its heaviness, throw it and test his or her abilities
in throwing, smell it to see its particular scent, maybe try to bite it to see
how it tastes. But a book once thrown up or ahead opens easily, its pages are
being browsed open during its short flight. So our toddler would be happy
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and curious to discover that a hardback can become soft once opened. It
could be said right now that the experience of the materiality of the book is
still not institutionally constructed. The toddler experiences its materiality
through his or her senses and various sensory organs scattered around the
body, such as the gravity sensors in the joints of the arms and hands. But
even grown-ups have these experiences of a book. A quite common habit,
for example, of book lovers is to smell the pages of books, especially old
ones. During a scene in a recent popular blockbuster movie, The Bourne
Ultimatum, taking place in Algiers, the protagonist, a former CIA super-spy,
in his effort to defend himself in a small room against a hitman who is holding
a knife, grabs a big hardcover book which he uses as a shield to defend himself
and then as a weapon of attack. The whole scene is so fast pacing that a lay
person wonders if it is possible to think about such defensive properties of a
hardback in a few split seconds. Or in another popular movie, The Day after
Tomorrow, the son of the protagonist and his friends, survive a deep freeze
hurricane in New York in a public library, locked in a room, gathered around
a fireplace and burning books, in order to warm up. In both these cases, as
well as in the case of the toddler, we see that the imagined and experienced
properties of a hardback book are not dictated by social convention but by
the resourcefulness and innovation of the users. But we already know that
this is not what a book is for.
So what is a book for? We are going now to try to (re)discover the (insti-
tutional) purpose of a book, a certain book, in particular, directly related
to our study. Necessary prerequisites for studying mathematics in the So-
viet Union as an undergra-duate were elementary set theory, topology, and
functional analysis. We will see later each one of them more specifically, af-
ter we have developed the necessary phenomenological framework. All these
are contained in Kolmogorov and Fomin’s book on functional analysis [254]
which is still popular for the training of postgraduate students. We are going
to base our observations on its English translation [253], popular, as well,
in English-speaking universities. Besides the titles, the main diffe-rence be-
tween these two is that the Russian edition has some extra chapters, which
wee considered as undergraduate prerequisites in the Soviet universities .
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Also the Russian edition is more condensed in its presentation, quite usual
in the Russian tradition of mathematical tradition of book writing, while the
English one is rather detailed in some topics, in simplified way, written in a
more pedagogic fashion. A very interesting observation is that the Russian
edition is interested in developing mathematical concepts, and extending the
student’s “mathematical maturity”. The concept of concept is directly re-
lated to cave art painting. We will see later how. Let us see now the first
paragraph of the first chapter of the Russian book; the reader is asked to
intently study, and then try to copy it by hand on a white sheet of paper
([254, p.13], , italics in the original have been replaced by typewriter font):
В математике встречаются самые разнообразные множества.
Можно говорить о множестве граней многограника, точек на
приямой, множестве натуральных чисел и т.д. Понятие множества
настолько общее, что трудно дать ему какое-либо определение,
которое не сводилось бы просто к замене слова «множество»
его синонимами: совокупность, собрание элементов и т.д.
To those who do not know Russian, or simply cannot read aloud Cyrillic,
that is indeed a great challenge. Even writing can be problematic, especially
the letter “ж”. If we try the same with italics the situation even seems worse
and confusing:
В математике встречаются самые разнообразные множества.
Можно говорить о множестве граней многограника, точек
на приямой, множестве натуральных чисел и т.д. Понятие
множества настолько общее, что трудно дать ему какое-
либо определение, которое не сводилось бы просто к замене
слова «множество» его синонимами: совокупность, собрание
элементов и т.д.
We can see now how the materiality of the form is extremely important. Due
to years of prolonged schooling, and in the case of highly educated people
excessive schooling, one tends to forget the tremendous effort exerted by
260
primary school pupils to learn how to read and write; one tends to forget
as well that a toddler learns sound language, the material form of which is
sound: toddlers have no idea of grammar, words, verbs, prepositions, object,
indirect subject, or, in the case of Russian, perfective and imperfective verbs
or genitive and dative cases. We can try to transliterate the above text into
Latin characters
V matematike vstrechajutsja samye raznoobraznye mnozhestva.
Mozhno govorit’ o mnozhestve granejmnogogranika, tochek na
prijamoj, mnozhestve natural’nyh chisel i t.d. Ponjatie mnozh-
estva nastol’ko obshhee, chto trudno dat’ emu kakoe-libo oprede-
lenie, kotoroe he svodilos’ by prosto k zamene slova “mnozhestvo”
ego sinonimami: sovokupnost’, sobranie elementov i t.d.
Now the material form has become more familiar, we can read and hand-
write the text, understand the meaning of some words which seem familiar,
but still, we can not infer its meaning, if we do not have a certain knowledge
of Russian. Let us now try to translate it into English, using the Oxford
Russian dictionary:
One can find in mathematics the most diverse of sets. One can
talk about the set of [geometric] faces, the points on a straight
line, the set of natural numbers and so on. The concept of a set
is so general, that it is difficult to give any definition for it, which
would not be reduced simply to the substitution of the word “set”
by its synonyms: aggregate, collection of elements and so on.
Now there is no problem in understanding the text. Its materiality is a
familiar one, although there might still be some problems as to what is a
face, or a point. The reader could also wonder whether natural numbers
are numbers living free in the wild. In other words, while the text now is
readable and understandable, there are still some problems in understanding
it. Let us now cite another mathematical excerpt formulating the so-called
Kolmogorov’s extension theorem ([347, p. 11]):
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For all t1, . . . , tk ∈ T, k ∈ N, let νt1,...,tk be probability measures
on Rnk such that
νtσ(1),...,σ(k)(F1 × · · · × Fk) = νt1,...,tk(Fσ−1 × . . . Fσ−1(k))
for all permutations σ on {1, 2, . . . k} and
νt1,...,tk(F1×. . . Fk) = νt1,...,tk,tk+1,...,tk+m(F1×· · ·×Fk×Rn×· · ·×Rn)
for all m ∈ N, where (of course) the set on the right-hand side
has a total of k +m factors.
Then there exists a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and a stochastic
process {Xt}t∈T on Ω, Xt : Ω→ Rn, such that
νt1,...,tk(F1 × · · · × Fk) = P [Xt1 ∈ F1, . . . , Xtk ∈ Fk]
for all ti ∈ T, k ∈ N and all Borel sets Fi.
Now we are faced with more problems than the translated text: we can read
and write the text, we know the words, we understand the subscripts and
superscripts, but still to the uninitiated into mathematics, it makes no sense;
it still has no meaning. And in the end one could wonder what is meaning
in mathematics?
Summarising the above observations, when we are confronted with an open
book “the first thing we notice is the visual perception of signs” ([224], p.19).
These signs can be handwritten, or printed. Moreover,
in fluent, fast reading we do not perceive the individual letters
themselves, although they do not disappear from our conscious-
ness... The first process of reading a literary work [as well as a
mathematical one] is thus not a simple and purely sensory per-
ception but goes beyond such a perception by concentrating at-
tention on the typical features in the physical or phonetic form
of the words” ([224], p.20, my emphasis).
This attention to the material form of the text can be called as the coupling
of mind with matter. It can be attention to the thickness or the colour of
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the fonts, or if it is a serif or sans serif typeface. In the case of martial arts,
for example, as we saw in the beginning of the section, this kind of attention
turns to the felt weight, or hardness of the book, since it is going to be used
as a weapon of defence or attack; whether the book is written in Russian, En-
glish, or ancient Greek, is totally irrelevant to the contextual circumstances
of a street fight. Put simply, the institutional context (including the shortly
lived institution of a street fight or a chance encounter) dictates the collec-
tive perception (or rather intentionality) of a corresponding assemblage of
artefacts, and not the artefacts themselves. Since
the meaning of a word can be considered in two different ways:
as part of a sentence or a higher semantic unit, or as an isolated
single word, taken by itself” (p.24),
we can see that the meaning is itself a (perishable) assemblage of sound arte-
facts, whether attention is on the pronunciation of each individual phoneme,
as in begin-ning to learn a foreign language, or on each word, as in being
taught the grammar of a language, or on a whole sentence, as in an everyday
speech. Also the pronunciation of a word or a phoneme can be the topic of
a joke, or an attempt to demonstrate higher status. In each social context
therefore the context defines the assemblage, on which attention is drawn.
Moreover, the material of the assemblage of artefacts is not always sound; it
can be material space, as is the case of a room together with the position of
personal belongings, combined with the coordinates the user of the room has
to orientate himself or herself; the more messy a room, the more demanding
the personal coordinate system, obviously. The assemblages here are actu-
ally distances among objects, concentrations of objects in various points in
the room, objects as coordination points or difficulty in finding an object.
The materiality, in other words, of a room with personal belongings can be
divided by the person using the room, into various sub-materialiaties, which
in return can be divided into smaller ones, or can be combined into larger
sub-materialities, attaching at the same time spatial meaning into each one,
creating a spatial encyclopedia of interconnected meanings. This mental abil-
ity has been called spatial cognition ([341]). In other words there is no human
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cognition without artefacts, and no artefacts without human cognition.
5.3 Counting Infinity
Set theory is the first theory that unified mathematics. It created the
common conceptual framework, which made possible communication among
mathematicians of different and very diverse fields. Its originator was Georg
Cantor, who became famous (and infamous) in the mathematical circles of
the 19th for his definition of infinity and infinite sets. This was a major change
in the mathematical perception of infinity([431]). This could be described as
a Kuhnian paradigm shift: the resistance it met as a mathematical theory
has become legendary ([111], see esp. p.1, 266). Today there are no such
disputes over set theory, and there are no disputes among mathematicians in
general, since proofs based on set theory have eliminated scientific consensus
problems. Behind set theory, actually, was lying the problem of foundations
of mathematics: what is proof, what exists in mathematics, mathematical
ontology and so on. The end result of this process was the establishment of
the axiomatic method : the mathematical community accepts the existence of
certain fundamental mathematical entities and the validity of certain propo-
sitions without proof (postulates in Euclid’s language, the originator of this
scientific world-view); moreover, it is accepted that some fundamental con-
cepts are primitive, that is they cannot be defined. The most famous axiom,
for example, was Euclid’s 5th postulate:
if a point does not belong to a straight line, both lying on the
plane, then only one other straight line can be drawn from that
point, which is parallel to the original one.
This proposition, although obvious, remained, and still is, unprovable within
Eucli-dean plane geometry. It can be proved only when the algebraic methods
of analytic geometry are introduced; then the straight lines can be formu-
lated as solutions of first degree polynomials of two variables on the two-
dimensional analytic plane, the R2, as it is traditionally denoted in black-
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board bold typeface. But in the formalism of mathematics R2 is not the
same as the Euclidean plane, since on the Euclidean plane only the ruler and
compasses are allowed to be used for geometrical constructions: a practical
engineer’s demand, in fact . What interests us here is that the community of
mathematicians reached a consensus regarding set theory. This consensus,
moreover was achieved by taking into consideration additional proposals as
to how to eliminate controversies and contradictions, arising in various prob-
lems to be solved; it was not achieved by itself, as the general reader might
be led to believe. It was achieved by the creative proposals of some scientists,
who managed to convince the community as to their usefulness in everyday
problem-solving practices.
Set theory interests us here, because of its presence throughout all of math-
ematics. It is a very fundamental subject in university mathematics depart-
ments, and all the undergraduates have a rough knowledge of it. Actually it
is the basic common communication conceptual framework between working
mathematicians, as regards their professional everyday research life. The first
chapter of Kolmogorov and Fomin’s book is devoted to set theory. Cantor’s
definition of a set, which is still being used in set theory textbooks, was:
By an ‘aggregate’ [i.e. a set] we are to understand any collection
into a whole M of definite and separate objects m of our intuition
or our thought ([79], p.85).
This definition was rejected as a mathematical definition, actually it is evi-
dently not, so a set was, later considered as an (undefinable) primitive notion,
i.e. it was left to the reader, or the researcher, to get a conceptual grasp of
it. Mathematicians learn how to handle the concept of a set during their un-
dergraduate years; it is, in other words, part of their scientific socialisation
processes. The first chapter, therefore, in Kolmogorov and Fomin’s book is
mainly a revision, rather than a main part of of the book. A set is usually
denoted be capital letters of the Roman alphabet (in the Russian text as
well), e.g. A or B, type-faced in italics. Their elements (or points) are de-
noted by small Roman letters, e.g x or y, type-faced, as well, in italics. The
membership property is denoted as x ∈ A (read x belongs to/ is a member
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of/lies in A) . The concepts of a set, an element, or membership are primi-
tive, so no formal definition is given. On the contrary, many examples of sets
and their elements are given in the classroom, or in a textbook. Underlying
the cited examples is the assumption that actually we are mainly interested
in sets of numbers. If we know that the elements of a set are a, b, c, and d,
we can denote that as A = {a, b, c, d}. We are faced now with a very well
known problem in philosophy: intentionality ; where are these mathematical
symbols and concepts pointing to? Materiality means the ability to point to
a material location or property, such as a place, a colour, a sound, and so
on, which is publicly perceived by any other human in the vicinity. So a set
becomes visible by writing down on a paper, by type-facing on the pages of
a book, or by talking about it. At the same time it is a concept, i.e. it is
imagined. These fundamental mathematical concepts, therefore, have both
material and phantasmatic support. This constitutes the public sphere of
mathematics: visible materiality and shared fantasy. Every mathematician
has a personal and intimate perception of mathematics, but, at the same
time, they can understand one another’s perceptions by materially formu-
lating their proposals, maybe in an informal way, as well, even though their
common fantasy space may be totally inaccessible to the non expert.
If an element x does not belong to a set A, this is denoted by (or type-set
as) x /∈ A. And here is the first point of one truth proposal, in order to
avoid the contradictions inherent in Cantor’s theory: if A and B are sets,
then A /∈ B, and B /∈ A; in other words a set cannot belong to any set,
itself included. A set whose elements are sets is called a collection, class, or
a family, of sets. Although a collection is handled in the same way as a set in
computations, they are ontologically different in the fictional universe of set
theory: collections are “big” sets. Collections are usually denoted by capital
letters of the Roman alphabet and type-set in Kuenstler script typeface:
A ,B or C ; in the Russian text they are type-set in Fraktur typeface: A,B
or C. Families are usually collections of indexed sets : {Ai}i∈I , where I is the
index set. In stochastic calculus, for example, families of collections with
the set of nonnegative numbers as the index set are in use: {Ft}t≥0, or, in
the Russian text, {Ft}t≥0. Letting aside now the formalities of mathematical
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logic, and assuming by belief that what we are going to define does exist, as
most of the working mathematicians do, we are going to define operations
on sets. The union of two sets A and B, denoted by A ∪ B, is a new set,
let us say C, whose elements are the elements either of A or B: C = A ∪B.
The intersection of A and B, denoted by A ∩ B is a new set, let us say D,
whose elements are the common elements of A and B: D = A∩B. If A and
C = A B D = A B E = A \ B∪ ∩
Figure 5.1: Venn Diagrams
B have no common elements, then their intersection is the empty set, that
is the set with no elements, denoted by {}, or ∅, which is a capital letter
borrowed from the Danish and Norwegian alphabets. Note that {∅} is not
the empty set, but a set whose only element is the empty set: {∅} 6= ∅. The
relative complement of B in A, denoted in the past by A − B, nowadays
by A \ B, is a set E, whose elements are the elements of A which do not
belong to B: E = A \ B. The reader should bear in mind that so far no
specific reference has been made as to the particular elements of any set;
as long as their material (visual in particular) denotations exist, that is not
necessary. The postgraduates do not need this reference, the undergraduates
have already enough experience in previous mathematical subjects in the
course of their studies prior to choosing a set theory course. There are also
unions and intersections of families or collections of sets: ∪i∈IAi, and ∩i∈IAi.
Quite often Venn diagrams are used to illustrate graphically the operations
between sets (Fig. 5.1). Finally, when all the elements of a set A belong to a
set B, then this is denoted by either A ⊂ B, or A ⊆ B (read A is a subset of
B), or by B ⊃ A, or B ⊇ A (read B is a superset of A). In the Russian text
only the first (A ⊂ B) an the third (B ⊃ A) denotations are being used.
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Before proceeding to a consideration of infinity in mathematics, we have
to examine the concept of a function. Functions, in early undergraduate
courses, are actually (deterministic) computational mathematical formulas
producing numbers:












arg z + eiπz + z̄
|z|2 + 3
In more advanced courses of calculus and mathematical analysis, functions
are perceived as mappings, that is as mechanisms associating the elements
of one set, the domain, with those of another one, the range. The function
f(x) = x2, for example, associates numbers with their squares: it maps the
set of (the usual) numbers R into itself; this is denoted by f : R → R. The
function g(x, y) = x2+iy2, where i is the imaginary unit, maps the Cartesian
plane R2 into the complex plane C, that is g : R2 → C. This conceptual
change in the perception of a function has a very important computational
consequence: it is not necessary any more to know the explicit formula of a
function, as long as we know some of its properties; and this is the situation
in real life problems: deriving some properties from experimentation and
educated guesses, the mathematician tries to approximate the function under
investigation, and, if possible guess its formula. This is going to be important
in stochastic calculus, because predictions are based on functions of unknown
formulas but of known particular properties. Another, more interesting at the
moment, example is to consider the set of natural numbers, N = {1, 2, 3, . . . },
the set of even numbers, 2N = {2, 4, 6, . . . }, and define the function f(n) =
2n, n ∈ N. We can clearly see that f maps N into 2N. If, reversely, we define
the function g(m) = m
2
,m ∈ 2N, then g maps 2N into N. We can therefore
associate every element of N, with every element of 2N, in a reversible way,
which, additionally is one-to-one: to every element of N corresponds only
one element of 2N, and vice versa. The same methodology can be observed
by a shepherd who wants to check if there are any stray sheep: having a
number of pebbles equal to the number of his sheep, he drops one in a small
bag, every time one sheep enters the pen; when a sheep is missing, then
a pebble will remain “orphan” on his hand. In the case of counting even
or natural numbers we saw that when we followed the same procedure as
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the shepherd and use pebbles from the “bags” of natural or even numbers
correspondingly, we are left with no “orphan pebbles” on our hands. What
Cantor did, and annoyed many of his contemporaries, was to assert that,
since there is a one-to-one function from the set of natural numbers N onto
the set of even numbers 2N, that is into the whole of 2N, the sets N and
2N have “the same amount, or multitude, or quantity”, of elements, they are
of the same “size”. He called this “infinite amount of elements” cardinality,
and he denoted the cardinality of the set of natural numbers by ℵ0 (read
aleph-naught, aleph-null or aleph-zero), which is the first letter aleph of the
modern Israeli Hebrew alphabet, always typeset in serif typeface. The zero
subscript denotes that N is the “smallest” infinite set. Cardinalities in finite
sets are the usual numbers: the sets


















have the same cardinality: cardA = cardB = 5. We already saw that
card 2N = cardN = ℵ0. Sets whose cardinality is finite or ℵ0 are called
countable (or sometimes denumerable) in mathematical analysis, discrete in
probability theory, or digital in telecommunications. Sets whose cardinality
is greater than ℵ0 are called uncountable.
We have given a definition of a function, of infinity, we can handle numbers,
but still there is no material support of these besides the typeset visual
representations of these; we still can not answer to a toddler where he or
she can find some numbers in the wild; even in the case of shepherd, the
pebbles are still pebbles, and not numbers. Like Shakespeare’s King Lear,
or like the recently filmed Batman and Bane of DC Comics, numbers, sets,
collections and cardinalities are the acting characters of the fictional universe
of mathematics: they animate mathematical narrative.
Since 2N is countable, it can be written as an indexed set with N as the index
set: 2N = {an}n∈N; or, alternatively, 2N = {an|n ∈ N}, where the vertical
dash “|” is read as “with the property.” The indexed set {ai}i∈I is called
a sequence if the index set I is the set of natural numbers N. Countable
sets, in other words, can be written as sequences. If a set A is finite, A =
{a1, a2, . . . , ak}, then it can be written, as well, as a sequence by setting an =
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ak, for all n ≥ k. The set of integers Z = {· · ·−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . }, that
is the set of positive and negative natural numbers is countable, cardZ = ℵ0.
The set of rational numbers Q = {κ
λ
|κ ∈ Z, λ ∈ N}, that is the set of
positive and negative numbers which can be written as fractions, the finite
and periodic decimals included, is countable, as well: cardQ = ℵ0. All these,
of course, and what follows are being proved in Kolmogorov and Fomin’s
book, and also in any standard textbook of set theory. So the question
arises: are there any examples of uncountable sets? The answer is positive.
The set of real numbers R, that is the set of all known and still unknown
numbers, is uncountable, cardR  ℵ0: it cannot be written as a sequence. A
second question arises. The powerset of a set A, denoted usually in advanced
texts by 2A, is the collection of subsets of A: 2A = {B|B ⊂ A}. Then the
powerset of a set is proved to be of higher cardinality than the original one,
that is cardA ≺ card 2A. Since N ≺ 2N, and N ≺ R, is there any possibility
that 2N ' R, that is card 2N = cardR? This used to be called the continuum
hypothesis. In 1966 it was proved by Cohen that this is actually an axiom:
the existence of an infinity bigger than the infinity of the natural numbers and
smaller than the infinity of the real numbers cannot be proved or disproved
within the formal system of modern mathematics. Put simply, it is a matter of
belief and faith,rather than science. In the historical course of mathematics,
the assumption that the proposition 2N ' R is true proved very useful, and
mathematics since then is based on that. Since the time of the proof of the
independence of the continuum hypothesis, a set A whose cardinality is the
cardinality of R, cardR = ℵ1 (read aleph one), has been traditionally called
uncountable in mathematical analysis, continuous in probability theory, and
analog in telecommunications. There are also other interesting topics of set
theory included in Kolmogorov and Fomin’s book, which are not going to
concern us since they go beyond the scope of this thesis.
Let us now try to follow very carefully the proof that the closed unit interval
[0, 1] = {x ∈ R| 0 ≤ x ≤ 1} 1 is uncountable, as presented in the book
of Kolmogorov and Fomin. We are not interested so much in the proof
1If the reader feels overwhelmed and confused by the many formulas and definitions
introduced in a small amount of space, this has been done intentionally.
270
itself, but rather on the imaginative prerequisites to understand the proof.
The first thing to bear in mind is that we are talking about infinity, that
is something that has no ending in real life; the reader, therefore, of the
proof has already a conscious or unconscious idea of what infinite means.
For the undergraduate student of mathematics, since he or she is going to be
examined, it is imperative to have an idea of this; during the examinations a
student has to coordinate his or her eye with the hand, in order to write, and
this can be done only through his or her vision of the infinity, among others.
A toddler, in a similar fashion, coordinates his or her hands and eyes in order
to build imagined constructions with Lego bricks; when two toddlers play
with the same Lego bricks, then we are witnessing a conversation between
them, that is, in the current sociological parlance, a Lego focus group.
Our concern now is if the set [0, 1] can be written as a sequence, that is in
the form [0, 1] = {αn}n∈N, with the condition that if κ 6= λ, then ακ 6= αλ
and vice versa, if ακ 6= αλ, then κ 6= λ. Since for any n ∈ N, we have
that 0 ≤ αn ≤ 1 (we can formulate now normal sentences with the heavy
use of mathematical symbols), every αn, n ∈ N, can be written as a decimal
number: αn = 0.an,1an,2 . . . an,m . . . , where an,m (m ∈ N), is the m-th digit
in the decimal expansion of αn. First prerequisite for this proof, therefore,
is the ability to abstract: the symbol αn is the generic number which we do
not know (and if we knew we would still not know, since a number does not
exist materially) of the interval [0, 1] which does not, as well, exist materially
besides as a typeface on the book pages, or in handwritten form. What
exists actually in real life applications are measurements producing numbers,
but not numbers themselves. On the other hand the generic number αn does
exist, since an undergraduate can fail the examinations, if he or she considers
this number as a figment of the professor’s imagination; in other words the
assumption that numbers do exist does have a real impact in social life, as
everybody knows. The decimal expansion of a number is already known from
school:
1 = 0.9999 . . . ,
√
2− 1 = 0.4142 . . . , π − 3 = 0.1415 . . . ,
1
3
= 0.3333 . . . , 0.5 = 0.5000 . . . , . . . and so on.
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Infinity now is denoted by ellipsis, that is the three dots: “ . . . ”, as something
always unfinished, or rather unfinishable. Every number therefore has a
decimal, maybe infinite, representation. Underlying this assertion of decimal
approximation of every number is the continuum hypothesis, that is cardR =
card 2N; we will see how in the next section.
When reading the proof, consciousness zooms in on the writing symbols. So
in order to facilitate the argument of the proof, the terms of the sequence
together with their decimal representations are being graphically rearranged
on the white page background in the following way:
α1 = 0.a1,1a1,2 . . . a1,n . . . ,
α2 = 0.a2,1a2,2 . . . a2,n . . . ,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
αn = 0.an,1an,2 . . . an,n . . . ,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
At the same time it is always a good idea to write down this rearrange-
ment, so that the reader can facilitate himself or herself by using the hands
equipped with the pencil, or ballpoint, in creating new rearrangements. We
see that still the watching eye and the writing hand must still be coordinated,
since the view of the proof until it is understood is a parallax view. The fact
that the view of the proof changes, and the hand, in concert with the eye,
rearrange the symbols of the proof, indicate that actually consciousness is
cinematic. In other words the symbols of the proof are being rearranged
by means of the eye and the hand is being coordinated by this imaginary
footage of consciousness in use. The researcher cannot possibly have access
to this cinematic consciousness, but he or she can record the material rear-
rangements of the particular assemblages being used in a particular material
context. This can be done, for example, in the classroom, or, especially in
our case, during an informal coffee meeting between researchers. Returning
back to the proof, observing the above arrangement, we can see that the
decimal digits a1,1, a2,2 . . . an,n . . . form an imaginary infinite diagonal; this is
denoted also by the fact that the double subscripts are the same. The proof
is actually based on the handling of these subscripts, and on the ability to
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communicate the validity of this particular handling to the audience of the
proof.
Let us now choose the decimal β = 0.b1b2 . . . bn . . . , with digits (from 0 to 9)
bn 6= an,n, for all n ∈ N. In other words b1 6= a1,1, b2 6= a2,2, . . . , bn 6= an,n, . . .
and so on. Then we can observe that the decimal β is different from the
generic term αn of our sequence, at least on the decimal digit of order n, that
is bn 6= an,n. We reach, therefore, the conclusion that actually β /∈ {αn}n∈N,
since, for all n ∈ N, β 6= αn. Now we have just reached a contradiction, not
a real conclusion, since we assumed that the unit interval [0, 1] is countable.
The new conclusion we reach is that our initial hypothesis was false, since
every step in the proof was in concert with the laws of mathematical logic.
The negation of the initial hypothesis, therefore, is true: that the unit interval
is not a countable set. Since it is infinite, it is uncountable. We have to
modify slightly the above proof in order to make it complete, but this does
not alter the basic argumentation of the proof, which is (Cantor’s) diagonal
argument.
This section has introduced many symbols, many new definitions in a seem-
ingly short amount of space. This has been done with certain purposes in
mind. When the undergraduate is introduced into new subjects there are
more symbols and definitions to remember, and we can say that actually the
mathematical fictional universe is indeed overcrowded: the student himself
or herself is going to impose his or her fictional order, in the end of the day,
on this universe. The confusion that the non initiated reader might have
felt was actually intentional. In the practice of mathematics exercises and
problems play a very important role. The first role is to train the cinematic
consciousness to coordinate the writing hand with the watching eyes. This is
accomplished, for example, in the case of chemistry with the laboratory, or
in mechanical engineering by assembling and disassembling a car by hand;
this is what is actually meant by hands-on experience. This is the main ob-
stacle, as well, in invention and innovation. A second very important role is
to start forgetting the use of symbols and definitions, and begin focusing on
new mathematical constructions, which will be forgotten again and the focus
of intentional attention will be on the next constructions dictated by the
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curriculum. The situation in the social sciences is totally different: the focus
is mostly on reading texts, than writing. The only comparable situation in
the social sciences and humanities happens when a new foreign language is
learned, especially one with an alphabet different from the Latin one. Then
the learner is under pressure to compile sounds, words, sentences and text
on his or her own, or, in a more sociological terminology, to compile his or
her own assemblages. When the primary school pupils learn how to read and
write, the corresponding assemblages of sound, paper, pencil, desk, black-
board, and so on, become part and parcel of their cinematic consciousness.
Later in secondary school they will have forgotten that they use them, and
their consciousness will be withdrawing to other levels of focus. Cinematic
consciousness by engaging itself as the who, that is as Homo faber, with the
what, that is the tool, the spoken word, or the written letter, cannot distin-
guish any more the who from the what : it has assimilated both of them in
its running footage [421, see p.239–276].
5.4 Keeping Distances
The previous section was written with two purposes in mind: the first was to
introduce the mathematical perception of infinity by trying to construct it
materially and then imagine it, and then to give an idea of how different kinds
of infinities are distinguished. It should be borne in mind that in proving
that the set of numbers between zero and one, the numbers zero and one
included,2 Cantor’s diagonal argument does not construct the uncountouble
infinity of this set, as it is the case of the natural and even numbers; this
is actually proof by contradiction. It is not a constructive or computational
proof. Leaving aside the formalities of mathematical logic, we can see now
that Cantor’s proof leaves the perception of uncountable infinity to the reader
of the proof, as it claims only existence, but exposes no demonstration or a
concrete way of understanding of uncountable infinity. This is actually a first
serious indication of a very strong imagination behind proving or disproving
as a mathematical practice, not only that of the author of the proof, as it is
2That is the closed unit interval [0, 1] = {x ∈ R|0 ≤ x ≤ 1}.
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rather obvious, but also that imagination of the reader. as well: a proof is
not a proof, unless it can be communicated as such(see [118]).
On the other hand too much reliance on imagination can lead to false conclu-
sions; this can be avoided by peer reviews. When Andrew Wiles claimed in
1993 to have solved Fermat’s last theorem, notorious in mathematical circles
for its relentless resistance to any proof whatsoever, he created a sensation;
it was discovered by peer referees after a few months that there was a major
gap in the proof, which Wiles had missed and undermined seriously its va-
lidity. Later in 1994, he managed to solve that gap, and proved a theorem
unproven for centuries [416, p.277–302]. The second, and more important
purpose of writing the previous section is to illustrate the different academic
cultures with respect to undergraduate studying between the social and the
mathematical (and engineering, as well) sciences: while the future social sci-
entist focuses on understanding the material by reading, the mathematician
focuses on understanding the material by writing.3 In other words the usual
participant observation is not enough in the conventional sense. In a usual
anthropological study by participant observation understanding by writing
is being accomplished by taking part into conversations: the writing hand
in that case is the talking mouth. But this kind of “writing” is something
that the social scientist has been trained for since very early in his or her ca-
reer. But becoming and engineer, or a mathematician, or any profession that
demands extensive and exhausting training in creating a multitude of arte-
facts and mechanisms, is not something the social scientist has been trained
for. And the artefacts involved in cultures of low level material complexity
can be used, in most of the cased, by simple imitation: there is a difference
between using a sword to kill and using a nuclear missile to kill: they are
both socio-technical systems, but there is a huge difference in the material
complexity between them. There is a great gap in the sociological literature
regarding a phenomenology of high-complexity material culture, something
like Simondon’s technical individuation [415], or his concept of mechanology
(see [414]).
3This has been called the (phono)logocentrism of the social sciences [121, p.81-87], [421,
p.136].
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We have seen how complex has been so far the definition of a set. The sets
and their points though are not enough to study space; we need more. We 4
are going to enter now the concept of space in mathematics by defining the
metric, or distance, function:
Definition 1. Let X be a set. A metric function ρ on X, ρ : X × X →
R+,5 is defined as follows:
ρ(x, y) ≥ 0 (non−negativity) (5.1)
ρ(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y (coincidence axiom) (5.2)
ρ(x, y) = ρ(y, x) (symmetry) (5.3)
ρ(x, y) ≤ ρ(x, z) + ρ(z, y) (triangle inequality) (5.4)
where x, y, z are any points of X. A set X equipped with a metric (func-
tion) is called a metric space, and is denoted by (X, ρ).
The property of non-negativity, that is property 5.1, denotes something we
would expect from a distance function: the distance between two points in
space can be only a positive number or zero. Moreover we would expect
that when two points coincide, then the distance between them should be
zero, and vice versa, which is property 5.2. Property 5.3 denotes that the
distance of x from y is the same as the distance of y from x (the property of
symmetry). So far the properties defined are expected, or “common sense,”
ones. The triangle inequality, property 5.4, is actually a well known theorem
from Euclidean geometry (Fig. 5.2): “the length of each side of a triangle is
always smaller than or equal to the sum of the lengths of the other two”;
Euclides is still pulling the strings from the background.
We are going to see some examples of metric spaces now. It is important
to note at this point that the definition of a metric does not contain its
calculation, only the properties of it, after a particular measurement has
been done. Which method of measuring distances is going to be applied is
4We the mathematicians, or we the outsiders observing the mathematicians.
5R+ denotes the (set of) non-negative numbers and X × X denotes the Cartesian
product of X with itself, that is the set whose elements are (ordered) pairs of points.
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Figure 5.2: Triangle Inequality
left to the discretion of the reader, or the mathematician in general. Let us
now see 6 some more concrete examples of metric spaces.
Example 1. The set Rn = {(x1, . . . , xn)|xi ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , n} of ordered




(xi − yi)2 =
√
(x1 − y1)2 + (x2 − y2)2 + · · ·+ (xn − yn)2
where x = (x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn) any points of Rn. The metric space
(Rn, ρ) is called the n-dimensional Euclidean space, and x1, . . . , xn are
the Cartesian coordinates of x.
If we observe the calculation of the Euclidean metric in example 1, we see
that it is the square root of a sum of squares, that is the sum of the dif-
ferences of the corresponding coordinates of the points. This is actually the
Pythagorean theorem, which the definition demands to hold, when three
points in Rn form a right-angled triangle, that is a triangle whose one angle
6See as mathematicians or “see” as outside observers of mathematicians.




Figure 5.3: The Euclidean metric in R2.
is 90 degrees (Fig. 5.3). Needless to say at this point that triangles, squares,
or coordinates do not exist in the wild, in some kind of naturally created
inorganic or organic form; even “inorganic” or “organic” are taxonomies of
chemistry and biology, not of an observed nature. A triangle is an artefact
produced by the artefact of a drawing stick, on the plane artefact of paper
or papyrus: it is an assemblage, in other words, both material and phantas-
matic. But this kind of triangle is in Euclidean plane and solid geometry. The
triangle whose three vertices can be expressed in the form of coordinates on
the Cartesian plane is an artefact of analytic geometry, not of the Euclidean
one: there are, in other words, fundamental differences between Euclidean
and analytic geometries. It is rather easy to prove that the Euclidean metric
satisfies properties 1-3 of definition 1, page 276. The triangle inequality, the
proof of which is not trivial, takes the following form:√√√√ n∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2 ≤
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(xi − zi)2 +
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(zi − yi)2 ,
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where x = (x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn), z = (z1, . . . , zn) are any points in
Rn; in the case of R1 = R, for any points x, y, z in R, the inequality becomes:
|x− y| ≤ |x− z|+ |z − x|.8
Let us now give an example of another interesting metric:
Example 2. Considering again the set of n-tuples x = (x1, . . . , xn) we can




|xi − y1| = |x1 − y1|+ · · ·+ |xn − yn|,
where x = (x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn) any points of Rn. The space Rn
together with the Manhattan (or L1) distance is called the n-dimensional
L1 space,9 which is the simplest example of a non Euclidean geometry: the
so-called taxicab geometry.
The triangle inequality now takes the following form:
n∑
i=1






|zi − yi| ,
where x = (x1, . . . , xn), y = (y1, . . . , yn), z = (z1, . . . , zn) are any points in
Rn. In the case of R the inequality becomes again:
|x− y| ≤ |x− z|+ |z − x|,
just like in the case of the Euclidean metric on R. We will see the L1 spaces
later on. The geometry equipped with the Manhattan distance is called the
taxicab geometry, because this is the problem of a taxi driver in Manhattan:10
the driving distance between two points in Manhattan is not the straight
segment that connects these points, which is calculated by the Euclidean
metric, but the sum of the absolute differences of their coordinates (Fig. 5.4);
8The |x| is the absolute value of x, that is x without the minus or plus signs.
9In the Russian text, as well as in the English translation, this metric space is denoted
by Rn1 .
10Or in general any type of city plan in which streets run at right angles to each other.
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Figure 5.4: The Manhattan distance in R2.
the well known from Euclidean geometry shapes, like the circle, change form,
as well (see [255]).
We are going to see now an example in which the points of the metric space
are functions.
Example 3. Let [a, b] be a closed interval, that is the set whose numbers
are between a and b (a < b), a and b included: [a, b] = {x ∈ R| a ≤ x ≤ b}.
The set C[a,b], or C[a, b] in the Russian text, of all continuous functions
f : [a, b]→ R 11 becomes a metric space with the uniform metric:
ρ(f, g) = sup
x∈[a,b]
|f(x)− g(x)| = sup{|f(x)− g(x)| | x ∈ [a, b] }
where f, g continuous functions with the closed interval [a, b] as their domain,
and R as their range: f, g : [a, b]→ R, and sup is their supremum, that is the
11The graph of a continuous function has no “gaps”.
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smallest number which is greater than or equal to each absolute difference of
all their values in R:
sup
x∈[a,b]
|f(x)− g(x)| ≥ |f(y)− g(y)|, for all y ∈ [a, b].
The supremum of a number set is always a number, and in the case of the
supremum of the values of a continuous function defined on a closed interval
it coincides with the maximum value of the function:
sup
x∈[a,b]
|f(x)− g(x)| = max
x∈[a,b]
|f(x)− g(x)|, since f, g are continuous.
A space like C[a,b], whose points are functions, is called a function space. The
triangle inequality now becomes:
sup
x∈[a,b]





where f, g, h lie in C[a,b]; C[a,b] has become a uniform space. This is the start-
ing point of functional analysis : the geometrical study of function spaces. We
are not interested any more in the formula of a function, but in its properties.
What has been accomplished so far is to expand Euclidean geometry to non-
Euclidean ones by Euclidean means: a metric space, due to the required
properties of a metric still has triangles in the Euclidean sense: only the
measurement of the distance between two points changes. And with the last
example we can start realising something of major importance in functional
analysis: the artefacts of geometrical figures now are not the “geometrical
interpretation” of the theory any more, as is the case for examples 1 and 2;
they can confuse rather, than illuminate the study of function spaces. The
use of mathematical symbols now becomes indispen-sable, and the concepts
more abstract. We can start now forming an idea of the mathematicians’
“spirit world”: we can use our (lay) imagination to approach their (shamanist)
imagination.12
After the definition of a metric comes another very handy, and necessary
indeed, definition:
12The mathematical symbols are now becoming the magical runes of these shamans.
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Open unit ball 
B(x  ,r) in Euclidean 
geometry
x =(0,0) x =(0,0)
Open unit ball






Figure 5.5: Euclidean and taxicab open balls in R2.
Definition 2. Let (X, ρ) be a metric space and a point x0 ∈ X; an open
ball with centre x0 and radius r > 0 is the set B(x0, r) = {x ∈ X| ρ(x0, x) <
r}; a closed ball with centre x0 and radius r is the set B[x0, r] =
x ∈ X| ρ(x0, x) ≤ r.
We already know the form of the open and closed balls in R:
B(x0, r) = (x0 − r, x0 + r) = {x ∈ R| |x− x0| < 1}, which is an open interval ;
B[x0, r] = [x0 − r, x0 + r] = {x ∈ R| |x− x0| ≤ 1}, which is a closed interval .
If the radius is one, then B(x0, 1) is the open unit ball, and B[x0, 1] is the
closed unit ball, where x0 ∈ X. In Fig.5.5 we can see the form of the open
unit ball with centre the beginning x0 = (0, 0) of the coordinate axes in the
2-dimensional Euclidean and taxicab geometries. Open unit ball in in two
dimensions means the disc without the circumference, whereas the closed unit
ball includes the circumference of the circle. In three dimensions the surface
of the sphere does not belong to the open ball, while it is contained in the
closed ball. In more than three dimensions we lose view of the materiality of
the ball: we cannot perceive directly artefacts of four or more dimensions, if
they exist.
All the physical realities which are more than four dimensions are always
translated by scientists into artefacts of three or less, dimensions. In Fig.
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Figure 5.6: Schlegel diagram of a tesseract.
5.6, for example we can see the Schlegel diagram of a tesseract13, that is a
3-dimensional projection of a 4-dimensional cube; the artefact is actually 2-
dimensional, but the human eye can perceive a third dimension in a drawing,
which is the sense of depth, or perspective. The Schlegel diagram of a tesser-
act is, actually, a material attempt to extend the sense of perspective to more
dimensions. In a recent movie called Dredd, a new drug appears in the black
market of a future American megacity which slows down to an extreme degree
the perception of time flow; the movie was filmed in 3D and the director uti-
lizes the sense of spatial perspective of the viewer, to convey this slow-down
of the perceived flow of time when under the influence of this new drug. In
13Taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesseract.
283
the theory of relativity, both special and general relativity, time has become
the fourth dimension. But still it cannot perceived as a fourth dimension
from first-hand experience; it can be experienced only through mathemati-
cal theory and its measurement is accomplished by instruments independent
of human consciousness, which produce 2-dimensional artefacts.14 When it
comes to a function space the situation is even worse: the (open or closed)
balls can be (proved to be) infinite-dimensional, that is of countably infinite
dimensions. The open unit ball in the uniform function space C[a,b] with






|f0(x)− f(x)| < 1
}
.
These can indeed be difficult to handle, but still the mathematicians have
managed to move ahead.
Definition 3. Let (X, ρ) be a metric space and a {xn}n∈N a sequence of
points lying in X, that is {xn}n∈N ⊆ X. Then {xn}n∈N converges to a
point x0 of X, denoted by xn → x0,15 if, given any ε > 0, there is a natural
number nε ∈ N,16 such that the open ball B(x0, ε) contains all the points of
the sequence beyond nε, that is {xn}n≥nε ⊆ B(x0, ε). The point x0 is the
limit of the sequence {xn}n∈N.
The introduction of limits to a generic metric space is the starting point of
mathematical analysis. If xn → x0, then limn→∞ ρ(xn, x0) = 0, and vice
versa; that is the computation of the limit of a sequence in a generic metric
space is sub-delegated to the computation of a usual limit in calculus. The
ε is actually the error in computations, which is arbitrarily chosen by the
mathematician, and therefore depends on a more general social context, since
mathematics is not only a theoretical venture, but an applied disciplined, as
well (see [302]). Some examples will illustrate the concept of a limit.
14Actually only 3-dimensional artefacts can be perceived by the human eye; a sheet of
white A4 paper seems to be 2-dimensional, because the third dimension of its thickness is
almost invisible. A bacterium for the same reason appears to be dimensionless.
15While n tends to infinity, n→∞.
16The subscript ε denotes that nε is, in general, dependent on ε, while ε can be chosen
arbitrarily.
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Example 4. Let us consider the number
√
2, and a sequence {xn}n∈N, such
that xn →
√
2. Let ε > 0; then, according to the previous definition, there is
a nε ∈ N, such that xn ∈ B(
√
2, ε), for any n ≥ nε. Then
|xn −
√
2| < ε, for any n ≥ nε.




x1 = 1, x6 = 1, 41421
x2 = 1.4, x7 = 1.414213,
x3 = 1.41 x8 = 1.4142135,
x4 = 1.414 x9 = 1.41421356,
x5 = 1.4142, x10 = 1.414213562;
These are are actually the first ten terms of the sequence A002193 in the
On-Line Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences. If we want error e < .001 in the
calculation of
√
2, we can set ε = .001, and therefore
|xn −
√
2| < 0.001, that is (xn − 0.001)2 < 2 & 2 < (xn + 0.001)2.
We check which of these last inequalities hold for each of the first ten terms
of the sequence {xn}n∈N:
n = 1, (x1 − .001)2 = .9980010000, (x1 + .001)2 = 1.002001000;
n = 2, (x2 − .001)2 = 1.957201000, (x2 + .001)2 = 1.962801000;
n = 3, (x3 − .001)2 = 1.985281000, (x3 + .001)2 = 1.990921000;
n = 4, (x4 − .001)2 = 1.996569000, (x4 + .001)2 = 2.002225000;
n = 5, (x5 − .001)2 = 1.997134240, (x5 + .001)2 = 2.002791040;
n = 6, (x6 − .001)2 = 1.997162504, (x6 + .001)2 = 2.002819344;
n = 7, (x7 − .001)2 = 1.997098300, (x7 + .001)2 = 2.002827835;
n = 8, (x8 − .001)2 = 1.997172397, (x8 + .001)2 = 2.002829251;
n = 9, (x9 − .001)2 = 1.997172566, (x9 + .001)2 = 2.002829420;
n = 10, (x10 − .001)2 = 1.997172572, (x10 + .001)2 = 2.002829426.
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We can clearly see that for n ≥ 4 the inequality |xn−
√
2| < 0.001 does hold.
So we conclude that n.001 = 4. In other words by choosing any term xn of
the sequence, such that n ≥ 4 we can have the desired approximation within
the error limits we have set.
Decisions concerning the acceptable error in a measurement are not dictated
by the needs of the mathematical community, but they are usually extrasys-
temic imperatives : for a risk analyst the approximation of two decimal points
can be enough, since there are no smaller currency denominations; NASA
may need an approximation of four decimals; a quantum physicist usually
needs an approximation of 10 to 20 decimals. The theory of metric spaces is,
in fact, an approximation theory in a generic space. It should be noted that
in the approximation of
√
2 no reference was made as to whether the metric
used for approximation was the Euclidean or the Manhattan one: in R they
both coincide with the absolute value of the difference of the values of the
points at issue; that is
ρeuclidean(x, y) = ρmanhattan(x, y) = |x− y|,
where x, y any elements of R.
The importance of the rational numbers, and the decimal ones in particular
is illustrated by the following:
Example 5. Every real m-tuple x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm (m ∈ N) can be ap-
proximated by a rational sequence of the form {x(n)}n∈N = {(x(n)1 , . . . , x
(n)
m )}n∈N ⊆
Qm using either the Euclidean or the Manhattan metric (they are equivalent).
We can see now an example of approximation in a function space:
Example 6. The function f(x) = 1−
√
1− x, x ∈ [0, 1], can be approximated
by a sequence of polynomials {pn}n∈N on [0, 1] with rational coefficients; where
pn, n ∈ N, is a polynomial of m degree (m ∈ N):
pn(x) = amx
m + am−1x
m−1 + · · ·+ a2x2 + a1x+ a0, x ∈ [0, 1].
The polynomials pn, n ∈ N are defined on the closed unit interval [0, 1], and
we know from calculus that they are continuous and differentiable. They are
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points, therefore, of the function space C[a,b]. Using the uniform metric
ρu(f, g) = sup
x∈[0,1]
|f(x)− g(x)|,
where f, g any points of C[a,b], it will be shown that the following sequence








(p2n(x) + x), x ∈ [0, 1] (n ∈ N).
The proof will be conducted in a series of steps:
1. It can be shown, by using mathematical indunction, that, when x0 ∈
[0, 1], we get 0 ≤ pn(x0) ≤ 1, for all n ∈ N: we consider x0 as given, and
then {pn(x0)}n∈N becomes a number sequence which can be handled
with a knowledge of calculus. The function pn(x), x ∈ [0, 1], therefore,
is bounded17 for any n ∈ N.
2. When x0 ∈ [0, 1], it can be shown by mathematical induction again that
the sequence of the first order derivatives {p′n(x0)}n∈N is a sequence of
positive numbers: p′n(x0) ≥ 0; therefore, considering now the func-
tion sequence {pn}n∈N, we deduce that for every n ∈ N, the function




for any n ∈ [0, 1].
3. Employing induction for a third time, by considering x0 as a given point
of [0, 1], it can be shown that pn+1(x0) ≥ pn(x0), n ∈ N; the number
sequence {pn(x0)}n∈N, in other words, is monotonically increasing, for
each x0 ∈ [0, 1].
4. Since by steps 1 and 3, given an x0 ∈ [0, 1], the num- ber seq- uence
{pn(x0)}n∈N is monotonically increasing and bounded, we deduce that
17A function f is bounded when there is a number c > 0, such that |f(x)| ≤ c, for all x;
then f is bounded by c, and c is a bound of f .
287
it converges to a point `0 ≤ 1. Using the recursive definition of the
sequence of polynomials {pn}n∈N, we deduce that `0 = 1 ±
√
1− x0.
Since `0 ≤ 1, we conclude that `0 = 1−
√




In other words the function sequence {pn}n∈N converges pointwise to
f , that is point by point, and not uniformly, which is the desired type
of convergence.
5. We will now zoom in on the fifth and most important step of the proof.
Let ε > 0 be any positive number.
(a) If x0 ∈ [0, 1], then we saw that limn→∞ pn(x0) = f(x0), or, in the
usual notation of functional analysis for sequence limits, pn(x0)→
f(x0).
(b) Taking into consideration the definition of convergence of a se-
quence in a metric space (Def. 3, page 284), for ε
2
> 0 there is a
n ε
2






, when n ≥ n ε
2
.






is a ball on the number space R,
which is not the space we want, that is the function space C[0,1].






, for n ≥ n ε
2




, when n ≥ n ε
2
.
(e) But x0 is any point in [0, 1], and therefore the positive number ε2




, for all x ∈ [0, 1],when n ≥ n ε
2
(f) Therefore the last inequality will hold for the least upper bound of






, when n ≥ n ε
2
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(g) Since the function |pn(x)− f(x)|, x ∈ [0, 1], is continuous and de-
fined on the closed interval [0, 1], for all n ∈ N, it has a maximum






, for all n ≥ n ε
2
6. We have reached therefore the conclusion that
ρu(pn, f) < ε, for all n ≥ n ε
2
,
where ρu is the uniform metric of the uniform function space C[0,1];
7. In other words, that for any ε > 0, there is an nε(= n ε
2
) ≥ n, such that
pn ∈ B(f, ε), for all n ≥ nε, where B(f, ε) is the open ball in C[0,1],18
with centre the function f and radius ε > 0.
8. Considering definition 3, page 284, from the above we deduce that the
sequence of polynomials {pn}n∈N converges uniformly to f .
Every proof has a particular audience: a theorem is not proved in the same
way when it is intended for undergraduates, as when it is intended for peers.
Undergraduates, and later postgraduates are not peers; postgraduates in
particular are nor peers yet. The first thing to mention is that the first
three steps can be solved by knowledge of calculus. It has to be noted that
there is a play with the variables: the x variable is stabilised and the n runs
through N, steps 1, 2, and 3, and then the n variable is stabilised and the
x runs through [0, 1], steps 1 and 2. It is important, therefore, to do, as a
reader, this interchange on the variables mentally, and to be in a position to
reproduce it later in examinations by hand. For a sociologist of science, it is
more important not to understand a proof, than to understand it: it simply
poses the question of how the subjects of a proof understand, and, moreover,
how these subjects communicate with others their results. The usual answer
that pervades to that is that someone is good at mathematics because he or
she is especially talented: the really talented people are actually very few,
18Which means B(f, ε) ⊆ C[0,1].
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and generally they receive prizes for their innovations.19 The above proof
can be very daunting to an undergraduate, but all of the postgraduates who
specialise in a branch of mathematical analysis, or probability theory, are
able to understand it. So how can someone understand this proof?
An important way, in fact, of understanding a mathematical proof is some-
thing common sense dictates: reading the above proof. But before proceeding
to read the proof, it has to be reminded that a proof in the beginning was
not a proof: it was a passing thought, an idea, then it was an experiment,
a discussion with colleagues, and then it was tidied up for presentation to a
peer journal. So when we read a proof in a journal, we see the presentable
version of it, not its process of generation. In reading the above proof it will
be assumed that the imaginary reader of it is proficient in the English lan-
guage, although this is not always the case. The first thing to bear in mind is
working memory : the “system of interacting components [of the brain] that
maintain newly acquired and reactivated stored information, both verbal
and nonverbal, and make it available for further information processing”[38].
That is, in other words, the memory mechanisms being used to perform a
task at hand. In steps 1, 2 and 3 the method used for proving is mathemati-
cal induction, which is already known from first year calculus. Depending on
how many exercises a first year student has solved,20 which involve induction,
these sub-proofs will induce corresponding feelings of familiarity: some will
understand it on the spot, just by reading it; some will have to copy the proof
to a sheet of paper and try to do the proof themselves by hand; some will ask
a fellow student, or the lecturer. In every case the result will be better un-
derstanding along with an increased sense of familiarity. The really difficult
task for an early undergraduate will be to understand the transition from the
number space R, a space whose elements are already familiar from school, to
the abstract function space C[0,1], whose elements are functions. The same








19The Fields medal is the most prestigious prize in mathematics, awarded to two up to
four mathematicians who are not over forty years of age at the time of the award ceremony,
during each International Congress of the International Mathematical Union, organised
every four years.
20Depending also on the student’s mathematical talent.
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ball B (f, ε). These happen in step 5. During this step the working memory
may hinder perception, since it has to be modified, in order to identify new
kinds of spaces and balls, that are necessary to proceed in functional analy-
sis. This extra effort required to understand an extended concept of space,
by modifying information processed in the working memory brain modules,
makes an exercise a personal achievement, maybe small, maybe important;
many similar exercises make this achievement business as usual, a trivial,
everyday matter.
In general, returning to the previous proof, “every function f ∈ C[a,b], a and b
lying in R, can be uniformly approximated by a sequence of polynomials with
rational coefficients”: this is the so-called Stone-Weierstrass theorem. More-
over there is something else about the proof that has not been mentioned:
step 2, actually is not necessary, since its argument is covered by steps 5e,
5f, and 5g: that the function pn(x), x ∈ [0, 1], has a maximum for all n ∈ N,
or all n ≥ n ε
2
. This proof was performed by the author by copying initially a
proof available on the internet, and then translating into a more understand-
able for him framework. The argument of step 2 was included in the initial
online proof. Later it became clear, that the modified proof of the author
was valid, as well. This step was kept for two reasons. The first is to show
that the initial reading of a proof is experimental, as to the understanding of
it, especially when introducing new concepts. The second, and more impor-
tant reason, is to demonstrate the importance of instruction, in the case of
undergraduates and postgraduates, and peer reviewing, in the case of work-
ing mathematicians. The undergraduates are being socialized in the formal
presentation of proofs by instruction and submission of assignments to be
corrected, as well, as they usually miss or add unnecessary steps in a proof.
In the case of working mathematicians, due to the nature of innovation in
a much more complex framework, especially in articles crossing the various
fields of mathematics, the possibility to miss a step in a proof is much higher.
The above cited proof, obviously, can still have mistakes or omissions, since
the author is not a professional mathemati-cian.
Returning now to Kolmogorov and Fomin’s book, we have to cite some more
important definitions, before we proceed to the next section.
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Definition 4. Let (X, ρ) be a metric space and Y be a subset of X, i.e.
Y ⊆ X, Then Y is dense in X, if every point x0 of X, i.e. x0 ∈ X, is the
limit of a sequence {yn}n∈N in Y , i.e. {yn}n∈N ⊆ Y , that is yn → x0. If,
moreover, Y is countable, that is card(Y ) = ℵ0, then X is separable.
We can say now that the set of rational numbers Q is dense in R, and, since
Q is countable, that R is separable. Alternatively, Q is a dense sequence in
R. Also the Stone-Weierstrass theorem actually asserts the set of polynomi-
als of one variable with rational coefficients, denoted by Q[X] in algebraic
geometry, is dense in C[a,b]. Since Q[X] is countable, C[a,b] is separable. The
importance of separable spaces cannot be overestimated: the majority of lit-
erature in functional analysis, especially its applied version, is on separable
spaces. We do not know, and will never know, the exact value of
√
2, π, or
Euler’s number e; we know only their rational approximations. The same
holds for functions: if we don not know the exact formula of a function con-
tinuous on a closed interval, we can set the approximation error, and then
find a corresponding polynomial to use as the function’s formula. In other
words, in the definition of a separable space in functional analysis a systemic
imperative is latent: to study spaces whose points can be computationally
approximated by sequences. This was the imperative underlying the early
develop-ment of functional analysis. Later on, especially after the second
world war, research turned also to more general spaces, and the concept of
convergence was achieved by using only set theory, and doing away with the
metrics and introducing instead topologies:
Definition 5. If X is a metric space with metric ρ, then the sets which are
(countable or uncountable) unions of open balls B(x, ε), x ∈ X, ε > 0, are
called open sets, and the collection of open sets is the topology of X with
respect to the metric ρ, denoted by Tρ(X), or Tρ if X is known, or simply T.
A closed set A, A ⊆ X, is a set whose complement AC = X\A is open.
Unions of open balls are open sets. Closed balls are closed sets, as well as any
intersection of them. Any union (countable or uncountable) of open sets is
always an open set, and any finite intersection of open sets is always an open
set. Any intersection (countable or uncountable) of closed sets is a closed set,
292
as well as any finite union of closed sets. A collection T of subsets of X is a
topology, if: (a) ∅ and X lie in T; (b) the union of the elements of any family
of elements of T is an element of T, that is, {Ai}i∈I ⊆ T implies
⋃
i∈I Ai ∈ T,
where the index set I can be countable or uncountable; (c) A ∈ T and B ∈ T
implies A
⋂
B ∈ T. Then (X,T) is a topological space. A topology defined
on a set X does not necessarily correspond to a metric. Kolmogorov and
Fomin’s book have a whole chapter on general topological spaces, which is
a standard subject for postgraduate students in mathematical analysis, but
this theme will not be further pursued here. It is necessary, nevertheless,
for the study of probability and stochastic processes on general topological
spaces.
After we have seen some examples of convergence on metric spaces we now
need a criterion as to whether a sequence converges or not:
Definition 6. A sequence of points {xn}n∈N in a metric space (X, ρ) is called
a Cauchy (or fundamental) sequence if it satisfies the Cauchy criterion:
given any ε > 0, there is a number nε ∈ N such that ρ(xn, xm) < ε, for all
n,m > nε. A metric space (X, ρ) is called complete, if every Cauchy se-
quence is convergent.
If a {xn}n∈N is a Cauchy sequence, then it is always convergent (see Fig.
5.7). The opposite does not always hold. We saw for example, that there is a




2 is not rational, and so Q is
not complete, whereas R is. The importance of completeness lies in the fact
that in a complete space there are no structural holes. The set of rational
numbers, for example, has holes:
√
2 is such a hole. But any incomplete
space can always be extended to a complete one with respect to its metric,
like Q, for instance, can be extended to R; When a new space (X ′, ρ′) is a
complete extension of an incomplete one (X, ρ), it is called the completion
of (X, ρ).
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Cauchy sequence Not a Cauchy sequence 
Figure 5.7: A Cauchy and a non-Cauchy sequence.
5.5 Straight Line Management
In the previous section the metric (or distance) function was presented and
it was shown how it is used to define limits. In fact, the concept of a limit
is what defines mathematical analysis, or analytical techniques, as they are
often termed, as well. Without convergence, actually, there would be almost
no mathematics today. The proofs that were given were rather too detailed
at some points; this is what is called mathematical rigour : extreme attention
to detail, to the point of appearing to a lay person sometimes as a symp-
tom of obsessive-compulsive behavioral disorder. But it serves a fundamental
purpose: since there is no way in a generic function space to consult a geo-
metrical model on how to investigate that space, the mathematical analyst
has to be extremely careful on handling formulas, concepts and proofs. Al-
though the situation is similar to a toddler building with Lego bricks, the
Lego bricks, in the case of functional analysis, are phantasms,21 seen only by
well trained shamans. It is not accidental that, while undergraduate calcu-
lus books have many graphic figures, advanced books on functional analysis
have very few, if any; the redear is assumed to “understand” the object of
study. Due to many computations by hand, in exercises, proofs, and so on,
the undergraduate gradually becomes able to see the meaning, to watch the
unfolding narrative of a proof, especially when geometrical properties are in-
volved. This is the same situation when toddlers learn a language very early
in their lives; in that case the toddler learns to hear the meaning, and to
21That is illusions, appaparitions, or ghosts, according to the Oxford dictionary defini-
tion of the noun “phantasm”.
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listen to the unfolding narrative of a story or a fairy tale. But seeing and
hearing are actually material modalities, that is, ways of engaging with the
environing material space by means of reading. Building and talking are, on
the other hand, material modalities by means of writing, which are based,
correspondingly, on watching and listening:
Humans ... can make tools as well as [sound] symbols, both of
which derive from the same process, or, rather, draw upon the
same basic equipment in the brain. This leads us back to con-
clude, not only that language is as characteristic of humans as are
tools, but also that both are the expression of the same intrinsi-
cally human property ([281, p.113]; see also [421, p.164-169]).
Proceeding now to chapter 4 of Kolmogorov and Fomin’s book, we are in-
troduced to linear (or vector) spaces: the points of a set X, which are now
called vectors, can be added to and subtracted from one another, and they
can be multiplied by usual numbers, which are also called scalars. We say
then that X is a real linear space.22 The set Rn = {(x1, x2, . . . , xn)| xi ∈
R, i = 1, . . . , n} (n ∈ N), becomes a linear space if we define the addition of
vectors, and the product of scalar with a vector as follows:
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) + (y1, y2, . . . , yn) = (x1 + y1, x2 + y2, . . . , xn + yn)
α(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = (αx1, αx2, . . . , αxn),
where (x1, x2, . . . , xn), (y1, y2, . . . , yn) vectors of Rn, and α ∈ R (see Fig. 5.8).
Vector addition Scalar-Vector Multiplication
Figure 5.8: Vector addition, and scalar-vector product in R2.
22Or a complex linear space if the scalars are complex numbers.
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The space C[a,b] of all continuous functions f : [a, b] → R, where a, b are
real numbers, equipped with the usual addition between functions, and the
usual multipli-cation between a number and a function, becomes a linear
space as well. It must be noted that the multiplication of a scalar with
a vector produces a vector, and not a scalar. So the multiplication of the
number α with the function f ∈ C[a,b] produces the new function αf ∈ C[a,b]
defined as (αf)(x) = αf(x), x ∈ R. A vector x in undergraduate calculus
is usually denoted by ~x to mark its different treatment from a number, but
in functional analysis this notation is dropped. So the null or zero vector,
which in calculus is denoted as ~0, in functional analysis it is denoted by the
same symbol used for the number zero, that is “0”. If there are many null
vectors from different spaces, then the notation 0X can be used to denote
the null vector of the linear space X, in order to avoid any confusion. So the
null vector of C[a,b] is
0C[a,b](x) = 0R, x ∈ [a, b].23
Given a linear space X, a set Y is called a linear subspace of X, if Y ⊆ X,
and for any real numbers α and β and any vectors x and y lying in Y ,
the linear combination αx + βy lies in Y , that is αx + βy ∈ Y (see Fig.
5.9). A linear space is always a subspace of itself. A straight line L in a
generic vector X space determined by two points x, y in X is defined as
L = {αx + βy| α ∈ X, β ∈ X}. A linear space, therefore, contains the
straight lines determined by all the pairs of its points. The space P[a,b] of
polynomials defined on the closed interval [a, b] is a linear subspace of C[a,b] .
If B ⊆ X, the linear hull of B, denoted by [B], is the set of all (finite) linear






∣∣∣∣∣ αi ∈ R, xi ∈ X, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, n ∈ N
}
[B] is always a linear subspace of X; if [B] = x, then B generates X; if B
generates X and every vector in B, cannot be written as a linear combination
of other vectors in B, then it is called a basis of X. The cardinal number of
23We can see now that symbols have already become arcane to the lay person, that is,
they have become the academic runes of the shamans of mathematics.
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a basis of a linear space X is called the dimension of X. There are infinitely
many bases of a linear space but they all have the same cardinal number,
either the bases are finite or infinite.
Three one-dimensional 
subspaces in R .
Three two-dimensional 
subspaces in R .
2 3
Figure 5.9: One- and two-dimensional subspaces.
A linear space X can become a metric space by defining a norm function:
Definition of a norm function
Definition 7. Let X be a linear space. A norm function on X, ‖·‖ : X →
is defined as follows:
‖x‖ ≥ 0 (non−negativity) (5.5)
‖x‖ = 0⇔ x = 0X (nondegeneracy) (5.6)
‖αx‖ = |α| ‖x‖ (positive homogeneity) (5.7)
‖x+ y‖ ≤ ‖x‖+ ‖y‖ (triangle inequality) (5.8)
where x, y are any vectors in X, and α any number in R.
We can see that properties 5.5, 5.6 and 5.8 correspond to the properties 5.1,
5.2 and 5.4 of a metric (definition 1, page 276). Since a norm of a vector is
considered its “length”, we would expect positive homogeneity (property 5.7):
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the length of a vector multiplied by a number is equal to the product of the
number without the minus or plus signs 24 times the length of the original
vector ar issue. The metric now can be defined as ρ(x, y) = ‖x − y‖, where
x, y any vectors in X. The linear space X equiped with a norm is called
a normed linear space, and it is formally denoted by (X, ‖·‖). A normed
linear space is automatically a metric space; it is actually a spacial case of
a metric space. A complete normed linear space is called a Banach space.25
Everything said about metric spaces so far holds for normed linear spaces,
as well.
Now we are getting close to redefine Euclidean geometry on infinite-dimensional
terms; there are, though still a few more mathematical entities left to be de-
fined.
Definition 8. Let X be a real linear space. A scalar (or inner) product
on X is a function 〈·, ·〉 : X ×X → R with the following properties:〈x, x〉 ≥ 0〈x, x〉 = 0⇔ x = 0X (positive definiteness) (5.9)
〈x, y〉 = 〈y, x〉 (symmetry) (5.10)
〈αx+ βy, z〉 = α〈x, z〉+ β〈y, z〉 (linearity) (5.11)
where x, y, z are any vectors in X and α, β are any scalars in R. A linear
space X equipped with an inner product is called a Euclidean space.
A Euclidean space X becomes a normed linear space by setting ‖x‖ =√
〈x, x〉, for all x ∈ X.
If the property of positive definitness is relaxed, and only the non-degeneracy
of the inner product is kept, that is
〈x, x〉 = 0⇔ x = 0X ,
for all x ∈ X, then that marks the beginning of semi-Riemannian geome-
try,26 a special case of which is the four dimensional Minkowski spacetime of
24That is, the absolute value of the number | · |.
25Named after the Polish mathematician Stefan Banach
26Or pseudo-Riemannian geometry.
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Einstein’s special relativity theory. Then there are three kind of vectors, or
rather events, if we borrow the terminology of relativity:
Definition 9. The causal character of an event x lying in a spacetime X
depends on whether x is
spacelike , if 〈x, x〉 > 0 or x = 0,
lightlike , if 〈x, x〉 = 0 and x 6= 0, or
timelike , if 〈x, x〉 < 0.
Lightlike events are also called null, and the set of lightlike events is the light
cone, or the null cone (see Fig. 5.10) . The causal character of an event
means that events within the light cone cannot influence events outside the
light cone, and vice versa; in other words, a particle can move either within,
or outside the light cone; it cannot cross it. The norm of a vector in the case
of semi-Riemannian geometry, is defined as
‖x‖=
√
|〈x, x〉|, x ∈ X.
Returning back to Euclidean spaces, because of the Cauchy-Schwarz-Bunyakovski
inequality (C-S-B),27 which asserts that if x, y are any vectors in the inner
product space X, then the inequality |〈x, y〉| ≤ ‖x‖ ‖y‖ is always valid, we




, x 6= 0, y 6= 0,
since by C-S-B inequality
−1 ≤ 〈x, y〉
‖x‖ ‖y‖
≤ 1, x 6= 0, y 6= 0.
If ‖x‖ = 1, then x is called normal ; if 〈x, y〉 = 0, then x and y are orthogonal,
that is, perpendicular to each other. A set of nonzero vectors {xi ∈ X| i =
1, 2, . . . , n} is called an orthonormal system if
〈xi, xj〉 =
0, when i 6= j1, when i = j.
27In the English text it is only Schwarz; in the Russian it is Cauchy-Bunykovski.
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Figure 5.10: The ligh cone in the (non Euclidean) R3 spacetime.
The main interest in Euclidean spaces lies in orthonormal bases (see Fig.
5.11). Every basis, either finite or countable, can always be changed into a
new orthonormal one, and every orthonormal system can be extended to an
orthonormal basis.
A very interesting example mentioned in Kolmogorov-Fomin’s book is the
following:
Example 7. The space C2[a,b] consisting of all the continuous functions de-




Figure 5.11: The orthonormal base {(1, 0), (0, 1)} in R2.




f(x)g(x)dx, f, g ∈ C2[a,b].










and a very important orthogonal basis is the system of trigonometric func-
tions
e(x) = 1, x ∈ [a, b]
fn(x) = cos
2πnx
b−a , x ∈ [a, b] (n ∈ N)
gn(x) = sin
2πnx



































dx = 0 (n ∈ N).
In other words, for all n ∈ N, the vectors e, fn, gn, are pairwise orthogonal,
that is, pairwise perpendicular to each other.
Now we are ready to enter the universe of infinite-dimensional Euclidean
geometry:
Definition 10. A Hilbert space28 is a complete, separable, and infinite-
dimensional Euclidean space.
If H is a Hilbert space and and M is a subspace of H, then the orthogonal
complement of H, denoted by M⊥, is the subset of H whose vectors are
orthogonal to all the vectors of M :
M⊥ = {f ∈ H| 〈f, x〉 = 0, for every x ∈M}.
The orthogonal complement M⊥ of a subspace M is itself a Euclidean, or
Hilbert, space and H is the direct sum of M and M⊥, denoted by H =
M ⊕M⊥, that is, every vector f ∈ H can be written in a unique way as
f = x1 + x2, for some x1 ∈M, and x2 ∈M⊥.
Hilbert spaces have had a tremendous impact on twentieth century math-
ematics: complete means that any Cauchy sequence converges; separable
means that there is a sequence such that every vector in the space is a limit
of one of its subsequences; infinite-dimensional means that its bases are infi-
nite. Since a Hilbert space is separable, there is a theorem that says that its
28Named after the German mathematician David Hilbert.
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bases will always be countable. Each basis, therefore, is a sequence as well.
And the most natural question that now arises, is how is it possible for math-
ematicians to prove theorems that cannot have any material and artefactual
representation whatsoever? How is it possible to prove theorems holding in
infinite-dimensional spaces using only three-dimensional artefacts, or rather
two-dimensional sheets of paper with written symbols on them, then using
these theorems to formulate theories describing the quantum reality, since
in quantum physics there are infinite degrees of freedom, that is, infinite
dimensions, and then conduct experiments based on these theories with par-
ticle accelerators? It is impossible to explain all these without assuming the
ability of Homo faber, not only to construct, but also to imagine.
The only modern Western discipline that has studied extensively imagination
is psychoanalysis with its concept of phantasy. In modern Islamic philosophy,
on the contrary, imagination (and creativity) is a recurring theme,29 because
any material representation of Allah is a sin; the faithful have to imagine
God, to raise their consciousness beyond the artefact, in order to avoid the
trap of idolatry. If someone goes into a Roman Catholic or into an Eastern
Orthodox church, they will see depictions of saints, angels, and God: the
Catholic paintings are more vivid than the Orthodox ones, but they both
attempt to materially depict God. In a mosque, on the contrary, there is no
visual depiction of Allah, only Arabic (usually) calligraphic script praising
Him. The situation in mathematics of infinite-dimensional spaces is not much
different: the mathematician has to go beyond the artefact in order to prove
a theorem, not because it is a sin to do so, but because there are no infinite-
dimensional artefacts to use, and if they do exist, the human eye has its
limitations on that. Imagination, in other words, as the universe of human
consciousness, undertakes the job of pushing perception beyond the artefact.
29See for example [443, p.173-203].
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5.6 The Pure and the Applied Sciences
Integral equations, an important field in both physics and mathematics, was
the second major inspiration behind Hilbert spaces. The first though goes
back to the ancient Greek infinity:
[t]he simplest and most “natural” passage “from finiteness to in-
finity” is the “indefinite repetition” of the arithmetical operation
of addition, on smaller and smaller summands, giving birth to
the concept of convergent series, of which one can already find
examples in Archimedes.” [125, p. 87–88].
An integral equation is an equation that has an unknown function under an
integral sign. One of the simplest integral equations, leaving aside mathe-
matical rigour for the purposes of clarity, is the equation∫ x
a
u(t)dt = f(x) a ≤ x ≤ b,
where f(x) is a given (differentiable) function, and u(x) is the unknown
function. From an introductory course in differential equations its solution
is u(x) = f ′(x), where f ′(x) is the first derivative of f (with respect to x).




K(x, t)u(t)dt = f(x) a ≤ x ≤ b,
where K(x, t) is the kernel function of the integral equation. Both K(x, t),
and f(x) are known, and u(x) is the unknown function. David Hilbert showed
in 1906 that solving the Fredholm integral equation was the same as solving




Ki,juj = fi i = 1, 2, . . . ,
where {ui}(i∈N) is an unknown sequence of (real) numbers, {fi}(i∈N) is a
given sequence of (real) numbers, and Ki,j (i, j ∈ N) are the (real) entries
of a given infinite matrix. Most importantly, though, was that the only
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The set of all square-summable sequences of (real) numbers is denoted by
`2(R).
By the time Riemann was making his contributions, the concept of “space”
in mathematics had by far already been changed during the last fifty years
before Riemann:
[w]ithout doubt, the spectacular development of various geome-
tries during the 19th century, beginning with non-Euclidean ge-
ometries (Gauss, Lobachevsky, Bolyai) and culminating in 1872
in Klein’s Erlanger Programm, had profound influence on the idea
of a general “space” [48, p. 262].
Non-Euclidean geometries, in fact, dispelled the concept of the parallels in a
Euclidean geometry setting. The famous fifth postulate in Euclid’s Elements,
in simple words, declared that if we are given a straight line on the plane,
then from a given point that does not lie in the given line we can draw only
one straight line parallel to the originally given line. On the other hand, Felix
Klein’s main idea in his Erlagen Programm was that geometrical concepts
should be studied using the theory of groups, symmetric groups in particular,
rather than the traditional ruler and pair of compasses. Hilbert, influenced by
the new intellectual climate on the concept of a geometrical space, proceeded
with certain definitions that amount to the later concept of a dot product.
In particular, if we consider the infinite (real) sequences ~u = {ui}(i∈N) and
~v = {vi}(i∈N) as vectors in the set of square-summable sequences `2(R), then












which in fact is the Euclidean distance of ~u with coordinates (u1, u2, . . . ) if
we consider the set of square-summable (real) sequences `2(R) as an infinite-
dimensional Euclidean geometrical space. After Hilbert’s publications ma-
jor contributors in the field, such as Maurice Frechét and Erhard Schmidt,
started using the language of Euclidean geometry when referring to Hilbert
spaces.
The interesting fact about the Soviet tradition in mathematics was that, in
general, it seems to have continued Hilbert’s approach to functional analysis,
that is, functional analysis was presented to undergraduate students as a
generalisation of Euclidean geometry. Integral equations, though, the main
motivation behind Hilbert’s contributions, comes from physics, and integral
equations appeared as the inverse of differential equations. In American
and Canadian (as well as in some British) mathematics departments, on the
contrary, functional analysis was most often related to applications, especially
in physics and engineering. In other words, Soviet mathematics focused more
on the pure side of mathematics, while the majority of their North-American
counterparts focused more on the applied side. As one Soviet mathematician
remembers in a book on functional analysis and mechanics:
[i]n Russia, a university Mechanics department will typically ex-
ist within a “Mathematical Faculty.” Such a department is not
an engineering department in the western sense, but is some-
thing intermediate between a mathematics department and an
engineering department. [. . . ] When the first author of this book
[Leonid Lebedev] was a student [in Rostov State University] of the
second author [Iosif Vorovich], functional analysis was not in the
curriculum for mechanicists. In 1971, Professor Vorovich offered
a short course on functional analysis to a broad audience consist-
ing of mathematicians and mechanicists, students and professors.
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It included a simple and minimal introduction to the theory of
Banach and Hilbert spaces that opened the door to understand-
ing (with some difficulty on the part of the non-mathematicians)
certain interesting applications in mechanics. The mathemati-
cians were surprised at how abstract theorems could be applied
to mechanics and, moreover, that these theorems could actually
be rooted in mechanics [275, p. v, italics added].
On the other hand, in the preface of a textbook still very popular in North-
American, as well as British, functional analysis undergraduate courses, pub-
lished in 1978, the author mentions:
Functional analysis plays an increasing role in the applied sciences
as well as in mathematics itself. Consequently, it becomes more
and more desirable to introduce the student to the field at an early
stage of study. This book is intended to familiarize the reader
with the basic concepts, principles and methods of functional
analysis and its applications [261, p. v].
Very indicative of the Soviet school of mathematics was Andrei Kolmogorov’s
foundational work on probability theory. Probability theory already had a
quite long history in mathematics, especially before Kolmogorov (see [408]).
As it is well known among probabilists and statisticians
[p]robability theory has a right and a left hand. On the right
is the rigorous founadational work using the tools of measure
theory. The left hand “thinks probabilistically,” reduces problems
to gambling situations, coin-tossing, motions of a physical particle
[65, p. ix].
It is indeed much easier to explain to a lay person, or to an undergraduate
student of sociology, the meaning of the Central Limit Theorem, than to try
to explain its proof, which is quite advanced, even for mathematicians. When
Kolmogorov published in 1933 hisGrundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeits The-
orie (see [252] for its English translation) the mathematics world was already
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mature enough to embrace it. Probably the most striking aspect was its ax-
iomatic approach to mathematical concepts of probability, similar to Euclid’s
elements. A practitioner’s intuition was not enough, any more; a mathemat-
ically more rigorous approach was necessary. The axiomatic presentation of
probability meant basically one thing: no matter how the practitioner de-
fined probability relations, as long as they satisfied the axioms presented by
by Kolmogorov, they were mathematically sound. This rigorous tradition in
mathematical probability seems to have been continued in the Soviet Union,
as it can be seen in the English introduction to a translated, undergradu-
ate by Soviet standards, text in stochastic processes, published in English in
1969, and required by Lomonosov as well as Kiev Universities, in the Soviet
times as a prerequisite, as well as today in its second edition, to proceed to
postgraduate study in probability theory and statistics in a Soviet university
or research mathematics institute:
[t]he book is appropriate for students who have a sound back-
ground in probability from a measure-theoretic viewpoint and
will, undoubtedly, be welcome as a graduate text. [. . . ] The au-
thors take great care to state the topological assumptions under-
lying each theorem, although occasionally a result may be stated
in slightly greater generality than seems warranted by the proof.
The book contains a wealth of results, ideas, and techniques, the
deepest appreciation of which demands a most careful reading.
Certainly, this is not a book for the indolent [171, p. iii, italics
added].
Simply, or rather simplistically, put no probabilist or statistician studies,
especially to a great depth, the topological properties of proofs in probabil-
ity theory: that is usually done in the West by pure mathematicians; and
probability measures in topological spaces, although formally a branch of
probability, in the Western universities this is considered more as belonging
to fields of real and complex analysis from a postgraduate viewpoint, that
is, to the field of pure mathematics, rather than to the fields of probability
theory and statistics, that is, to the field of applied mathematics.
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One major change in nineteenth-century mathematics that had a major im-
pact on modern pure mathematics was the rise of structural algebra:
the fact that algebraic manipulations on different kinds of “ob-
jects” had a strikingly similar appearance soon attracted atten-
tion, and after 1840 it gradually became clear that the essence of
these manipulations did not lie in the essence of the objects, but
in the rules to be followed in handling them, which might be the
same for handling them [125, p. 116, italics in the original].
We saw earlier, for example, that the length of a vector in a Hilbert space
is the infinite sum of the squares of its coordinates, just like the length of a
vector in a three-dimensional Euclidean space is the sum of the squares of its
three coordinates; the infinity of the sum of squares in a Hilbert-space vector,
simply demands a more careful algebraic definition. According to Leo Corry
[t]wo domains of discourse can accordingly be tentatively iden-
tified when speaking about any scientific discipline; they can be
described schematically as the “body of knowledge” and the “im-
ages of knowledge.” [. . . ] he body of knowledge includes theories,
’facts’, methods, open problems. The images of knowledge serve
as guiding principles, or selectors. They pose and resolve ques-
tions which arise from the body of knowledge, questions which
are in general not part of and cannot be settled within the body
of knowledge itself. The images of knowledge determine attitudes
concerning issues such as the following: Which of the open prob-
lems of the discipline most urgently demands attention? What
is to be considered a relevant experiment, or a relevant argu-
ment? What procedures, individuals or institutions have author-
ity to adjudicate disagreements within the discipline? What is to
be taken as the legitimate methodology of the discipline? [. . . ]
What is the appropriate university curriculum for educating the
next generation of scientists in a given discipline? Thus the im-
ages of knowledge cover both cognitive and normative views of
scientists concerning their own discipline [107, p. 3–4].
309
What Corry called “images of knowledge”, in this thesis have been called
the social imaginary of the discipline, since they are socially constructed by
material means of voice, gestures, and blackboard or paper writing.
We saw in the third chapter the importance of gestures in everyday mathe-
matical communication, whether this is teaching, lecturing, exchanging opin-
ions and so on. The idea of the social imaginary has been borrowed from
Castoriadis and
[i]t is the unceasing and essentially undetermined (social-historical
and psychical) creation of figures/forms/images, on the basis of
which alone there can ever be a question of “something.” What
we call “reality” and “rationality” are its works [84, p. 3, italics in
the original].
Castoriadis’s social imaginary has its origins in Sigmund Freud’s unconscious,
but not as centre of psychical dynamics, but rather as a source of human
creativity. The focus of this thesis was not just mathematicians, as practi-
tioners, which seems to be a widespread view. The main focus of this thesis,
on the contrary, was on inventor mathematicians, as pioneers and produc-
ers of knowledge, rather than receptors and reproducers of knowledge. In
other words, the community of research mathematicians was considered as a
community of artists, rather than as a community of practitioners. A more
radical approach, in other words, had to be invented and implemented. The
problem with speech, and in general language as speech as it is singularly
perceived, is that pioneering mathematicians have been overly schooled in
grammar and syntax, which, in its turn, has lead them to self-disciplinary
regimes concerning speech. Gestures, on the other hand, are and under-
studied subject, and the grammar of gesturing is not as widespread as the
grammar of speech. The intention, in other words, was that of “going native”
in the following way: just as the San people, for example, in the Kalahari
Desert had not been schooled at all in speech grammar, in a very similar
way the mathematicians interviewed had not been schooled in gesture stud-
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ies.30 By focusing, therefore on gesturing while explaining, and presenting
myself as a quite competent former mathematics postgraduate student, I
could achieve a more “enhanced” authenticity from their part: they would
use language, imagery, and (cinematic) gesturing performance without much
internal speech discipline, a quite common trait among academicians. My
focus, in other words, were slips of the language, and these would be more
easily observed as slips on the gesturing aspect of language. I could thus
achieve more individual authenticity in their expositions of mathematics.
Another important component of this approach was asking the interviewees
to elaborate on something that they themselves had contributed: that made
them feel more comfortable, and another part of authenticity I wanted to in-
duce is the authenticity someone gives off when walking in familiar territory,
a territory that they themselves had created.
As one can infer from the previous sections of this chapter, the theory of
Hilbert spaces is a rather demanding subfield of functional analysis, another
very demanding field, as well. The intellectual efforts required of a sociol-
ogist of science without formal training in mathematics would potentially
obstruct his or her observations. Let us not forget that what most proba-
bly protected Soviet mathematicians from the frequent interventions of the
communist authorities into the Soviet mathematical community was, in fact,
the high abstraction of mathematical knowledge: it demanded, and still de-
mands, extensive training, its results are not visible to the general public,
and amateur mathematicians with high claims of contribution practically do
not exist. It can be safely said, in other words, that with the advent of
the twentieth century self-taught professional mathematicians have practi-
cally disappeared, especially in the Soviet case. And this poses a problem in
appreciating modern mathematics. Although one can “see” and “touch” tech-
nical artefacts in other disciplines, such as physics, chemistry, or biology, in
mathematics, as the (generally quite simple for modern standards) example
of Hilbert spaces has demonstrated, it is quite difficult to create a “museum”
of mathematical artefacts such as a Hilbert or a Banach space, a simplex,
30Only maybe they could have a passing acquaintance with “body language” lay percep-
tions from the popular press.
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or an algebraic variety. The material footprint of mathematical artefacts, in




6.1 Theoretical Origins and Empirical Investi-
gations
The theoretical inspirations behind this dissertation were Parsons’s The Amer-
ican University, and Leroi-Gourhan’s Gesture and Speech. I was interested,
in other words, in an empirical framework for both of these theoretical under-
pinnings. Presenting Leroi-Gourhan’s ideas was rather easy, since today there
is an implicit consensus among the archaeological community that speech,
gestures and stone tool construction and use are more deeply connected than
previously thought. The only empirical challenge that remained was that
with gesturing, though this was greatly enhanced by the recently emerged
field of gesture studies. Empirical evidence, therefore, was to be based on
video recordings, as sound recordings were considered as inadequate. Par-
sons, on the other hand, posed a challenge, since he never provided himself
empirical evidence, and his main purpose was theoretical: to merge sociol-
ogy and economics together. Although the final result was a little clumsy, his
ideas were rather inspiring for the author, as well as challenging. Parsons’s
language is, in general, rather difficult to penetrate, as well as too stilted to
ease reading and understanding it. So, instead of trying to apply Parsons’s
rather vague empirical framework, I let Parsons’s idea of “the banking of sci-
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ence” reside on the background of my mind waiting for an inspiration, and
engaged my working attention to more empirical matters. But I will come
to this in a while.
The most urgent problem to be solved was setting up a list of former So-
viet mathematicians and contacting them. An initially helpful solution came
form the The Mathematics Genealogy Project, an online database of aca-
demic genealogies of academicians (see [228]). By finding, therefore, one So-
viet mathematician, I could also find all of his or her acknowledged academic
descendants. Still though, there was another problem cropping up: there
were no contact details, as well as no information as to where each mathe-
matician was working, or whether he or she had passed away. Fortunately,
later on, I discovered another database: www.mathnet.ru. mathnet.ru is
an online database, set up originally by the Stekhlov Mathematics Institute,
which contains, in Russian as well in English, all mathematicians who have
published at least one scientific article in Russian, as well as mathematicians
working in Russian and former Soviet Union universities: contact details,
all the Russian articles authored by a Russian speaking mathematician, as
well as hosting the online versions of all the Russian mathematical journals.
The majority of the scientific articles on mathematics are free to download,
except for those published the last one or two years, depending on the jour-
nal’s rules. This database is an extremely helpful one for sociologists and
historians of mathematics. The problem of finding local archives was rather
easily solved: there is the online database ArcheoBiblioBase set up by the
International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam which can be found
on www.iisg.nl/abb/index.php. ArcheoBiblioBase contains the electronic
addresses of almost all the main central and regional archives of Russia. Since
now most of the archives have online contact details any researcher can call
the archivists up and ask them for more information. Still though, many
online sites of the Russian archives are already very helpful.
A major problem that emerged during fieldwork was contacting potential in-
terviewees in Russia. Before fieldwork I had attempted to contact many po-
tential interviewees. Those in North American universities replied promptly.
But from those located in Moscow very few replied. Even when I started
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fieldwork in Moscow, it was very difficult to contact many potential inter-
viewees by telephone or by email, whenever these appeared on the official
site of the university they where employed. After some time, when I had
made quite a few attempts I managed to contact two mathematicians, and
through them I was introduced to many others. Another major hindrance
which contributed to this problem of contacting potential interviewees was
the fact that in the universities and the research institutes it is necessary to
acquire a special invitation to enter the building, because there is a security
guard. One cannot just enter the building and explore it. This experience ac-
tually prompted, later on, during the writing up of the thesis, the section on
presenting the Soviet mathematics community as a social estate, rather than
as a community. During fieldwork in Canada and the USA, on the contrary,
everything went according to original planning, Almost all the emails I had
sent were answered rather promptly, and most of the interviews were con-
ducted according to my original scheduling. The interesting thing was that
while in Canada and the USA I covered a much greater geographical area
(practically all the East Coast) than in Russia (I was located in Moscow), in
Moscow I had greater difficulty in accessing the community.
The research method I had chosen for the research was my version of grounded
theory. My version means that I had already some preconceptions about
what theoretical framework I wanted to follow, that is, a Parsonian one, it
was, though, very vague in its details and I had to take a broad view on
which types of data were relevant. I decided, in other words, to let Parsons’s
economic approach to stand in the background of my mind, and I started
analysing the data of every interview after I had conducted it. From my first
interviews I was handwriting notes on the interviews and contemplating on
how to code them, and sometimes I revised them. I had already attended two
seminars on NVivo at the university before I embarked on fieldwork, but at
the time I did not want to use computer software, because I thought I would
lose an intimate connection I had built up with my data. Later on, though,
when I had to analyse all the 48 interviews I had conducted, in addition
to the fieldnotes I had written, writing by hand became a burden that was
delaying the writing up of the thesis. I decided, as a result, to start using
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NVivo for data analysis to speed up the process of writing up. While in the
beginning I experimented with a great number of codes and themes, in the
end I fixed on a small number of them. One important was “gift’, whenever
I saw enthusiasm in the fieldnotes when talking about mathemat ics, or a
job in the Soviet Union irrelevant to the interviewee’s doctoral research in
mathematics. Another code was “privilege” whenever I saw special objective
privileges as a result of being a mathematician, or privileges perceived as
such when, for example, choosing mathematics over other fields. A quite
recurring phrase was “. . . a problem to solve . . . ”, which in the end it became
a code in itself as “lifestyle”.
The practicality of fieldwork research posed some limitations on the types of
data collected. Initially I had in mind to conduct video recordings on each
interview. This proved to be almost impossible due to various reasons. One
was that it was my first time using a video camera and in many interviews
I simply had not placed the camera in a proper position for capturing the
details I wanted; or something unexpected would happen, such as the visit
of the interviewee’s student or a colleague, and the interviewee would change
position after the interruption and I had to readjust the camera. Another
problem that emerged was that many interviewee’s were camera-shy, and did
not want to be video-recorded; unfortunately I had not developed sufficiently
compelling arguments as to why video-recordings were necessary for historical
research in order to convince the interviewees to be video-recorded. Another
data limitation was the use of the archives. After some engagement with
archives, I decided to drop them as a source of data, because I realised that
these types of data were not the ones I was looking for: I was interested in
the social imaginary behind mathematics research, and that was something
that only interviews could provide. Besides, I came to the conclusion that
interviews could provide me with enough data to form a good picture of the
culture behind mathematics research in the Soviet Union. The economic
approach, though, that emerged later on during the writing up of the thesis
pointed, in fact, to potential future projects where archival data could be
more relevant: building up more quantitative models of mathematics research
in the Soviet Union, as well as in other sociological fields, such as the political
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social system, the legal social system, and so on, in a purely Parsonian spirit.
Some final comments on the dissertation as a whole seem to be in order.
This particular project, or rather the final product of this research project,
could seem either as quite intimidating or as rather ambitious to a doctoral
student, depending on his or her self-confidence. I saw it as a quite ambi-
tious one: it is indeed quite wide ranging. But my role models have been
two towering figures of social research, that is, Jürgen Habermas and Michel
Foucault: Habermas developed a theoretical framework that will last for
centuries, while Foucault changed the face of sociology forever. I have never
considered these two only as sociologists, but as professionals and practition-
ers in a profession with strong claims in improving and changing society. I
decided to be ambitious because of the careers of these two particular sociol-
ogists. The most, probably, ambitious chapter in the thesis is chapter 2: it is
a chapter that I went beyond my discipline, and indeed many claims against
it could be made. But, in the end of the day, what scientific work in the
social sciences is so perfect that no claims can be raised against its scientific
validity?
The guarded reader should bear, also, in mind some important things in my
opinion. When writing a thesis there are always back-end processes taking
place, such as motivation and creativity. The reader, though, sees only the
front-end product. As an aspiring scientist I had to set some standards for
myself along with those that my future peers would set for me. I had been
thinking for many years, before I started on my PhD, on the evolutionary
perspectives of society, and many other ideas presented in this thesis were
not formed during only the years of my PhD, but, actually, quite earlier. So
this PhD was a chance for me, not only to acquire a doctoral degree, but
also to organise my thought; nobody else would have done for me, and for
the next six to seven years I will most probably not have the time to do it
again. Now, on the contrary, I can more easily read articles on neurobiology
and archaeology and relate them to my discipline. Maybe later, in my career
to come, I will change my approach; maybe I will be able to make it more
rigorous; maybe I will drop it altogether. Habermas did it twice; Foucault
did it almost with every one of his books. A PhD is a journey, but in the
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end of it its only visible part is the thesis. Everybody, though, seems to
forget the most important goal, in my opinion, of a doctoral degree: not only
to produce an original contribution to scientific knowledge, but to help the
student develop his or her research intuition; to develop, in other words, his
or her judgement on making decisions as to which directions involve fruitful
lines of research. And this is how I saw my research project: to train myself
to become a prolific future researcher, and every single chapter in this thesis
served exactly this purpose, among others.
6.2 Mathematics as Applied Technology
We saw in the third chapter how gestures can be used when talking about a
mathematical theorem, or any technical subject in mathematics. The inter-
views were conducted without informing in advance the interviewees about
the observation of their gestures, which is an important part of this thesis,
because it demonstrates the nature of human consciousness: spontaneous
gestures demonstrate that consciousness is indeed cinematic. When in dis-
cussion about a mathematical object, the movements of gestures are em-
ployed as a secondary means in explaining, along with the sound of speech.
Mathematicians’ brains are no different from the brains of humans who lived
twenty thousand years ago. So gestures and speech are fundamental material
modalities in human understanding and human communicating. A starting
point, in other words, in studying mathematicians and their theorems, and
in fact in studying any scientific discipline, would be to start from the univer-
sals of human understanding as dictated and described by the archaeological
and biological disciplines, rather than to resort to speculative philosophical
discourse as a starting point. Philosophical speculation is actually very use-
ful in producing ideas, but very counterproductive in producing facts, and
this is how it has been treated in this thesis. Gestures, as well as speech,
presented a very dynamic view of consciousness, a cinematic one, which is
quite different from the view that Science and Technology Studies (STS)
have rather implicitly adopted, following a general trend in the social sci-
ences. Mathematical objects are first and foremost temporal objects whose
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existence is rather phantasmatic than actually real. When a mathematical
object is presented as a hand movement, then it can be concluded that human
consciousness constructs stability out of instability. In fact cinematic con-
sciousness is in every aspect of human perception: we do not only daydream
while awake, but also properly dream while asleep.
Dreaming and daydreaming, though, are personal and very intimate activi-
ties, and as such they can be very elusive to the individual herself, as well
as invisible to the co-present individuals. Gestures and speech, on the con-
trary, externalise cinematic consciousness in a cinematic way: the material
modalities of speech sound and gesture movement, either unconsciously or
consciously, or even partly-consciously, make visible the internal conscious-
ness of the speaker, and then the listener’s consciousness stabilises the cine-
matic nature of knowledge transfer during a conversation, a presentation, or
classroom instruction. What actually stabilises mathematical knowledge is,
in fact, a writing system as well as (written) mathematical symbols. When a
mathematical proof has been written down, it becomes visible to everybody,
but not necessarily understandable. A written mathematical proof has ex-
ternalised materially a mathematician’s elusive imagination in a quite stable
mode. Published books and journal articles become now the external memory
of mathematics as a discipline. Nobody remembers everything, and nobody
knows what has been happening in every mathematical field and subfield;
any time though they can photocopy an article, borrow a book, or today
download a book collection, and have access to it in a more domesticated
environment: in the silence of the university library, in the comfort of their
personal office, or, in the relaxing environment of their homes. The cine-
matic nature of gesture and speech becomes a photographic one: knowledge,
while in the beginning was audiovisual, acquires with writing a purely visual
material modality, and material movement has been disposed of; knowledge
has now become a series of cinematic screenshots. As a consequence one can
now claim that mathematics is in fact applied technology, rather than the
reverse.
If a sociologist attempts to examine herself these screenshots of mathemati-
cal knowledge, then it can become a quite challenging task, if not impossible.
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What is a rational variety and what is a differentiable manifold? What is
a prime ideal and what is almost-sure continuity? In the end of the day,
what is proof in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert geometrical space, and how
is it possible to prove anything in that space, since there are actually no
infinite-dimensional artefacts? If there are indeed infinite-dimensional arte-
facts, as modern quantum and relativity theories assert, then these are simply
non-perceivable by the human eye, and they can only be imagined. It was
demonstrated, for example, in the third chapter, that during an interview the
speaker was talking of an n-dimensional simplex and at the same time he was
describing the simplex with the movement of his right hand. And the listener
also could clearly see this, because he already knew what a simplex was. And
there are also many articles and books on n-dimensional simplices which are
in fact stabilised screenshots of simplices. And while mathematical descrip-
tion and mathematical notation can be difficult to penetrate, hand gestures,
on the contrary, are universal, and they make the argument purely cinematic,
that is, closer to the primary level of human consciousness, than to the sec-
ondary level of consciousness induced by artefacts. When only the members
of a rather closed community are in position to decipher their own artefacts,
those artefacts that their community has constructed, then we should be
talking about a community of shamans, rather than a scientific community.
The primary way a sociologist, who is not initiated to mathematics, has at
his or her disposal to decipher the spirit-world of these shamans of science is
hand gestures: patterned hand movement and hand posture provide a visible
access to a mathematician’s imaginary space. In this way, a sociologist can
be initiated into the scientific cult of mathematics, by starting to see himself
or herself what the mathematicians’ spirit-world is starting to look like.
The fifth chapter examined the construction of the geometrical infinite-dimen-
sional Hilbert spaces. The materiality of the book as well as the materiality
of symbols was shown to be of primary importance. Then it was explained
how two kinds of infinities were invented, and later extended, by mathemati-
cians. Then these infinities were employed to create a new kind of infinite-
dimensional geometry, the geometry of Hilbert spaces. Hilbert spaces are
direct descendants of the ancient Greek Euclidean geometry. The problem
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with Hilbert spaces: the ruler and the compasses cannot be used with Hilbert
geometry, in the same fashion as in the original two- and three-dimensional
ancient Greek Euclidean geometry. Did this prevent mathematicians from
continuing? Not at all; their collective creativity was, and still remains,
unprecedented. The purpose of this chapter was, in fact, more to cause puz-
zlement and make the (uninitiated) reader perplexed, rather than to clarify
Hilbert geometry, or to explain some obscure points in these geometrical
spaces. A puzzled and perplexed reader would most often ask: “Why am I
unable to understand? Is my intelligence rather limited? Or are these math-
ematicians insane and have lost touch with reality?” All these questions,
though, miss the actual point: understanding mathematics means joining
the altered states of consciousness of the shamanistic community of math-
ematicians. In fact, every scientific community has their own spirit-world,
or rather fictional universe, which is commonly referred to as their technical
terminology. It is not only terminology, since when asked, any scientist an-
swers both in speaking as well as in gesturing. A scientific field, any scientific
field, is first and foremost a literary and artistic genre. There is no mathe-
matics without writing technologies, as there is no scientific, or artistic, field
without its own artefacts, whether these are called laboratory, microscope,
Large Hadron Collider, paint, graphics, or calligraphy. Applied science does
not seem to exist; what seem to exist are in fact fields of applied technology.
6.3 Scaling Up the Enterprise
Mathematics as a scientific-religious discipline was practised by a small mi-
nority of people in ancient Greece which was in fact more akin to a secret
society. In the Soviet Union, on the contrary, the business of scientific math-
ematics had scaled up to gigantic proportions. Due to the limited financial
compensation system in Soviet science, Soviet mathematics had developed
its own gift economy. Mathematical knowledge was considered valuable, as
well as the person who produced it. It was considered worthwhile, in other
words, to spend one’s free time in research and publications. The community
encouraged it, the Soviet state did not pay any attention to it, and every-
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body was happy. The most important gift donation to the community was
the scientific research article, which carried the name of its author: the whole
community could claim possession of the article, but only its author could
claim ownership. Everybody in the community was welcome to donate, and
those who donated more, were those who received more respect and recogni-
tion. A published scientific article, in other words was an heirloom shared by
everybody, and as such, was a connection link between the older generations
and the younger ones. In this way a gift economy developed which was par-
allel to the usual financial economy. And each article had economic value, if
we define economic value as the importance a certain community ascribes to
this value. The article, as an economic artefact, that is, as a gift, makes the
value of mathematics public: somebody has expended a lot human labour
to produce it, and the fact of publication declares this product of human
labour as acceptable to the scientific community. In this way, the material
visibility of a gift donation and a gift receipt affirms the gift as a material
instance of the imaginary scientific value, and reproduces the community by
reproducing scientific value in the imaginary realm. A gift, in other words, is
self-referential : it receives value from the community and at the same time
returns back to the community this value.
By entering the university as a student in mathematics, the undergraduate
started to become initiated into the gift economy of Soviet mathematics. Be-
sides the compulsory courses for everyone, there were seminars every year
organised by the research staff, and the subject of these seminars was related
to the current research of the seminar organiser. These seminars were op-
tional individually, but a student had to choose a number of them. Later on
the students chose an advisor-supervisor who was usually a seminar organ-
iser. If a student wanted to continue to postgraduate studies, then he had
to publish at least two articles. Usually the advisor gave the student an un-
solved problem to solve, and the student had to reciprocate by returning an
attempted solution. The years of university study in the Soviet Union were
five, and these problems were actually the student’s master’s dissertation.
This exchange of an unsolved problem and an attempted solution was in fact
the socialisation of the student into the gift economy of Soviet mathematics.
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There were of course the gift exchanges of examinations, for example, but
the exchange problem-solution between the advisor and the student was on
a rather more personal level, than on an institutional one. The students, in
this way created an emotional bond with the institution of science by creat-
ing an emotional bond with their advisors. There was, it is true, an instance
of an interviewee who was very negative about his own advisor. But the
general pattern was that one described. This kind of recruitment infused
more loyalty to the mathematical scientific enterprise both on the student
side as well as on the supervisor side. This student-supervisor relationship at
the same time produced the institutional imaginary future of the enterprise:
the student would start thinking about postgraduate study, discuss with the
supervisor and the supervisor would help the student either himself, or with
some of his connections. Needless to say that any institution without an
imaginary future is bound to extinction.
The gift economy of Soviet mathematics, though, was not enough to scale up
the research operations: institutions which could inspire trust were necessary,
in order to make the system all-encompassing, and therefore more impersonal.
The scientific article, beyond its author(s), has the issuing institution on
it, that is, the scientific journal. The issuing institution accorded scientific
validity to the article, transforming it into a coin: the “heads” were the
banking institution, that is, the scientific journal, and the “tails” were the
scientific article itself as one monetary unit. The banking institution was
necessary to scale up: Soviet mathematicians were producing more and more
theorems and these theorems needed a vehicle to validate them and make
them publicly available. One peculiarity of the Soviet system of scientific
journals was that there was no peer reviewing. The burden therefore of
the validation lay on the journal editor, that is, the “fiduciary” of the bank,
and probably on any other potential reader of the article. In the Western
universities, on the contrary, validation lay, and still lies, within the peer-
reviewing process, by unknown, that is, anonymous peer reviewers.
And here is a peculiarity probably of the Soviet and modern Russian society
in general. While the Western university system was an economic system
relying on banks, the Soviet university system was an economic system rely-
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ing on bankers. And this is a major difference, in general, between modern
Russia and the West: Western capitalism is a capitalism of banks, that is,
institutions inspire trust; while Russian, as well as Soviet, capitalism is a cap-
italism of bankers, that is, the person behind the institution inspires trust.
The fact that modern Russia has been quite often accused of systemic cor-
ruption most probably validates exactly this, since widespread corruption in
a state is, in fact, a gift economy: a bribe is a (material/imaginary) con-
nection between the identity of the briber and the identities of those bribed;
and the more bribes and favours one has allocated, the more people become
indebted to him or her, and the greater a status of a banking institution he
or she acquires. In the USA the central banking institution of the USA is
the Federal Reserve Bank and the central banker is Ben Bernanke; in today’s
Russia, on the contrary, it could indeed be said without much exaggeration,
that while the central banking institution of Russia is the Central Bank of
the Russian Federation the central banker in Russia Vladimir Putin. While
in the West there is anonymous capitalism, in Russia there seems to exist
eponymous capitalism, and Soviet mathematics was no exception to that.
Being a mathematician in the Soviet Union meant a certain way of life, a par-
ticular lifestyle. Students aspiring to become mathematicians learned very
early that the culture of Soviet mathematics, was especially valued in the
Soviet society. One of the interviewees, for example, mentioned that even
television programmes promoted the lifestyle of a scientist. Mathematicians
had their own separate buildings, their own special research activities, their
own sense of distinct identity: through universities future researchers were
not only socialised, but also integrated into the wider Soviet society. Most of
their friends were, and still are, Soviet mathematicians. Moreover they were
in general more close to their colleagues, to a point that one could even speak
of a brotherhood of scientists, rather than a community. A fundamental ac-
tivity both in working and in leisure time was solving problems and proving
theorems: rather than a sign of a student’s diligence, it was more of a con-
sumption pattern. Solving problems, besides being a systemic imperative
for an ambitious student, was at the same time a pleasant leisure activity.
The community was very rarely harassed by the communist regime or any
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other outsider to the community. The only major problem, that was rather
endemic in all Soviet institutions, was the selection process of new undergrad-
uates and postgraduates: antisemitism seemed to have remained widespread,
but still many Jewish mathematicians continued research, mostly because of
their emotional and social bonds to the mathematical community, rather
than to the institution they worked for. As a community of its own and sep-
arate from other communities, mathematicians in the Soviet Union seemed
to have been a social estate, rather than a community, or even a social class:
their lifestyle was a shared one, most of their friends were from mathematics,
and they enjoyed some extra privileges in a society of a meager distribution
of means and resources.
6.4 Growing a Stronger Strong Programme
This thesis aspires to continue the Edinburgh’s Strong Programme in the
sociology of science, with some, though, necessary updates, in the author’s
opinion. The author, in particular, considers the Luhmannian sociocyber-
netic approach as a logical continuation and a further strengthening of the
Strong Programme. According to Bloor the Strong Programme “would be
causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which bring about belief or
states of knowledge” [54, p. 7, my emphasis]. One should be very cautious
with the so-called “causal explanations”, especially in light of a modern quan-
tum field theory backed by empirical data which claims that the universe
is indeterministic, that is, mathematical probability equations describe, or
rather prescribe, its evolution over time. Gravity on the on the other hand
has never been observed: only its effects on materiality have been observed,
because Homo sapiens individuals can observe only material modalities, that
is, sound, voice, smell, weight, and so on: the human body evolved biologi-
cally to survive in a certain ecosystem by perceiving and utilising the ecosys-
tem’s material modalities; it did not evolve to produce scientific knowledge.
Second, any causal explanation has to be backed by existing empirical data
on the archaeological, biological and brain sciences, as this thesis has demon-
strated. Data from these sciences provide the sociological universals of any
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social activity, and not only of the sociology of sciences. Sociological expla-
nations, in contradistinction, are mainly speculative and data collection is in
fact data production, a fact that seems to be repeatedly forgotten. And it
is data production for another reason: the sociologist’s, and in general, the
scientist’s creative ability and feeling of subjectivity.
All of science and technology studies has repeatedly treated scientists so far
as either robots, or mentally retarded in the best case scenario. Instead of
studying their creative abilities as a social agent of the unknown, it has stud-
ied innovation by studying in fact the products of innovation, rather than
innovation itself. Creativity lies in an unknown area beyond the sociologist’s
visibility, and the only visible means available so far is the gesture analysis
method proposed in this thesis. If, for example, a social scientist wants to
study creativity with respect to Lego bricks, she would observe how the tod-
dler uses the material to make constructions with his hands. Each Lego brick
is a word, and video-recording the construction can unveil the cinematic con-
sciousness of the toddler. The gestural analysis proposed in the third chapter
can, in fact, be generalised, and studying the successive screenshot frames can
reveal a lot about creativity on the spot. In the same way one could study a
mathematician handling equations and formulas, and observe the way these
formulas levitate in the imaginary. The most proper research fields to study
the innovator in connection with his or her innovation product are the psy-
choanalytic disciplines, art theory, and literary studies, and less the cognitive
sciences. Gesture analysis for example, in this thesis, was conducted with an
ethnographic-literary, rather than a cognitive-statistical, flavour.
The second tenet of the Strong Programme is that “[i]t would be impar-
tial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, success or
failure” [p. 7, my emphasis]. Since this thesis follows a Luhmannian social
systems approach in its foundational principles, truth or falsity, or rationality
or irrationality, and so on, are treated as operational formalities rather than
as value systems that a social scientist should adhere to. What is the rela-
tion between truth in mathematics, truth in physics, or truth in chemistry:
absolutely no relation. If a chemist proves the outcome of an experiment
by means of a mathematical theorem and then tries to publish his or her
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“existence proof” he or she will most probably will be scoffed at both by his
colleagues, and most of his peers. If a physicist conducts an experiment to
prove a mathematical theorem, and then tries to publish the results, he will
be ridiculed, most probably, by the mathematical community. In a similar
way, legality or illegality is again a binary operational formality outside sci-
ence, that is, in the legal social system, with its own operational imperatives,
depending on which subfield of the social legal system the social scientist is
conducting research. But still, a creative scientist can create bridges between
disciplines and thus pioneer into new cross-disciplinary and interdisciplinary
fields such as modern cognitive archaeology, psycholinguistics, or evolution-
ary psychoanalysis: these three fields do produce scientific truth and facts,
but these belong to the semantics of the corresponding subfield and its fic-
tional technical universe, which its researchers adhere to. Each scientific
field has its own accounting system as to which fact and which instance of
truth belong to it: binary distinctions, in other words of that kind lead to
operational differentiation the social system under scrutiny from its social
environment: truth has to do with the social system of science, legality has
to do with the social system of law, and so on. In the case of Soviet math-
ematics we saw that the social system of mathematics was in fact a social
estate, and due to the lack of social mobility it was relatively easy for the
system to differentiate itself from its social environment.
The third tenet of the Strong Programme declares that “[i]t would be symmet-
rical in its style of explanation” [p. 7, my emphasis]. The approach adopted
in this thesis was that of a sociology of a scientific cult, rather than that of
a sociology of scientific knowledge. The semantics of
cult identifies a pattern of ritual behavior in connection with spe-
cific objects, within a framework of spatial and temporal coor-
dinates. Ritual behavior would include (but not necessarily be
restricted to) prayer, sacrifice, votive offerings, competitions, pro-
cessions, and construction of monuments. Some degree both of
recurrence in place and repetition over time of ritual action is nec-
essary for cult to be enacted, to be practiced [11, p. 398, emphasis
in the original].
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Modern ritual behaviour of members of the scientific community would in-
clude going to their offices everyday, teaching on a regular basis, meeting with
their undergraduates on a supervisory basis, examination diets, construction
of new buildings, and so on. By default, and by definition, therefore, this the-
sis’ approach leads to symmetrical explanations in science, by treating each
scientific field or subfield as a cult, rather than as a scientific field proper,
if that has ever existed. This is an illusion, in fact, inculcated in modern
universities. “If modern monetarist economics, for example, was a scientific
field, then why this financial crisis of 2008 started, in the first place”, would
be a rather common-sense question to ask. Moreover Marxism-Leninism pro-
claimed itself as “scientific communism”, rather than a theory.
The fact, borrowed as such from archaeology, is that science has existed for
three centuries, while shamanism has existed for, at least, forty thousand
years. The brain has not evolved since, so what makes modern science so
special? The brains of modern mathematicians, monetary economists, and
quantum physicists are functionally exactly the same as that of prehistoric
shamans, and no proper social scientist can blatantly ignore that. Besides,
by treating scientific disciplines as scientific cults leads to the idea of sci-
entific knowledge as an altered state of consciousness. Only the shamans
can “see” their spirit-world; only the mathematicians can “see” their Hilbert
spaces; only the physicists can “see” their superstrings; only the economists
can “see” their utility functions. And at this point, a social scientist can eas-
ily introduce the social imaginary, not as reflected on the artefacts, but as
an imaginary proper, as a transcendental reality accessed only by the initi-
ated, and as something that is elusive and at the same time organises society.
Trust, for example, a necessity in any banking system, like that one described
in the case of the Soviet science gift economy, lies on the imaginary realm,
not on the real one. It cannot be measured by material instruments, but
anyone can see the destructive lack of it: the stereotypical run on the bank.
Finally, the Strong Programme “would be reflexive” [p. 7, my emphasis]. Luh-
mannian sociocybernetics, in fact, satisfies this principle but with another
name for it: self-reference. A rather older term for social reflexivity found
in cybernetics would be that of a feedback loop. But modern sociology has
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always been rather hypocritical with respect to cybernetics. All the sociology
and anthropology undergraduates are being extensively instructed on data
collection, data analysis, or big data; nobody, though, has ever acknowledged
that the concept of “data” is an idea foreign to sociology; “data” has never
been a sociological concept. On the contrary, in cybernetics, the precur-
sor of modern computer science and informatics, it presupposes a sentient
agent handling the appropriate data. In informatics departments there is an-
other course vital for modern cyberneticians, that is, computer programmers:
data structures, that is, how data are presented to a computing [or sentient]
machine. There is, though, a certain institutional silence among the social
sciences departments, as to the particular presentation and organisation of
data, and how that affects the understanding of the sentient agents handling
them, that is, the sociologists.
In the theoretical framework of this thesis, sociological data are generated
and not collected, by generating corresponding artefacts as material data
structures.1 This is of fundamental importance, because under this light the
social scientist is seen as the agent of explanation, and the data themselves
are merely peripheral to the social research enterprise. So when Luhmann
speaks of second order observation in the social sciences, what he means is
that what is being observed, in fact, is not the social reality itself, but the
material data structures produced during fieldwork. Due to the materiality of
sociological data structures data have been accorded an illusion of objectivity,
accompanied by an aura of an intimate connection with them. And when a
sociologist produces a certain explanation for a social phenomenon, what he
or she actually produces is not a causal, but a narrative explanation within a
certain fictional universe which can very well be that of Latour’s sociological
magic realism. Social scientists are no different from prehistoric shamans:
they have produced a very elaborate and sophisticated spirit-world with its
own fictional heroes, and its own distinct, and at times dividing, plots; it
would be more advisable, though, that they were indeed more aware of it.
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